Performative democratic practice: An ethnographic study of the Women’s Rights Centre in Montenegro by Smolovic-Jones, Sanela
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Performative democratic practice: An ethnographic
study of the Women’s Rights Centre in Montenegro
Thesis
How to cite:
Smolovic-Jones, Sanela (2019). Performative democratic practice: An ethnographic study of the Women’s
Rights Centre in Montenegro. PhD thesis The Open University.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2018 The Author
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
			
						 	
A	thesis	submitted	to	the	Open	University	in	the	fulfilment	of	the	
requirements	for	the	degree	of	Doctor	of	Philosophy	
The	Open	University,	Faculty	of	Business	and	Law,	Department	for	Public	Leadership	and	Social	Enterprise		December	2018		
Performative	democratic	practice:	An	ethnographic	study	
of	the	Women’s	Rights	Centre	in	Montenegro	
		
	2	
	
	
	
	
	
Acknowledgements	
	I	would	like	to	thank	the	wonderful	members	of	WRC	for	keeping	a	dedicated	sentry	over	liberty	 and	equality	 and	 for	 allowing	me	 to	 learn	 from	 them.	Without	 their	 voices	 and	their	support	this	research	would	not	have	been	possible.	I	would	also	like	to	extend	my	gratitude	to	my	supervisors,	Dr	Nik	Winchester	and	Dr	Caroline	Clarke,	for	their	kind	and	knowledgeable	 support	 throughout	 the	 PhD	process.	 Finally,	 I	would	 like	 to	 thank	my	partner,	Owain,	for	endless	patience	and	encouragement.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 3	
Abstract	
	This	 thesis	 explores	 how	 democratic	 practice	 is	 enacted	 by	 non-governmental	organisation	 (NGO)	 practitioners	 in	 a	 country	 in	 transition	 and	 seeks	 to	 unpack	 the	embodied	 experiences	 of	 people	 who	 are	 increasingly	 perceived	 by	 international	stakeholders	and	scholars	as	being	 important	actors	 in	processes	of	democratisation.	 I	offer	 an	 in-depth	 ethnographic	 account	 of	 the	work	 of	 practitioners	within	 a	women’s	NGO	 in	 Montenegro,	 the	 Women’s	 Rights	 Centre,	 as	 they	 seek	 to	 enact	 democratic	practice	within	and	through	a	context	of	patriarchy	and	corruption.	Whereas	the	extant	literature	on	democratic	practice	in	relation	to	NGOs	offers	insight	into	the	processes	of	democratisation	in	countries	in	transition,	it	does	not,	by	and	large,	account	for	the	lived	experiences	of	practitioners	as	they	strive	to	democratise	their	societies.	Bearing	this	gap	in	 mind,	 I	 turn	 to	 contemporary	 theories	 of	 democratic	 practice,	 deliberation	 and	agonism,	 perspectives	 that	 explore	 democracy	 as	 participative	 engagement	 between	people,	 groups	 and	 governments.	 I	 interrogate	 these	 from	 a	 poststructuralist	perspective.	 Specifically,	 I	 interpret	 them	 through	 Judith	 Butler’s	 theory	 of	 embodied	performativity,	 an	 account	 of	 agency	 within	 a	 matrix	 of	 re-iterative	 norms,	 which	 is	adopted	as	my	theoretical	framework.	Pursuing	a	participant-observer	research	identity,	I	draw	on	my	own	observations	generated	through	a	30-month-long	ethnography,	11	of	which	 were	 spent	 in	 the	 field.	 I	 adopt	 a	 multimodal	 discourse	 analytic	 approach	 in	analysing	 the	multifaceted	 and	 embodied	 sense	 of	what	 it	means	 to	 enact	 democratic	practice	 as	 an	NGO	 practitioner.	 I	 present	 three	 broad	 democratic	 practices.	 The	 first,	
embodying	 democratic	 practice,	 surfaces	 the	 bodies	 of	 practitioners	 as	 sites	 through	which	democracy	is	enacted.	The	second,	navigating	corruption,	illustrates	the	struggle	of	practicing	democracy	within	a	ubiquitous	context	of	corruption.	The	third,	the	aesthetics	
of	assembling,	 offers	 insight	 into	 how	 democratic	 practice	 can	 be	 enacted	 through	 the	entanglement	 of	 different	 aesthetic	 mediums,	 connecting	 and	 drawing	 diverse	 people	into	a	public	assembly.					
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I	Introduction		
1.1	Thesis	introduction		In	this	thesis	I	explore	how	non-governmental	practitioners	enact	democratic	practice	in	a	 country	 in	 transition1.	 In	 particular,	my	 focus	 is	 on	 how	people	within	 a	 civil	 sector	organisation	in	Montenegro	experience	and	struggle	with	practicing	democracy	within	a	new	 democratic	 context.	 This	 is	 an	 important	 topic	 because	 democracy	 has	 played	 a	central	 role	 in	 the	 adaptation	 and	 restructuring	 of	 countries	 in	 transition,	 with	 non-governmental	organisations	(NGOs)	adopting	an	 increasingly	active	part	 in	 the	process	of	 democratisation	 (Mair,	 2013).	 Yet	 democracy	 is	 a	 contested	 concept	 (Laclau,	 2014:	20),	 and	 little	 is	 known	 about	 how	 the	 ideas,	 practices	 and	 identities	 implicit	 within	democracy	are	experienced	and	enacted	by	NGO	practitioners.			In	 this	 ethnographic	 study	 I	 explore	 in	depth	 the	work	of	 an	NGO	 called	 the	Women’s	Rights	 Centre	 (WRC),	 whose	 members	 seek	 to	 influence	 the	 democratic	 processes	 of	Montenegro	 by	 generating	 “gender-equal	 democratic	 practice”	 (WRC,	 2017).	 The	purpose	 of	 the	 research	 is	 to	 explore:	 how	 NGO	 practitioners	 influence	 and	 inform	practice,	 and	 vice	 versa;	 how	 practitioners	 inter-relate	 with	 the	 dominant	 discursive	fabric	 of	 the	 context	 in	 which	 they	 live;	 and	 how	 practitioners	 relate	 and	 work	 with	larger	 discourses	 and	 norms	 of	 democracy.	 Within	 this	 study,	 practitioners	 are	
																																																								1	Countries	in	transition	are	deemed	to	be	countries	undergoing	a	process	of	democratisation,	i.e.	a	shift	from	(often)	autocratic	regimes	to	democracies.	Such	a	process	involves	major	social,	economic	and	political	adjustments,	such	as	the	transformation/establishment	of	democratic	institutions	as	well	as	a	change	of	people’s	mindsets	(Rustow,	1970).	
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approached	as	agents	of	democratic	practice,	who	enact	democracy	through	their	day-to-day	engagements	and	within	the	context	of	discursive	norms	they	co-constitute.		In	 this	 chapter	 I	 outline	 the	 aims	 and	 rationale	 of	 the	 research,	 before	presenting	 and	discussing	my	research	question.				
1.2	Aims,	Rationale,	Research	Question	and	Objectives		The	aim	of	this	research	is	to	explore	the	enactment	of	democratic	practice.	Specifically,	I	focus	on	the	ways	in	which	subjects	performatively	construct	democracy	in	a	country	in	transition	 through	 reinterpreting,	 resisting	 and	 re-performing	 discourses	 in	 an	embodied	 way.	 I	 pursue	 this	 research	 drawing	 on	 two	 theories	 of	 participative	democracy,	 deliberative	 (Habermas,	 1984;	 1987;	 1996;	 1998)	 and	 agonistic	 (Mouffe,	1999;	 2009a,	 2009b	 2013	 and	 2014),	 which	 I	 interpret	 as	 generating	 a	 series	 of	performative	norms	(Butler,	1999;	2004;	2011;	2015).	I	employ	Judith	Butler’s	concept	of	performativity	as	my	 theoretical	 framework	–	an	account	 that	 allows	us	 to	 see	how	subjects	enact	practice	agentically	within	and	through	a	matrix	of	norms.		This	research	 is	 important	because	while	much	 is	known	concerning	 the	 influence	and	growth	of	NGOs	 in	countries	 in	 transition	(e.g.	Clarke,	1998;	Fowler,	1993;	Mair,	2013;	Mercer,	 2002),	 what	 remains	 unexplored	 is	 an	 underlying	 sense	 of	 how	 people	 both	conceptualise	and	enact	democratic	practice.	There	 is	much	more	 to	understand	about	how	 practitioners	 work	 with,	 adapt	 and	 reinvent	 discourses	 of	 democracy	 via	 their	practices,	in	novel	and	valuable	ways	within	a	context	of	democratic	norms.		
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I	 pose	 the	 following	 research	 question	 (RQ),	 which	 I	 develop	 theoretically	 and	methodologically	as	the	thesis	proceeds:		
How	 do	 people	 working	 within	 an	 NGO	 in	 a	 country	 in	 transition	 performatively	 enact	
democratic	practice?			This	question	is	based	on	an	assumption	that	exploring	the	practice	of	these	subjects	will	enable	 an	 understanding	 of	 their	 commitments	 in	 relation	 to	 larger	 discourses	 of	democracy	and	the	implications	of	these	commitments	for	practice.	The	RQ	is	addressed	via	 a	 poststructuralist	 onto-epistemological	 perspective	 and	 an	 ethnographic	methodology,	 paying	 close	 attention	 to	 the	 entanglement	 of	 text	 and	 visual,	 with	 an	emphasis	 on	 embodied	 experience.	 In	 order	 to	 answer	 the	 RQ	 two	 salient	 research	objectives	are	proposed	(Denzin	and	Lincoln,	2011).		The	 first	 objective	 is	 to	 identify	 the	 broader	 practices	 created	 through	 embodied	enactments	of	NGO	practitioners	in	relation	to	a	range	of	participants,	such	as	civil	sector	practitioners,	the	country’s	residents,	politicians,	government	workers	and	international	representatives,	within	a	context	of	a	country	in	transition.	Practitioners	are	approached	as	 subjects	 situated	 within	 a	 larger	 context	 of	 assumptions	 and	 norms	 regarding	 the	meaning	 of	 democracy	 and	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 a	 democratic	 practitioner:	 e.g.	 those	generated	by	government,	the	political	context	of	the	research	site	and	the	identifications	of	 those	 people	 NGOs	 work	 with.	 However,	 they	 are	 simultaneously	 approached	 as	agents	of	democratic	practice	who	actively	shape	such	a	context.	I	identify	two	bodies	of	literature	as	relevant	to	this	objective,	deliberative	and	agonistic	accounts	of	democracy.	These	accounts	offer	insight	into	performing	democratic	practice	from	the	bottom	up,	via	
	10	
civil	engagement,	rather	than	via	formal	democratic	institutions.	I	argue	that	they	offer	a	range	 of	 performative	 norms	 relating	 to	 democratic	 practice,	 which	 may	 be	 adopted,	rejected	or	reconfigured	through	embodied	practice.		The	 second	 objective	 is	 to	 explore	 WRC	 practices	 in	 depth,	 paying	 attention	 to	dimensions	 that	 constitute	 the	 broader	 democratic	 practice	 enacted	 by	 practitioners.	This	 is	 significant	 for	 understanding	 the	 embodied	 ways	 in	 which	 NGO	 practitioners	enact,	reproduce	and	shape	practices	of	democracy	 in	a	context	where	democracy	may	be	 in	 its	 nascent	 stages	 and	 inevitably	 entangled	with	 other	 socio-political	 norms	 (e.g.	‘democracy’	 is	often	associated	with	violence	and	civil	war	in	Yugoslavia).	 I	employ	the	theory	 termed	 performativity	 by	 Judith	 Butler	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	 second	 objective,	which	serves	as	the	theoretical	framework	for	this	research.			
1.3	Contributions	to	knowledge		My	main	contribution	to	knowledge	is	to	provide	rich	insight	into	the	experiences	of	NGO	practitioners	 who	 enact	 democratic	 practice.	 I	 offer	 an	 embodied	 and	 performative	account	of	what	it	means	to	generate	democratic	practice	within	a	country	in	transition,	whose	 normative	 framework	 is	 marked	 by	 hostility	 and	 patriarchy.	 I	 achieve	 this	through	 weaving	 insights	 from	 Judith	 Butler’s	 theory	 of	 performativity	 (Butler,	 1999,	2006,	 2011	 and	 2015)	with	 theories	 of	 deliberative	 and	 agonistic	 democratic	 practice	(e.g.,	Habermas,	 1984,	1987	and	1996;	Laclau	 and	Mouffe,	 1985;	Mouffe,	 1999,	2009a,	2009b,	 2013,	 2014	 and	 2018),	 as	 well	 as	 my	 own	 ethnographic	 account.	 The	 NGO	literature	 relating	 to	 democracy	 tends	 to	 overlook	 practice	 in	 favour	 of	 outcomes.	Further,	 it	 does	 not	 offer	 a	 gendered	 account	 of	 how	women	NGO	practitioners	might	
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enact	democracy	within	a	context	of	misogyny	and	patriarchy.	These	are	insights	I	seek	to	offer	to	the	NGO	literature	and	the	broader	literature	on	democratic	practice.			Within	 this	 overall	 frame	 I	 make	 four	 contributions	 to	 the	 literature	 pertaining	 to	democratic	 practice	 and	 NGOs.	 The	 first	 is	 to	 introduce	 an	 embodied	 account	 of	democratic	practice,	outlining	how	practitioners’	bodies	act	as	sites	 for	generating	and	contesting	 democratic	 practice	 within	 a	 context	 of	 constraints	 and	 possibility.	 The	second	 contribution	 is	 to	 foreground	 corruption	 as	 something	 co-constitutive	 of	democratic	 practice.	 Corruption	 is	 largely	 overlooked	 in	 terms	 of	 practice	 by	 both	 the	NGO	literature	and	by	theories	of	deliberation	and	agonism.	Yet,	I	found	that	navigating	corruption,	while	not	succumbing	to	it,	was	a	key	practice	of	NGO	practitioners.	My	third	contribution	 is	 to	 further	 develop	 knowledge	 of	 the	 aesthetics	 of	 democratic	 practice.	Aesthetics	 is	 again	 not	 addressed	 by	 the	 NGO	 literature	 and	 receives	 only	 high-level	conceptual	treatment	within	theories	of	agonism.		My	 fourth	 contribution	 is	 to	 offer	 a	 lived	 and	 everyday	 understanding	 of	 democratic	practice	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 women	 operating	 within	 a	 patriarchal	 and	 corrupt	setting.	While	 this	 is	a	piece	of	research	that	explores	and	contributes	 to	knowledge	 in	the	 area	of	 the	democratic	practices	 generated	by	organisations	 in	 general,	 it	 is	worth	acknowledging	 that	 this	 particular	 context	 is	 overtly	 gendered,	 given	 the	 empirical	setting	 of	 a	women’s	 organisation.	While	 other	 studies	may	 erase	 gender	 entirely	 as	 a	consideration,	often	presenting	heavily	male	and	masculine	contexts	as	being	generally	representative	 of	 democratic	 practice,	 this	 research	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 broader	knowledge,	while	also	acknowledging	that	such	practices	often	take	place	within	hostile,	and	in	this	case,	heavily	patriarchal,	environments.	Focusing	specifically	on	the	work	of	a	
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women’s	 organisation	 is	 valuable	 for	 achieving	 a	more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 the	tension	that	exists	between	the	prevailing	patriarchy	within	a	context	of	transition	and	the	democratic	principles	of	liberty	and	equality.				
1.4	Thesis	outline		The	remainder	of	the	thesis	contains	nine	chapters.	In	Chapter	2,	I	describe	the	broader	context	 within	 which	 the	 study	 is	 situated,	 the	 relatively	 young	 liberal	 democracy	 of	Montenegro;	a	country	that	also	suffers	from	endemic	corruption	and	patriarchal	social	norms.	I	next	offer	an	account	of	the	relevant	socio-historical	context	relating	to	women’s	engagement	 in	 the	democratisation	of	Yugoslavia,	 long	before	 the	 formal	 institution	of	democracy.	In	doing	so	I	draw	attention	to	a	rich	discursive	history	of	women’s	activism	in	 the	 region,	 which	 informs	 contemporary	 struggles.	 Finally,	 I	 describe	 the	 research	setting,	that	of	WRC,	providing	detail	concerning	its	overall	focus	of	enacting	democratic	principles	and	how	such	a	focus	translates	into	its	various	programmes	of	work.		In	Chapter	3,	I	review	the	relevant	literature	pertaining	to	democratic	practice.	I	do	so	by	exploring	how	scholars	have	researched	NGOs	as	democratic	actors	within	countries	in	transition.	I	find	that	while	these	studies	illuminate	some	important	foci	of	NGOs,	such	as	combating	corruption	and	patriarchy,	ultimately	the	literature	does	not	offer	insight	into	the	 lived	 experiences	 of	 practitioners	 as	 they	 seek	 to	 enact	 democratic	 practice.	 I	therefore	 turn	 to	 contemporary	 theories	 of	 participative	 democratic	 practice,	deliberation	 and	 agonism,	 in	 order	 to	 extrapolate	 a	 set	 of	 norms	 that	 might	 be	perceptible	in	the	field	as	informing	democratic	practice.			
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	In	 Chapter	 4,	 I	 offer	 my	 theoretical	 framework	 for	 exploring	 the	 research	 question	 –	Judith	 Butler’s	 theory	 of	 embodied	 performativity,	 which	 represents	 an	 account	 of	agency	within	 a	matrix	 of	 reiterative	 norms.	 I	 argue	 that	while	 theories	 of	 democratic	practice	 tend	 to	 offer	 a	 somewhat	 disembodied	 account	 of	 how	 practitioners	 might	engage,	Butler	provides	a	means	through	which	I	can	develop	an	account	of	democratic	practice	that	is	enacted	through:	the	entanglement	of	bodily/speech	acts;	the	working	of	continuously	 reiterating	 norms;	 the	 process	 in	 which	 people	 come	 to	 recognise	themselves	as	viable	democratic	subjects;	and	embodied	and	relational	connections	and	co-dependencies	between	vulnerable	humans.		In	Chapter	5,	I	discuss	my	methodology,	a	discourse-based	ethnography,	which	seeks	to	combine	 rich,	 critically	 engaged	 and	 in-depth	 insight	 into	 the	 lived	 experience	 of	practicing	democracy.	I	outline	my	participant-observation,	which	lasted	30	months,	11	of	which	were	spent	in	the	field.	I	describe	my	role	as	an	organisational	equal,	in	which	I	enacted	 democratic	 practice	 with	 research	 participants	 and	 they,	 in	 turn,	 helped	 me	make	 sense	 of	 my	 ongoing	 theorising	 of	 knowledge.	 Providing	 an	 account	 of	 my	multimodal	discourse	analytical	approach,	I	make	the	case	that	this	 is	a	suitable	means	for	drawing	out	the	richness	of	the	discursive	community	I	was	embedded	within.		In	 Chapters	 6,	 7	 and	 8,	 I	 offer	 my	 findings,	 which	 are	 organised	 as	 three	 overarching	democratic	practices.	Chapter	6,	‘Embodying	democratic	practice’,	focuses	on	the	body	as	a	 site	 of	 practice,	 where	 the	 possibilities	 and	 tensions	 of	 democratic	 engagement	 are	played	out	with	and	through	bodily	acts.	I	also	emphasise	the	physical	struggle	involved	in	 performing	 democratic	 practice	 and	 how	 it	 bears	 on	 the	 bodies	 of	 practitioners.	
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Chapter	7,	‘Navigating	corruption’,	explores	the	ways	in	which	practitioners	confront	and	work	 around	 corruption,	 as	 they	 strive	 to	 generate	 democratic	 practice	 in	 a	 setting	where	 endemic	 corruption	 pervades	 nearly	 every	 segment	 of	 people’s	 lives.	 I	 identify	and	 analyse	 the	 corrupt	 practices	 that	 practitioners	 encounter,	 as	 these	 exist	 in	 a	 co-dependent	relationship	with	the	democratic	practices	they	offer	in	response.	Chapter	8,	‘The	aesthetics	of	assembling’,	explores	the	artful	ways	in	which	practitioners	facilitate,	shape	 and	 influence	 assembly.	 I	 outline	 how	 collective	 agency	 emerges	 out	 of	 the	entanglement	of	diverse	aesthetic	mediums	and	articulations.		In	 Chapter	 9,	 I	 relate	 my	 findings	 back	 to	 the	 NGO,	 democratic	 practice	 and	performativity	 literatures	 to	 surface	 and	enrich	my	 contributions	 to	knowledge,	which	all	build	towards	the	production	of	a	rich	account	of	what	it	means	to	enact	an	embodied	form	 of	 democratic	 practice.	 First,	 I	 highlight	 theories	 of	 democratic	 practice	 as	disembodied	 and	 build	 upon	 their	 performative	 assumptions	 to	 theorise	 how	we	 can	interpret	practitioners’	bodies	as	sites	upon	which	democratic	practice	unfolds.	Second,	I	theorise	 democratic	 practice	 as	 inextricably	 linked	 to	 its	 scene	 of	 endemic	 corruption	and	in	the	process	I	emphasise	how	corruption	informs	and	shapes	democratic	practice,	and	vice	versa.	Third,	I	apply	a	performative	and	aesthetic	perspective	to	theorising	how	alliances	and	connections	in	democratic	practice	are	formed.	In	doing	so,	I	conceptualise	the	rich	and	sensory	ways	in	which	disparate	people	are	brought	together	in	democratic	assembly.		In	Chapter	10,	I	conclude	the	thesis	by	returning	to	my	research	question	and	objectives	and	 consider	 the	 contributions	 in	 light	 of	 these.	 I	 also	 offer	 some	 practice-relevant	contributions	emerging	from	the	research.	I	highlight	some	of	the	limitations	of	the	study	
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and	thereby	also	avenues	for	 future	research.	 I	end	by	offering	some	reflections	on	the	methodology	pursued,	presenting	modest	insight	into	the	possibilities	of	assuming	such	an	 embedded	 research	 identity	 in	 the	work	 of	 an	 organisation	 intensely	 committed	 to	enacting	democratic	practice.																		
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II	The	scene	of	study	and	sociohistorical	context		I	begin	this	chapter	by	exploring	the	current	socio-political	context	of	Montenegro	as	a	country	 in	 transition	 in	 order	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 role	 of	 NGOs	 in	 such	 an	environment.	I	argue	that	while	a	vibrant	civil	sector	is	posited	as	an	important	driver	of	democratisation	 in	 countries	 in	 transition	 (Ahmeti,	 2010;	 Gunther	 et	 al,	 2006),	 in	Montenegro	the	work	of	these	organisations	is	often	inhibited	by	endemic	corruption	in	the	public	and	civil	sector,	where	patriarchy	frequently	appears	as	a	symptom,	or	even	cause,	 of	 such	 corruption.	 Second,	 I	 offer	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 women’s	 activism	 in	Yugoslavia	from	pre-WWII	to	the	present	day	in	order	to	highlight	the	continuous	efforts	of	women	towards	democratisation.	Such	a	historical	overview	helps	situate	the	work	of	WRC,	 linking	 its	 practice	 to	 the	 enduring	 continuum	 of	 the	 struggle	 for	 liberty	 and	equality	in	the	context	of	the	former	Yugoslavia.	Finally,	I	provide	a	detailed	account	of	the	research	setting	–	WRC	-	and	the	work	it	undertakes.				
2.1.	Broader	context	within	which	the	Women’s	Rights	Centre	is	situated		A	 republic	of	 the	 former	Yugoslavia,	Montenegro	 is	a	valuable	context	 for	 the	research	because	 it	 has	 been	 seeking	 to	 introduce	 and	 normalise	 liberal	 democracy	 since	 the	1990s	and	NGOs	are	at	the	centre	of	these	efforts.	This	section	outlines	some	of	the	main	features	of	attempts	to	democratise	Montenegro,	some	of	the	obstacles	to	doing	so	and	the	role	of	NGOs	in	this	process.		
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Montenegro	 has	 been	 an	 electoral	 democracy	 since	 1990,	 which	 makes	 it	 one	 of	 the	youngest	democracies	 in	Europe.	 It	 is	often	described	 in	positive	terms	by	members	of	the	 international	 community2 	as	 “a	 leader	 in	 the	 European	 integration	 [process]”	(European	 Western	 Balkans,	 18/05/2017),	 	 “the	 unchallenged	 champion	 of	 [the	 EU]	accession	negotiations”	 (Marković,	 2016)	 and	even	a	 “success	 story”	when	 it	 comes	 to	the	process	of	democratisation	(CDM,	2016).	It	is	a	country	that	officially	complies	with	many	of	the	legal	requirements	of	a	democratic	country	(Diamond,	2015):	it	distributes	its	powers	across	three	separate	pillars	of	democracy	(legislative,	executive	and	judicial);	it	holds	national	and	local	elections	regularly;	and	it	has	a	broad	civil	sector	(European	Commission,	2016;	Freedom	House,	2013).			Yet,	 despite	 such	a	positive	 evaluation	of	 the	 country’s	democratisation	process,	 it	 has	also	been	 recognised	as	 suffering	 significant	 corruption	 (see	Bieber,	 2003;	 Igrić,	 2010;	Trivunović,	 2007;	 Williams	 et	 al,	 2017).	 Montenegro	 scores	 46	 out	 of	 100	 on	 the	Transparency	 International	 (TI)	Corruption	Perception	 Index	(2017),	which	 focuses	on	the	 perceptions	 of	 citizens	 of	 corruption	 in	 the	 public	 sphere,	 where	 0	 represents	extremely	corrupt	and	100	“very	clean”	(TI,	2017:	1).	As	many	as	72.25%	of	its	citizens	perceive	corruption	as	all-encompassing	and	unavoidable	in	Montenegrin	society	(CEMI,	2014),	 and	 in	 2015	 the	 off-on	 recurring	Montenegrin	 Prime	Minister,	Milo	Đukanović,	was	 (sardonically)	 awarded	 the	 Man	 of	 the	 Year	 in	 Organised	 Crime	 Award	 by	 the	Organised	 Crime	 and	 Corruption	 Reporting	 Project	 (OCCRP)	 for	 “promot[ing]	 uncivil	
																																																								2	The	international	community	here	stands	for	various	international	and	supranational	representatives	and	bodies.			
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society	 [and]	 build[ing]	 one	 of	 the	 most	 dedicated	 kleptocracies	 and	 organised	 crime	havens	in	the	world”	(OCCRP,	2015).			Endemic	 corruption	 in	 Montenegro	 developed	 hand-in-hand	 with	 the	 advent	 of	democracy,	 a	 phenomenon	 fostered	 and	 enhanced	 in	 the	 1990s,	 as	 Yugoslavia	 limped	through	a	civil	war	(Bieber,	2003).	Running	in	parallel	with	democratisation	was	a	drive	to	liberalise	the	economy	and	to	privatise	state	services,	“a	process	which	strengthened	the	 link	between	 the	business	oligarchy	and	 the	political	 elite”	 (Igrić,	2010:	22)	and	 is	now	considered	 “one	of	 the	major	obstacles	 to	 the	 country’s	democratic	development”	(Vuković,	 2017:	 3)	 as	 it	 strengthened	 and	 formalised	 links	 between	 government	 and	organised	 crime	 (Radulović	 and	 Ćalović,	 2015).	 Although	 the	 European	 Commission	recognises	 that	Montenegro	has	made	certain	 improvements	when	 it	comes	to	battling	corruption	 (EC,	 2016),	 significant	 challenges	 remain	 to	 the	 democratisation	 agenda,	indicated	by	the	simple	fact	that	there	has	not	yet	been	a	change	of	government	(Blaug	and	Schwarzmantel,	2014;	Diamond,	2015)	 in	 the	country,	with	 the	 same	party	 ruling,	under	different	guises,	for	the	past	60	years3.			Nevertheless,	 a	 vibrant	 civil	 sector	 in	 the	 Balkans	 region	 is	 often	 posited	 as	 a	‘counterforce’	 to	 an	 otherwise	 corrupt	 environment	 (Ahmeti,	 2010:	 56),	 a	 “crucial	component”	for	building	democracy	(EC,	2016:	9),	and	‘indispensable’	to	the	process	of	democratisation	 (Vuković,	 2017:	 11).	 In	 common	 with	 other	 countries	 in	 transition,	
																																																								3	With	the	introduction	of	multiparty	democracy,	The	Communist	Party,	from	the	era	of	one-party	rule	in	Yugoslavia,	transformed	into	the	Democratic	Party	of	Socialists,	a	party	that	has	held	power	in	Montenegro	for	almost	three	decades.	
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Montenegro	 has	 experienced	 a	 proliferation	 of	 NGOs:	 3,589	 registered	 in	 2015 4	(Montenegro	 Government,	 2015),	 meaning	 that,	 in	 theory,	 there	 is	 one	 NGO	 per	 175	people	 in	 the	 country.	 In	 practice,	 of	 course,	 many	 of	 these	 organisations	 are	 either	dormant	(Vuković,	2017),	have	limited	outreach	(CSOSI,	2015),	or	operate	as	GONGOs5	–	“government-sponsored	 civil	 society	 organisations”	 (Belskaya,	 2017).	 Simultaneously,	genuinely	 independent	 organisations	 are	 often	 sabotaged	 and	 incapacitated	 by	 the	government6	and	publicly	presented	as	‘enemies	of	the	state’	(Jovićević,	2012;	Malidžan,	2012;	Tomović,	2015).		Montenegrin	 NGOs	 often	 state	 the	 three	 main	 inhibiting	 tactics	 utilised	 by	 the	government	 as:	 financing,	 exclusion	 and	 smear	 campaigns	 (CGO,	 2016;	 CEDAW,	 2017;	GREVIO	2017;	MANS,	2017).	 Even	 though	NGOs	are	 eligible	 for	public	 funding	by	 law,	money	is	often	allocated	in	a	non-transparent	and	even	illegal	way	(Đonović,	2016).	For	example,	 the	 Centre	 for	 Civic	 Education	 claims	 that	 the	 illegal	 application	 of	 laws	resulted	 in	 NGOs	 being	 denied	 almost	 €4m	 between	 2013-2015	 (CGO,	 2016:	 10).	 In	terms	of	foreign	funding,	the	view	prevails	that	NGOs	receive	abundant	funding	from	the	EU	and	other	international	donors	(CDM,	12/05/2017;	RTCG,	2017),	yet	a	great	portion	of	 these	 funds	 is	 not	 issued	directly	 to	NGOs	but	 to	 larger	 international	 organisations,	which	hold	power	over	further	channelling	of	funds	to	local	NGOs	(see	the	example	of	UN	Women,	2018).	Moreover,	some	of	these	funds	are	reserved	for	government	institutional	support,	rather	than	the	civil	sector	(see	CoE,	2017;	UNDP,	2018).																																																										4	The	Ministry	of	Interior	has	not	published	the	number	of	registered	NGOs	since	2015.	5	The	Centre	for	NGO	Development	has	recently	criticised	the	Government	for	its	“lack	of	transparent	procedures	in	[the	area	of	collaboration	between	the	government	and	civil	sector]	which	allows	the	Government	discretion	to	decide	which	NGOs	are	to	be	allocated	[resources]	according	to	their	political	agreeability”	(Zeković,	2017).	6	For	example,	in	2012	several	thousand	NGOs	were	erased	from	the	official	register	of	NGOs	by	the	Ministry	of	Interior	(Jovićević,	15/08/2012).	
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	Those	 organisations	 that	manage	 to	 prevail	 despite	 restrictive	 financing	 arrangements	often	have	to	fight	hard	to	be	included	in	working	groups	of	government	and	NGO	actors	tasked	with	developing	new	policies,	processes	and	strategies	(GREVIO,	2017:	52;	MANS,	2017:	112).	For	example,	collaboration	between	NGOs	and	the	national	Anti-Corruption	Agency	would	seem	crucial,	considering	the	prevalence	of	corruption	in	the	country	and	in	 government.	 However,	 “the	 government	 does	 not	 strive	 to	 establish	 meaningful	cooperation	with	the	NGOs	in	the	field	of	anticorruption…[and]	during	2016	no	one	from	the	 civil	 sector	 participated	 in	 the	 board	 for	 anti-corruption”	 (MANS,	 2017:	 63),	 even	though	 the	 European	 Commission	 praised	 the	 government	 for	 making	 advances	 in	combatting	corruption	by	establishing	an	Anti-Corruption	Agency	(EC,	2016:	15).				In	 addition	 to	 exclusion,	 civil	 sector	 organisations	 are	 often	 slandered	 in	 the	 pro-government	press	(Vuković,	2017)	and	individual	activists	“targeted	on	a	personal	basis	by	the	media	through	smear	campaigns”	(EC,	2016:	9),	‘intimidated’	(Kvinna	till	Kvinna,	2016)	and	‘harassed’	(TI,	2014).	The	smear	campaigns	are	often	directed	against	female	activists	 (Kvinna	 till	 Kvinna,	 2016),	 which	 emphasises	 yet	 another	 impediment	 to	 the	generation	 of	 democratic	 practice	 in	 the	 country	 –	 the	 presence	 of	 widespread	 and	deeply	embedded	patriarchy.		Indeed,	patriarchy	is	recognised	as	one	of	the	main	inhibitors	to	attaining	a	democratic	society	by	the	participants	in	this	research,	but	the	same	argument	can	also	be	found	in	the	 testaments	 and	 writings	 of	 pre-	 and	 post-WWII	 activists	 and	 historians,	 which	demonstrates	the	scale	and	persistence	of	the	problem.	I	will	briefly	outline	the	efforts	of	women	to	secure	democracy	in	Yugoslavia	in	an	attempt	to	sketch	a	continuum	of	similar	
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issues	women	 have	 faced	 throughout	more	 recent	 history	 and	 the	 issues	my	 research	participants	currently	face.				
2.2.	Women	and	democracy	in	Yugoslavia:	a	brief	overview		This	section	offers	insight	into	the	historical	context	of	the	research,	placing	the	present	within	a	lineage	of	struggle	for	democracy	on	the	part	of	women’s	groups	in	Yugoslavia.	The	purpose	of	this	section	is	twofold.	First,	I	highlight	the	enduring	tension	that	exists	between	 the	 prevailing	 patriarchy	 and	 the	 main	 principles	 of	 democracy:	 liberty	 and	equality	(Mouffe,	1991).	Second,	I	demonstrate	that	women	were	always	at	the	forefront	of	the	struggle	to	establish	democratic	practice	in	the	context	of	Yugoslavia,	as	those	who	experience	first-hand	what	it	means	to	be	treated	unequally	in	both	practice	and	within	legal	frameworks	(Božinović,	1996:	119).		I	 offer	 a	 partial	 account	 of	 democratisation	 in	 the	 country	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	women;	 however,	 it	 ought	 to	 be	 noted	 that	 although	 Yugoslavia	 was	 not	 officially	democratic	after	WWII	(in	the	sense	of	the	head	of	state	being	elected),	in	most	ways	it	created	democratic	practices,	such	as	active	industrial	democracy,	policymaking	through	trade	unions,	the	establishment	of	co-operative	ownership,	and	so	on	(Whitehorn,	1978).	Although	 women’s	 engagement	 in	 democratic	 practice	 fluctuated	 during	 the	 20th	century,	it	was	a	narrative	of	gradual	progression,	which	was	curtailed	in	the	build-up	to,	during,	 and	 after	 the	 country’s	 civil	wars	 of	 the	 1990s	 –	 and	 the	 institution	 of	 formal	democracy	(Đokanović	et	al,	2014).			
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Women’s	 struggle	 for	 democracy	 in	 Yugoslavia	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 pre-WWII	Yugoslavia.	The	 role	of	women	 in	 society	had	changed	 immensely	as	a	 consequence	of	the	two	Balkan	wars	(1912	and	1913),	as	well	as	WWI	(1914-1918).	The	dramatic	loss	of	life	 within	 the	 male	 population	 meant	 that	 the	 task	 of	 rebuilding	 the	 nation,	 a	constitutional	 monarchy	 at	 the	 time,	 fell	 predominantly	 on	 the	 shoulders	 of	 women.	Unpaid	housework	 and	 traditionally	 feminine	professional	 roles	 (e.g.	 teachers,	 nurses)	were	 extended	 to	 include	 unpaid	 (or	 underpaid)	 labour	 in	 the	 mines,	 building	 sites,	factories	 and	 fields	 (Bošnjak	 and	Gavrić,	 2014;	 Stefanović,	 1921).	 Yet	when	 it	 came	 to	formal	 recognition	 of	 women	 as	 equals	 in	 the	 newly	 rebuilt	 country,	 they	 were	overlooked	(Bošnjak	and	Gavrić,	2014;	Obrenić,	2008).			As	 a	 reaction	 to	 such	 treatment,	 the	 Society	 for	 the	 Emancipation	 and	 Protection	 of	Women’s	Rights	called	for	an	urgent	assembly	of	women	in	Belgrade	on	8	May	1921	in	order	to	express	resentment	and	to	encourage	action	(Ženski	pokret,	1921).	The	women	communicated	their	dissatisfaction	with	being	used	as	a	free	and/or	cheap	labour	force	(Petković,	1921);	not	being	recognised	as	full	citizens	in	law	(Milčinović,	1921);	and	their	lack	of	 suffrage.	 Indeed,	 at	 the	 time,	 the	 right	 to	 vote	was	 issued	 to	 some	women	as	 a	“kind	 of	 gift”	 (Štebi,	 1921:	 16)	 by	 the	 government	 -	 a	 strategic	 and	 cynical	 means	 of	strengthening	 the	 ruling	 party’s	 electoral	 support.	 Women	 held	 similar	 gatherings	 all	over	 the	 country	 in	 the	 years	 running	 up	 to	 WWII	 and	 organised	 themselves	 into	numerous	 bodies,	 alliances7	and	 eventually	 a	 movement	 (Bošnjak	 and	 Gavrić,	 2014;	
																																																								7	Some	of	the	most	prominent	were:	Alliansa	jugoslovenskih	društava	u	kraljevini	SHS	(1923)	that	became	Alijansa	ženskih	pokreta	in	1926;	Udruženje	univerzitetski	obrazovanih	žena(1927);	Ženska	stranka	(1927);	Jugoslovenska	liga	žena	za	mir	i	slobodu;	Jugoslovenski	ženski	savez	(1929)	(Stojaković,	2014a).	
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Božinović,	 2017a),	 while	 simultaneously	 building	 alliances	 with	 international	(predominantly	pacifist)	organisations	(Stojaković,	2014a).			In	the	mid	1930s	many	women,	having	struggled	for	recognition	as	workers	who	rebuilt	the	country	after	several	wars,	perceived	the	tenets	of	communism	as	close	to	their	own	fight	 for	 liberty	 and	 equality	 and	 so	 their	 membership	 in	 the	 early,	 and	 then	 illegal8,	communist	 organisations	 does	 not	 come	 as	 a	 surprise	 (Barać,	 2016).	 Women	communists	were	also	motivated	 to	 fight	 the	rising	 threat	of	 fascism	 in	 this	era,	which	was	 viewed	 as	 catastrophic	 for	 the	 realisation	 of	 democratic	 values	 (Božinović	 and	Snuderl,	 1953).	 Unlike	 their	 male	 communist	 comrades,	 however,	 who	 gradually	prepared	 themselves	 for	 the	upcoming	war,	women	 largely	promoted	pacifism,	 urging	“active	 participation	 in	 the	 prevention	 [of	 war]”	 (Mitrović,	 04/03/1937).	 Taking	 this	position	 meant	 that	 they	 were	 sometimes	 excluded	 from	 communist	 circles	 (ibid).	Women’s	groups	were	also	perceived	as	a	‘threat’	to	other	democratic	alternatives	to	the	communists,	such	as	the	Democratic	Party	(Štebi,	1921:	23),	even	though	they	advocated	for	more	democracy:	equality	for	all	and	the	freedom	to	be	a	full	citizen	(Petković,	1921).			The	women’s	struggle	was	gradually	equated	with	 the	class	struggle,	however,	and	the	key	 notions	 that	 a	 society	 cannot	 be	 democratic	 unless	 everyone	 is	 treated	 equally	(Pejanović,	 1984)	 and	 unless	 exploitation	 and	 privilege	 are	 eradicated	 (Božinović,	2017b)	 became	 widely	 accepted	 within	 the	 communist	 left.	 The	 absorption	 of	 the	women’s	 movement	 within	 the	 communist	 left	 occurred	 firstly	 through	 joint	 combat	
																																																								8	The	Communist	Party	of	Yugoslavia	was	founded	in	1919	under	the	name	of	the	Socialist	Labour	Party	of	Yugoslavia	but	it	became	a	proscribed	organisation	under	the	royal	government	in	1921	and	it	remained	so	until	the	beginning	of	WWII	(Vujošević,	1985).	
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efforts	against	 the	occupying	 fascist	 forces	and	subsequently	 through	 the	 rebuilding	of	the	new	socialist	country	(Bošnjak	and	Gavrić,	2014).		The	 annexation	 of	 Austria	 by	 Germany	 in	 1938	 brought	 fascism	 to	 the	 border	 of	 the	Yugoslav	monarchy,	which	practically	marked	the	end	of	the	pacifist	efforts	on	the	part	of	 women’s	 organisations,	 which	 now	 committed	 to	 a	 militaristic	 strategy.	 As	 war	appeared	 imminent,	 the	 lines	 between	 women’s	 activism	 and	 communism	 blurred	further.	 The	 existing	 monarchist	 government	 began	 to	 fortify	 an	 alliance	 with	 fascist	Germany	 and	 Italy,	 which	 had	 severe	 consequences	 for	 the	 women’s	 antifascist	movement,	 whose	 activists	 were	 hunted,	 imprisoned	 in	 newly	 opened	 concentration	camps,	and	murdered	(Božinović,	2017b).	When	Yugoslavia	capitulated	in	1941,	women	were	 well	 represented	 within	 the	 Communist	 Party	 of	 Yugoslavia	 (KPJ),	 amplifying	resistance	 to	 the	 fascist	 invasion	 (Bošnjak	 and	 Gavrić,	 2014).	 Women	 participated	equally	 in	 the	 liberation	 struggle,	 fighting	 shoulder	 to	 shoulder	 with	 their	 male	comrades,	attaining	high	military	positions	(Malinović	and	Petakov,	2011)	and	acting	as	“professional	 revolutionaries”	 (Mladenović,	 1979:	 32).	 Very	 quickly	 women	 organised	themselves	 politically	 via	 the	 ‘People’s	 Liberation	 Committees’,	 which	 were	predominantly	 in	 charge	 of	 providing	 resources	 for	 the	 liberation	 army	 and	 in	 some	cases	assumed	the	role	of	a	local	government	(Božinović	and	Snuderl,	1953),	especially	in	 occupied	 territories	 (Stojaković,	 2014b),	 connecting	 previously	 isolated	 women’s	groups	(Božinović,	2017b).	Owing	to	this	connectedness,	women	were	able	to	organise	the	first	conference	of	women	as	soon	as	1942,	an	event	that	attracted	women	from	all	over	 the	 country	 (Stojaković,	 2014b).	 The	most	 important	 outcome	 of	 the	 conference	was	 the	 birth	 of	 an	 organisation	 called	 the	 Antifascist	 Front	 of	 Women	 (AFŽ),	 which	
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became	a	powerful	vehicle	for	women’s	emancipation,	 formal	political	engagement	and	equal	economic	participation	for	over	a	decade.			Women’s	 formal	 political	 engagement	 during	 the	 war,	 and	 subsequently,	 unfolded	largely	 through	AFŽ	but	also	via	 the	Narodni	Front9	and	 the	aforementioned	 liberation	committees	(Stojaković,	2014b).	Such	engagement	brought	advancements	to	the	position	of	women	in	wartime	and	subsequently	in	the	socialist	society	that	Yugoslavia	became.	For	 example,	 some	 of	 the	 first	 procedural	 policies	 issued	 in	 1942	 by	 the	 Supreme	Headquarters	 of	 the	 People’s	 Liberation	 Army	 were	 drafted	 upon	 the	 principle	 of	equality	 –	 women	 gained	 the	 right	 to	 be	 formally	 elected	 as	 heads	 of	 the	 liberation	boards	(which	they	were),	and	in	Montenegro	the	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	Citizens	formally	recognised	women	as	free	and	equal	citizens	(Božinović	and	Snuderl,	1953:	9).			At	the	end	of	the	war,	women	were	included	within	the	Constitution	of	the	newly	formed	Federative	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 Yugoslavia:	 “women	 are	 equal	 in	 all	 areas	 of	 state,	economic	 and	 socio-political	 life”	 (ibid:	 10).	 While	 these	 documents	 represented	 an	important	 milestone	 for	 women’s	 struggle	 for	 democracy,	 they	 also	 liberated	 women	from	the	shackles	of	remaining	within	the	private	sphere	and	introduced	them	formally	(legally)	into	an	egalitarian	relationship	with	men	in	the	public	sphere.	However,	social	equality	 was	 yet	 to	 be	 achieved	 and	 so	 women	 continued	 to	 work	 towards	 the	“democratisation	 of	 the	 country	 [and]	 betterment	 of	 the	 economic	 position	 of	 the	
																																																								9	Narodni	Front	(People’s	Front)	is	short	for	the	Socialist	Workers’	Alliance	of	the	People	of	Yugoslavia,	a	political	organisation	active	between	1945	–	1960.	The	main	purpose	of	the	organisation	was	establishing	socialist	relations	between	citizens	upon	the	basis	of	socialist	democracy	(Boričić,	1990)		
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working	class”	after	the	war	(Božinović	and	Snuderl,	1953:	4)	through	AFŽ	(Bonfiglioli,	2012).			In	a	by	now	familiar	pattern,	the	first	Congress	of	AFŽ	in	August	1945	invited	all	women	to	 rebuild	 the	 country	 and	 organise	 day-to-day	 life	 post-war	 (Bonfiglioli,	 2012).	 The	challenge	set	was	to	“protect	peace	and	democratic	values”	(Božinović,	1996:	119).	Yet	this	 time,	such	an	effort	would	be	conducted	hand	 in	hand	with	 the	KPJ	and	the	newly	formed	People’s	Government	(Stojaković,	2013;	Ždralović,	2014).			It	 is	 important	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 fact	 that	 AFŽ	 was	 a	 widespread	 and	 engaged	organisation	 (Stojaković,	 2011	 and	 2014b),	 which	 accelerated	 the	 social	 and	organisational	democratisation	of	 the	 country	–	 even	 if	 national	 governance	 continued	along	 single	 party	 lines	 -	 and	 via	which	women	 saw	 a	 period	 of	 “rapid	 emancipation”	(Đokanović	et	al,	2014:	104).	Božinović	and	Snuderl	(1953)	offer	an	account	of	women’s	manifold	 participation,	 gained	 via	 AFŽ’s	 campaigning	 and	 influence,	 in	 rebuilding	 the	country’s	 infrastructure	 (roads	 and	 railways),	 factories,	 agricultural	 mechanisation,	houses	 (e.g.	 in	 Bosnia	 and	 Herzegovina	 predominantly	 women	 worked	 as	 builders),	schools	and	hospitals;	their	work	as	smiths,	engineers,	mechanics,	tool-makers,	farmers,	teachers	and	medical	professionals.			However,	in	this	period	women	also	started	–	again	via	AFŽ	-	to	enact	their	constitutional	provisions,	 entering	 local	 and	 national	 governments,	 drafting	 and	 amending	 laws	 and	founding	 and	 participating	 in	 trade	 unions	 (Đokanović	 et	 al,	 2014).	 AFŽ	 also	 had	international	ambitions	and	scope,	 initiating	 the	Democratic	Federation	of	Women,	yet	ceasing	 membership	 when	 the	 body	 became	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 the	 politics	 of	 the	
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Soviet	 Union.	 AFŽ	 continued	 to	 maintain	 and	 strengthen	 alliances	 with	 antifascist	movements	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 Czechoslovakia,	 France,	 and	 other	 countries	(Božinović,	1996).			Undoubtedly,	 AFŽ	 was	 a	 powerful	 force	 for	 the	 democratic	 transformation	 of	 the	country,	which	 is	why	 it	 is	 surprising	 that	 the	 organisation	 came	 to	 an	 abrupt	 halt	 in	1953.	Stojaković	(2011	and	2013)	states	that	even	though	the	formal	dissolution	of	AFŽ	happened	 in	 1953,	 the	 actual	 process	 of	 dismantling	 had	 been	 initiated	 three	 years	earlier.	 In	 1950	 a	 new	 law	 on	 managing	 state	 enterprises	 transformed	 the	 economic	basis	 of	 the	 country	 by	 enabling	 collectives	 of	workers	 to	 run	 enterprises	 themselves.	However,	such	a	change	generated	significant	redundancies	within	the	female	workforce	under	 the	pretext	 that	women	workers	were	 insufficiently	qualified10	and	 that	 as	 such	they	 presented	 a	 burden	 to	 the	 profitability	 of	 the	 enterprise	 (Božinović	 and	 Snuderl,	1953).	 Very	 quickly,	 workplaces	 began	 closing	 the	 auxiliary	 facilities	 (nurseries	 and	clinics)	 AFŽ	 had	 helped	 to	 establish	 in	 the	 factories	 in	 order	 to	 enable	 women	 to	participate	equally	in	the	workforce,	under	the	pretext	that	these	facilities	were	a	great	burden	to	the	economy	(ibid).		Alongside	 the	 new	 law	 on	 managing	 state	 enterprises	 and	 the	 closing	 of	 auxiliary	facilities,	 the	 federal	 government	 issued	policies	 that	 guaranteed	generous	benefits	 for	the	birth	of	a	third	child,	which	was	supposed	to	be	paid	partially	from	the	federal	budget	and	partially	by	employers.	The	policy	 seemed	 to	 incentivise	employers	not	 to	employ																																																									10	After	WWII	people	were	employed	regardless	of	qualification	as	the	country	needed	a	workforce	to	rebuild,	however,	when	the	economy	started	to	improve,	a	qualifications	argument	was	used	as	justification	for	making	cuts	in	order	to	make	enterprises	more	profitable	(Božinović	and	Snuderl,	1953).			
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women	with	several	children,	while	simultaneously	incentivising	some	women	to	stay	at	home	 (Stojaković,	 2013).	At	 the	 same	 time,	 older	 discourses	 portraying	women	 as	 the	‘weaker	 sex’	 began	 to	 re-emerge	 in	 the	 workplace;	 women	 were	 labelled	 as	 ‘non-profitable’	because	of	 their	 allegedly	weaker	 constitution,	 and	as	mothers	whose	place	was	 at	 home	 caring	 for	 their	 families	 (Božinović	 and	 Snuderl,	 1953).	 Such	 labelling	appears	cynical	in	its	deployment	considering	how	women	rebuilt	the	country	practically	on	 their	 own	 after	 the	 country’s	 four	 wars	 (two	 Balkan	 and	 two	 world	 wars),	 often	working	 up	 to	 15	 hours	 a	 day	 performing	 household	 and	 caring	work	 alongside	 their	regular	 labour	 (Stojaković,	 2013).	 In	 the	 following	 decades,	 the	 steadfast	 revival	 of	patriarchal	narratives	and	attitudes	gradually	 started	 to	erode	 the	democratic	practice	women	fought	so	hard	to	achieve.		AFŽ	was	also	heavily	scrutinised	by	the	KPJ,	which	started	to	become	suspicious	of	the	momentum	the	organisation	was	developing	all	over	the	country,	in	both	urban	and	rural	areas	 (Bošnjak	 and	Gavrić,	 2014).	 In	Vojvodina,	 Serbia,	 for	 instance,	 Stojaković	 (2013)	reports	 numerous	 warnings	 from	 the	 party	 to	 the	 branch	 of	 AFŽ	 in	 that	 region,	cautioning	 against	 what	 was	 viewed	 as	 AFŽ’s	 tendencies	 towards	 becoming	 an	organisation	 detached	 from	 the	 party’s	 agenda.	 Finally,	 at	 the	 Fourth	 Congress	 of	 AFŽ	(26-28/10/1953)	 a	 conclusion	 was	 agreed	 upon	 that	 the	 organisation	 was	 too	centralised,	 in	 contradiction	 to	what	was	viewed	as	 the	 continuous	democratisation	of	the	country,	and	that	AFŽ	should	be	dissolved	in	order	to	allow	for	the	establishment	of	smaller,	decentralised	Women’s	Societies,	which	would	be	better	positioned	 to	 tend	 to	women’s	 issues	 locally	 (Dobrić,	 1987).	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 observe	 that	 the	 women’s	issues	 AFŽ	 focussed	 on	 differed	 dramatically	 from	 those	 undertaken	 by	 the	 newly	formed	 Women’s	 Societies,	 which	 prioritised	 domestic	 themes:	 household	 efficiency	
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improvements,	education	for	mothers,	support	 for	bringing	up	children,	 the	opening	of	school	kitchens	and	nurseries,	etc.			Those	 women	 who	 did	 participate	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Women’s	 Societies	 had	 an	opportunity	to	engage	politically	via	the	Narodni	Front	(a	broad	political	coalition	of	left-wing	members	and	groups),	Narodna	Omladina	(a	left-wing	youth	organisation),	various	unions,	as	well	as	the	communist	party	(Jovanović,	2014).	However,	their	overall	political	engagement	 started	 to	 drop	 dramatically	 after	 1952	 (Božinović	 and	 Snuderl,	 1953),	which	 coincided	 with	 the	 dissolution	 of	 AFŽ.	 Magazines	 that	 previously	 played	 a	significant	 role	 in	 the	 political	 liberation	 of	 women	 and	 helped	women	 stay	 informed	about	their	position	in	society	and	to	organise	started	featuring	domestic	texts	in	place	of	those	 celebrating	 a	 working,	 politically	 engaged	 and	 emancipated	 woman	 (Stojaković,	2011).	The	position	of	women	was	gradually	eroded,	their	activism	largely	absorbed	into	the	political	apparatus,	where	their	actions	could	be	scrutinised	and	regulated.			Women’s	fight	for	liberty	and	equality	did	not	cease	entirely	in	the	following	few	decades	but	 their	 organisations	were	weakened	 and	 social	 activism	 that	 did	not	 align	with	 the	official	political	discourse	was	thwarted.	Đokanović	et	al	(2014)	attribute	the	success	of	the	“process	of	repatriarchalisation”	(p.134),	which	took	place	in	the	decades	preceding	the	Yugoslav	wars	in	the	1990s,	precisely	to	this	weakening	of	the	women’s	movement	that	followed	the	dissolution	of	AFŽ.	Nevertheless,	women	still	maintained	a	far	greater	degree	 of	 equality	 in	 law	 and	 in	 practice	 than	 had	 been	 the	 case	 prior	 to	 WWII	 and	subsequently	in	the	officially	‘democratic’	republics	of	the	former	Yugoslavia.		
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Despite	these	regressive	events,	it	was	the	rise	of	ethno-nationalism	after	1980	that	dealt	the	 heaviest	 blow	 to	 women’s	 activism	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 their	 daily	 lives	 and,	 by	extension,	 to	 the	 entire	 country,	 which	 was	 relapsing	 into	 yet	 another	 war.	 The	discourses	of	conservative	religious	nationalism	gelled	well	with	those	of	patriarchy.	The	fight	for	liberty	and	equality,	in	the	words	of	Đokanović	et	al	(2014:	134-135):	“became	replaced	 with	 political	 and	 social	 efforts	 to	 return	 women	 to	 the	 private	 sphere	 and	reaffirm	 women’s	 roles	 as	 mothers	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 reproduction	 of	 ethnia”.	Paradoxically,	 the	 civil	 war	 that	 ensued	 led	 to	 the	 institution	 of	 formal,	 liberal	democracies	 in	the	former	republics	of	Yugoslavia,	while	at	 the	same	time	marking	the	death	of	a	more	qualitative	social	democracy.				Apart	 from	 a	 single	written	 reference	 to	women’s	 protests	 in	Montenegro	 against	 the	recent	wars	(GONG,	2018),	a	short	publication	(Anima,	2018)	and	sporadic	accounts	of	some	of	 the	research	participants,	 little	 information	exists	on	women’s	activism	during	the	war	years	in	the	1990s11.	However,	there	is	evidence	proving	that	a	group	of	women	in	 the	 coastal	 town	of	Kotor	organised	a	peace	protest	 in	1991,	 termed	Call	 to	Reason	and	 Peace,	 which	 fostered	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 group	 called	 Krug,	 opposing	 the	 wars	(Anima,	2018).	Krug	 facilitated	weekly	meetings	over	 the	course	of	 the	 five	war	years,	yet	 the	 short	publication	does	not	provide	 the	 content	 and	purpose	of	 these	meetings.	What	is	known	is	that	Krug	gave	birth	to	a	women’s	organisation,	called	Anima,	which	to	this	day	advocates	for	peace	and	conflict	resolution.			
																																																								11	Two	of	the	Anima	members	explained	to	me	that	hard	copy	material	on	peace	protests	and	women’s	activism	in	the	1990s	is	kept	in	the	organisation’s	library	in	Kotor,	but	unfortunately	there	are	no	electronic	editions	available.	
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Presently,	women	in	the	republics	of	the	former	Yugoslavia,	including	Montenegro,	have	to	fight	against	the	consequences	of	“rapid	repatriarchalisation”	(Đokanović	et	al,	2014:	134),	a	process	in	which	the	democratic	fight	for	liberty	and	equality	was	replaced	with	the	corrupt	and	repressive	practices	of	a	political	elite.	But	they	also	have	to	fight	against	new	 trends	 that	 fortify	 this	 ‘repatriarchialisation’,	 such	 as	 the	 masculinisation	 of	 the	public	sphere,	selective	abortions	(i.e.	abortions	of	female	foetuses)	and	the	revival	of	an	aggressive	nationalist	discourse,	to	name	only	a	few	(CEDAW,	2017;	GREVIO,	2017).				
2.3.	Women’s	Rights	Centre:	the	scene	of	study		The	 research	 setting	 I	 chose	 as	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 study	 is	 an	 organisation	 called	 the	Women’s	Rights	Centre	(WRC).	It	is	worth	noting,	though,	that	in	searching	for	a	data	set	to	explore	the	RQ,	I	initially	focused	predominantly	on	larger	organisations	with	a	longer	track	 record	within	Montenegro’s	 civil	 sector,	 especially	 those	with	a	derivation	of	 the	word	 ‘democracy’	 in	 their	 titles.	 However,	 the	 more	 I	 searched	 and	 spoke	 with	 NGO	actors,	 government	 officials,	 grassroots	 practitioners,	 academics	 and	 journalists,	 the	more	 I	 started	 hearing	 about	 WRC	 as	 a	 potentially	 suitable	 place	 to	 explore	 the	challenges	and	enactments	of	democratic	practice.	I	gradually	started	immersing	myself	in	the	organisation’s	work	via	its	website,	its	Facebook	page,	where	it	posts	its	reactions	to	 the	 various	 events	 taking	 place	 in	 society,	 alongside	 news	 of	 its	 own	 work,	 and	eventually	via	emails	and	other	messenger	services.		More	detail	on	the	work	of	WRC	will	be	provided	in	the	methodology	section	but	for	now	it	is	worth	noting	that	it	is	one	of	the	organisations	in	Montenegro	that	tasks	itself	with	
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the	 democratisation	 of	 society.	 Faithful	 to	 their	 heritage,	 WRC	 practitioners	 perceive	themselves	 as	 “champions	 of	 democracy	 in	 a	 country	 in	 transition”	 (Ina,	 a	 research	participant)	 and	 as	 campaigning	 women,	 “who	 have	 a	 true,	 rich	 and	 honest	 legacy	 of	democratic	 struggle	 to	 connect	 with”	 (Mina,	 a	 research	 participant).	 It	 is	 a	 relatively	young	 organisation,	 founded	 in	 2012;	 however,	 organisation	 members	 have	 long-standing	 experience	 of	 working	 in	 and	 with	 other	 civil	 sector	 organisations	 (in	 some	cases	 for	 over	 15	 years).	 The	 organisation	 is	 small,	 counting	 only	 six	 permanent	employees,	 although	 it	 attracts	 a	 sizeable	 number	 of	 volunteers	 and	 associates,	 who	support	 its	work	pro	bono.	 Yet,	 even	 though	WRC	 is	 small	 in	 size,	many	of	 those	who	work	 with	 it	 describe	 it	 as	 “an	 army	 of	 a	 few”	 (Nikola),	 “a	 big-small	 organisation”	(Milica),	 “a	powerful	 force	 for	 equality	 and	protectors	of	women’s	 lives”	 (Jasna).	 For	 a	few	years	after	 founding	the	organisation,	WRC	members	worked	for	 free,	 investing	all	the	funds	they	could	secure	into	programmes	and	working	pro	bono.			With	their	“selfless,	 intelligent	and	dedicated	work”	(a	donor),	WRC	managed	to	attract	the	 attention	of	 the	 Swedish	 foundation,	Kvinna	 till	Kvinna	 (KTK),	which	 is	 known	 for	providing	 assistance	 to	women	 in	 conflict	 and	post-conflict	 zones,	 such	 as	 the	Balkans	(KTK,	2018).	It	is	worth	noting	here	that	WRC	was	approached	by	the	foundation	rather	than	the	usual	other	way	around,	which	is	“a	testimony	to	WRC’s	integrity	and	genuine	dedication	 to	 liberty	 and	 equality”	 (KTK	 member).	 The	 assistance	 provided	 by	 KTK	helped	WRC	further	develop	its	programmes	and	the	foundation	remains	one	of	its	main	donors	to	this	day.			WRC	 also	 relies	 on	 funding	 from	 another	 major	 donor	 –	 the	 OAK	 Foundation,	 which	provides	 assistance	 in	 the	 area	 of	 strengthening	 the	 women’s	 movement	 and	 civil	
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organisations’	 capacity	 building	 (see	 OAK,	 2018).	WRC	 also	 received	 assistance	 in	 the	past	 for	 individual,	 smaller	 projects	 (e.g.	 educational	 seminars	 for	 the	 judiciary	 or	workshops	for	domestic	violence	survivors)	from	foreign	embassies.	In	addition,	a	more	modest	 financial	 resource	 is	 secured	 through	 a	 small	 enterprise	 WRC	 initiated	 a	 few	years	 ago,	 namely,	 the	 organisation	makes	 and	 sells	 shopping	 bags,	 t-shirts,	 jewellery	and	 stationery	 boxes	 featuring	 its	 own	 designs,	 the	 proceeds	 of	 which	 go	 towards	psychological	and	legal	support	for	the	survivors	of	gender-based	and	family	violence.		WRC	 has	 brought	 about	 a	 change	 in	 the	 mandate	 of	 women’s	 organisations	 in	Montenegro:	 instead	 of	 focusing	 exclusively	 on	 family	 and	 gender-based	 violence	 and	pacifism,	 like	the	majority	of	women’s	organisations	in	the	country12,	WRC,	similarly	to	its	 predecessors	 in	 the	 former	 Yugoslavia,	 focuses	 on	 the	 proactive	 generation	 of	democratic	practice	for	everyone	and	not	solely	upon	ameliorating	the	consequences	of	the	 power	 imbalance	 between	 genders.	 The	 work	 of	 WRC	 is	 rooted	 in	 democratic	principles	of	 liberty	and	equality	 and	 the	overall	 aim	of	 the	organisation	 is	 to	 create	a	more	equal	society.	Its	mission	statement	closely	aligns	with	the	concerns	of	the	RQ	and	reads	as	follows:			 WRC	 is	 a	 non-profit,	 non-partisan,	 non-religious	 organisation	 that	 fights	 for	 the	elimination	 of	 all	 forms	 of	 violence	 against	women,	 helping	women	 access	 justice,	 and	developing	 gender-equal	 democratic	 practice	 in	 cooperation	 with	 all	 relevant	 national	and	international	stakeholders	(WRC,	2017).		
																																																								12	E.g.	Most	of	the	women’s	organisations,	such	as	the	NGO	Safe	Women’s	House	and	SOS	NGOs	in	different	municipalities,	specialize	in	the	provision	of	assistance	to	survivors	of	violence,	with	the	exception	of	ANIMA,	another	influential	organisation,	which	focuses	predominantly	on	pacifism.	
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Broadly,	 the	work	of	WRC	 can	be	 categorised	 as	 taking	place	 via	 three	 interconnected	concerns:	 supporting	 the	 legal	 and	 psychological	wellbeing	 of	women;	 influencing	 the	country’s	 legal	 framework;	 and,	 challenging	 patriarchal	 culture.	 Each	 area	 has	 a	corresponding	programme,	designed	to	feed	into	and	complement	one	another,	and	they	are	 all	 directed	 at	 addressing	 the	 problem	 of	 inequality,	 albeit	 from	 different	perspectives.	 These	 are:	 the	 programme	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 legal	 and	 psychological	assistance;	the	advocacy	programme;	and	the	cultural	programme.	It	is	worth	noting	that	even	 though	 the	 activities	 of	WRC	 are	 formally	 divided	 into	 these	 three	 programmes,	there	is	a	significant	overlap	between	them	and	they	should	not	be	perceived	as	discrete.				
II	Summary		I	 first	 explored	 the	 current	 socio-political	 context	 of	 Montenegro	 as	 a	 country	 in	transition	 in	 order	 to	 underline	 the	 role	 of	 NGOs	 in	 the	 process	 of	 democratisation.	 I	argued	 that	 while	 civil	 sector	 organisations	 are	 perceived	 as	 important	 drivers	 of	democratic	 practice	 in	 countries	 in	 transition,	 their	 work	 in	 Montenegro	 is	 often	inhibited	by	endemic	corruption	and	patriarchy.	Second,	I	provided	a	historical	overview	of	the	fight	for	liberty	and	equality	by	women	in	the	context	of	the	former	Yugoslavia	in	order	to	situate	the	work	of	WRC	within	the	lineage	of	 its	predecessors.	 In	particular,	 I	argued	that	women	occupied,	and	continue	to	occupy,	a	central	role	in	democratisation	struggles	in	Yugoslavia.	Finally,	I	provided	a	more	detailed	account	of	the	work	of	WRC	in	instigating	“gender-equal	democratic	practice”	(WRC,	2017)	in	the	country.			
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I	 now	move	 on	 to	 present	 a	 literature	 review	 relevant	 to	 addressing	 the	 topic	 of	 how	NGO	 practitioners	 enact	 democratic	 practice,	 paying	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	discursive	norms	generated	through	studies	and	accounts	of	democracy.						
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III	Literature	review	–	Democratic	practice		
Introduction		I	 begin	 the	 chapter	 by	 reviewing	 the	 literature	 that	 relates	 to	 NGOs	 and	 democratic	practice,	 searching	 for	 insight	 into	 the	 work	 of	 NGO	 practitioners.	 Finding	 little	explanation	 or	 exploration	 of	 democratic	 practice,	 I	 explore	 two	 contemporary	participative	theories	of	democratic	practice	–	deliberation	and	agonism	–	as	a	means	of	surfacing	 norms	 of	 democratic	 engagement	 that	 may	 be	 observed	 in	 the	 field.	 In	particular,	 I	 interpret	 agonism	 and	 deliberative	 democracy	 as	 generating	 a	 series	 of	similar,	yet	also	in	many	ways	divergent	norms,	which	aim	to	guide	democratic	practice.	Read	from	a	performative	perspective,	such	norms	provide	a	series	of	expectations,	even	guidelines,	regarding	what	it	means	to	be	a	democratic	subject.		Before	proceeding,	however,	it	is	necessary	to	clarify	how	I	approach	studies	of	internal	organisational	 democracy,	 which	 are	 related,	 but	 not	 central	 to,	 the	 focus	 of	 this	research.	There	 is	a	substantial	 literature	relating	to	 internal	organisational	democracy	and	the	building	of	“alternative	practices	of	organisation”	(King	and	Land,	2018:	2).	Such	studies	focus	on	how	people	within	organisations	can	generate	more	egalitarian	relations	and	 forms	 of	 decision-making	 (e.g.	 Griffin	 et	 al,	 2015;	 Parker	 and	Parker,	 2015).	 They	also	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 organisational	 structure	 and	 its	 effects	 (e.g.	 Blaug,	 2009),	 rather	than	upon	the	practices	of	organisations	in	democratising	the	societies	in	which	they	are	situated,	 although	 some	 organisations,	 particularly	 ones	 informed	 by	 an	 anarchist	ideology,	seek	to	model	their	visions	for	society	internally,	within	the	organisation	(e.g.	
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Lagallise,	 2010;	 Land	 and	 King,	 2014;	 Sutherland	 et	 al,	 2014).	 While	 internal	organisational	democracy	is	not	the	focus	of	this	research,	studies	that	inform	and	enrich	the	 conceptualisation	 and	 understanding	 of	 democratic	 practice	 more	 generally	 are	included	in	the	section	of	the	literature	review	relating	to	deliberation	and	agonism.		
3.1.	NGOs	as	democratic	actors		This	 section	 of	 the	 review	 focuses	 on	 better	 understanding	 the	 role	 of	 NGOs	 in	 the	process	 of	 democratising	 the	 environments	 they	 are	 embedded	 within.	 I	 begin	 by	offering	some	of	the	definitions	necessary	for	understanding	the	focus	of	my	research	–	of	 civil	 society	 in	 general	 and	 especially	NGOs,	 organisations	 that	 can	 task	 themselves	with	building	democracy	in	transition	contexts.	Second,	I	establish	an	evidence	base	from	the	 literature	 that	NGOs	 indeed	play	 a	major	 role	 in	 generating	democratic	practice	 in	countries	 in	 transition.	 Third,	 I	 offer	 an	 exploration	 of	 dominant	 approaches	 to	 NGO-specific	 research	 in	 the	 context	 of	 democratic	 practice.	 Fourth,	 I	 consider	 what	 the	literature	tells	us	about	the	role	of	NGOs	in	corrupt	environments.	Finally,	I	explore	NGO	research	that	studies	the	relationship	between	patriarchy	and	democracy.			The	 majority	 of	 this	 literature	 seeks	 to	 make	 general	 claims	 about	 democratisation	programmes	or	initiative	effectiveness	based	upon	measuring	impact	and	participation.	Personal	accounts	or	narratives	relating	to	 the	practitioners	of	democratic	practice	are	largely	missing	from	these	studies,	together	with	a	sense	of	how	practitioners	generate	democratic	 practice.	 Likewise,	 the	 conceptual	 positioning	 of	 democracy	 is	 found	 to	 be	lacking	in	sophistication.	The	notion	that	democracy	might	be	a	rich,	multi-dimensional	and	contested	concept	is	absent	from	the	literature.		
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3.1.2.	Civil	society	and	NGOs		Civil	society	is	often	described	as	occupying	the	space	between	the	private	sphere,	state	and	 market	 (Dagher,	 2017)	 –	 a	 space	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 public	 sphere	(Habermas,	 1989),	 although	 its	 borders	 are	 fluid	 and	 changing.	 Such	 society	 is	 usually	thought	of	as	a	backbone	of	communal	life,	“a	pluralistic…self-developing	system,	which	influences	all	the	spheres	of	society”	(Ershova,	2015:	33);	an	organisation	of	community	life,	 which	 is	 “open,	 voluntary,	 self-generating,	 at	 least	 partially	 self-supporting,	autonomous	from	the	state,	and	bound	by	a	legal	order	or	set	of	shared	rules”	(Diamond	1999:	221).	As	such,	civil	society	can	feature	more	structured	formations,	such	as:	“non-government	 organisations…grass-roots	 organisations”	 (Sahoo,	 2013:	 259),	 but	 also	loosely	 structured	 “groups	of	people…informal	networks	 [and]	 associations”	 (Crotty	 et	al.,	2014:	1255).			Yet	in	the	context	of	post-communist	societies,	civil	society	is	often	used	interchangeably	with	 ‘NGOs’	 (see	 Jordan,	 2010;	 Mercer,	 2002)	 and	 understood	 as	 an	 “assemblage	 of	NGOs”	 (Drażkiewich-Grodzicka,	2016:	346),	or	a	 “wide	array	of	non-governmental	 and	not-for-profit	organisations”	(Dagher,	2017:	55).	Such	conflation	between	the	two	terms	is	predominantly	a	result	of	the	mushrooming	of	NGOs	in	the	post-communist	countries	in	the	1990s,	often	labelled	as	civil	society	“by	both	academics	and	activists”	(Jezierska,	2015:	 835).	 Organisations	 such	 as	 these	 came	 to	 fill	 a	 gap	 in	 civic	 and	 social	 life	 in	countries	ravaged	by	uncertainty	and	violence	(El-Kassem,	2008).			
	 39	
Crotty	et	al.	(2014)	describe	NGOs	as	“voluntary,	self-governing,	non-profit	formations”	(p.	1255),	or	“formal	civil	society	groups”	(ibid.),	which	are	established	for	the	purpose	of	realising	the	common	goals	of	a	particular	group	–	e.g.	ethnic,	political,	religious,	and	so	on.	This	description	corresponds	to	the	definition	provided	in	the	Montenegrin	Law	on	NGOs,	 which	 states	 that:	 “non-governmental	 organisations	 are	 voluntary,	 non-profit	organisations…founded	 by	 either	 local	 or	 foreign	 private	 or	 legal	 entities,	 with	 the	purpose	of	 realising	common	goals	and	 interests”	 (Službeni	 list	CG,	br.	039/11).	These	organisations	 often	 mediate	 between	 the	 state	 and	 people,	 especially	 in	 a	 transition	context	 (Dagher,	 2017;	 Drażkiewicz-Grodzicka,	 2016;	 Grodsky,	 2012).	 Such	mediation	usually	 involves	 close	 monitoring	 of	 the	 government’s	 work,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	fostering	people’s	 interest	 in,	 and	engagement	with,	 socio-political	 issues,	on	 the	other	(Ennaji,	2016).				NGOs	that	task	themselves	with	generating	democratic	practice	are	frequently	described	as	organisations	“serving	as	watchdogs	against	government	abuses”	(Antlöv	et	al,	2010:	419;	Herrold,	 2016:	 191;	 Jezierska,	 2015:	 844).	However,	 in	 new	democratic	 contexts,	NGOs	also	operate	as	“conduits	of	citizen	interests”	(Herrold,	2016:	191)	into	the	public	sphere,	ensuring	that	those	interests	are	heard	and	acted	upon	by	decision-makers.	Yet	these	organisations	are	not	merely	messengers	and	watchdogs,	but	are	also	perceived	as	responsible	for	“empowering	marginalised	and	disadvantaged	societal	groups,	providing	civic	education,	engaging	in	advocacy,	and	lobbying	for	public	goods”	(Antlöv	et	al,	2010:	419).	 Moreover,	 they	 are	 perceived	 as	 crucial	 for	 the	 process	 of	 democratisation	 in	countries	in	transition	(Mair,	2013),	as	I	elaborate	upon	in	the	next	section.			
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3.1.3.	The	importance	and	role	of	NGOs	in	generating	democratic	practice		The	 generation	 of	 democracy	 in	 countries	 in	 transition	 has	 attracted	 the	 attention	 of	scholars	 for	 a	 number	 of	 decades.	 Major	 geopolitical	 shifts,	 such	 as	 the	 collapse	 of	communism	and	the	liberation	of	former	colonies	in	the	1970s	and	1980s,	placed	NGOs	at	the	heart	of	the	process	of	‘democratisation’	in	these	countries	(Clarke,	1998;	Fowler,	1993;	Mair,	2013;	Mercer,	2002).	Democratisation	is	a	term	used	to	denote	a	process	of	transition	 from	 a	 non-democratic	 (autocratic)	 to	 democratic	 form	 of	 government	(Antlöv,	 2010;	Gershman	 and	Allen,	 2006;	 Papaloannou	 and	 Siourounis,	 2008).	 Such	 a	transition	is	envisaged	to	involve	major	social,	economic	and	political	adjustments,	such	as	 the	 transformation	 and/or	 establishment	 of	 democratic	 institutions,	 as	 well	 as	 a	change	of	people’s	mindsets	(Rustow,	1970).			Transition	 towards	 democracy	 can	 be	 a	 turbulent	 process	 (Lokar,	 2007),	 and	 just	because	 a	 country	 has	 opted	 for	 a	 formally	 democratic	 form	 of	 governing	 does	 not	necessarily	 mean	 that	 its	 government	 is	 committed	 to	 democratic	 norms	 and	 values	(Gershman	and	Allen,	2006).	Hybrid	regimes	(those	that	hover	between	autocratic	and	democratic)	 often	 suffer	 from	 “manipulated	 elections,	 a	 weak	 parliament,	 an	overweening	 executive	 branch,	 state-controlled	 media,	 rampant	 corruption,	 and	 no	recourse	 to	 an	 independent	 judiciary.”	 (ibid:	 37).	 Therefore,	 one	 of	 the	main	 tasks	 of	NGOs	 in	 a	 process	 of	 democratisation	 is	 to	 “pressure,	 prod,	 and	 advise	 transitional	government	 institutions	 to	 become	 more	 transparent	 and	 accountable	 to	 citizens”	(Harrold,	2016:	192).	The	underlying	justification	for	an	increase	in	the	involvement	of	NGOs	in	the	public	life	of	countries	in	transition,	provided	by	scholars	and	practitioners,	is	 threefold.	 First,	 as	 governments	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 problematic	 (repressive,	 corrupt	 or	
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simply	possessing	a	partisan	political	agenda),	NGOs	can	offer	a	critical	stance	and	insist	on	 accountability	 (Herrold,	 2016;	 Mountford,	 2009).	 Second,	 NGOs	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	possessing	 technical	knowledge	 (often	supplied	by	various	 international	organisations’	guidelines,	brochures	and	manuals)	largely	absent	within	the	governments	of	countries	in	 transition	 (Blaug,	 2002;	 Carothers,	 2009;	 Ennaji,	 2016).	 Third,	 NGOs	 are	 viewed	 as	part	of	a	broader	civil	society,	whose	vitality	is	held	as	essential	for	the	maintenance	of	economically	 and	 socially	 healthy	 nation-states	 (Mair,	 2013;	 Shipper,	 2012;	 Todor,	2017).			Such	a	positioning	of	NGOs	has	contributed	to	their	widely	perceived	identity	as	“agents”	(Fowler,	 1993:	 325)	 and/or	 the	 “new	 political	 actor[s]”	 (Clarke,	 1998:	 37)	 of	 socio-political	transformation	within	countries	in	transition.	Some	scholars	have	gone	as	far	as	to	describe	NGOs	as	an	essential	 ingredient	 for	the	“formula”	of	developing	democratic	practice	(Mair,	2013:	11)	or	a	force	that	mobilises	civil	society	and	thus	generates	a	more	inclusive	and	diverse	“political	sphere”	(Mercer,	2002:	10).	Thus,	the	task	of	generating	democratic	 practice	 in	 countries	 in	 transition	 has	 increasingly	 been	 characterised	 and	practiced	 as	 the	 responsibility	 of	 NGOs,	 rather	 than	 only	 governments	 (Feltes,	 2013;	Mair,	2013;	Suleiman,	2013;	Todor,	2017).				
3.1.4.	Democratic	practice	and	the	work	of	NGOs		The	focus	in	the	literature	is	largely	on	measuring	the	degree	and	quality	of	democracy	‘attained’	 through	 the	 formal	 programmes	 of	 NGOs	 and	 government,	 rather	 than	 on	exploring	 the	 practices	 of	 people	 delivering	 these	 programmes	 (see,	 Fuchs	 and	Roller,	
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2018;	 Sigman	 and	 Lindberg,	 2018).	 Such	 an	 approach	 means	 that	 the	 meaning	 of	democracy	tends	to	be	assumed,	rather	than	explicitly	stated	and	interrogated,	defined	in	an	ex-post	manner	through	categories	of	measurement.	For	example,	Kneuer	(2016)	presents	 a	 model	 for	 measuring	 the	 quality	 of	 online	 democracy	 by	 breaking	participative	 democracy	 into	 three	 clusters	 (information,	 dialogue	 and	 monitoring	 of	decision-making)	and	then	measuring	an	individual	indicator	for	each	(e.g.	the	existence	of	 regulations	 pertaining	 to	 freedom	 of	 expression,	 blogs,	 government’s	 tools	 for	 the	inclusion	of	citizens,	etc.).			Where	defined,	democracy	tends	to	be	understood	as	representing	a	series	of	values	held	as	universal,	e.g.	 ‘liberty’,	 ‘freedom’,	 ‘equality’,	 ‘justice’,	etc.,	 (see	Carbone,	2009),	which	authors	 translate	 as	 a	 series	 of	 indicators	 (e.g.	 number	 of	 women	 in	 various	 tiers	 of	government,	 etc.)	 that	 can	be	measured	 and	 compared	 across	 contexts	 (Altman,	 2013;	Bogaards,	 2012;	 Blair,	 2003;	 Diamond	 and	 Morlino,	 2005;	 Munck,	 2015).	 Relatedly,	democratic	practice	tends	to	be	understood	as	a	set	of	procedures,	e.g.	‘the	rule-of-law’,	‘responsiveness’,	 ‘elections’,	 ‘accountability’	 and	 ‘participation’,	 which	 can	 also	 be	defined	 through	 a	 series	 of	 indicators	 (e.g.	 ratification	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	Human	Rights,	etc.)	and	quantified	(see,	Bland	et	al,	2013;	Mechkova	et	al,	2017;	Morlino,	2004;	Todor,	2017).			No	doubt	this	quantitative	(usually	positivist)	approach	to	democratic	practice	has	value	in	confirming	or	disconfirming	a	number	of	trends,	providing	an	assessment	of	the	‘state’	of	 democratic	 practice	 (e.g.	 statistical	 analysis	 provides	 us	 with	 a	 description	 of	preference	 trends	 in	 voting,	 differences	 between	 demographics,	 the	 effectiveness	 of	NGOs,	etc.)	but,	often,	statistics	mask	as	much	as	they	show.	Doorenspleet	(2015)	states	
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that	a	lack	of	practitioner	voice	in	accounts	of	democracy	skews	perceptions,	providing	‘expert’	opinions	on	the	kinds	of	democratic	practice	performed,	without	consulting	the	people	who	perform	it,	which	may	privilege	an	“elitist	notion	of	democracy”	(ibid:	479).	With	 a	 taken-for-granted	 assumption	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 democracy	 and	 democratic	practice,	 the	 literature	 reveals	 less	 about	 the	 work	 by	 practitioners	 who	 deliver	programmes	 and	 the	 rich	 and	 contested	 meaning	 attached	 to	 ‘democracy’	 and	‘democratic	 practice’	 (Doorenspleet,	 2015;	 Mercer,	 2002;	 McHenry	 and	 Mady,	 2006;	Hogstrom,	 2014;	 Ohanyan,	 2012;	 Seeberg,	 2014).	 The	 impression	 is	 conveyed	 that	democratic	practice	exists	as	a	discrete	object,	free	from	contest	and	set	apart	from	the	people	who	work	with	it	and	generate	it.			A	 small	 number	 of	 qualitative	 researchers	 in	 this	 area	 argue	 that	 the	 emphasis	 on	generalisation	 in	quantitative	studies	 inevitably	misses	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	 democracy	 and	 associated	 practice	 (El-Kassem,	 2008;	 Feltes,	 2013;	 Sahoo,	 2014;	Suleiman,	2013).	The	argument	of	these	scholars	of	NGOs	and	democratic	practice	is	that	qualitative	 research	 may	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 highlighting	 previously	 masked	dynamics	in	the	work	of	NGOs,	such	as	the	capacity	of	initiatives	labelled	as	‘democratic’	to	disenfranchise,	as	well	as	empower	(Drażkiewicz-Grodzicka,	2016;	Sahoo,	2014).	For	example,	 Drażkiewicz-Grodzicka	 (2016)	 reports	 on	 her	 experiences	 working	 in	 an	organisation	 in	 Poland	 in	 the	 post-accession	 period	 (when	 Poland	 became	 a	member-state	 of	 the	 EU),	 which	 now	 acts	 as	 a	 democracy	 support	 fund	 for	 neighbouring	countries.	The	author	argues	 that	 the	organisation	supports	only	 those	NGO	 initiatives	that	 are	 technical	 in	 character	 (e.g.	 workshops	 for	 managers	 and	 leaders)	 and/or	politically	 neutral	 and	 devoid	 of	 activism	 (e.g.	 service	 provisions	 for	 gender-based	
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violence	 victims)	 but	 never	 those	 that	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 challenging	 the	 status	 quo,	which	has	the	potential	to	render	these	NGOs	“institutionalised”	(p.346)	and	passive.			An	 account	 of	 people’s	 experiences	 and	 enactments	 of	 ‘democracy’	 remains	 absent	 in	these	 studies,	 which	 favour	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 socio-political	 environment	 surrounding	specific	initiatives	(see	Antlöv	et	al,	2010;	Crotty	et	al,	2015;	Herrold,	2016).	While	it	is	important	 to	 acknowledge	 that	NGOs	 and	 their	 programmes	play	 an	 important	 role	 in	democratising	 formerly	 autocratic	 states,	 it	would	 be	 naïve	 to	 take	 these	 processes	 as	challenge-free	 and	 devoid	 of	 human	 involvement.	 Acknowledging	 that	 democracy	 is	 a	contested	 concept	 and	 exploring	 how	 people	 experience,	 grapple	 and	 struggle	 with	putting	 ‘democracy’	 into	 practice	 is	 of	 value	 for	 understanding	 the	 generation	 of	democratic	practice	in	a	transitional	context.			
3.1.5.	Corruption,	NGOs	and	democratic	practice		Public	 corruption	 is	 frequently	 defined	 as	 “the	 abuse	 of	 public	 office	 for	 private	 gain”	(Epperlon	and	Lee,	2015:	176;	see	also	Kolstad	and	Wiig,	2016;	Lennerfors,	2007).	Such	abuse	 can	manifest	 in	 the	 form	 of	 “state	 capture”	 (Sadiku,	 2015:	 42),	where	 powerful	individuals	influence	and	control	political	decisions	(e.g.	laws,	votes,	rules,	etc.)	through	private	 payments	 such	 as	 “bribery”	 (Granter,	 2017:	 98)	 or	 “racketeering”	 (ibid:	 97).	Another	manifestation	of	corruption	 is	 termed	“clientelism”	(Johnson	et	al,	2013:	181),	where	political	decisions	are	influenced	through	the	exchanging	of	favours.	For	instance,	political	 party	 representatives	 may	 offer	 favours	 to	 hesitant	 voters	 in	 exchange	 for	support,	 and	 so	 influence	 the	 outcome	 of	 elections	 (Vicente	 and	 Wantchekon,	 2009).	
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However,	Johnson	et	al	(2013)	explore	a	more	covert	form	of	clientelism	–	as	patriarchal	associations	of	patronage,	where	men	 support	 one	 another	 through	a	network	of	 quid	pro	 quo	 relations,	 which	 further	 entrenches	 inequality	 in	 formally	 democratic	environments.	 In	 clientelist	 settings,	 corrupt	practice	 is	driven	by	 “egoism,	 selfishness,	greed	and	abuse	of	trust”	(Lennerfors,	2007:	387),	which	bear	material	consequences	for	the	lives	of	women	(Roberts,	2012).			The	 NGO	 literature	 that	 explores	 the	 relationship	 between	 democratic	 practice	 and	corruption	 is	 predominantly	 quantitative	 and	 could	 broadly	 be	 grouped	 into	 three	streams:	 research	 that	 explores	 the	 positive	 impact	 of	 NGOs	 in	 fighting	 corruption;	research	that	recognises	NGOs	as	contributors	to	corruption;	and,	a	body	of	research	that	explores	 the	 gendered	 nature	 of	 corrupt	 practices,	 positing	 women	 as	 a	 potential	counterforce	in	new	democracies.	Each	is	addressed	in	turn	below.			
NGOs	as	counterforce	to	corruption		Democracy	is	recognised	by	some	researchers	as	a	solution	to	corruption,	which	is	why	advocates	 for	 the	 development	 of	 democracy	 urge	 more	 investment	 in	 strengthening	democratic	 institutions	 (Kolstad	 and	 Wiig,	 2016;	 Madeley,	 2003).	 However,	 some	authors	 argue	 that	 a	 problem	 arises	 when	 ‘democratic’	 government	 institutions	themselves	become	the	major	generators	of	corrupt	practices,	most	notably	in	the	‘new’	democracies	 of	 countries	 in	 transition	 (Chandler,	 2010;	 Nahan	 and	 D’Cruze,	 2004;	Sadiku,	2015).	In	contexts	where	democracy	is	in	its	early	stages	of	development,	NGOs	are	recognised	as	a	“watch-dog”	–	a	powerful	force	for	reducing	corruption	and	keeping	
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institutions	accountable	(Sadiku,	2015:	36).	Yet,	research	demonstrates	that	 in	practice	NGOs	 often	 lose	 battles	 with	 corrupt	 institutions,	 which	 undermine	 the	 legal	 and	financial	 capacities	 of	NGOs	 regarded	 as	 oppositional	 (Dupuy	 et	 al,	 2015;	 Epperly	 and	Lee,	2015;	Mietzner,	2012).	While	most	researchers	in	this	stream	of	literature	recognise	the	 difficult	 position	 of	 NGOs	 in	 countries	 in	 transition	 to	 fulfil	 their	 role	 as	 the	main	combatants	of	corrupt	institutional	and	social	practices,	such	research	offers	no	insight	into	experiences	of	NGO	practitioners	in	relation	to	corrupt	practices	in	their	day-to-day	work.			
NGOs	as	contributors	to	corruption		Some	authors	argue	 that	NGOs	not	only	 fail	 at	 their	 task	of	 combatting	 corruption	but	sometimes	 actively	 perpetuate	 the	 problem	 (Rakner,	 2011;	 Smith,	 2010).	 Many	 NGOs	receive	funds	from	foreign	donors	(various	foundations,	international	and	supranational	organisations)	for	the	purpose	of	promoting	and	developing	democratic	practice,	which	makes	these	donors	directly	implicated	in	the	work	of	local	NGOs.	However,	such	funding	rarely	 comes	 without	 specific	 caveats,	 which	 can	 wield	 significant	 influence	 on	 the	policymaking	of	governments.			The	 phenomenon	 of	 the	 “GONGO”	 (Smith,	 2010:	 250)	 –	 a	 governmental	 non-governmental	 organisation	 –	 is	 important	 for	 better	 understanding	 how	 NGOs	 can	perpetuate	 corruption.	 GONGOs	 operate	 through	 funds	 donated	 to	 government	 via	foreign	 aid	 agencies	 and	 international	 donors	 but	 are	 in	 reality	 ‘shell’	 organisations	established	 to	 pursue	 the	 private	 interests	 of	 corrupt	 government	 actors,	 promoting	
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political	causes	that	will	result	in	the	private	financial	profit	of	the	political	elite	(ibid).	In	contrast,	NGOs	that	succumb	to	the	agenda	of	their	international	donors	are	sometimes	referred	to	as	“briefcase	NGOs”	(Dupuy	et	al,	2015:	419)	due	to	their	excessive	attention	to	‘carrying’	the	political	agenda	of	donors,	which	may	or	may	not	be	relevant	to	the	local	context.	In	societies	in	which	corruption	is	widespread,	even	NGO	practitioners	deemed	trustworthy	and	respectable	“frequently	get	caught	up	in	corruption”	(Smith,	2010:	249)	simply	 because	 operating	 in	 such	 environments	 means	 that	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 avoid	dealing	with	corrupt	officials.				
Women	as	a	counterforce	to	corruption		A	 number	 of	 researchers	 claim	 that	 women	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 impervious	 to	corruption	and	generally	orientated	towards	“promoting	honest	government”	(Dollar	et	al,	 2001:	 423),	 advocating	 for	 “human	 rights,	 tolerance…conflict-resolution”	 (Mulalić,	2011:	53)	and	fighting	against	“discrimination,	 inequality,	deprivation,	exploitation	and	oppression”	 (Nazneen	 et	 al,	 2010:	 240).	 In	 the	 developing	 world,	 including	 young	democracies,	 “women	have	become	 the	awaited	saviours	of	 countries	afflicted	by	poor	governance”	 (Sung,	 2012:	 196),	 and	 increased	 representation	 of	 women	 in	 decision-making	 processes	 has	 been	 advocated	 for	 as	 a	 strategy	 for	 combating	 corruption	(Mulalić,	2011;	Stockemer,	2011;	Sung,	2003	and	2012).			Even	if	such	stereotypical	assumptions	concerning	women	were	to	hold	true,	in	practice,	the	 public	 sphere	 globally	 is	 still	 dominated	 by	 men,	 who	 are	 “given	 precedence	 in	[constructing	 and]	 interpreting	 reality”	 (Crevani	 and	 Lennerfors,	 2009:	 127).	 It	 is	 a	
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‘reality’	in	which	patriarchal	relations	reproduce,	reinvent	and	reinstitute	practices	that	are	 unequal,	 restrictive	 –	 and,	 by	 extension,	 corrupt,	 according	 to	 liberal	 democratic	standards	of	liberty	and	equality	(Baxter	and	MacLeod,	2005).	Perhaps	such	patriarchal	dominance	explains	why	women	may	be	 “reluctant	 to	enter	 the	world	of	 government”	(Croegaert,	2015:	29),	because	when	they	do,	they	are	left	exposed	by	weak	democratic	institutions	that	fail	to	“promote	equality,	fairness,	and	meritocracy”	(Sung,	2003:	718).			Much	 research	 focuses	 on	 the	 institutional	 representation	 of	 women	 and	 the	programmes	 designed	 for	 fostering	 the	 inclusion	 of	 women	 in	 politics	 and	 business,	rather	than	the	day-to-day	experiences	of	female	NGO	practitioners	within	the	milieu	of	socio-political	 corruption	 or	 the	 experiences	 of	 practitioners	 in	 seeking	 to	 change	 the	system	 itself	 (e.g.	Dollar	et	al,	2001;	Haukenes	and	Freyberg-Inan,	2013;	 Johnson	et	al,	2013;	 Stockemer,	 2011).	 In	 the	 Yugoslav	 context,	 Mulalić	 (2011)	 recognises	 the	importance	of	women’s	NGOs	in	democratising	Bosnia	and	Herzegovinian	society,	during	and	after	the	wars	of	the	1990s.	However,	even	though	the	author	states	that	women’s	NGOs	 employed	 anti-corruption	 initiatives,	 Mulalić	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 glimpse	 into	practitioners’	engagement	with	corrupt	practices,	 individuals	and	groups	in	their	work,	something	common	to	other	similar	studies.		In	 summary,	 the	 NGO	 literature,	 while	 exploring	 empirically	 the	 connections	 between	corruption	and	democratic	practice,	does	not	address	the	everyday	experiences	of	NGO	practitioners	in	navigating	their	way	through	such	an	environment,	 issues	which	I	seek	to	address	through	my	performative	focus.				
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Democracy,	patriarchy	and	NGOs		Patriarchy	 is	 recognised	as	being	 “inconsistent	with	democracy”	 (Richards,	2013:	178)	because	it	goes	against	the	principles	of	liberty	and	equality,	privileging	certain	men	and	masculinities	 with	 a	 ‘natural’	 form	 of	 authority,	 exempt	 from	 the	 requirements	 of	democratic	scrutiny	or	mandate.	 Indeed,	the	patriarchal	mindset	has	been	identified	as	stifling	 equality	 throughout	 history	 in	 societies	 deemed	 officially	 democratic	 (Gilligan	and	Richards,	2008).	The	NGO	literature	shows	that	patriarchy	can	inhere	in	a	range	of	ways.	Tsetsura	(2013),	in	a	post-Soviet	context,	highlights	restrictive	legislation	relating	to	funding,	as	well	as	the	patriarchal	attitudes	of	decision-makers,	as	barriers	to	change.	Lazda	 (2018)	 likewise	 argues	 that	 the	 active	 promotion	 of	 patriarchal	 attitudes	 is	 a	practice	characteristic	of	transition	leaders	in	post-socialist	countries,	who	advocate	for	“neotraditional	 gender	 roles”	 (p.	 425).	 Such	 a	 patriarchal	 climate,	 the	 author	 states,	 is	responsible	for	bringing	women’s	NGOs	to	the	forefront	of	democratisation	efforts.			In	contemporary	societies,	patriarchy	has	been	closely	linked	with	the	‘neoliberalisation’	(Ayers,	 2006:	 321)	 of	 democracy,	 where	 “national	 and	 global	 policymaking	bodies…continue	 to	 adhere	 to	 principles	 of	 market-led	 development	 and	 good	governance”	 (Schech	and	Mustafa,	 2010:	126).	Neoliberalism	 is	defined	as	 a	particular	form	of	capitalism,	which	 involves	 “economic	 liberalisation…deregulation,	privatisation	and	 allowing	 market	 forces	 to	 reign”	 (Sahoo,	 2013:	 258),	 one	 that	 also	 bears	 on	 the	structures	 of	 the	 democratic	 state	 and	 civil	 society.	 Namely,	 in	 the	 process	 of	neoliberalisation,	 states	 are	 pressured	 to	 shrink	 the	 scope	 of	 their	 provisions	 by	stripping	all	functions	that	“could	conceivably	be	carried	out	by	the	private	sector”	(ibid:	259),	while	civil	society	organisations	often	become	“public	service	contractors”	(ibid.),	
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further	entrenching	neoliberal	ideology	(Jezierska,	2015).	Such	(neo)liberal	democracies	(Ishkanian,	2007;	 Jaquette,	2001;	 Jezierska,	2015)	can	have	 the	effect	of	bracketing	off	what	 is	 valid	 or	 invalid	 (or,	 indeed,	 possible)	 terrain	 for	 democratic	 engagement	 and	debate.			The	 connection	between	neoliberalising	 societies	 and	patriarchy	has	been	explored	by	the	NGO	literature.	The	transition	towards	democracy	is	ideally	envisaged	by	academics	and	policymakers	 to	unfold	as	an	“open	and	constructive	dialogue”	(Börzela	and	Risse,	2005:	7)	between	assisting	parties	 (e.g.	EU	and	various	US	development	agencies)	and	aspirant	 countries,	 taking	 into	 consideration	 the	 contextual	 nuances	 of	 the	 transiting	states	 (e.g.	one	might	expect	 the	 former	republics	of	Yugoslavia	 to	maintain	an	affinity	for	state	ownership	and	running	of	certain	provisions	regarded	as	central	to	society,	such	as	welfare,	 infrastructure,	health	and	education).	However,	 in	practice,	Yugoslavia,	 like	other	 countries	 in	 transition,	 became	 a	 neoliberal	 project	 (Lokar,	 2007),	 part	 of	 the	“liberal	 international	 political	 order”	 (Cooley,	 2015:	 49).	 Lokar	 (2007)	 argues	 that	 the	transition	to	liberal	democracy,	in	the	Yugoslav	context,	has	led	to	the	destruction	of	the	previously	established	welfare	system,	which	acted	as	the	“guarantor	of	women’s	social,	economic	and	political	equality”	(p.111),	rendering	women	“the	biggest	losers”	(ibid)	of	transition.	 In	general,	 the	 lack	of	structural	support	 in	the	form	of	welfare	systems	and	support	 services	 largely	 condemned	 women	 in	 countries	 in	 transition	 to	 the	 private	sphere.			Moreover,	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy	 has	 not	 only	 expunged	 some	 of	 the	 structural	systems	of	support	for	equality,	but	has	also	enforced	fiercer	patriarchal	attitudes,	due	to	the	masculinisation	of	the	public	and	feminisation	of	the	private	spheres,	brought	about	
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precisely	 by	 the	 destruction	 of	 systems	 of	 state	 support	 and,	 often,	 violent	 conflict	(Lokar,	2007).	In	Yugoslavia,	the	transition	to	a	neoliberal	form	of	democracy	also	gave	birth	 to	savage	attacks	on	women	(e.g.	 rape	as	an	ethnic-cleansing	strategy)	and	other	forms	of	patriarchalisation,	such	as	the	division	of	labour	according	to	traditional	gender	roles,	 sexism,	 etc.,	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 institution	 of	 a	 “democracy	 without	 women”	(ibid:	111).			The	 NGO	 literature	 identifies	 the	 prominent	 role	 of	 women’s	 NGO’s	 in	 building	democracy	(Lazda,	2018;	Lokar,	2007;	Schech	and	Mustafa,	2010;	Shircliff	and	Shandra,	2011;	Tsesura,	2013),	but	offers	 little	detail	 in	 terms	of	 the	practices	adopted	by	 these	organisations	and	practitioners.	As	a	result,	we	can	learn	much	about	the	achievements	of	 these	 organisations	 but	 less	 about	 their	 methods	 (e.g.	 Ennaji,	 2016;	 Schech	 and	Mustafa,	 2010).	 However,	 there	 are	 some	 hints	 of	 the	 practices	 of	 women’s	 NGOs	perceptible	 in	 the	 literature.	 Tsetsura’s	 (2013)	 study	 of	 post-Soviet	 communication	practices	 of	 women’s	 NGOs	 highlights	 the	 assembling	 of	 discursive	 coalitions	 as	significant.	She	examines	the	strategy	of	framing	the	women’s	struggle	as	one	of	general	human	 rights	 as	 having	 achieved	 important	 gains	 but	 questions	 the	 ability	 of	 such	 an	approach	to	adequately	represent	the	specificity	of	women’s	experiences	(see	also	Lazda,	2018).	 The	 reader	 gains	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 strategies	 organisations	 employ	 to	 combat	patriarchy	 (e.g.	 building	 alliances	 with	 international	 organisations,	 realigning	 equality	narratives	 with	 those	 from	 abroad,	 etc.),	 and	 the	 numerous	 achievements	 of	organisations,	but	the	detail	of	how	practitioners	go	about	their	work	remains	absent.			The	 literature	 reviewed	 so	 far	 is	 useful	 for	 understanding	 the	 role	 NGOs	 play	 in	democratisation	 and	 the	 broader	 context	 in	which	 they	 operate.	However,	what	 is	 yet	
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unclear	is	what	democratic	practice	entails,	as	well	as	what	practitioners	of	democratic	practice	do.	This	is	why	I	now	turn	to	examine	the	notion	of	democratic	practice	in	more	depth.	 In	particular,	 I	 review	 two	 theoretical	 accounts	of	democratic	practice:	 agonism	and	 deliberation,	 and	 supplement	 these	 accounts	 with	 relevant	 studies	 drawing	 on	organisational	 democratic	 practice.	 I	 read	 these	 accounts	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 how	authors	 seem	 to	 position	 and	 construct	 the	 desired	 enactments	 of	 practitioners	 and,	therefore,	 by	 extension,	 to	 surface	 the	 discursive	 practices	 and	 norms	 of	 participative	democracy	that	may	be	encountered	in	the	field.			
3.2.	Theories	of	democratic	practice:	Introduction		Descriptive,	 normative	 and	 aspirational	 theories	 of	 democratic	 practice	 abound,	 each	offering	different	aspects	or	outcomes	of	a	democratic	process	as	being	of	salience	(Blaug	and	Schwarzmantel,	2014).	Democracy	is	often	spoken	of	as	if	it	is	a	given	mechanism	for	governing,	 underpinned	 by	 values	 such	 as	 liberty	 and	 equality	 (Blaug	 and	Schwarzmantel,	 2014;	 Dahl,	 2000;	 Mouffe,	 1991	 and	 2013).	 Moreover,	 democracy	 is	usually	 taken	 as	 standing	 for	 the	 ‘rule	 of	 the	 people’	 (popular	 sovereignty),	 or	 “the	possibility	of	large	numbers	of	people	coming	together	in	some	form	to	make	collective	decisions	about	major	issues”	(Gilbert,	2014:	loc303).	Broad	agreement	exists	about	the	principles	 that	 democratic	 practice	 should	 be	 founded	 upon,	 such	 as:	 the	 peaceful	transition	 of	 governments	 following	 elections;	 universal	 suffrage;	 representation	 and	citizenship	 (Morlino,	 2004;	 Terchek	 and	 Conte,	 2001).	 Yet,	 any	 attempt	 at	 defining	democracy	 and	 unpacking	 these	 assumptions	 brings	 into	 focus	 a	 number	 of	
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contestations	over	the	meaning	and	practice	of	each	principle,	as	well	as	differing	views	on	whether	–	and	to	whom	-	these	are	valuable	principles	in	and	of	themselves.				Democracy	 theory	 is	 often	 presented	 as	 manifesting	 in	 two	 historical	 eras:	 the	traditional/ancient	and	the	contemporary/modern	(see	Blaug	and	Schwarzmantel,	2014;	Dahl,	2000;	Terchek	and	Conte,	2001).	Broadly,	what	 is	usually	cited	as	the	break	with	older	 conceptions	 of	 democracy	 is	 the	 radical	 turn	 towards	 a	 more	 inclusive	 and	participatory	democracy,	which	was,	until	the	end	of	WWII,	sporadic	at	best	in	western	countries	 (Dahl,	 2000;	 Graeber,	 2014).	 Such	 a	 break	 with	 traditional	 conceptions	 of	democracy	 also	 involved	 a	 shift	 in	 focus	 for	 theorists	 from	 exploring	 democracy	 as	 a	system	 designed	 for	 governing,	 to	 democracy	 as	 a	 ‘form	 of	 social	 idea’	 (Dewey,	 1946:	143).	Civic	engagement,	greater	inclusivity	and	building	democracy	from	the	bottom	up	became	central	to	scholarly	debate	(Benhabib,	1996;	Dahl,	2000;	Young,	2011).	This	shift	can	be	thought	of	as	the	difference	between	democracy	as	a	system	of	government	and	democracy	as	a	practice.			I	 consider	 two	 contemporary	 accounts	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 practice	 participative	democracy:	deliberation	and	agonism.	Both	offer	a	series	of	assumptions	and	norms	for	practice.	 These	 two	 particular	 theories	 were	 selected	 for	 further	 critical	 exploration	because	 they	are:	analytical	 (and	 thus	applicable	 to	any	democratic	context);	 rooted	 in	liberal	norms	(and	 thus	appropriate	 for	 the	research	context	of	Montenegro,	a	country	that	has	officially	adopted	 liberal	democracy	as	a	 form	of	governance);	social	 (drawing	attention	 to	 civic	 engagement	 rather	 than	 institutions);	 and,	performative	 (suitable	 for	an	 exploration	 of	 the	 enactment	 of	 democratic	 practice).	 I	 review	 both	 theories,	 and	studies	 adopting	 these	 theories,	 first,	 to	 critically	 unpack	 each	 as	 offering	 a	 particular	
	54	
exposition	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 practice	 democracy	 and,	 second,	 to	 surface	 the	 set	 of	assumptions	made	about	the	practitioner	and	participants	within	these	theoretical	areas.				
3.2.1.	Deliberative	democratic	practice		Forms	 of	 deliberative,	 direct	 and	 participative	 democratic	 practice	 have	 gained	prominence	 in	 public	 attention	 in	 recent	 years	 through	 the	 rise	 of	 social	 movements	claiming	 alternative,	more	 egalitarian	models	 of	 social	 relations	 and	 organisation	 (e.g.	Munro,	 2014).	 Informed	 by	 anarchist	 principles,	 studies	 of	 such	 ‘prefigurative’	organisations	 and	 movements	 have	 adopted	 a	 practical	 emphasis,	 exploring	 ways	 in	which	organisations	may	generate	internal	forms	of	democratic	practice	that	can	act	as	organising	exemplars	for	broader	societies	(Graber,	2014;	Lagalisse,	2010;	Maeckelberg,	2011;	Reedy	et	al,	2016).	Proponents	of	prefigurative	forms	of	organising	are	interested	in	building	alternative	models	of	democracy	–	indeed,	in	alternative	social	relations	more	broadly	–	and	by	definition	are	therefore	not	interested	in	how	organisations	engage	and	overlap	with	the	state,	as	their	focus	is	ultimately	in	overthrowing	the	state	as	we	know	it.	 Such	 studies	 of	 prefigurative	 forms	 of	 democratic	 practice	 will	 be	 included	 in	 the	discussion	 below	 where	 they	 help	 enrich	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 processes	 of	deliberation.			The	 main	 focus	 will	 be	 upon	 Habermas’	 account	 of	 deliberative	 democratic	 practice,	which	 seeks	 to	 address	 not	 only	 the	 internal	 dynamics	 of	 deliberation	 but	 also	 the	relationship	between	deliberative	practice,	civil	society	and	the	state,	concerns	that	are	more	 closely	 related	 to	my	 research	 setting	 and	 question.	Habermas	 is	 sceptical	 of	 an	
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overbearing	 of	 philosophy	 on	 knowledge;	 he	 believes	 philosophy	 should	 guide	 the	interpretation	 of	 social	 reality	 but	 also	 act	 as	 its	 critique	 (Habermas,	 1987b).	 He	envisages	his	 theory	of	 communicative	action	 (CA),	which	underpins	deliberation,	 as	 a	scholarly	endeavour,	in	which	philosophy	and	empirical	evidence	inform	one	another	for	a	 social	 purpose,	 transforming	 social	 relations.	 In	 practical	 terms,	 CA	 is	 an	 action	 in	which	 social	 actors	 (at	 least	 two)	 seek	 to	 reach	 mutual	 understanding,	 as	 well	 as	agreement,	and	coordinate	social	action	via	the	means	of	rational	argument	(Habermas,	1984:	86).			In	this	section,	I	first	address	the	overarching	principles	that	inform	Habermas’	theory	of	deliberation.	Second,	I	proceed	to	discuss	CA,	a	conceptual	resource	that	underpins	the	process	 of	 deliberation	 where	 people	 orientate	 themselves	 towards	 reaching	understanding,	and	ultimately	a	consensus,	on	issues	of	common	interest.	 In	contrast,	 I	then	discuss	 ‘strategic	 action’	 as	 a	process	 in	which	 consensus	 is	 reached	by	means	of	influence	 and	 authority,	 where	 actors	 orientate	 themselves	 towards	 reaching	 success	and	benefit,	 rather	 than	understanding.	Fourth,	 I	 explore	 the	 relationship	between	 the	civil	sector	(lifeworld)	and	formal	institutions	(system)	as	central	to	understanding	the	relationship	 between	 communicative	 and	 strategic	 action.	 Finally,	 I	 discuss	Habermas’	notion	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	 and	 forums	 within	 which	 democratic	 engagement	 is	envisaged	to	take	place.					
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Overarching	principles	of	Habermas’	deliberative	democracy		In	 this	 section	 I	 aim	 to	 provide	 an	 outline	 of	 the	 overarching	 principles	 that	 underpin	Habermas’	 democratic	 deliberation	 –	 rationality,	 the	 mediating	 role	 of	 language	 and	consensus	–	in	order	to	provide	a	way	into	my	reading	of	his	theoretical	account.	While	in	 this	 research	 I	 assume	 a	 different	 paradigmatic	 position	 to	 Habermas,	 filtering	 his	account	through	the	lens	of	poststructuralism,	it	is	nevertheless	important	to	explore	his	foundational	assumptions.		Deliberative	democratic	practice	extends	the	notion	of	participatory	democracy	through	deepening	 an	 understanding	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 deliberate	 over	 particular	 issues	(Crespy,	 2014;	 Habermas,	 1996).	 Deliberative	 democracy	 scholars,	 however,	 not	 only	emphasise	 the	 inclusion	of	 the	wider	population	 in	decision-making	processes	but	also	focus	in	depth	on	the	intersubjective	communication	adopted	in	participatory	decision-making	(Griffin	et	al,	2015;	Hampton,	2013;	Mansbridge,	1999).				Habermas’	 (1984)	 social	 theory	 of	 CA	 is	 inspired	 by	 Enlightenment	 principles,	 both	through	 an	 account	 of	 progressive	 history	 and	 the	 centrality	 of	 reason.	 Yet,	 unlike	Enlightenment	philosophers,	Habermas	believes	 that	a	 “philosophy	of	 consciousness	 is	exhausted”	 (Habermas,	1987b:	296)	and	 that	 “communicative	 reason	 is	expressed	 in	a	decentred	 understanding	 of	 the	world”	 (ibid:	 314).	 Habermas’	 account	 of	 deliberation	through	 CA	 theory	 is	 informed	 by	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘communicative	 rationality’,	 which	 is	particularly	salient	for	understanding	his	outlining	of	a	respectful,	democratic	process	of	deliberation.	Rationality	 is	understood	broadly	 as	 the	 acknowledgement	 that	 reason	 is	the	 only	 legitimate	 source	 of	 knowledge,	 evaluator	 of	 standards	 and	 guide	 to	 action	
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(Eriksen	and	Weigård,	2003).	Yet	it	would	be	difficult	to	explicate	‘rationality’	without	an	exploration	of	“what	is	actually	experienced	as	a	rational	life	or	is	claimed	to	be	as	such”	(Schnädelbach,	1991:	8).	For	this	purpose,	Habermas	(1984,	1996)	attempts	to	develop	a	theory	that	will	account	for	both	the	processes	of	rationalisation	in	society,	as	well	as	the	application	of	various	concepts	of	rationality	to	social	 life	that	arise	as	a	result	of	these	processes.			Rationality,	for	Habermas,	is	grounded	in	language	and	denotes	a	communicative	process	(dialogue)	between	three	domains	of	rationality	(Seel,	1991),	which	are:	“objective	facts,	social	norms	and	personal	 feelings”	(Blau,	2011:	46).	Within	communicative	rationality	each	 of	 these	 three	 domains	 (objective,	 social	 and	 subjective)	 corresponds	 to	 three	rationalities:	 theoretical-instrumental;	 moral-practical;	 and	 aesthetic-expressive	(Habermas,	 1984).	 These	 provide	 the	 architecture	 for	 communication	 between	 social	actors.	 What	 this	 view	 of	 rationality	 represents	 is	 a	 philosophical	 shift	 from	 the	philosophy	 of	 consciousness	 (subjectivity),	 where	 knowledge	 is	 produced	 through	 the	medium	of	the	solitary	subject’s	reason,	to	the	philosophy	of	communicative	rationality	(intersubjectivity)	where	knowledge	 is	a	product	of	 the	 intersubjective	communication	of	social	actors	(Habermas,	1996).	Therefore,	communicative	reason	is	accepted	if	what	is	 said	 can	be	characterised,	but	yet	 still	 contested,	 as	 true	 (objectively),	 just	 (socially)	and	sincere	(subjectively)	(Habermas,	1984:	398).			Habermas	 (1984;	 1996)	 establishes	 the	 deployment	 of	 language	 as	 crucial	 in	deliberation,	 focusing	on	what	he	views	as	the	internal	structure	of	 language,	which	he	believes	 enables	 social	 interaction	 and	 provides	 conditions	 for	 mutual	 understanding	and	agreement,	regardless	of	 the	context	within	which	communication	occurs.	 In	other	
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words,	Habermas’	CA	is	an	exploration	of	the	conditions	of	communication,	which	could	enable	 rational	 deliberation	 upon	 issues,	 rather	 than	 upon	 the	 substance	 of	communication.	Therefore,	for	Habermas	(1984;	1996),	possession	of	specific	knowledge	is	 less	 important	 than	 the	means	 of	 acquiring	 it,	 and	 the	ways	 in	 which	 the	 acquired	knowledge	is	deployed,	by	speaking	democratic	actors	engaged	in	dialogue.		Ultimately,	deliberative	democratic	practice	is	orientated	towards	reaching	consensus	on	matters	 of	 common	 concern	 (Dryzek,	 2010;	 Fryer,	 2012;	 Griffin	 et	 al,	 2015).	 Such	consensus	 is	 to	 be	 accomplished	 through	 the	 medium	 of	 communicative	 rationality,	where	participants	are	free	to	express	their	views,	but	are	also	open	to	hearing	the	views	of	 others,	 and	where	 consensus	 is	 reached	 on	 the	 condition	 of	mutual	 understanding,	rather	 than	 some	 form	 of	 “strategic	 bargaining”	 (Habermas,	 1996:	 330).	 Habermas	argues	that	reaching	understanding	 is	 the	 telos	of	CA:	communication	 in	 itself	supplies	and	 accrues	 the	 reason	 necessary	 for	 reaching	 understanding	 and	 potentially	 an	agreement	 (Habermas,	 1998).	 Moreover,	 CA	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 illocutionary	performativity	of	language,	that	is,	the	intention	of	the	speaker,	which	is	crucial	because	it	acts	as	a	binding	force	between	interlocutors	(ibid:	127).			Having	provided	an	overview	of	Habermas’	account	of	deliberative	practice,	I	now	move	on	to	explore	the	main	concepts	contained	within	Habermas’	work.					
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Communicative	Action		Communicative	 action	 (CA)	 holds	 a	 central	 position	 within	 deliberative	 democratic	practice,	 as	 it	 is	 the	 conceptual	 resource	 for	 conducting	 and	 justifying	 a	 form	 of	respectful	decision-making	(Niemi,	2005).	Habermas	believes	that	social	transformation	is	possible	through	acts	of	communicating	(speech	acts)	between	interlocutors,	aimed	at	reaching	understanding	about	issues	of	common	concern	(Habermas,	1984;	1996).	Here,	I	 highlight	 three	aspects	 that	 are	 important	 to	understanding	CA:	 the	 role	of	 language,	validity	claims	and	consensus.		The	role	of	language:		CA	 takes	 language	 to	 be	 the	medium	 through	which	 social	 action,	 orientated	 towards	reaching	understanding	on	issues	of	common	concern,	is	accomplished	(Honeth	and	Joas,	1991).	 Yet	 the	 “communicative	 model	 of	 action	 does	 not	 equate	 action	 with	communication”	 (Habermas,	 1984:	 101).	 Rather,	 language	 is	 only	 a	 conduit	 for	communication	 aimed	 at	 reaching	 understanding,	 whereas	 “actors,	 in	 coming	 to	 an	understanding	with	one	another	so	as	to	coordinate	their	actions,	pursue	their	particular	aims”	(ibid).	Utterances	we	use	in	our	day-to-day	talk	are	termed	‘speech	acts’,	which	can	lead	 to	 the	 conflation	 of	 the	 two:	 action	 and	 communication.	 However,	 ‘speech	 acts’	denote	 only	 the	 performative	 potential	 of	 communication	 (Habermas,	 1984:101-102).	Habermas	 treats	 language	 as	 a	 vessel	 for	 communication	 and	 actors	 as	 those	 who	perform	action	via	language.	Language	does	not	possess	an	agency	in	and	of	itself;	rather,	agency	is	infused	in	language	by	speaking	actors	and	their	intentions.	CA	therefore	“takes	place	when	[deliberating]	participants	achieve	mutual	understanding	through	dialogue”	
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(Chang	 and	 Jacobson,	 2010:	 633),	 but	 also	 “when	 participants	 have	 expectations	 that	their	discussions	are	aimed	at	reaching	mutual	understanding”	(ibid).				How	participants	determine	the	soundness	and	intelligibility	of	their	own	articulations	in	language,	as	well	as	those	of	others,	is	made	sense	of	in	Habermas’	writing	through	the	notions	of	validity	claims	and	consensus,	which	I	now	explore.		Validity	claims:		As	 a	 precondition	 to	 the	 process	 of	 assessing	 the	 validity	 of	 utterances	 made,	 social	actors	need	to	be,	 first	and	foremost,	 familiar	with	the	context	within	which	the	claims	are	uttered	(McCarthy,	1991)13.	Provided	that	such	a	precondition	is	fulfilled,	the	social	actor	 (the	 hearer)	 may	 proceed	 to	 assess	 the	 conditions	 of	 deliberation	 via	 ‘validity	claims’	(Chang	and	Jacobson,	2010;	Flynn,	2011;	Habermas,	1984;	O’Donovan,	2013).			Understanding,	 within	 a	 Habermasian	 account	 of	 democratic	 practice,	 can	 be	 reached	only	 if	 four	validity	 claims	are	 redeemed	 through	dialogue	 (McCarthy,	1984).	The	 first	validity	claim	is	elementary	in	character	and	refers	to	the	grammatical	soundness	of	the	claim	 made.	 Simply,	 if	 the	 claim	 made	 is	 not	 intelligible	 the	 interlocutors	 may	 not	proceed	with	deliberation	(Raelin,	2012).	The	second	validity	claim	refers	to	the	truth	of	the	 utterance	 (Habermas,	 1984:	 38).	 This	 validity	 claim	 is	 rooted	 in	 instrumental-theoretical	 rationality	 and	 draws	 on	 scientific/factual	 evidence	 as	 the	 criteria	 for	 the																																																									13	Placing	an	accent	on	the	importance	of	the	context	may	sound	counter-intuitive	considering	that	Habermas	favours	universal	rationality	and	the	conditions	of	communication	over	the	content	of	what	is	being	communicated.	However,	it	is	important	to	note	here	that	Habermas	understands	rationality,	in	the	first	place,	as	the	product	of	socialisation	throughout	history	and	not	as	something	created	in	a	vacuum	(Habermas,	1984).	
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assessing	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 claim	 raised.	 These	 two	 validity	 claims	 can	 be	 assessed	 as	empirically	credible	(Hammersley,	2009).	The	first	is	credible	in	the	sense	that	it	is	likely	that	a	non-intelligible	utterance	will	 lead	 to	either	misunderstanding	or	confusion.	The	second	 claim	 is	 credible	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 generally	 accepted	 practice	 to	 support	claims	with	 evidence	 if	we	want	 them	 to	 be	 respected.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 backdoor	 for	 the	privileging	of	positivism,	as	the	content	of	the	claim,	in	Habermas’	work,	is	less	important	for	 communicative	 action	 than	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 claim	 can	 or	 cannot	 be	redeemed	by	evidence	regarded	as	valid	within	a	certain	paradigmatic	context.			The	third	validity	claim	refers	to	the	cultural	and	empirical	soundness	of	the	claim	and	is	closely	tied	to	moral-practical	rationality	(Habermas,	1984:	38-39).	If	the	claim	made	is	not	 intelligible	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 cultural/social	 context	 in	 which	 it	 is	 raised,	 the	 claim	cannot	 be	 regarded	 as	 valid.	 Yet	 the	 third	 validity	 claim	 has	 been	 complicated	 by	globalisation	 and	 increasingly	 multicultural	 societies.	 In	 a	 more	 globalised	 world,	 in	which	 national	 borders	 no	 longer	 define	 cultures	 as	 neatly	 as	 they	 perhaps	 once	 did	(Yuval-Davis,	 2011),	 increased	 migration	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 new	“working-class”,	 of	 “cosmopolitans”	 (Kothari,	 2008:	 505),	 and	 people	 who	 often	 cross	borders	 in	 search	 of	 better	 living	 conditions.	 In	 multicultural	 communities	 there	 will	likely	be	a	variety	of	 cultural	 ‘standards’	 in	play,	as	well	as	definitions	of	 fair	practices	and	moral	prescriptions	(Taylor,	1994),	and	these	are	not	fully	addressed	by	Habermas.			While	the	standardisation	of	what	is	moral	or	fair	is	possible	to	a	degree,	and	Habermas	(1990	and	1996)	does	acknowledge	this	through	his	elaboration	of	how	a	public	opinion	becomes	‘universalised’	into	a	law,	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	that	all	cultural	norms	within	a	community	could	be	accepted	as	universal.	Does	this	mean	that	deliberation	would	be	
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locked	until	 a	 particular	 interlocutor	 concedes?	Habermas	does	not	 seem	 to	provide	 a	sufficiently	 ‘rational’	 or	 ‘irrational’	 means	 of	 escaping	 such	 a	 deadlock.	 The	 issue	 of	discursive	 closure	 in	 respect	 of	 norms	 in	 general	 is	 not	 dealt	 with	 by	 Habermas	particularly	well,	and	the	”force	of	 the	better	argument”	(Habermas,	1996:	306)	 that	 is	supposed	to	prevail,	as	assumed	by	CA	theory,	appears	somewhat	weak	here.				The	 fourth	 and	 final	 validity	 claim	 refers	 to	 the	 sincerity	 of	 the	 expression,	 or	 the	“genuine	 intentions”	 (Chang	and	 Jacobson,	2010:	664)	of	 the	 interlocutor.	This	validity	claim	is	closely	related	to	aesthetic-expressive	rationality	and	is	the	most	subjective	of	all	validity	 claims	 and	 thus	 the	 most	 difficult	 to	 assess.	 However,	 provided	 that	 there	 is	enough	 time	 for	 the	 interlocutor	 to	assess	 the	sincerity	of	 the	claim,	 it	 is	assumed	that	judgement	 about	 the	 claim	 can	 eventually	 be	 reached,	 for	 example,	 if	 I	 claim	 to	 be	 a	feminist	 and	 yet	 engage	 in	 an	 activity	 such	 as	 women-shaming,	 my	 claim	 would	 be	judged	as	insincere.				Consensus:		Consensus	is	assumed	to	be	both	a	precondition	to	deliberation	and	an	ideal	result	of	a	deliberative	 process	 (Chang	 and	 Jacobson,	 2010).	 In	 terms	 of	 consensus	 acting	 as	 a	precondition	 to	 deliberation,	 following	 the	 tenets	 of	 CA,	 Habermas	 begins	 with	 the	assumption	 that	 social	 actors	 will	 enter	 deliberation	 respectfully,	 i.e.	 there	 will	 be	 an	assumption	 regarding	 good	 intentions,	 on	 the	 orientation	 of	 deliberators	 towards	reaching	understanding	(Dux,	1991;	Erman,	2012).	Without	such	a	condition	 there	can	be	 no	 CA.	 In	 terms	 of	 consensus	 as	 an	 ideal	 outcome,	 there	 is	 a	 pragmatic	 acceptance	
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within	Habermas’	 theorising	 that	consensus	will	not	be	reached	all	 the	 time	and	on	all	matters	 deliberated	 upon	 (Habermas,	 1996).	 Although	 consensus	 might	 appear	 as	 an	ideal	 end-point,	 the	 argument	 established	 is	 that	 the	 process	 of	 working	 towards	consensus	in	and	of	itself	provides	sufficient	justification	for	pursuing	such	a	course.			CA	may	be	realised	even	if	consensus	is	not	reached,	so	long	as	the	deliberation	process	is	assessed	as	valid	 (Habermas,	1991).	Such	a	position	can	be	 thought	of	as	 respecting	the	underlying	 justifications	and	validity	of	 an	opponent	while	 also	disagreeing	on	 the	conclusions	drawn.	Yet,	it	is	assumed	that	consensus	will	eventually	be	reached	through	the	process	of	CA,	“given	enough	time”	(O’Donovan,	2013:	132).	The	pragmatic	concern	of	 how	public	 actors	will	 ever	 be	 able	 to	 reach	 fairly	 idealistic	 conditions	 of	 sufficient	time	and	space	to	reach	consensus	is	not	addressed,	however	(Sager,	2014).			Such	a	concern	connects	to	a	broader	problem	with	direct	and	deliberative	democracy:	that	“the	level	of	effort	and	involvement	in	politics	that	direct	democracy	demands	leads	to	problems	of	 sustainability…endlessly	 ramifying…meetings	over	 every	detail	 of	 life	 –	hardly	 the	 inspiring	 stuff	 of	 utopian	 visions”	 (Srnicek	 and	 Williams,	 2016:	 48).	 This	critique	 is	recognised	by	Graeber	(2014)	 in	relation	to	Occupy,	which	 is	why	he	 insists	upon	 ways	 in	 which	 to	 make	 deliberation	 more	 efficient,	 through	 the	 adoption	 of	working	groups	and	efficient	tricks	of	communication,	such	as	the	live	microphone.	Yet	none	 of	 these	 solutions	 manage	 to	 overcome	 the	 central	 critique	 of	 deliberative	democracy	 as	 needlessly	 time	 consuming	 –	 as	 the	 further	 one	 moves	 towards	 more	efficient	 solutions,	 the	 further	 one	moves	 away	 from	 CA	 –	 and	 also,	 by	 extension,	 the	principles	of	deliberative	democracy.	Instead,	one	gets	closer	to	a	form	of	representative	democracy.	
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	Deliberative	 democratic	 practice,	 with	 its	 emphasis	 on	 consensus,	 has	 also	 been	criticised	 for	 downplaying	 the	 affective	 and	 embodied	 identifications	 of	 democratic	participants	(Mouffe,	2009a;	2013).	The	theory	recognises	a	plurality	of	opinions,	beliefs	and	 people,	 yet	 the	 identity	 of	 democratic	 participants	 is	 not	 regarded	 as	 salient.	 The	accent	 placed	 on	 rational	 communication	 in	 reaching	 consensus	 suggests	 that	democratic	practitioners	need	to	relegate	their	 ‘irrational’	 identities	in	order	to	be	able	to	 perform	 democratic	 practice	 effectively.	 Considering	 that	 rationality	 is	 often	understood	as	the	“transcendence	of	the	feminine	itself”	(Lloyd,	1984:	104),	insisting	on	rational	communication	can	also	signal	a	favouring	of	the	masculine	over	other	ways	of	framing	practice	(Pullen	and	Rhodes,	2014;	Ross-Smith	and	Kornberger,	2004).				
Strategic	Action		Habermas	 (1996)	 recognises	 that	 CA	 has	 eroded	 during	 the	modernisation	 of	 society,	something	he	terms	the	“colonisation	of	the	lifeworld”	(Habermas,	1987a:	322).	Instead	of	acting	communicatively,	social	actors	act	strategically	–	a	process	in	which	consensus	is	reached	by	means	of	influence	and/or	authority	(Eriksen	and	Weigård,	2003;	Griffin	et	al,	 2015).	 Whereas	 communicative	 actors	 orientate	 themselves	 towards	 reaching	understanding,	 strategic	 actors	 orientate	 themselves	 towards	 reaching	 success	(Habermas,	 1996:	 166).	 Moreover,	 the	 orientation	 of	 actors	 towards	 success	 is	characterised	as	undertaken	in	pursuit	of	individual	and	not	common	goals,	or	in	favour	of	a	corporate	agent	rather	than	a	diverse	community	(Dux,	1991).			
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Whether	an	action	is	communicative	or	strategic	will	depend	on	the	usage	of	speech	acts	as	well	as	the	intention	of	the	speaker	(Niemi,	2005).	For	the	purpose	of	distinguishing	the	two	actions,	Habermas	draws	on	the	speech	acts	theory	developed	by	John	L.	Austin	(1962),	which	 treats	 language	as	performative	 (Habermas,	1984:	 xxv).	 In	other	words,	speech	is	action.	The	central	core	of	the	theory	is	that	language	is	to	be	studied	according	to	 the	 type	of	action	 that	utterances	perform.	Austin	 (1962)	distinguishes	between	 the	following	speech	acts:	a)	 locutionary	(action	is	performed	simply	through	the	means	of	uttering),	and	is	contained	in	all	other	speech	acts;	b)	illocutionary	(a	subject	performs	a	dual	action:	uttering	and	expressing	something	specific	in	addition,	such	as	a	promise,	or	an	order),	and	can	be	said	to	parallel	communicative	action,	as	the	intended	action	of	an	utterance	is	to	enable	the	hearer	to	understand	the	utterance;	and,	c)	perlocutionary	(an	effect	 the	 utterance	 has	 upon	 the	 hearer,	 such	 as	 comfort	 or	 irritation).	 The	 latter	corresponds,	according	 to	Habermas	(1984:	328),	 to	strategic	action	(SA)	as	 the	action	performed	by	an	utterance	is	always	aimed	at	eliciting	a	particular	effect/result	upon	the	hearer	by	the	way	of	language.			Habermas	also	states	that	the	intention	of	the	speaker	may	be	more	or	less	obvious	and	for	 that	 purpose	 he	 distinguishes	 two	ways	 in	which	 strategic	 communication	may	 be	employed:	latent	and	manifest	(Habermas,	1984:	294).	Both	manifest	and	latent	actions	are	orientated	towards	success,	rather	than	reaching	understanding,	as	is	the	case	with	CA	 (Eriksen	 and	Weigård,	 2003).	Manifest	 SA	 is	 often	 very	 obvious	 and	 overt	 and	 the	result	of	such	an	action	frequently	entails	a	tangible	empirical	outcome	(Niemi,	2005).	An	example	of	such	action	could	be	a	threat,	command	or	blackmail.	Understanding	reached	in	manifest	 SA	 refers	 solely	 to	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 speaker.	 For	 instance,	 if	 an	 armed	mugger	 requested	 possession	 of	 my	 wallet	 under	 threat	 of	 physical	 harm,	 I	 would	
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understand	 that	 if	 I	 did	not	 sacrifice	my	wallet	 s/he	would	harm	me.	We	would	 reach	consensus	 on	 an	 action	 orientation;	 however,	 such	 a	 consensus	 would	 have	 been	achieved	through	coercion.	Having	said	that,	SA	could	also	manifest	in	more	benign	ways,	e.g.	openly	asking	someone	for	a	favour.		Latent	 SA	 is	 less	 overt	 and	 yet,	 just	 like	manifest	 action,	 is	 always	 orientated	 towards	reaching	 success,	 “a	 desired	 result”	 (Niemi,	 2005:	 518).	 Such	 success	 is	 often	 reached	through	means	of	deceit,	trickery,	 lying,	etc.	The	main	difference	between	manifest	and	latent	 SA	 is	 that	 the	 intention	of	 the	 speaker	 is	 not	 evident.	As	 an	 example	 of	 such	 an	action,	Habermas	(1984:	294)	talks	of	a	military	officer	who	lures	his	troops	into	a	trap	via	the	means	of	a	deceitful	command.	However,	latent	SA	may	be	enacted	by	something	less	dramatic,	such	as	the	phenomenon	of	Munchausen’s,	feigning	illness	in	order	to	fulfil	certain	needs	for	attention,	affection	and	love.			In	 both	 manifest	 and	 latent	 SA,	 the	 performative	 effect	 of	 language	 is	 narrowed:	 the	speaker	passes	information	to	a	hearer	for	the	purpose	of	achieving	a	desired,	personal	goal.	The	performative	effects	of	language	in	CA	are	much	broader:	a)	the	aim	is	to	reach	an	 understanding,	 but	more	 importantly	 b)	 to	 instigate	 social	 change	 through	mutual	action-coordination	 based	 on	mutual	 understanding.	 Of	 course,	 in	 practice	 CA	 and	 SA	may	 both	 operate	 in	 the	 same	 context	 and	 may	 interact	 with	 one	 another.	 This	 may	particularly	 be	 the	 case	 in	 corrupt	 contexts,	 such	 as	Montenegro,	 and	 as	 such	may	 be	useful	concepts	for	understanding	democratic	practice.			There	is	one	lacuna	that	needs	to	be	addressed	at	this	point;	namely,	the	way	in	which	Habermas	understands	the	performativity	of	language.	Habermas	(1984:	101)	explicitly	
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states	 that	 communication	 and	 action	 are	 two	 separate	 categories.	 The	 author	 further	adds	 that	 while	 language	 has	 a	 performative	 potential,	 it	 is	 ultimately	 a	 conduit	 of	communication.	 What	 drives	 social	 transformation	 are	 social	 actors	 who	 are	communicatively	 orientated	 towards	 one	 another.	 Yet,	 drawing	 on	 Austin’s	 (1962)	speech	 acts	 theory	 in	 developing	 the	 concept	 of	 strategic	 action,	 Habermas	 shifts	 his	understanding,	claiming	in	fact	the	opposite.	Communication,	in	this	instance,	is	action.			If	language	is	understood	as	performative	and	not	merely	a	vessel	for	communication,	it	would	 mean	 that	 spoken	 utterances	 do	 not	 only	 describe	 the	 world	 but	 that	 they	simultaneously	 create	and	change	 it.	Claims	can	no	 longer	be	 judged	as	 simply	 true	or	false	according	to	a	validity	claim	but	must	also	be	considered	performative,	as	shaping	the	terrain	of	what	could	be	considered	as	true	or	false	in	the	first	place.	Even	by	making	a	 declaration	 (e.g.	 ‘women	 are	 leaders’)	we	 are	 performing	 an	 act	 of	 informing,	which	may	have	an	effect	on	how	‘reality’	is	created	or	how	‘reality’	is	known	(Hall,	2000:	184).	To	reframe	the	point	in	Habermasian	language,	understanding	language	as	performative	leads	 to	 an	 erosion	 of	 communicative	 rationality,	 as	 there	 is	 always	 an	 effect	 of	construction	 inherent	 in	 speech	 acts	 (foreseen	 or	 unforeseen)	 which	 does	 not	necessarily	lead	to	a	position	of	mutual	understanding.			So	far	the	focus	of	this	section	has	been	upon	the	basis	of,	and	the	acts	of,	communication	unfolding	between	deliberative	interlocutors.	The	forums	and	spheres	in	which	such	acts	are	envisaged	as	taking	place	have	been	elided.	These	dimensions	of	Habermas’	 theory	will	now	be	addressed.			
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Lifeworld	and	system		Lifeworld	and	system	are	central	concepts	 for	understanding	the	distinction	Habermas	makes	 between	 strategic	 and	 communicative	 action	 (Schnädelbach,	 1991:	 10).	 Even	though	lifeworld	and	system	are	discussed	separately	in	the	literature,	it	is	worth	stating	at	the	outset	that	these	two	spheres	of	modern	sociality	are	interconnected	and	inform	one	another.	How	these	spheres	interact	with	one	another	will	be	explored	after	each	is	addressed	in	turn.			Lifeworld:		Habermas	 (1996)	 links	 lifeworld	 with	 everything	 that	 makes	 our	 social	 life,	 beyond	formal	institutions,	such	as:	“family,	household,	culture,	political	life	outside	of	organised	parties,	mass	media,	voluntary	organisations”	etc.	(Finlayson,	2005:	51).	These	spheres	of	 social	 life	 provide	 a	 reservoir	 of	meaning	 and	 a	 space	 for	 cultural	 exchange,	which,	through	 the	 means	 of	 CA,	 create	 social	 unity	 (Alexander,	 1991;	 Finlayson,	 2005).	 A	lifeworld	 should	 be	 perceived	 as	 “a	 culturally	 transmitted	 framework,	 which…binds	together	individuals	and	society…it	communicates	the	stock	of	ideas	which	gives	identity	to	the	individual	and	collective”	(Eriksen	and	Weigård,	2003:	46).			Unity,	 however,	 Eriksen	 and	 Weigård	 (ibid.)	 warn,	 should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 in	 a	totalising	 way,	 as	 the	 content	 of	 a	 lifeworld	 is	 always	 open	 to	 challenge	 and	 critique	through	 the	 process	 of	 thematisation	 (Habermas,	 1984:	 18).	 Thematisation	 simply	means	that	certain	parts	of	social	life	are	brought	“into	view	[for	the	purpose	of]	revision	
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and	change”	in	CA,	through	validity	claims	(Finlayson,	2005:	52).	This	means	that	some	sort	of	finite	understanding	may	never	be	reached	and	that	CA	is	an	ongoing	process.		The	 concept	 of	 a	 lifeworld	 should	 be	 read	 in	 generative	 terms	 as	 one	 that	 creates,	preserves	 and	 revives	 a	 society.	 Through	 communicative	 interaction	with	 one	 another	over	time,	social	meaning	is	created	(Alexander,	1991).	The	meaning	social	actors	agree	upon	(via	the	process	of	CA)	streams	back	into	the	lifeworld,	thus	preserving	a	stock	of	social	context	(Finlayson,	2005:	53).	And	finally,	every	agreement,	once	made,	is	open	to	challenge	(Raelin,	2012)	and	can	serve	as	a	basis	for	further	reflection	by	social	actors,	thus	reviving	and	renewing	the	lifeworld	–	performing	the	function	of	social	integration	(Graeber,	2014;	Niemi,	2005).			Habermas	does	not	elaborate	much	on	the	process	of	thematisation	(or	dissent)	and	how	disagreements	may	be	resolved	and	this	is	a	weakness	in	his	work	that	has	been	noted	by	some	scholars	(e.g.	Carpentier	and	Cammaerts,	2006;	Mouffe,	2009a;	Mouffe,	2013).	However,	he	does	state	that	the	conception	of	the	lifeworld	as	circular,	where	CA	feeds	into	 the	 social	 context	 and	where	 social	 context,	 in	 return,	 feeds	 into	 CA,	 reduces	 the	chances	of	fatal	dissent	emerging	(Habermas,	1996).	Envisaging	a	lifeworld	as	a	pool	of	shared	 knowledge	does	not	 guarantee	 that	members	 of	 a	 given	 society	 predominantly	agree	about	the	meaning	of	that	knowledge.			Advocates	 of	 deliberative	 democratic	 practice	 address	 the	 relationship	 between	lifeworld	and	the	production	of	self	within	such	a	context.	Eriksen	and	Weigård	(2003:	46)	argue	that	a	common	identity	is	the	outcome	of	CA	within	a	lifeworld.	Yet,	while	the	claim	 that	 social	 context	 ‘produces’	 identity	 can	 be	 substantiated	 to	 a	 large	 degree	
	70	
(Knights	and	Clarke,	2017),	it	is	doubtful	that	any	context	(even	a	relatively	homogenised	one)	will	 produce	 an	 identity	 capable	 of	 being	 generalised	 as	 common	 in	 any	 kind	 of	defining	way.	Surely	even	in	relatively	homogenised	societies	a	common	identity	will	be	at	best	relatively	common.	Although	Habermas,	 in	his	circular	theorisation	of	 lifeworld,	allows	 for	 shifting	views	–	and,	by	extension,	 identifications	and	dissent	–	his	 focus	on	dissent	 as	 something	 to	 be	 overcome	 through	 CA,	 rather	 than	 surfaced	 and	 nurtured,	could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 limiting	 for	 the	 generation	 of	 democratic	 practice.	 Namely,	overcoming	 dissent	 seems	 to	work	 towards	 the	 goal	 of	 a	more	 harmonious	 and	 even	homogenous	society	and	against	an	embrace	of	difference	as	a	source	of	value.			System:		Habermas’	 notion	 of	 system	 stands	 in	 opposition	 to	 his	 conception	 of	 lifeworld	 and	refers	 to	 the	 two	 subsystems	of	 administration	 and	 economy	 (Habermas	1984;	 1996).	Whereas	 the	 lifeworld	 is	viewed	as	 responsible	 for	 social	 integration,	 socialisation	and	cultural	 production,	 as	 stated	 earlier,	 systems	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 material	reproduction	of	a	society	(Habermas,	1987a).	While	a	lifeworld	consists	of	civil	society,	a	system	consists	of	formal	institutions,	such	as	the	judiciary	or	the	market.			Systems	 are	 underpinned	 by	 an	 instrumental	 rationality,	 which	 means	 that	 action	 is	coordinated	strategically	rather	than	communicatively	(Eriksen	and	Weigård,	2003).	The	communication	that	unfolds	in	systems	is	always	directed	towards	reaching	a	particular	benefit	 and	 therefore	 social	 actors	 do	 not	 need	 to	 justify	 their	 actions	 as	 they	 do	 in	 a	lifeworld.	 However,	 strategic	 action	 (SA)	 is	 not	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 undesirable	 form	 of	
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action	 coordination	 as,	 indeed,	 the	 efficacy	 of	 a	 system	 depends	 on	 a	 successfully	achieved	 strategic	 action	 (Habermas,	 1996).	 SA	 is	 desirable	 as	 long	 as	 it	 does	 not	encroach	upon	and	dominate	a	 lifeworld	(Habermas,	1987a:	322),	a	process	framed	by	Habermas	in	strong	language	as	a	‘colonisation’	(Habermas,	1987a:	196).			Whereas	 in	 pre-modern	 societies,	 decision-making	 power	 lay	 in	 the	 hands	 of	predominantly	 religious,	 royal	 or	 tribal	 leaders,	 decision-making	 in	 modern	 societies,	Habermas	 states,	 rests	 upon	 communicatively	 orientated	 social	 actors	 (Habermas,	1984).	 Communicatively	 coordinated	 action	 is	 desirable	 but	 may	 be	 a	 long	 and	exhausting	 process,	 as	 stated	 earlier	 (O’Donovan,	 2013).	 Therefore,	 a	 material	reproduction	of	the	social	(which	does	not	require	communicative	action	coordination)	falls	 onto	 systems	 (Habermas,	 1987a:	 179).	 Yet	 an	 increased	 reliance	 on	 systems	 by	social	actors,	as	well	as	an	increased	infringement	of	SA	upon	a	lifeworld	may	lead	to	the	distortion	of	a	lifeworld:		 In	the	end,	systemic	mechanisms	suppress	forms	of	social	integration	even	in	those	areas	where	a	consensus-dependent	coordination	of	action	cannot	be	replaced,	 that	 is,	where	the	symbolic	reproduction	of	the	lifeworld	is	at	stake.	In	these	areas,	the	mediatisation	of	the	lifeworld	assumes	the	form	of	a	colonisation	(Habermas,	1987a:	196).		Questions	 of	 how	 views	 are	 represented	 and	whose	 views	 are	 represented	 in	 and	 via	formal	 institutions	 seem	 to	 be	 further	 complicated	 by	 the	 implied	 shrinking	 and	colonisation	 of	 the	 lifeworld.	 If	 a	 lifeworld	 is	 in	 danger	 of	 being	 ‘colonised’	 by	 an	instrumentally	rational	system,	that	would	mean	that	views	of	democratic	social	actors	are	 in	danger	of	being	 tokenised.	Moreover,	 the	procedures	via	which	decision-making	
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are	performed	(e.g.	elections)	would	enjoy	a	“mock-legitimacy”	as	social	actors’	opinions	(expressed	via	the	act	of	voting)	would	not	carry	any	real	influence	(Vetlesen,	1991:	6).	So	what	are	 the	ways	 in	which	colonisation	of	 the	 lifeworld	may	happen	and	what	can	prevent	such	a	regressive	outcome?				The	inter-relationship	between	lifeworld	and	system:		As	 stated	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 sub-section,	 lifeworld	 and	 system	 do	 not	 exist	separately	 from	one	another	but	rather	overlap	 in	a	number	of	ways.	For	example,	 the	family	 is	 an	 informal	 institution	 of	 the	 private	 sphere	 (lifeworld),	 but	 is	 regulated	 via	legislation	in	formal	institutions	(system)	(Jütten,	2011).	Put	simply,	formal	institutions	exist	 as	 products	 of	 the	 social	 evolution	 of	 norms	 (Eriksen	 and	 Weigård,	 2003).	 For	example,	 according	 to	 Habermas’	 theorising,	 marriage	 and	 elections	 exist	 as	institutionalised	procedures	only	because	people	have	communicatively	agreed	that	they	are	desirable	ways	of	organising	themselves	socially	(Outhwaite,	1996	and	2009).			Institutionalising	forms	of	social	life	draws	from	the	social	organisation	already	formed	in	 a	 lifeworld.	 Yet,	 such	 an	 evolution	 leads	 to	 a	 paradox:	 the	 more	 society	 evolves	rationally,	the	more	a	lifeworld	shrinks,	as	shared	understanding	and	consensus	grow.	In	time,	 instrumentally	 rational	 systems	may	 overpower	 the	 lifeworld,	 and	 decrease	 the	need	 for	 acting	 communicatively	 (Finlayson,	 2005).	 Some	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	shrinking	of	a	lifeworld	might	occur	involve:			
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[F]ormalising	 interaction	 and	 networks	 that	 used	 to	 have	 an	 informal	 structure	(legalisation)…[by]	redefine[ing]	the	family	sphere	and	leisure	activities	as	markets	with	an	 insatiable	 need	 to	 consume	 entertainment	 articles	 (monetisation,	commercialisation)…[by]	 obtaining	 support	 for	 political	 decisions	 that	 are	 made	independently	of	a	public	exchange	of	opinions	(Vetlesen,	1991:	6).			In	sum,	a	lifeworld	becomes	colonised	by	instrumental	rationality	when	systems	perform	decision	 making	 via	 formal,	 institutionalised	 procedures	 that	 bypass	 the	 CA	 of	 social	actors.	 However,	 while	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 system	 rationalisation	 is	 a	 desirable	 goal,	Habermas	 states,	 it	 is	 necessary	 for	 systems	 to	 receive	 continuous	 input	 from	 the	lifeworld	for	the	purposes	of	meaningful	social	progress	(Habermas,	1984,	1987a,	1991	and	 1996).	 The	 next	 section	 addresses	 Habermas’	 propositions	 for	 maintaining	generative	forums	of	deliberation	within	lifeworlds.			
Public	sphere			Habermas	 first	 provided	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	 in	 his	 book	 The	 Structural	
Transformation	 of	 the	 Public	 Sphere	 (1989[1962]).	 In	 this	 work	 Habermas	 broadly	characterises	a	public	sphere	as	a	place	where	members	of	society	can	come	together	to	freely	discuss	issues	of	social	concern	and	so	influence	political	decisions	regarding	the	creation	and	adoption	of	public	policies.	He	traces	the	concept	of	the	public	sphere	back	to	 18th	 century	 liberal	 democracies,	 stating	 that	 public	 discussions	 unfolded	 in	 public	forums,	 such	 as	 literary	 clubs,	 pubs,	 salons,	 etc.	 –	 places	 that	 enabled	members	 of	 the	public	to	participate	in	the	politics	of	the	time.		
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	The	 book	 was	 met	 with	 praise	 as	 a	 first	 attempt	 to	 provide	 a	 comprehensive	interpretation	of	the	public	sphere	(Honneth	and	Joas,	1991).	However,	it	has	also	been	criticised	 for	 Habermas’	 somewhat	 superficial	 presentation	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	 as	inclusive	 and	 participatory,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 public	 sphere	 in	 the	 18th	 century	belonged	predominantly	to	upper	class	white	males	and	is,	as	such,	unrepresentative	of	the	public	in	its	totality	(Outhwaite,	2009).	Yet,	Habermas,	in	his	later	work	(1996),	does	reflect	upon	the	exclusionary	character	of	the	public	sphere	and	tries	to	define	its	main	features,	which	includes	a	revised	interpretation	of	the	boundaries	between	public	and	private	 spheres.	 It	 is	 his	 later	 work	 (Habermas,	 1996)	 that	 I	 will	 draw	 upon	 in	 what	follows.				The	performativity	of	the	public	sphere:		Structurally,	 a	 public	 sphere	 spans	 lifeworld	 and	 system	 (in	 particular,	 the	administrative	 sub-system)	 and	 links	 the	 two	 via	 processes	 of	 bureaucratisation	(Habermas,	1987a).	In	ideal	terms,	what	is	communicatively	agreed	upon	in	a	lifeworld	amongst	social	actors	should	feed	into	the	administrative	system	in	the	form	of	various	regulating	 mechanisms	 (e.g.	 agreeing	 upon	 the	 way	 to	 choose	 a	 government	 in	 the	lifeworld	results	in	institutionally	established	electoral	procedures	in	the	administrative	system).	Similarly,	what	is	established	as	an	institutionalised	procedure	(in	this	example,	elections)	 regulates	 how	 a	 government	 is	 chosen	 by	 the	 social	 actors	 in	 the	 lifeworld	(through	 the	 act	 of	 casting	 a	 vote).	 Such	 a	 trajectory	 of	 the	 agreed	 upon	 issue,	 from	lifeworld	to	a	regulated	procedure	in	the	administrative	system,	is	not	straightforward,	
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however.	 In	 order	 to	understand	how	a	 communicatively	 agreed	upon	 issue	 travels	 to	the	 administrative	 system,	 one	 needs	 to	 explore	 the	 sites	 identified	 for	 deliberative	practice.				The	sites	of	public	deliberation:		Habermas	(1996)	distinguishes	between	the	formal	and	informal	public	spheres	as	sites	of	deliberation.	Formal	public	sphere	refers	to	parliamentary	assemblies	as	well	as	other	formally	established	institutions	(system),	whereas	informal	public	sphere	refers	to	the	deliberation	that	unfolds	outside	the	boundaries	of	formal	institutions	(lifeworld)	often,	but	not	exclusively,	in	what	is	referred	to	as	civil	society	(Habermas,	1996:	307-313).			The	 lifeworld	 aspect	 of	 a	 public	 sphere	 (an	 informal	 public	 sphere)	 consists	 of	 a	multitude	 of	 temporally	 and	 spatially	 overlapping	 sites	 of	 deliberation	 (Eriksen	 and	Weigård,	 2003).	Habermas	maintains	 that	 these	public	 sites	 “still	 cling	 to	 the	 concrete	locales	where	an	audience	is	physically	gathered”	(1996:	361).	However,	other	scholars	of	 deliberative	 democratic	 practice	 insist	 that	 lifeworld	 public	 spheres	 also	 include	virtual	sites	of	deliberation,	such	as	social	networks	and	even	written	texts	(Eriksen	and	Weigård,	2003:	185).	Habermas	does	acknowledge	that	new	technologies	enable	people	to	 deliberate	 virtually,	 but	 claims	 that	 deliberators	 may	 become	 detached	 and	 the	discourse	may	become	‘abstracted’	in	these	digital	forums,	which	is	why	he	advocates	for	deliberation	 in	 person	 (Habermas,	 1996:	 361).	 While	 being	 present	 physically	 in	deliberative	 forums	 can	 be	 useful	 (e.g.	 one	 can	 ‘read’	 an	 interlocutor’s	 body	 language	when	assessing	validity	claims),	the	emphasis	on	being	physically	present	in	deliberative	
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forums	can	be	interpreted	as	a	manifestation	of	privilege	(Butler,	2015),	i.e.	not	everyone	is	 able	 to	 travel	 regularly	 to	meetings	 and	 dedicate	 as	much	 time	 to	 deliberation	 in	 a	single	sitting.	Such	normalising	of	privilege	comes	in	the	guise	of	‘participative’	practice	but	it	can	also	have	the	effect	of	exclusion	(Srnicek	and	Williams,	2016:	49).			
Summary		I	discussed	the	theory	of	deliberative	democratic	practice	as	elaborated	by	Habermas.	It	was	 established	 that	 deliberative	 democratic	 practice	 is	 underpinned	 by	 the	 theory	 of	communicative	 rationality,	 which	 represents	 a	 dialogical	 account	 of	 three	 types	 of	rationality:	 theoretical-instrumental,	 moral-practical	 and	 aesthetic-expressive	(Habermas,	 1984;	Honneth	 and	 Joas,	 1991).	 Each	of	 these	 rationalities	 is	 incorporated	into	the	form	of	communicative	rationality,	according	to	Habermas	(1984),	to	influence	the	way	we	understand	the	world,	as	well	as	the	way	we	relate	to	it.			CA,	 informed	 by	 communicative	 rationality,	 is	 the	 modus	 operandi	 of	 deliberative	democratic	practice.	The	main	tenet	of	the	theory	of	CA	is	the	positing	of	language	as	the	medium	 for	 coordinating	 action	 aimed	 at	 reaching	 understanding	 regarding	 issues	 of	common	concern	(Habermas,	1984).	Language	is	here	understood	merely	as	a	structured	conduit	 for	 passing	 information	 between	 interlocutors	 (ibid).	 SA	 is	 a	 mode	 of	communication	 where	 interlocutors	 are	 orientated	 towards	 attaining	 certain	 goals,	either	latently	or	manifestly	(Eriksen	and	Weigård,	2003).			
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Habermas	 seeks	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 relationship	 in	 democratic	 practice	 between	state	 and	 civil	 society.	 Lifeworld	 and	 system	 are	 stated	 as	 the	 two	major	 domains	 of	modern	sociality	(Finlayson,	2005:	47).	The	lifeworld	represents	the	informal	sphere	of	social	life	in	which	the	social	fabric	is	weaved	communicatively.	The	system,	on	the	other	hand,	 represents	 that	 formal	 domain	 of	 social	 life	 in	 which	 action	 is	 coordinated	strategically.	Although	seemingly	separate,	lifeworld	and	system	overlap	and	inform	one	another	in	complex	ways.			The	 public	 sphere	 spans	 both	 lifeworld	 and	 system	 (the	 administrative	 sub-system	 in	particular)	and	represents	 ‘a	network’	of	communication	that	expresses	the	kind	of	 life	people	wish	to	live	(Habermas,	1996:	360).	Metaphorically,	the	public	sphere	represents	an	umbilical	cord	between	lifeworld	and	system.		In	terms	of	critique,	Habermas’	deliberative	democratic	practice	overlooks	the	embodied	and	 affective	 aspects	 of	 engagement,	 and	 its	 emphasis	 on	 rationality	 can	 leave	 the	impression	 of	 a	 particularly	 masculine	 set	 of	 norms	 (Knights,	 2015).	 It	 also	 heavily	focuses	on	conditions	of	communication,	rather	than	content	exchanged	in	deliberation,	meaning	 that	 it	 relegates	 passionately	 held	 beliefs	 and	 identifications	 as	 secondary	 to	processes	of	consensus.	 Its	emphasis	on	face-to-face	communication	and	its	acceptance	of	 heavy	 time	 commitments	 imply	 a	 preference	 for	more	 formal	 and	bounded	 forums,	rather	than	viewing	democratic	practice	as	an	ongoing,	informal	and	everyday	practice.	However,	 it	might	be	possible	to	interpret	some	of	the	norms	of	deliberation	through	a	performative	 lens,	 as	 aspects	 of	 democratic	 practice	 folded	 into	 more	 embodied	 and	everyday	acts	(Butler,	1999,	see	Chapter	4).	The	critique	of	Habermas	as	overly	focused	
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on	 consensus	 and	 rationality	 can	partially	 be	 addressed	 through	 a	 consideration	of	 an	alternative	account	of	democratic	practice,	that	of	agonism,	which	I	now	explore.			
3.2.2.	Agonistic	democratic	practice		
Introduction		In	 this	 section	 I	 first	 address	 the	 onto-epistemological	 grounding	 of	 agonism,	 that	 of	post-foundationalism.	From	this	basis	I	outline	and	critically	evaluate	five	key	concepts	within	agonism:	pluralism	(vs.	universalism),	conflict	(vs.	consensus),	relational	identity	(vs.	essentialist	identity),	passion	(vs.	reason)	and	the	aesthetics	of	democratic	practice.	Overall,	I	conclude	that	agonism	injects	some	vigour	into	the	notion	of	what	it	means	to	be	 a	 subject	 of	 democracy,	 supplementing	 the	 somewhat	 conflict-light	 account	 of	deliberative	democratic	practice.			The	theory	of	agonistic	democratic	practice	as	envisaged	by	Chantal	Mouffe	has	recently	provoked	a	 lively	discussion	within	academic	circles.	For	example,	 the	 journal	Parallax	(2014)	has	dedicated	an	entire	 issue	 (20:2)	 to	an	exploration	of	various	aspects	of	 the	theory.	 Yet,	 so	 far	 there	 has	 been	 little	 attempt	 to	 explore	 empirically	 the	 theoretical	assumptions	made	by	agonism,	with	only	a	few	authors	supplying	evidence	and	analysis	from	 fieldwork	 (Bäcklund	 and	 Mäntysalo,	 2010;	 Spencer,	 2012;	 Purakayastha,	 2014).	Where	 there	 have	 been	 empirical	 contributions	 or	 contributions	 seeking	 to	 relate	 the	
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theory	to	areas	outside	politics,	those	contributions	seem	to	hold	significance	for	theory	and	practice	(e.g.	Rhodes,	2016)	and	will	be	referred	to	as	this	section	unfolds.				
Ontological	assumptions	of	agonism:	post-foundationalism		Broadly,	 post-foundationalism	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 more	 radical	 version	 of	poststructuralism,	 where	 ‘grounds’	 such	 as	 “totality,	 universality,	 essence”	 are	continuously	 questioned	 and	 examined	 (Marchart,	 2007:	 2).	 However,	 within	 post-foundationalism	the	ontological	grounds	of	any	social	phenomena	are	weakened,	rather	than	 erased.	 Post-foundationalists	 assume	 that	 there	 is	 a	 possibility	 that	 some	 social	phenomena	 could	 stabilise	 to	 a	 degree;	 however,	 such	 stabilisation	 should	 not	 be	perceived	 as	 the	 definite	 and	 final	 ground	 of	 meaning	 (Marchart,	 2007;	 Parker	 and	Parker,	2017).			Specifically,	the	case	made	by	post-foundationalists	is	that	language	should	be	viewed	as	“contingent	 all	 the	 way	 down”,	 with	 words	 and	 constructs	 always	 and	 indefinitely	dependent	 on	 other	words	 and	 constructs	 for	meaning	 (Cederström	and	 Spicer,	 2014:	198;	Mouffe,	2014).	Holding	this	view	does	not	mean	that	all	words	and	communication	acts	 are	 entirely	 groundless	 and	 therefore	 meaningless.	 Final	 closure	 of	 meaning,	 for	agonists,	does	remain	impossible	and	hence	there	is	a	core	of	incompletion	that	remains	at	the	heart	of	all	communication,	which	is	why	post-foundationalism	has	been	described	as	a	 ‘negative	ontology’	(Kelly,	2014).	 It	 is	 this	very	 impossibility	of	 final	completion	in	language	that	results	in	meaningful	investment	(Cederström	and	Spicer,	2014);	it	is	the	process	of	chasing	meaning	and	circling	incompletion	that	interests	agonists.	
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	An	enduring,	seemingly	stable,	phenomenon	(e.g.	democracy)	is	achieved	via			 repeated	acts	that	seek	to	approximate	the	ideal	of	a	substantial	ground	of	[phenomena],	but	 which,	 in	 their	 occasional	 discontinuity,	 reveal	 the	 temporal	 and	 contingent	groundlessness	of	this	‘ground’	(Butler,	1999:	192).		Against	 the	 post-foundational	 ontological	 backdrop	 of	 agonism,	 democracy	 is	approached	as	a	contingent	and	empty	floating	signifier	(Laclau	and	Mouffe,	1985:	113).	It	 is	empty,	agonists	argue,	because	 in	and	of	 itself	 it	means	 little	unless	combined	and	complemented	with	other	 signifiers.	 It	 is	 also	a	 contingent	 signifier	whose	 significance	lies	in	the	fact	that	it	knits	together	other	associations	and	chains	of	signification	in	order	to	generate	meaning	(Laclau,	2014).	 It	 is	 floating	because	 its	meaning	 is	contested	and	fought	over	between	a	number	of	competing	 interpretations:	e.g.	neoliberal	democracy	and	socialist	democracy.	This	 is	not	a	 licence	 for	a	 free-for-all	 in	meaning	construction	but	 does	 acknowledge	 that	 meaning	 is	 based	 on	 what	 can	 be	 accomplished	 between	actors	and	discourses	in	a	specific	context.			
The	main	features	of	agonism		Agonism	 is	 an	 analytical	 approach	 to	 democratic	 practice	 envisaged	 predominantly	against	more	consensual	approaches,	such	as	deliberative	democracy	(Mouffe,	2014).	It	aims	at	radicalising	liberal	democracy	through	placing	conflict	at	the	fore	of	democratic	practice.	Agonism	is	a	way	of	performing	a	democratic	practice	by	and	amongst	diverse	
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populations	 regardless	 of	 their	 political	 preferences	 (at	 least	 within	 the	 broad	framework	 of	 liberal	 democratic	 norms,	 discussed	 in	 more	 depth	 later)	 and/or	 other	forms	 of	 identification	 (Hansen	 and	 Sonnichsen,	 2014).	 Such	 democratic	 practice	 is	imagined	as	a	vibrant	struggle	between	democratic	participants,	but	a	struggle	that	does	not	lead	to	violent	conflict	(Mouffe,	2009a).				While	 all	 agonistic	 theories	 of	 democracy	 share	 a	 number	 of	 common	 features,	 they	differ	 in	 some	 ways	 (Eriksen	 and	 Weigård,	 2003).	 All	 theories	 of	 agonism	 stand	 in	sceptical	 and	 critical	 relation	 to	 liberal	 democracy;	 they	 all	 maintain	 that	 conflict	 is	ineradicable	in	any	pluralist	society;	each	theory	is	situated	within	post-foundationalism;	and,	 all	 of	 the	 theories	 argue	 that	 exclusions	 in	 democratic	 practice	 are	 inevitable.	However,	some	differ	 in	their	approach	to	the	 institutions	of	 liberal	democracy.	 I	 focus	here	 predominantly	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Chantal	 Mouffe,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 William	Connolly,	as	they	argue	that	the	framework	of	liberal	democracy	is	suitable	for	agonistic	practice	 and,	 unlike	 some	 agonists	 (e.g.	 Badiou,	 2005),	 they	 do	 not	 reject	 liberal	institutions	 but	 instead	 argue	 that	 these	 can	 be	 transformed	 through	 a	 process	 of	agonistic	engagement	(Connolly,	2002,	2004	and	2005;	Mouffe,	2009a,	2009b	and	2013).			Decisions	concerning	whether	or	how	to	engage	with	official	government	institutions	are	echoed	in	the	practice	context	of	this	research.	The	Women’s	Rights	Centre	(WRC)	has	a	longstanding	 adversarial	 relationship	 with	 various	 government	 institutions,	 often	challenging	decisions	(e.g.	it	publicly	challenged	the	recently	adopted	law	on	benefits	for	mothers,	which	the	organisation	found	to	be	discriminatory	(see	CDM,	2015)).	However,	WRC	often	collaborates	with	government	institutions	alone	or	in	partnership	with	other	civil	 sector	 organisations.	 Such	 an	 emphasis	 bears	more	 in	 common	with	 a	 stream	 of	
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agonism	that	seeks	to	‘transform’	(Wingenbach,	2011:	38)	liberal	democratic	institutions	through	continuous	engagement,	rather	than	abolish	them.			I	 will	 now	 turn	 to	 explore	 the	 key	 concepts	 within	 agonism	 relevant	 to	 my	 research	question.				
Pluralism		Pluralism	refers	to	a	conceptualisation	of	social	relations	as	a	“pluriverse”	of	democratic	projects	 rather	 than	 a	 ‘universe’	 of	 the	 ‘Western’14	vision	 of	 democracy	 as	 the	 only	legitimate	 one	 (Mouffe,	 2009a:	 561).	 Mouffe	 (2009b;	 2013)	 argues	 that	 the	 Western	version	 of	 democracy	 is	 globally	 promoted	 and	 accepted	 as	 the	 only	 valid	 form	 of	democracy	 and	 that	 such	 an	 attitude	 supresses	 and	 diminishes	 alternative	understandings	 of	 democratic	 practice	 and	 values	 in	 countries	 that	 do	 not	 share	 the	same	politico-historical	development.	This	 is	why,	 the	author	argues,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	take	 into	 account	 that	 other	 contexts	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 develop	 their	 own	interpretations	 and	 that	 scholars	 and	 practitioners	 should	 embrace	 a	 diversity	 of	different	 forms	 of	 democratic	 arrangements	 (Mouffe,	 2009a;	 Rhodes	 and	 Wray-Bliss,	2012).			
																																																								14	‘Western’	democracy	is	understood	here	as	“multiparty	electoral	democracy,	accompanied	by	an	individualistic	conception	of	human	rights	and…free	market	policies.”	(Mouffe,	2009a:	561)		
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However,	agonistic	pluralism	does	not	refer	solely	to	the	plurality	of	different	 forms	of	democracy	worldwide	but	also	to	potential	varieties	of	pluralist	orderings	of	particular	societies	(Connoly,	2005;	Mouffe,	1991).	For	agonists,	there	is	an	“irreducible	plurality	of	social	 values	 in	 society”	 (Legget,	 2013:	 303),	 enacted	 as	 different	 and/or	 opposing	democratic	 identities	 (Mouffe,	 2009a)	 that	 might	 stand	 in	 potentially	 antagonistic	relation	to	one	another	(Mihai,	2014;	Tully,	2008).	Pluralism	signifies	an	interpretation	of	 the	 social	 as	 “open	 and	porous”,	which	 “gives	 rise	 to	 the	 creation	 of	multiple	 social	identities”	(Jones,	2014:	15).			Plurality	 is	an	“axiological	principle”	connected	to	agonisms’s	emphasis	on	contingency	(Mouffe,	 2009a:	 19)	 –	 a	 value	 that	 is	 fundamental	 to	 the	 conception	 of	 agonistic	democracy.	Contingency	occurs	due	to	the	pluralism	of	systems	of	values	that	democratic	participants	 ascribe	 to,	 which	 always	 escape	 complete	 homogenisation	 (Jones,	 2014;	Parker	 and	Parker,	2017;	 Smolović	 Jones	et	 al,	 2016):	 there	will	 always	be	an	 ‘us’	 and	‘them’	 amongst	whom	differences	 cannot	 be	 finally	 resolved	 (Mouffe,	 2005	 and	 2013;	Rhodes	and	Wray-Bliss,	2012;	Tambakakaki,	2014).	This	is	why	Connolly	(2004)	prefers	the	 notion	 of	 ‘pluralisation’	 to	 ‘pluralism’,	 connoting	 a	 process	 of	 pluralising	 relations	between	 people	 that	 never	 truly	 ends,	 whereas	 pluralism	 suggests	 a	 state	 of	 plural	relations,	something	more	static:	pluralising	and	pluralism	are	to	be	viewed	as	locked	in	a	relationship	of	opening	up	and	closing	down	democratic	identities.			There	 has	 been	 some	 work	 conducted	 seeking	 to	 translate	 agonistic	 pluralism	 as	relevant	to	organisational	settings.	Rhodes	and	Harvey	(2012)	posit	agonism	as	a	useful	framework	 via	 which	 depersonalised	 and	 controlling	 ethical	 norms	 in	 organisations	(viewed	 as	 established	 via	 a	 dominant	 discourse	 of	 Human	 Resources	 Management)	
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could	 be	 challenged.	 The	 authors	 claim	 that	 in	 the	 present	 day	 “globalised	 economy”	(ibid:	49),	which	is	reflected	in	increasingly	multicultural	organisational	settings,	there	is	a	 pluralism	 of	 “potentially	 incommensurable	 interests,	 interpretations	 and	 ethical	standpoints”	(ibid:	50),	that	could	offer	a	range	of	ethical	alternatives	to	managerialism.	If	drawn	upon	agonistically,	 the	authors	state,	HRM	could	be	read	and	worked	with	as	part	of	a	broader	set	of	‘socio-ethical	relations’	(p.56).			Such	an	understanding	of	pluralism,	as	a	way	of	ordering	the	social	via	a	multiplicity	of	social	 identities,	denotes	yet	 another	 important	aspect	of	 agonistic	democracy;	namely	the	 impossibility	 of	 reconciling	 the	 different	 values	 that	 social	 actors	may	 attribute	 to	democratic	practice	(Jones,	2014).	In	the	words	of	Mouffe	(1991:	81):		 plural	democracy	recognises	 the	 impossibility	of	 the	complete	realisation	of	democracy	and	 the	 final	 achievement	 of	 the	 political	 community.	 Its	 aim	 is	 to	 use	 the	 symbolic	resources	 of	 the	 liberal	 democratic	 tradition	 to	 struggle	 for	 the	 deepening	 of	 the	democratic	revolution,	knowing	that	it	is	a	never-ending	process.		Agonists	 are	 therefore	 sceptical	 about	 the	 possibility	 that	 differences	 amongst	 social	actors	may	be	ultimately	reconciled	via	democratic	engagement.			This	issue	of	the	impossibility	of	reconciling	difference	leads	us	to	the	second	principle	of	pluralism	for	agonists	–	that	it	serves	to	channel	potentially	violent	clashes	of	difference.	To	 enable	 pluralism,	 it	 is	 necessary	 for	 differences	 “not	 just	 to	 be	 acknowledged	 and	affirmed,	but	also	expressed”	(Tambakaki,	2014:	2).	However,	since	such	an	expression	of	 differences	 amongst	 democratic	 participants	 will	 most	 likely	 involve	 a	 degree	 of	
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struggle	(Rhodes,	2012),	it	is	necessary	to	ensure	that	such	a	struggle	does	not	escalate	into	violence.	Mouffe	therefore	seeks	to	channel	pluralising	differences	through	what	she	views	 as	 the	 two	most	 important	 principles	 of	 liberal	 democracy,	 liberty	 and	 equality,	noting	that	that	there	will	always	be	contestation	concerning	the	interpretation	of	these	principles	 in	practice	 (Erman,	2009;	Fletcher,	2003;	Mouffe,	2013;	Rhodes,	2016).	One	could	interpret	this	presupposition	of	consensus	in	relation	to	the	importance	of	liberty	and	equality	 as	 running	 counter	 to	 a	 core	 tenet	of	 the	 agonistic	project	 (Erman,	2009;	Knops,	 2007	 and	 2012;	 Rhodes,	 2012).	 Indeed,	 some	 advocates	 of	 deliberative	democratic	practice	argue	 that	Mouffe	 “commits	a	performative	contradiction”	 (Knops,	2012:	 151)	 through	 building	 her	 pluralist	 democratic	 theory	 on	 a	 critique	 of,	 and	opposition	 to,	 consensus,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 relying	 on	 an	 assumption	 that	 social	actors	 will	 cohere	 around	 the	 principles	 of	 liberty	 and	 equality	 for	 all	 (Erman,	 2009;	Knops,	 2007).	 Yet	 from	 the	 ontological	 perspective	 of	 post-foundationalism,	 and	 in	defence	 of	 Mouffe’s	 theorising,	 these	 principles	 (liberty	 and	 equality)	 could	 be	understood	as	products	of	a	relative	stabilisation	of	two	‘signifiers’	(Laclau	and	Mouffe,	1985),	 acquired	 through	 a	 repetition	 of	 discursive	 practices	 (Butler,	 1999),	 the	 final	closure	of	which	is	impossible	to	attain	(Cederström	and	Spicer,	2014).			These	 two	 signifiers	 (liberty	 and	 equality),	 Mouffe	 states,	 are	 representative	 of	 two	different,	if	contested,	traditions:	“liberalism,	with	its	emphasis	on	individual	liberty	and	universal	 rights,	 and	 democracy,	 which	 privileges	 the	 idea	 of	 equality	 and…popular	sovereignty”	 (Mouffe,	 2009b:	 556-557).	 The	 impossibility	 of	 finalising	 the	meaning,	 to	settle	 the	 ground	 for	 these	 two	 signifiers,	 is	 the	 result	 of	 continuous	 and	 competing	interpretations	 over	 what	 they	 might	 represent	 to	 different	 people	 and	 groups.	 Each	
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actor	in	an	adversarial	relationship	will	likely	have	their	own	interpretation	of	what	each	of	these	principles	should	represent	(Mouffe,	2005;	2009).				
Conflict	and	consensus		Agonists	 grant	 pre-eminence	 to	 a	 generative	 and	 open	 form	 of	 contested	 relations	 as	offering	 a	 kind	 of	 vitality	 to	 democratic	 practice	 (Connolly,	 2005;	 Tully,	 2002),	 as	subjects	 attempt	 to	 renegotiate	 the	borders	 of	 “common	 symbolic	 space”	 (Hansen	 and	Sonnichsen,	 2014:	 268).	 Central	 to	 this	 foregrounding	 of	 contestation	 is	 the	 idea	 of	 a	conflict	 of	 “adversaries”,	 rather	 than	 “enemies”,	 each	 side	 fighting	 to	 establish	 its	 own	‘hegemonic	order’	(Mouffe,	2009a:	13).	Mouffe	differentiates	adversaries	from	enemies,	as,	 unlike	 enemies,	 “[adversaries]	 share	 a	 common	 allegiance	 to	 the	 democratic	principles	 of	 ‘liberty	 and	 equality	 for	 all’”	 (Mouffe,	 2013:	 7),	 even	 though	 they	 may	disagree	 about	 the	 meaning	 of	 these	 principles	 in	 practice	 (Maeckelberg,	 2011).	 In	agonism,	each	group	will	aim	to	establish	its	own	understanding	of	democratic	principles	via	 a	 “vibrant	 democracy”	 of	 continuous	 debate	 (Mouffe,	 2013:7).	 Similarly,	 Connolly	(2005)	 speaks	 of	 ‘agonistic	 respect’,	 a	 phrase	 that	 describes	 relations	 of	 contest	 built	upon	 a	 basic	 awareness	 that	 one’s	 own	 identity	 and	 way	 of	 seeing	 the	 world	 is	necessarily	incomplete.		What	 is	more	radical	about	 this	view	 is	 the	 recognition	 that	although	some	agreement	can	be	reached	on	democratic	principles,	a	core	of	negativity	will	always	 inhere	 in	any	agonistic	relation:	while	proponents	hope	that	agonism	may	act	to	channel	people	away	from	antagonism,	 it	does	not	pretend	 to	heal	 the	basic	negativity	within	 language	 that	
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prevents	full	closure	(Connolly,	2002;	Fossen,	2008;	Tully,	2002).	Conflict	will	always	be	present,	 and	 should	 be	 encouraged,	 as	 no	 worldview	 or	 system	 of	 language	 will	 be	capable	of	fully	unifying	an	identity	or	society	(Legget,	2009;	Wingenbach,	2011).		Given	the	centrality	of	conflict	to	agonism,	the	question	of	how	alliances	capable	of	being	stable	enough	to	engender	change	are	formed	needs	to	be	addressed.	Mouffe	(2009a	and	2013)	 argues	 that	 any	 hegemonic	 constellation,	 understood	 broadly	 as	 a	 diverse	collection	of	groups,	people,	organisations	and	discourses,	will	of	course	act	as	a	means	of	 stabilising	democratic	practice,	and	 that	 this	occurs	 through	a	 ‘chain	of	equivalence’	(Laclau	 and	Mouffe,	 1985:	 144).	 Use	 of	 the	 word	 ‘chain’	 signals	 connections	 between	groups	 and	 discourses	 that	 may	 have	 previously	 been	 disconnected.	 For	 example,	Occupy	was	comprised	of	diverse	individuals	and	groups	who	related	to	one	another	in	a	number	 of	 ways:	 these	 chains	might	 be	 said	 to	 have	 consisted	 of	 common	 discourses	suspicious	 of	 ‘political	 elites’	 and	 favouring	 ‘direct	 democracy’	 (see	 Occupy	 London,	2011).	 Equivalential	 chains	 are	 characterised	 by	 Laclau	 (2007)	 as	 synonymous	 with	populist	movements.	They	are	defined	against	an	external	‘enemy’	or	‘adversary’.	In	the	words	of	Laclau,	“there	is	a	specific	negativity	which	is	inherent	to	the	equivalential	link”	(ibid:	 96),	 which	 means	 that	 a	 chain	 of	 equivalence	 depends	 on	 a	 negative	 outside	against	which	the	chain	of	groups	and	discourses	can	define	themselves.	The	aim	of	such	chains	 is	 to	 radically	 challenge	 the	 dominant	 order	 (represented	 by	 the	 negative	outside),	 through	 demands	 that	 cannot	 be	met	 by	 the	 ruling	 system	 as	 it	 is	 currently	constituted.	 This	 connecting	 of	 groups	 and	 causes	 in	 relation	 to	 an	 outside	 offers	 a	degree	of	stabilisation,	if	not	closure.		
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As	language	itself	is	considered	to	be	ultimately	contingent,	this	process	of	contestation	through	 chains	 of	 equivalence	 is	 inescapable	 and	 unending	 (Brown	 and	Dillard,	 2015;	Fletcher,	2003;	Jones,	2014;	Legget,	2009;	Mouffe,	2009a,	2013,	2014).	That	is	not	to	say	that	 contestation	 may	 not	 be	 marginalised	 or	 subdued	 through	 superficial	 or	 public	consensus.	 Yet,	 agonists	 maintain,	 conflict	 and	 dissensus	 are	 unavoidable	 and	 a	constitutive	 part	 of	 any	 democratic	 engagement,	 even	 when	 such	 processes	 appear	relatively	 consensual	 (Mouffe,	 2014;	 Reedy	 et	 al,	 2016;	 Rhodes,	 2012	 and	 2016).	Agonists	perceive	the	establishment	of	any	order	as	an	act	of	power	and	argue	that	there	will	 always	 be	 attempts	 to	 establish	 a	 counter-order,	 a	 counter-hegemony,	 through	which	 conflict/dissensus	 will	 emerge	 (Carpentier	 and	 Camaerts,	 2006;	 Jones,	 2014;	Mouffe,	2014).				
Agonistic	identity		Mouffe	 (2014)	 places	 ‘negativity’	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 her	 agonistic	 theory,	which	 opens	 up	“the	 ever	 present	 possibility	 of	 antagonism”	 (p.155),	 of	 questioning	 and	 destabilising	one’s	own	and	others’	 identifications,	 in	a	discursively	 constructed	society.	Within	 this	logic,	 social	 actors’	 democratic	 identities	 are	 devoid	 of	 essence	 and	 are	 instead	continuously	performed	and	re-performed	via	a	myriad	of	identifications	(Mouffe,	2014).	Hence,	identifications	become	a	battleground	for	agonistic	democratic	practice15.																																																											15	Both	Laclau	and	Mouffe	tend	to	be	suspicious	of	the	word	‘identity’,	using	the	term	more	often	than	not	for	something	settled,	for	an	essentialist	view	of	the	world,	or	qualifying	the	term	as	one	that	should	be	interpreted	as	lacking	coherence,	assembled	from	a	range	of	contested	subject	positions	(e.g.	Mouffe,	1991:	80-81).			
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Agonists	 treat	 every	 identity	 (of	 a	 person	 or	 collective)	 as	 relational,	 temporary	 and	contested.	 Identity	 is	 approached	 as	 assembled	 from	 hegemonic	 constellations	 of	discourses,	which	are	all	partial	and	contingent	(Laclau	and	Mouffe,	1985).	I,	as	a	person,	am	 an	 assemblage	 of	 “subject	 positions,	 constructed	 within	 specific	 discourses	 and	always	 precariously	 and	 temporarily	 sutured	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 those	 subject	positions”	(Mouffe,	1991:	80).	Moreover,	identity	is	always	dependent	on	an	antagonistic	outside,	knowable	only	in	relation	to	and	against	an	other:	the	hegemonic	constellation	of	 ‘us’	 stands	 in	 adversarial	 relation	 to	 a	 hegemonic	 constellation	 of	 ‘them’	 (Mouffe,	2013).	Identity	is	therefore	relational	and	contested:	groups	or	people	will	always	stand	in	a	dependent	relationship	 to	one	another,	as	 their	very	 formation	 is	contingent	upon	the	 other,	 even,	 and	 perhaps	 especially,	 if	 that	 other	 is	 identified	with	 in	 antagonistic	ways	(Mouffe,	2009a).			Mouffe	 (1991;	1995;	1999;	2009a;	Laclau	and	Mouffe,	1985)	 is	 interested	 in	 collective	identity,	as	befits	her	commitment	to	relationality;	she	argues	for	a	conflictual	dialogue	that	unfolds	between	diverse	groups	rather	than	diverse	individuals	–	subjects	are	to	be	read	as	assemblages	of	discourses,	as	collectives.	Mouffe	interprets	agonism	not	merely	as	concerned	with	a	process	of	debate,	but	with	seeking	to	alter	the	ground	upon	which	people	base	 their	 identifications.	Therefore,	 in	order	 to	participate	agonistically	people	need	to	be	prepared	to	“undergo	a	radical	change	in	their	political	 identity	[which]	has	more	 of	 a	 quality	 of	 conversion	 than	 of	 a…	 persuasion”	 (Mouffe,	 1999:	 755).	 Through	relating	 with	 others	 agonistically,	 Mouffe	 argues,	 contingencies	 are	 surfaced	 and	challenged	and	the	 ‘order’	of	subject	positions	is	brought	 into	question	–	brought	to	 its	discursive	limits	(Cederström	and	Spicer,	2014;	Smolović	Jones	et	al,	2016).			
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Agonistic	passions		Underlying	conflict	for	agonists	is	the	passionate	investment	in	certain	values	democratic	subjects	 hold	 as	 important.	 Passions	 are	 understood	 as	 an	 important	 driving	 force	 for	identity	construction	and	social	mobilisation	(Jones,	2014;	Legget,	2013;	Machin,	2014).	In	the	words	of	Mouffe:		 The	model	 of	 ‘agonistic	 pluralism’	 that	 I	 am	 advocating	 asserts	 that	 the	 prime	 task	 of	democratic	politics	is	not	to	eliminate	passions…but	to	mobilise	those	passions	towards	the	promotion	of	democratic	designs”	(1999:	755-756).		Mouffe	places	the	passions	at	the	heart	of	collective	identity	formation,	stating	that	they	play	a	“crucial	role”	in	performing	democratic	practice	(Mouffe,	2013:	6).	She	argues	that	various	 rationalist	 frameworks	 of	 democratic	 practice	 (e.g.	 deliberative)	 have	wrongly	relegated	passions,	or	tried	to	overcome	them,	thus	potentially	overlooking	what	people	hold	as	most	vibrant	and	meaningful.	Such	an	emphasis	is	potentially	dangerous,	Mouffe	asserts,	 leading	 to	 “apathy	 and	 to	 a	 disaffection	 with	 political	 participation”	 (Mouffe,	2013:	7).			For	 Mouffe,	 passions	 are	 to	 be	 distinguished	 from	 emotions16,	 as	 emotions	 are	 often	associated	with	 individuals	 and	 not	 groups	 (Mouffe,	 2014:	 149).	 Passions,	 in	Mouffe’s	view,	are	more	specifically	political,	derived	from	the	politico-historical	identifications	of																																																									16	It	is	important	to	note	here	that	emotions	such	as	“boredom,	envy,	fear,	love,	anger,	guilt,	infatuation,	embarrassment,	nostalgia,	anxiety”	(Fineman,	2000:	1)	have	also	been	analysed	within	organisations	as	necessarily	relational.	
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the	 group,	 contingent	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 particular	 context.	 It	 is	 passions,	 rather	 than	emotions,	 that	 have	 “more	 violent	 connotations…[which]	 allows	 me	 to	 underline	 the	dimension	 of	 conflict	 and	 to	 suggest	 a	 confrontation	 between	 collective	 political	identities”	(Mouffe,	2014:	149).			It	is	through	confrontational	passions	that	the	distinction	between	us/them	emerges	i.e.	our	 interpretation	 of	 liberal	 democratic	 principles	 (based	 on	 politico-historical	experiences	with	the	context)	versus	their	 interpretation	(Legget,	2013;	Mouffe,	2014).	Yet	 the	 violent	 effects	 of	 passions	 may	 be	 ameliorated	 and	 ‘tamed’	 through	 the	framework	 of	 agonistic	 democratic	 practice	 (Roskamm,	 2015).	 In	 such	 a	 framework	violent	enemies	are	 transformed	 into	adversaries	 through	allegiance	 to	 the	same	over-arching	ethico-political	principles	(Mouffe,	2013).			Mouffe	has	been	criticised	for	offering	a	vague	category	of	‘passion’	and	doing	so	without	also	offering	a	more	precise	understanding	of	how	affect	can	be	approached	in	practice.	Mihai	 (2014)	 argues	 that	 ‘passions’	 have	 too	 negative	 a	 connotation	 to	 be	 ever	deconstructed	 as	 positive	 and	 states	 that	 ‘taming’	 passions	 holds	 “strong	 disciplinary	connotations”	(p.36).	The	latter,	the	author	argues,	contradicts	the	agonistic	conception	of	“citizens	as	agents	engaged	in	collective	processes	of	contestation”	(ibid.).	However,	it	is	difficult	 to	envisage	any	democratic	process	–	or	any	organisational	process	 for	 that	matter	-	that	does	not,	to	one	extent	or	another,	attempt	to	channel	passions.	That	said,	Mouffe’s	 account	 is	 somewhat	 underdeveloped,	 a	 problem	 that	 may	 be	 partially	overcome	through	considering	the	embodied	nature	of	democratic	practice,	something	I	will	explore	in	more	detail	through	Butler’s	work.		
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Aesthetics		Aesthetics	 is	 an	 emerging	 area	 of	 interest	 for	 agonists,	 particularly	 for	 Mouffe	 and	Jacques	Ranciére.	Writing	 about	 the	 role	 of	 art	 in	 agonistic	 politics,	Mouffe	 (2007	 and	2013)	recognises	artistic	practice	as	a	 force	 for	battling	“neo-liberal	hegemony”	(2007:	5).	Although	she	recognises	 that	art	has	been	 increasingly	co-opted	 into	contemporary	capitalism,	which	may	 have	 dampened	 its	 power	 to	 challenge	 the	 status-quo	 (Mouffe,	2007;	2013),	she	still	believes	that	art	can	make	visible	“what	the	dominant	consensus	tends	 to	 obscure	 and	 obliterate…giving	 a	 voice	 to	 all	 those	 who	 are	 silenced	 within	the…existing	 hegemony”	 (Mouffe,	 2013:	 93),	 especially	when	 enacted	 collectively	 (see	Elias	et	al,	2018,	for	a	discussion	of	similar	collective	meaning	construction	in	relations	between	art	entrepreneurs	and	their	customers)17.			Art	offers	an	alternative	means	for	the	“articulation	of	different…struggles”	(ibid.)	and	as	such	 can	 disturb	 and	 unsettle	 taken-for-granted	 sedimented	 practices,	 but	 it	 can	 also	“play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 constitution	 and	 maintenance	 of	 a	 given	 symbolic	 order”	 (Mouffe,	2013:	91).	The	role	of	artistic	practices	is	not	to	uncover	some	hidden	‘truth’	but	to	foster	“the	inscription	of	the	social	agent	in	a	set	of	practices	that	will	mobilise	its	affects	in	a	way	 that	disarticulates	 the	 framework	 in	which	 the	dominant	process	of	 identification	takes	place”	 (Mouffe,	2013:	93;	 see	Rafaeli	 and	Vilnai-Yavetz,	2004,	 for	a	discussion	of	the	overlap	between	the	aesthetic	and	affect	 in	organisations).	Understood	 in	this	way,	art	cannot	be	easily	distinguished	from	the	political,	as	there	is	“an	aesthetic	dimension																																																									17	Aesthetics	has	likewise	been	drawn	upon	in	organisation	studies	as	a	means	for	understanding	how	people	develop	practice	and	produce	knowledge	together	beyond	words,	and	through	more	artful	means	–	shared	sensemaking	through	relating	to	the	visual,	audio	and	text	(e.g.	Carroll	and	Smolović	Jones,	2018;	Ewenstein	and	Whyte,	2007).		
	 93	
in	 the	 political	 and	 there	 is	 a	 political	 dimension	 in	 art”	 (ibid).	 Artistic	 practices,	therefore,	 can	 be	 a	 battlefield	 of	 passionate	 politics,	 of	 sedimented	 and	 emerging	identifications,	where	diverse	articulations	of	people’s	beliefs	vie	for	authority	in	public	spaces.			Yet,	 Mouffe	 argues	 that	 for	 “artistico-activist”	 (2013:	 97)	 practice	 to	 be	 critical	 and	generative	it	is	not	sufficient	for	it	to	remain	on	the	“deconstructive	level”	(2013:	93).	It	must	 also	 supply	 a	 means	 of	 articulating	 new	 identifications	 that	 are	 not	 as	 of	 yet	available.	“Artivists”	need	to	abandon	“the	modernist	illusion	of	the	privileged	position	of	the	 artist”	 and	 engage	 in	 “constructing	 new	 practices	 and	 new	 subjectivities”	 (Mouffe,	2013:	106).			However,	while	Mouffe	underlines	the	importance	of	artistic	practices	for	socio-political,	democratic	transformation	and	recognises	the	entanglement	of	art	and	politics,	she	does	not	offer	a	nuanced	conceptual	understanding	of	how	such	entanglement	unfolds.	This	is	why	I	make	recourse	to	Ranciére’s	(2012)	twin	concepts	of	the	politics	of	aesthetics	and	the	aesthetics	of	politics.	Ranciére’s	understanding	of	these	concepts	is	more	embodied	than	Mouffe’s	account	of	art	 in	democratic	practice,	which	 is	a	welcome	 interpretation	for	 this	 research	 and	 compatible	 with	 its	 performative	 theoretical	 framework.	 This	embodied	aspect	of	the	two	concepts	is,	perhaps,	best	explicated	through	a	third	concept	from	Ranciére,	that	of	the	“distribution	of	the	sensible”	(Ranciére,	2012:	9).			‘Distribution	of	 the	 sensible’	demarcates	 the	borders	around	any	order,	which	 is	made	intelligible	through	the	“apportionment”	(Ranciére,	2012:	12)	of	bodies,	spaces,	objects,	discursive	 practices,	 routines,	 etc.	 For	 example,	 the	 sensible	 order	 of	 a	 ‘workplace’	 in	
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academia	 –	 and	office	 space	 in	 general	 (see	Alexandersson	 and	Kalonaityte,	 2018)	 -	 is	etched	through	the	selection	of	objects	(e.g.	desks,	computers,	whiteboards,	etc.),	spaces	(e.g.	 open-space	 offices,	 lecture	 theatres,	 classrooms,	 online	 discussion	 forums),	discursive	 practices	 (e.g.	 writing	 papers,	 lecturing,	 etc.),	 routines	 (e.g.	 marking	assignments,	etc.),	bodies	(e.g.	students,	lecturers,	etc.)	and	so	on.	Such	a	distribution	of	the	 sensible	 of	 the	 ‘academic	 workplace’	 renders	 it	 intelligible	 to	 us	 as	 an	 ‘academic	workplace’	 and	 not,	 say,	 a	 gym	 or	 a	 surgery,	 and	 so	 may	 appear	 to	 us	 as	 common-sensical.			However,	 there	 is	 another	 aspect	 to	 the	 sensible	 here	 –	 that	 which	 can	 be	 perceived	through	the	senses,	can	be	sensed,	but	is	not	necessarily	“sayable”	(Ranciére,	2012:	63)	in	 the	 present	 political	 climate.	 Using	 the	 same	 example,	 I	 may	 perceive	 an	 academic	workplace	 ordered	 by	 a	 masculine	 distribution	 of	 the	 sensible	 through	 a	 sense	 of	discomfort	(e.g.	feeling	cold	as	the	heating	system	is	set	according	to	the	thermal	needs	of	 my	 male	 counterparts,	 etc.)	 or	 I	 may	 simply	 accept	 that	 cooler	 workplaces	 are	common-sense	and	wear	a	duvet	at	work.	This	image	of	me	wearing	a	duvet	in	the	office	can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 an	 aesthetic-political	 act,	 which	 brings	 us	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 the	politics	of	aesthetics.			Ranciére	 (2012)	 theorises	 three	 regimes	 of	 art	 historically	 in	 order	 to	 help	 us	understand	its	role	in	society:	ethical,	representational	and	aesthetic.	These	regimes	are	tied	 to	 specific	 and	 sequential	 historic	 eras,	 yet	 they	 are	 not	 theorised	 as	 necessarily	successive,	 as	 ”each	 continues	 to	 exist	 alongside	 another”	 (Sayers,	 2005:	 2).	We	 could	also	understand	regimes	of	art	as	 imposing	organisational	principles	and	restraints	on	groups	 seeking	 to	 enact	 democratic	 practice	 (Ortmann	 and	 Sydow,	 2018).	Drawing	 on	
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Plato,	 Ranciére	 (2012)	 envisages	 the	 ethical	 regime	 of	 art	 as	 one	 that	 regulates	 the	distribution	 of	 the	 sensible	 through	 offering	 ethical	 norms	 of	 being	 in	 the	 world	 (e.g.	literary,	 visual,	 audio	 art	 that	 espouses	 virtues).	 	 The	 representative	 regime	 “breaks	away	from	the	ethical	regime…it	identifies	the	substance	of…	the	arts”	(ibid:	21).	Such	a	regime	purports	to	imitate	ways	of	“doing,	making,	seeing,	and	judging”	(ibid:	22)	as	they	‘really’	exist	in	the	world.	However,	Ranciére	argues,	this	regime	also	organises	what	is	regarded	as	sensible	 in	a	particular	order	–	 it	 is	a	 “regime	of	visibility	 [rather	 than]	an	artistic	process”	 (ibid.)	–	and	as	such	dictates	what	and	whom	is	 to	be	 included,	heard	and	recognised	 in	an	order	of	 the	sensible.	 It	 is	a	regime	that	seeks	 to	establish	power	relations	and	hierarchy	(ibid:	24-25).		In	contrast,	the	aesthetic	regime	is	closely	linked	to	the	process	of	“rupture”	(Ranciére,	in	Arnall	 et	 al,	 2012:	 289)	 between	 symbol	 and	 association,	 unsettling	 power	 relations	through	 disturbing	 a	 particular	 distribution	 of	 the	 sensible.	 It	 involves	 “disrupting	 the	relationship	between	the	visible,	the	sayable,	and	the	thinkable”	(ibid:	63).	Such	a	regime	“devotes	 itself	 to	 the	 invention	 of	 new	 forms	 of	 life”	 (Ranciére,	 2012:	 25),	 as	 critique	gives	 way	 to	 the	 generative.	 Art	 and	 artistic	 practices	 are	 ”no	 longer	 the	 codified	expression	 of	 a	 thought	 or	 feeling	 [or]	 a	 double	 or	 a	 translation	 [but]	 a	way	 in	which	things	 themselves	 speak	 and	 are	 silent”	 (Ranciére,	 2009:	 13).	 Art	 here	 performs	 the	political	 function	 of	 resistance,	 unsettling	 and	 opening	 up	 possibilities	 for	 new	subjectivities	to	emerge	(Ranciére,	2012:	9).	Although	not	a	directly	Ranciére-informed	study,	 Munro	 and	 Jordan	 (2013)	 draw	 attention	 to	 how	 art,	 performed	 through	embodied	public	acts	and	drawing	on	the	aesthetic	dimensions	of	the	visual	and	audio,	can	 re-order	 how	 we	 conceptualise	 shared,	 common	 space	 –	 overlapping	 aesthetic	interventions	can	re-order,	in	other	words	(see	also	Michels	and	Steyaert,	2017).	
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	The	aesthetic	 regime	 is	 therefore	closely	 linked	 to	 the	democratic	principle	of	equality	that	 denotes	 an	 “equality	 of	 the	 communicated”	 (Ranciere,	 2012:	 54),	 of	 a	 newly	imagined	relationship	to	space	and	ideas.	Art	offers	a	way	for	novel	meaning-making	to	occur	through	virtue	of	“silent	speech”	(Ranciere,	2009:	13),	which	is	understood	as	“the	eloquence	of	the	very	thing	that	is	silent,	the	capacity	to	exhibit	signs	written	on	a	body,	the	 marks	 directly	 imprinted	 by	 its	 history”	 (ibid.).	 Such	 a	 definition	 of	 silent	 speech	denotes	 the	 capacity	 of	 bodies	 and	 objects	 to	 evoke	 contextual	meaning,	 to	 provide	 a	sense	 of	 “familiarity”	 (2009:	 35).	 However,	 art	 can	 also	 evoke	 “the	 strangeness	 of	 the	familiar”	(2009:	57),	by	incorporating	“foreign”	elements	within	the	familiar	(2009:	57),	either	 through	 combining	 mediums	 (image,	 word,	 colour,	 sound,	 etc.)	 or	 symbols	 in	unexpected	ways,	 and	 so	 fostering	 novel	 inscriptions	 and	 subjectivities	 -	 for	 example,	combining	 the	 traditional	 symbols	 for	 ‘male’	 and	 ‘female’	 and	 adding	new	elements	 to	them	in	order	to	denote	fluidity	of	genders:	 	 		 	 	(see	Ray	Marquez,	2018).			Ranciére	 argues	 that	 politics	 is	 an	 aesthetic	 activity	 “not	 because	 there	 is	 a	 specific	aesthetic	to	politics…but	because	within	any	specific	social	arrangement	there	are	words	and	 images	 in	 constant	 circulation…whose	 proper	 order	 is	 a	 perpetual	 source	 of	disagreement”	 (Deranty,	 2010:100).	 Such	 a	 ‘proper’	 order	 can	 be	 challenged	 through	introjections	of	 the	previously	excluded,	 invisible	and	silent	(Ranciére,	2012).	Ordering	the	 sensible	 is	 an	ongoing	battle	 “of	domination	and	 subjection”	 (Ranciere,	2009a:	12)	where	exclusion	is	inevitable,	as	for	Ranciére	equality	is	not	an	end	result	but	a	principle	upon	 which	 democracy	 is	 enacted	 –	 it	 is	 a	 continuous	 struggle	 for	 inclusion.	 Such	exclusion	in	an	order	always	renders	some	elements	recognisable	and	obscures	others,	
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through	legitimising	what	is	an	“utterance	rather	than	a	gutterance,	speech	rather	than	noise,	language	rather	than	blabber”	(Deranty,	2010:	102).		The	 aesthetics	 of	 politics	 is	 therefore	not	 only	perceptible	 in	 the	 “epideictic	 oratory”18	(Ranciere,	2016:	4)	of	politicians,	propaganda	posters,	 campaign	videos	and	so	on,	but	also	in	the	distribution	of	bodies	in	any	particular	order	–	of	those	who	can	be	recognised	as	political	subjects	 -	and	so	democratic	practice	can	be	understood	as	 the	 insertion	of	bodies	 into	 a	 sensible	 order,	 of	 people	 previously	 invisible	 demanding	 to	 be	acknowledged.	 A	 good	 example	 of	 this	 would	 be	 the	 suffragette	 movement,	 where	women	physically,	through	the	aesthetic	presence	of	their	bodies,	encroached	upon	the	existing	political	order	of	the	time,	which	recognised	only	men	as	political	subjects,	and	reordered	 what	 was	 considered	 valid	 political	 decision-making	 (e.g.	 both	 men	 and	women	voting).	Such	reordering	did	not	take	place	simply	through	the	 implementation	of	a	new	law	(although	law	could	be	perceived	as	a	kind	of	malleable	aesthetic	medium),	but	 also	 through	 other,	 more	 evocative	 forms	 of	 writing	 (e.g.	 pamphlets,	 magazine	articles,	 etc.),	 and	 through	 occupying	 public	 spaces	 (e.g.	 street	 marching,	 protesting,	chaining	bodies	to	railings,	etc.).				
Summary		Agonism	 is	 a	 theory	 informed	 by	 post-foundational	 onto-epistemological	 assumptions,	and	 is	 devised	 against	 more	 consensual	 forms	 of	 democratic	 practice,	 such	 as																																																									18	Epideictic	oratory	refers	to	a	type	of	rhetoric,	in	Aristotle’s	Rhetoric,	that	entails	a	ceremonial,	dramatic	style	of	speech	usually	used	to	bestow	praise	or	to	judge.		
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deliberation	(Mouffe,	2014).	Proponents	of	agonism	propose	the	idea	of	an	irreconcilable	pluralism	 of	 ideas,	 values,	 identifications	 and	 people	 that	 cannot	 and	 should	 not	 be	tamed	 (Connoly,	 2005;	Mouffe,	 1991;	Roskamm,	2015).	A	 pluralism	of	 differences	will	inevitably	 lead	 to	 conflict,	 agonists	 argue,	which	 serves	 to	 invigorate	 the	 political	 and	lead	to	a	more	vibrant	democratic	practice	(Mouffe,	2013:7).	Mouffe,	in	particular,	argues	that	emergent	conflicts	will	not	escalate	into	violence	as	long	as	practitioners	subscribe	to	the	two	main	principles	of	democracy:	liberty	and	equality.			Those	 who	 subscribe	 to	 principles	 of	 liberty	 and	 equality	 but	 engage	 in	 a	 conflictual	interpretation	 of	 them	 are	 termed	 ‘adversaries’	 and	 are	 to	 be	 distinguished	 from	‘enemies’,	who	aim	to	collapse	democracy	altogether	(Maeckelberg,	2011;	Mouffe,	2013:	7).	However,	such	contestation	is	not	to	be	viewed	as	an	endless	bickering	of	all-against-all	 and	 agonists	 indeed	 recognise	 the	 possibility	 of	 hegemonic	 constellations	 forming	through	chains	of	equivalence	(Laclau,	2005;	Laclau	and	Mouffe,	1985).			Identity	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 democratic	 practice	 for	 agonists,	 and	 is	 something	conceptualised	 as	 relational	 and	dependent	 on	 an	 antagonistic	 outside:	 the	 hegemonic	constellation	of	‘us’	stands	in	adversarial	relation	to	a	hegemonic	constellation	of	‘them’	(Mouffe,	 2013).	 Identity	 is	 therefore	 contested	 through	 democratic	 practice	 at	 the	ontological	level	(Connolly,	2002;	Mouffe,	2009a).			Mouffe	places	passions	at	the	heart	of	collective	identity	formation,	stating	that	they	play	a	 “crucial	 role”	 (Mouffe,	 2013:	 6)	 in	 performing	 democratic	 practice	 and	 social	mobilisation	 (Jones,	 2014;	 Legget,	 2013;	 Machin,	 2014).	 Yet,	 even	 though	 Mouffe	
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recognises	 the	 importance	of	 passions,	 this	 aspect	 of	 democratic	 practice	 is	 somewhat	underdeveloped	in	her	account	of	agonism.			Mouffe	offers	a	view	of	art	as	holding	potential	for	instigating	change	but	it	is	the	work	of	Ranciére	 that	 supplies	 a	 more	 in-depth	 account	 of	 aesthetics	 in	 relation	 to	 agonistic	democratic	 practice.	 Using	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 ‘distribution	 of	 the	 sensible’,	 Ranciére	(2012)	helps	us	understand	the	interplay	between	exclusion	and	inclusion	in	the	never-ending	 struggle	 for	 equality	 between	 different	 groups	 (intelligible	 and	 unintelligible).	Through	his	concept	of	 the	politics	of	aesthetics	(ibid),	he	argues	that	art	may	serve	to	disrupt	some	sedimented,	taken-for-granted	practices	and	lead	to	the	emergence	of	new	subjectivities.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 through	 his	 concept	 of	 the	 aesthetics	 of	 politics,	 he	invites	us	to	observe	democratic	practice	as	an	entanglement	of	a	myriad	of	embodied,	visual	and	discursive	acts.			I	 now	proceed	 to	more	 explicitly	 draw	deliberation	 and	 agonism	back	 to	 the	 research	question	 through	 seeking	 to	 extrapolate	 their	 performative	 norms	 for	 practice,	highlighting	some	of	their	similarities,	differences	and	shortcomings	in	the	process.			
3.2.3.	The	performative	norms	of	agonism	and	deliberation	and	their	
shortcomings		In	this	section	I	focus	on	drawing	out	the	norms	of	democratic	practice	from	theories	of	deliberation	and	agonism,	and	reflect	on	the	implications	inherent	for	the	work	of	NGO	practitioners.	I	also	explore	the	shortcomings	of	the	theories,	in	the	process	justifying	a	
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more	 embodied,	 performative	 and	 everyday	 view	 of	 democratic	 practice	 that	 crosses	between	–	and	beyond	–	deliberation	and	agonism.		First,	 I	consider	the	gendered	normative	 implications	of	both	theories	 for	practice.	The	theory	of	deliberative	democracy	could	be	understood	as	traditionally	 ‘masculine’,	as	 it	assumes	 a	 practitioner	 who	 engages	 in	 rational	 dialogue	 based	 on	 a	 set	 of	 discursive	rules	(Erman,	2012).	Rationality	has	a	long	history	of	associations	with	men,	masculinity	and	 “good…practice”	 (Dougherty	 and	 Hode,	 2016:	 1734)	 against	 which	 passion	 and	emotion,	usually	associated	more	with	women	in	organisations,	are	usually	positioned	as	inferior,	‘other’	and	as	bad	practice	(Dougherty	and	Drumheller,	2006).	In	a	similar	vein,	agonism	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 traditionally	 ‘feminine’,	 as	 it	 assumes	 a	 practitioner	involved	 in	 a	 passionate	 discursive	 struggle.	 The	 former	 theory	 foregrounds	 reaching	consensus	 through	 reason	 and	 the	 latter	 the	 perpetuity	 of	 conflict	 and	 lack	 of	 stable	ontological	foundations	(Marchart,	2007).		Second,	 both	 theories	 convey	 norms	 of	 intersubjective	 engagement,	 a	 dialogical	character	 to	 the	 democratic	 bearing	 of	 subjects.	 For	 deliberative	 democratic	 subjects,	decision-making	processes	in	the	context	of	democratic	practice	should	be	underpinned	by	 understanding	 and	 agreements	made	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 by	 rational	 social	 actors	(Estlund,	 2012;	 Habermas,	 1996).	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 essential	 for	 deliberative	 democrats	that	deliberation	is	based	on	a	set	of	discourse	rules	(Erman,	2012).	This	means	that	the	interlocutors	involved	in	discourse	must	be	in	a	position	to	justify	any	of	the	claims	made	according	 to	 rules	 of	 rational	 communication	 (ibid).	 For	 agonists,	 however,	 decision-making	 should	 be	 characterised	 by	 passionate	 and	 conflictual	 discussions	 throughout	which	democratic	actors	will	be	willing	and	open	to	questioning	the	ontological	basis	of	
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their	 identities	 in	 order	 to	 arrive	 at	 a	 common	decision	 (Legget,	 2013;	Mouffe,	 2009a;	2014).	 They	 dispense	with	 the	 idea	 that	 language	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	 set	 of	 rational	rules	 that	 can	guide	discussion	and	 instead	believe	 that	democratic	 actors	ought	 to	be	engaged	in	continuous	struggles	around	the	meaning	of	democratic	principles	and	values	(Mouffe,	2009a).			Third,	there	is	an	“educational”	(Cooke,	2000:	948)	quality	perceptible	in	both	theories;	namely,	 people	 learn	 about	 others’	 opinions,	 beliefs	 and	 values	 but	 they	 also	 improve	their	 capacities	 to	 learn	 and	 debate,	 meaning	 that	 subjects	 commit	 to	 a	 process	 of	ongoing	change	in	their	opinions	and	identifications	(Connolly,	2002	and	2005;	Dryzek,	2010).	 Advocates	 of	 deliberative	 democratic	 practice	 hold	 that	 interests,	 opinions	 and	beliefs	can	be	influenced	via	a	process	of	deliberation	(Estlund,	2012),	that	“if	exposed	to	new	 facts	 and	 different	 points	 of	 view,	 citizens	may	 choose	 differently	 from	how	 they	would	 do	 on	 their	 own”	 (Chappell,	 2012:	 101).	 For	 agonists,	 however,	 learning	 from	engagement	with	others	means	challenging	the	ontological	basis	of	the	identifications	of	others	 while	 simultaneously	 questioning	 one’s	 own	 (Connolly,	 2002	 and	 2005;	 Jones,	2014;	Mouffe,	2014).			The	 fourth	 norm	 refers	 to	 the	 attitude	 of	 participants	 of	 democratic	 practice	 towards	reciprocity,	an	openness	to	the	views	of	others	and	the	factoring	in	of	others’	views	when	speaking	or	making	decisions.	Chappell	(2012:	7)	characterises	such	a	debate	as	“other-regarding”.	Possessing	such	an	attitude	manifests	in	not	only	holding	private	reasons	for	a	 particular	 preference,	 but	 also	 sharing	 these	 reasons	 with,	 and	 justifying	 them	 to,	others	in	a	comprehensible	way	while	simultaneously	keeping	others’	interests	in	mind	(ibid).	However,	such	an	attitude	also	refers	to	an	openness	to	hear	and	take	into	account	
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the	 reasons	 and	 justifications	 of	 others	 (Benhabib,	 1996).	 Deliberative	 debate	 aims	 to	disclose	and	promote	fairness,	respect	and	honesty	amongst	people,	kept	alive	through	an	ethos	of	reciprocity.	Agonists	also	insist	on	openness	and	respectfulness,	yet	instead	of	 deliberative	 rational	 persuasion,	 they	 emphasise	 a	 more	 radical	 conflict,	 and	attempted	 conversion,	 between	 adversaries	who	 subscribe	 to	 foundational	 democratic	principles	of	equality	and	liberty	(Mouffe,	1999).				Fifth	and	finally,	both	deliberative	and	agonistic	theories	of	democratic	practice	assume	that	 subjects	will	 engage	with	 official	 government	 bodies	 and	 institutions,	 rather	 than	seeking	 to	 overturn	 these	 structures	 (Connolly,	 2002;	 Dryzek,	 2000;	 Habermas,	 1996;	Mouffe,	 1991;	 2014).	 Such	 a	 position	 necessarily	 involves	 abiding	 by	 the	 norms	prescribed	by	government,	to	a	greater	or	lesser	degree,	and	hence	a	tension	persists	in	both	 theories	 regarding	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 may	 compromise	 with	 the	 very	institutions	 they	 seek	 to	 reform:	 do	 democratic	 acts	 truly	 subvert	 unequal	 norms	 or	might	they	simply	re-enforce	them	(Bloom	and	White,	2016)?		The	first	shortcoming	I	identify	relates	to	the	fact	that	both	Habermas	and	Mouffe	favour	language	as	 the	primary	means	of	understanding	and	doing	democratic	practice.	While	the	 act	 of	 debate	 comprises	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 democratic	 practice,	 language	 in	 isolation	seems	 insufficient	 for	understanding	and	accounting	 for	 the	everyday	 interactions	and	engagements	between	people	 in	 a	 variety	of	 settings.	Ranciére’s	 injection	of	 aesthetics	into	democratic	practice	partially	accounts	for	the	body,	but	his	framework	is	broad	and	does	 not	 allow	 for	 an	 interpretation	 of	 the	 detail	 of	 how	 such	 embodied	 work	 is	performed.	As	 I	discuss	 later	 in	 the	 thesis,	 the	emergence	of	democratic	agency	can	be	positioned	as	a	more	embodied	experience.		
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		The	 second	 shortcoming	 relates	 to	how	Habermas	 and	Mouffe	 envisage	 agency.	 In	 the	work	of	Habermas,	agency	is	sometimes	written	about	as	enacted	by	deliberators	(when	he	theorises	CA),	which	clashes	with	his	view	of	a	decentred	subject.	At	other	times	he	claims	 that	 agency	 resides	 in	 language	 (when	 he	 theorises	 SA),	 using	 Austin’s	 (1962)	account	 of	 performativity	 to	 support	 his	 position.	 Neither	 is	 sufficiently	 theorised	 for	deeper	understanding	of	the	relational	and	embodied	ways	in	which	people	enact	their	democratic	 agency.	 Mouffe’s	 writing,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 seems	 to	 overlook	 agency	entirely.	 Movement	 in	 subject-positions	 and	 commitments	 occurs	 when	 participants	come	 face-to-face	 with	 difference.	 Differences	 will	 emerge	 when	 they	 clash,	 and	 the	identity/practice	 re-configuration	 will	 then	 commence.	 Yet	 the	 meeting	 of	 difference,	face-to-face,	 does	 not	 seem	 an	 adequate	 explanation	 for	 how	 agency	 emerges,	 as	 the	process	 in	 practice	 could	 be	 more	 gradual	 or	 subtler,	 experienced	 over	 time	 and	 not	always	 occurring	 within	 formal,	 face-to-face	 contexts.	 Both	 Habermas	 and	 Mouffe	envisage	 democratic	 practice	 unfolding	 as	 people	 gather	 together	 in	 respectful	 places	called	 ‘forums’	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 ‘doing’	 democracy	 (either	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 rational,	civilised	 dialogue	 or	 to	 passionately	 renegotiate	 their	 identifications),	 rather	 than	 as	something	that	is	enacted	on	a	day-to-day	basis	in	a	wide	range	of	mundane	settings.			Finally,	both	authors	assume	that	democratic	practice	unfolds	 in	a	benign	environment	in	 which	 most	 are	 dedicated	 to	 the	 project	 of	 generating	 democratic	 practice.	 In	Habermas’	case,	the	corrupt	are	excluded	from	the	category	of	democratic	practice	and	classified	instead	as	engaged	in	a	form	of	SA;	in	Mouffe’s	case,	the	corrupt	are	written	off	as	enemies.	In	this	erasure	they	both	underplay	the	potential	significance	of	corruption,	particularly	of	contexts	where	it	may	be	widespread,	embedded	within	institutions	and	
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inescapable,	as	well	as	the	possibility	that	commitment	to	liberty	and	equality	might	not	be	widespread	in	certain	societies.		I	 now	move	 on	 to	 consider	 a	 performative	 account	 of	 agency	 as	 a	 valuable	means	 of	interpreting	how	democracy	is	practiced	within	the	context	of	Montenegro.	Such	a	focus	does	 not	 dismiss	 deliberative	 and	 agonistic	 accounts	 but	 enriches	 them	 by	 providing	insight	 into	 how	 they	 might	 surface	 as	 normative	 acts	 within	 a	 broader	 normative	framework	of	a	country	in	transition.	I	also	move	beyond	agonism	and	deliberation	–	and	their	 shortcomings	 –	 by	 seeking	 to	 understand	 how	 democracy	 could	 manifest	 in	embodied	and	everyday	ways.	I	approach	democracy	as	a	rich	discourse	that	can	serve	as	a	resource	for	a	more	‘agential’	generation	of	practice.	From	this	perspective,	discourses	of	democracy	suggest	certain	ways	of	being,	thinking	and	acting	in	the	world	that	might	be	accepted,	reconfigured	or	rejected.														
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IV	Theoretical	framework	–	Judith	Butler’s	Performativity			
Introduction		 	In	this	chapter	I	discuss	Judith	Butler’s	account	of	agency	termed	performativity	(1999;	2004;	2006;	2011;	2015)	as	a	perspective	that	can	enhance	understanding	of	democracy	as	an	embodied	and	everyday	practice,	thus	overcoming	some	of	the	‘formal’,	binary	and	normative	 prescriptions	 of	 deliberation	 and	 agonism.	 Butler’s	 account	 provides	 a	framework	 through	 which	 to	 understand	 how	 subjects	 become	 a	 site	 for	 democratic	contest,	defy	conventional	norms,	respond	to	others	in	vulnerability	and	assert	a	certain	collective	presence.	Moreover,	Butler’s	account	of	the	body	is	a	useful	way	of	helping	me	write	 my	 own	 embodied	 presence	 into	 the	 research,	 and	 in	 necessary	 relation	 to	participants.	Performativity	allows	me	to	offer	an	 interpretation	of	democratic	practice	beyond	the	strictures	of	democracy	theory	and	as	something	enmeshed	in	the	practices	of	everyday	life	and	work.	Its	relationship	to	theories	of	democracy	can	be	positioned	as	viewing	 processes	 of	 deliberation	 and	 agonism	 as	 sedimented	 norms.	 The	 process	 of	‘rational’	 deliberation	 can	 be	 re-interpreted	 as	 a	 series	 of	 practices	 aimed	 at	 asserting	certain	 ‘correct’	 and	 ‘right’	 means	 of	 engaging	 democratically.	 Likewise,	 the	 borders	between	 antagonism	 and	 agonism,	 when	 interpreted	 performatively	 and	 through	 the	lens	of	everyday	practice,	can	be	viewed	as	more	porous	and	ambiguous	than	assumed	by	Mouffe.			Judith	 Butler’s	 focus	 on	 gender	 means	 that	 many	 scholars	 using	 her	 framework	 are	drawn	 in	 their	 work	 to	 a	 gender	 “temptation”	 (Borgerson,	 2005:	 65).	 However,	 some	
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authors	 argue	 that	 Butler’s	 writing	 is	 applicable	 to	 different	 spheres	 of	 life,	 not	 only	gender,	and	that	her	concept	of	performativity	can	help	us	understand	different	kinds	of	phenomena,	 such	 as	 age,	 ethics	 or	 management	 (Borgerson,	 2005;	 Kenny,	 2010	 and	2018;	Riach	et	al,	2014	and	2016).	Moreover,	for	Butler	the	subject	cannot	be	observed	outside	practice	(and	vice-versa)	as	these	are	inextricably	intertwined,	and	in	this	thesis	I	approach	subjects	and	practices	as	entangled	‘subject/practice’,	where	subjects	become	intelligible	through	practice,	and	practices	through	agential	acts.	Gender	in	this	thesis	is	explored	as	a	set	of	norms	 interconnected	with	democratic	practice	but	 is	not	 the	sole	focus.		The	review	of	Butler’s	performativity	unfolds	via	four	interconnected	sub-sections,	each	representing	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 the	 theory	 in	 relation	 to	democratic	 practice.	The	first	 offers	 an	 exploration	 of	 language	 as	 performative	 and	 of	 how	 language	 relates	 to	subject	 formation.	 The	 second	 consists	 of	 a	 discussion	 of	 reiterative	 norms	 in	Butler’s	work.	The	third	offers	an	elaboration	of	the	concept	of	recognition	and	the	ways	in	which	norms	make	certain	subjects	and	practices	(un)intelligible.	The	fourth	enhances	the	first	by	 building	 upon	 an	 understanding	 of	 practice	 as	 discursively	 constructed	 by	contributing	an	account	of	embodied	performativity.	This	section	offers	a	more	rigorous	and	detailed	account	of	the	body	as	a	site	for	democratic	practice.				
4.1.	Butler	and	language			Considering	that	scholars	of	both	deliberation	and	agonism	rely	heavily	on	language	for	understanding	 democratic	 practice,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 explore	 the	 role	 of	 language	 as	
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envisaged	by	Butler.	In	doing	so,	I	begin	by	exploring	the	specific	theoretical	source	from	which	 Butler	 derives	 her	 understanding	 of	 language,	 Austin’s	 (1962)	 account	 of	performative	language,	and	then	focus	on	the	way	she	builds	on	Austin	to	craft	her	own	account	of	performativity.			
Poststructuralist	identity	and	language		In	line	with	the	broad	sentiments	of	poststructuralism,	Butler’s	account	of	performativity	is	reliant	on	language	for	an	understanding	of	the	construction	of	subjects	(Butler,	1999;	2004;	2011;	2015).	Subjects,	Butler	argues,	are	necessarily	born	into	regimes	of	language	not	of	their	making,	which	inevitably	shape	them;	yet,	in	turn,	subjects	also	possess	some	power	to	shape	their	own	language	(Butler,	1999).	Butler	uses	the	term	‘subject’	to	denote	the	restricted	power	of	the	individual	to	craft	an	identity:	namely,	the	identity	of	a	subject	is	performed	as	a	“practice	of	improvisation	within	a	scene	of	constraint”	(Butler,	2004:	1).	Such	constraint	refers	to	the	character	of	language	as	limited	(i.e.	not	being	able	to	signify	all	referents	and	make	all	subjects	intelligible)	and	limiting	(i.e.	bearing	on	subjects:	acting	as	regulatory	mechanisms	for	their	identifications).			Subjectivity	is	understood	as	a	person’s	experience	of	‘reality’,	which	is	both	shaped	and	expressed	via	 language,	 i.e.	 a	 subject	 comes	 into	 subjectivity	 through	speaking	 (Butler,	1999:	159),	or	“theorising	about	the	self”	(Harding,	2008:	48).	Through	speaking	about	themselves,	 subjects	bring	out	 the	 “aspect	of	 the	self	 to	 the	 ‘I’”	 (ibid:	47),	which	would	not	be	possible	without	language.	Language	enables	us	to	explore	how	the:		
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social	 penetrates	 the	 language	 used	 in	 discussing	 the	 ‘I’…how	 each	 version	 of	 the	‘I’…interacts	 in	 different	 ways	 with	 the	 other	 and	 the	 different	 versions	 of	 the	 ‘I’	presented	by	that	other	(ibid:	55-56).			The	 term	 ‘identity’	 is	 not	 understood	 as	 something	 stable	 and	 whole	 (Butler,	 1999):	‘identity’	 is	 not	 a	 “condition”	 but	 a	 “process”	 (Brubaker	 and	 Cooper,	 2000:	 17)	 and	should	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 myriad	 of	 identifications	 that	 are	 continuously	 and	“discursively	 mediated”	 via	 language	 (ibid.	 16).	 How	 these	 seemingly	 distinct	identifications	 are	 fused	 into	 identities	 is,	 in	 part,	 discursively	 and	 diachronically	negotiated	 between	 the	 subject	 and	 others	 through	 practice	 (Butler,	 2004,	 2011).	 The	subject	is	always	“in	formation”	(Borgerson,	2005:	68);	it	is	a	“linguistic	occasion”	(ibid)	striving	to	become	intelligible.			Butler	 argues	 that	 subject	 formation	 through	 language	 is	 an	ongoing	process	 that	may	have	 unforeseen	 consequences.	 Specifically,	 she	 holds	 language	 to	 be	 performative	(Butler,	 1999;	 2004;	 2011;	 2015).	 The	 subject	 is	 continuously	 enacted	 via	 iterative	speech	acts	(2011:	39)	and	is	always	a	“doing”,	always	in	a	state	of	becoming	(1999:	34):	speech	acts	become	intelligible	through	continuous	reiteration	and:		 [l]earning	 the	 rules	 that	 govern	 intelligible	 speech	 is	 an	 inculcation	 into	 normalised	language,	 where	 the	 price	 of	 not	 conforming	 is	 the	 loss	 of	 intelligibility	 itself	 (Butler,	1999:	loc266).		The	 rules	 that	 govern	 intelligible	 speech	 acts	 refer	 to	 the	 “grammar”	 and	 “style”	 of	speaking,	which	are	not	“politically	neutral”	(ibid).	The	‘I’	expressed	through	speech	acts	
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is	 “in	 part	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 grammar	 that	 governs	 the	 availability	 of	 persons	 in	language”	 (ibid:	 loc362).	 For	 example,	 the	 prevalence	 of	 only	 two	 gender-specific	pronouns	 in	 the	English	 language	make	 ‘female’	and	 ‘male’	partially	 intelligible.	Such	a	limited	intelligibility	of	gender	through	language	norms	reflects,	as	well	as	constitutes,	a	binary	social	organisation	of	gender	relations	but	is,	on	the	other	hand,	restrictive,	as	it	does	not	allow	for	alternative	understandings	of	gender	(e.g.	a	pronoun	for	transgender),	which	would	make	 “it	 possible	 to	 understand	people	 as	 genderful	 or	 ungendered,	 and	gender	 as	 multiplicity”	 (Knights	 and	 Thanem,	 2011:	 23).	 The	 more	 speech	 acts	 are	repeated,	 the	 more	 sedimented	 the	 intelligibility	 of	 a	 subject	 becomes,	 and	 this	continuous	 reiteration	 of	 speech	 acts	 means	 that	 identity	 is	 never	 a	 condition,	 never	fixed	 and	 static,	 but	 is	 rather	 a	 process	 that	 unfolds	 unremittingly	 via	 language,	 even	when	it	appears	stable	(Jenkins	and	Finneman,	2018).			Considering	that	much	of	democratic	practice	is	purported	to	take	place	through	debates,	according	to	theorists	of	democratic	practice,	understanding	language	as	performative	is	important	 for	understanding	how	subjects	(and	the	demands	they	raise)	of	democratic	practice	emerge	and	become	(or	not)	intelligible.				
Austin’s	account	of	performative	language	and	Butler		In	her	reading	of	performative	speech	acts,	Butler	draws	upon,	but	also	departs	from,	the	work	of	John	L.	Austin	(1962)	who	developed	a	speech	act	theory	that	treats	language	as	performative.	The	 core	of	 the	 theory	 is	 that	 language	 is	 to	be	 studied	according	 to	 the	type	of	 action	utterances	perform.	Austin	 (1962)	distinguishes	between	 three	kinds	of	speech	acts	–	locutionary,	illocutionary	and	perlocutionary	(see	section	3.2.1,	Chapter	3).	
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These	speech	acts	enact	an	effect	through	utterances,	such	as	comfort	or	irritation.	Thus,	performativity	refers	to	“that	characteristic	of	linguistic	utterances	that	in	the	moment	of	making	the	utterance	makes	something	happen”	(Butler,	2015:	28).	In	each	case,	there	is	an	assumption	that	there	is	a	performer	behind	the	utterances	who	intends	the	speech	acts	to	arrive	at	particular	outcomes.			Although	 Austin’s	 classification	 of	 speech	 acts	 renders	 them	 performative,	 i.e.	 as	something	that	“brings	some	phenomena	into	being	[or]	makes	a	set	of	events	happen”	(Butler,	 2015:	 28),	 he	 differentiates	 between	 utterances	 that	 are	 descriptive	 (e.g.	 my	name	is	Nela)	and	those	that	instigate	some	process	or	effect	a	change	(e.g.	when	a	judge	pronounces	a	defendant	‘not	guilty’).			Butler	builds	on	Austin’s	(1962)	theory	in	three	ways.	First,	she	places	a	poststructuralist	emphasis	on	Austin’s	work	by	drawing	attention	to	the	disciplinary	effects	of	repetitive	speech	acts	performed	in	familiar	environments	(de	Souza	et	al,	2016).	For	example,	we	come	 to	 think	 of	 democratic	 practices	 as	 closely	 tied	 to	 elections,	 rather	 than	 more	informal	day-to-day	practice,	through	familiar	speech	acts	of	results	announced	in	public	halls,	of	victory	and	concession	speeches	made.	Such	routines	and	rituals	of	speech	reify	meaning	and	 influence	 future	practice	and	 identities:	 for	 instance,	we	come	to	 think	of	democracy	as	embodied	in	elected	politicians	and	our	act	as	voters	of	either	voting	for,	against,	or	not	voting	at	all.		Second,	 drawing	 on	 Derrida	 (1988),	 Butler	 argues	 that	 words	 are	 not	 tied	 solely	 to	particular	contexts	and	that	they	may	put	something	in	motion	even	when	they	are	not	spoken	 in	 a	 traditionally	 ‘corresponding’	 context.	 She	has	been	 criticised	 for	her	 claim	
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that	words	can	performatively	exceed	 their	originating	context,	 for	 the	effectiveness	of	words,	it	is	argued,	depends	precisely	on	the	‘convention’	a	particular	word	is	tied	to	(e.g.	a	 judge	uttering:	 ‘I	 pronounce	you	guilty’	 in	 the	 context	of	 a	 court	 is	performative,	 yet	outside	a	court	the	utterance	will	not	be	effective)	(Boucher,	2006:	126).	However,	even	though	 speech	acts	derive	much	meaning	 from	 the	 context	of	 the	 convention	 in	which	they	are	repeatedly	uttered,	 these	acts	do	“not	take	place	 in	the	 isolated	moment	of	 its	utterance,	 but	 [are]	 the	 ‘condensation’	 of	 past,	 present,	 and	 even	 future	 unforeseen	meanings”	 (Salih,	 2002:	 102).	 The	meaning	 of	words,	 Butler	 (2011)	 claims,	 cannot	 be	fully	‘saturated’	in	a	particular	context	and	“meanings…exceed	[the]	purposes	for	which	they	are	intended”	(Butler,	1999:	6).			For	 example,	 after	 a	 victim	 of	 sex	 trafficking	 was	 sentenced	 and	 imprisoned	 in	Montenegro,	WRC	 activists	 subverted	 the	 language	 often	 used	 in	 the	 very	 courts	 that	perpetuated	 this	particular	 injustice.	They	drew	upon	 signifiers	 such	 as	 ‘evidence’	 and	‘legitimacy’,	 cited	 ‘articles’	 of	 ‘laws’,	 judged	 evidence	 used	 against	 the	 victim	 as	‘inadmissible’	and	‘incomplete’.	The	aim	of	such	a	strategy	was	to	subvert	the	practice	of	a	 trial	 (see	 Vijesti,	 2015b),	 while	 also	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 formalised	 injustices	experienced	within	this	passive	construction	of	identity	in	relation	to	the	law.	Discourse	can,	therefore,	from	a	performative	perspective,	become	democratised,	with	the	‘original’	or	‘traditional’	meaning	contested	between	actors	and	groups	(Rothenberg,	2006).		Third,	as	meanings	‘exceed’	their	intended	purposes,	it	follows	that	a	speaker	has	limited	power	over	words	and	their	effects	(Butler,	2011:	171).	There	is	no	all-powerful	subject	that	 ‘commands’	 language	 and	 is	 in	 control	 of	 the	 consequences	 that	 spoken	 language	performs,	as	suggested	by	Habermas	in	his	account	of	deliberative	democratic	practice.	
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Once	we	see	language	as	a	constant	movement	of	differences	in	which	there	is	no	stable	resting	point,	we	 can	no	 longer	 appeal	 to	 reality	 as	 a	 refuge	 independent	 of	 language:	everything	acquires	 the	 instability	and	ambiguity	 that	Derrida	 (1993	 [1970]:	223-224)	claims	to	be	inherent	in	language.	There	is	only	“a	reiterated	acting	that	is	power	in	its	persistence	and	 instability…a	nexus	of	power	and	discourse	 that	 repeats	or	mimes	 the	discursive	gestures	of	power”	(Butler,	2011:	171).			In	 terms	 of	 democratic	 practice,	 one	 might	 draw	 on	 Butler	 to	 consider	 discourses	 of	democracy	 persisting	 from	 past	 sedimented	 traditions	 but	 also	 capable	 of	 change	 and	subversion,	 as	 they	 are	 used	 in	 unfamiliar	 contexts	 and	 in	 unfamiliar	 ways.	 Such	 re-iterations	 of	 democratic	 practice	 hold	 the	 possibility	 of	 re-shaping	 democratic	discourses/identities.			
4.2.	Performativity	and	norms		Besides	 offering	 a	 range	 of	 norms	 for	 practicing	 democracy,	 theorists	 of	 agonism	 and	deliberation	 find	 social	 norms	 crucial	 for	 enacting	 democratic	 practice,	 be	 it	 as	 a	‘reservoir’	of	shared	meaning	relevant	for	redeeming	a	validity	claim	(Habermas,	1984:	38-39),	 or	 as	 a	 source	 of	 conflict	 between	 actors	 (Mouffe,	 2013:	 7).	 However,	 neither	offers	 a	 definition	 or	 detailed	 insight	 into	 the	workings	 of	 social	 norms	 and	 how	 they	bear	on	subjects	in	the	depth	that	Butler	does.			Butler	 offers	 a	 dynamic	 and	 nuanced	 account	 of	 reiterative	 norms,	 an	 account	 that	approaches	norms	as	both	disciplinary	 and	as	 a	 source	 for	 ‘agentic’	 (Butler,	 2011:	83)	
	 113	
practice.	 Norms	 are	 defined	 as	 “compelling	 social	 fictions”	 (Butler,	 1999:	 191),	 the	sedimentation	of	which	produces	“a	set	of	corporeal	styles	which,	in	reified	form,	appear	as	 the	natural”	 (ibid).	 From	 this	basis,	 acts	produce	norms,	 and	vice	versa.	Norms	and	acts	partially	govern	our	subjectivity,	yet	their	co-constitutive	entanglement	opens	up	a	space	for	different	identifications/practices	to	emerge	(Butler,	2004	and	2011).	Through	her	elaboration	of	reiterative	norms,	Butler	provides	an	account	of	where	agency	stems	from	 and	 how	 we	 can	 understand	 agency	 from	 a	 poststructuralist	 perspective.	 While	Butler	 acknowledges	 that	 identity	 can	 be	 performed	 in	 novel	 and	 different	 ways,	 she	argues	 that	 there	 is	 no	 agentic	 subject	 behind	 such	 performativity	 (1999:	 34):	 her	account	 of	 agency	 is	 “subjectless”	 (Boucher,	 2006:	 115;	 Fleming	 and	 Banerjee,	 2016:	264).		For	Butler,	norms	are	not	only	reproduced	but	are	also	impregnated	with	the	“potential	production	of	difference	emerging	from	required	modes	of	behaviour	–	not	necessarily	to	be	understood	as	intentional	resistance”	(Borgerson,	2005:	68).	Saying	that	resistance	to	the	 norm	 might	 not	 be	 intentional	 suggests	 that	 a	 subject	 is	 not	 sovereign	 over	 its	agency.	Rather,	Butler	(2004;	2011)	states	that	the	power	of	social	norms	is	inescapable	and	 that	 one	 will	 always	 be	 restricted	 within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 pre-established,	sedimented	 social	 norms,	 i.e.	 they	 bear	 upon	 the	 subject	 and	 enact	 it.	 Therefore,	 even	when	we	actively	resist,	escaping	the	boundaries	of	one	social	norm	does	not	necessarily	mean	 that	 it	 is	an	act	of	 subversion	but,	 rather,	 an	act	of	 “substitution”	of	one	existing	norm	for	another	(Butler,	2011:	80).			However,	even	though	such	a	view	implies	a	 totalising	power	of	social	norms,	 they	are	not	perceived	as	“mono-deterministic	forces”	(Schaefer	and	Wickert,	2016:	217),	for	the	
	114	
regulatory	 norm	 can	 be	 “turned	 against	 itself	 to	 spawn	 re-articulations	 that	 call	 into	question	 the	 hegemonic	 force”	 of	 such	 a	 norm	 (Butler,	 2011:	 xi).	 Butler	 draws	 on	Foucault’s	History	of	Sexuality	Vol.	1	 (1978)	 here	 to	 underline	 the	 generative	 power	 of	discourses,	 that	 even	 instituted	 prohibitions	 can	 provide	 suitable	 conditions	 for	 a	proliferation	of	different	discourses.		Norms	 become	 effective	 in	 regulating	 the	 self	 via	 processes	 of	 continuous	 reiteration	(Butler,	2011:	70).	The	norm	is	continuously	repeated	and	reaffirmed	via	both	informal	and	formal	social	institutions,	e.g.	via	customs	and	official	laws.	Through	this	repetition	an	 “‘I’	 is	 secured”,	 an	 ‘I’	whose	 boundaries	 are	 etched	 by	 “citing	 or	miming”	 the	 norm	(ibid:	71).	In	turn,	the	established	identity/practice	further	“(re)invokes	and	(re)invests	the	symbolic	law”	(ibid.)	of	the	norm,	rendering	it	naturalised.	This	is	a	process	via	which	subject-positions	 are	 assumed	 and	 understood	 as	 “hegemonic”	 (e.g.	 whiteness,	femininity,	etc.)	–	as	a	sedimentation	of	perceived	collective	identifications	(Jenkins	and	Finneman,	2018:	158).			Yet	 each	 of	 the	 repetitions	 performed	 may	 “go	 awry…and	 produce	 new	 and	 even	subversive	 effects”	 (Butler,	 2009:	 iii).	 The	 norm	 itself	 provides	 the	 conditions	 for	resisting	 that	 norm	and	may	 turn	 against	 itself.	 Citing	 a	norm	 in	 everyday	 speech	 and	acts	 is	 an	 ongoing	 process	 and	 while	 it	 “plays	 the	 role	 of	 producing	 identities	 and	foreclosing	 others	 maintaining	 the	 illusion	 of	 natural	 categories	 of	 behaviour”	(Borgerson,	2005:	68),	it	also	serves	as	a	vehicle	through	which	a	subject	can	be	undone	(Butler,	2004:	333;	see	also	Kenny	and	Fotaki,	2014;	Nicholson	and	Carroll,	2013).	The	rupture	 within	 such	 citing	 often	 occurs	 at	 the	 borders	 of	 foreclosure	 (Butler,	 1999:	
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loc287),	when	“the	right	way	[of	life]	is	decided	in	advance”	(Butler,	2004:	39),	but	when	such	a	life	is	perceived	as	“unliveable”	(ibid:	4).				One’s	own	sense	of	self	derives	from	existing	norms	(Joy	et	al,	2015),	yet	these	are	norms	that	are	constantly	being	reworked	and	rearticulated	via	discursive/bodily	enactments	of	these	norms	(Butler,	1999),	such	as	democratic	practices.	On	the	one	hand,	a	person	is	“dependent	on	this	outside”	to	‘establish’	what	one	is	(Butler,	2004:	7)	and	on	the	other,	the	reiteration	of	norms	via	 ‘oneself’	alters	and	re-inscribes	these	norms	in	novel	ways	(Butler,	2011).	In	this	sense	the	self	is	always	already	“other	to	[oneself]”	(Butler,	2004:	15)	as	the	“sociality	of	norms	exceeds	[one’s]	inception	and	[one’s]	demise”	(ibid).			With	regards	to	this	research,	I	explore	what	kinds	of	normative	democratic	frameworks	members	 of	 WRC	 operate	 within	 and	 explore	 the	 agency	 enacted	 within	 and	 beyond	these	frameworks:	whether	norms	are	primarily	informal	or	whether	they	are	driven	by	formal	government	procedures	and	informal	traditions,	and	whether	such	norms	prompt	an	 ‘agentic’	 reinscription.	 Equally,	 I	 consider	 sources	 of	 discourses	 and	 identifications	external	to	Montenegro,	such	as	the	norms	of	international	donors	or	even	the	norms	of	various	accounts	of	feminism.			
4.3.	Performativity	and	recognition		Butler’s	 account	 of	 recognition	 allows	 us	 to	 develop	 a	 framework	 for	 better	understanding	 how	 practitioners	 position	 themselves	 as	 democratic	 subjects	 and,	 in	turn,	how	they	are	positioned	by	the	normative	environment	they	inhabit	and	influence.	
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As	 noted	 earlier,	 we	 come	 into	 this	 world	 “on	 the	 condition	 that	 the	 social	 world	 is	already	there”	(Butler,	2004:	32).	This	social	world,	although	multiple	and	 fragmented,	provides	the	norms	under	which	we	are	identified	as	particular	human	beings.	In	other	words,	“the	sense	of	possibility	pertaining	to	me	must	first	be	imagined	from	somewhere	else	 before	 I	 can	 begin	 to	 imagine	myself”	 (ibid).	 Norms	 provide	 a	 framework	 for	 the	“intelligibility”	 of	 the	 self	 (ibid:	 42)	 and	 without	 them	 we	 would	 not	 be	 recognisable	(Kenny,	2018).	Yet,	on	the	other	hand,	 these	very	norms	provide	within	their	 language	gaps	and	contradictions	the	possibility	for	us	to	dis-identify.			Butler’s	 account	 of	 recognition	 adds	 depth	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	 how	 norms	 make	certain	 democratic	 subjects/practices	 (un)intelligible	 and	 socially	 (un)accepted	 (Tyler,	2018).	 Subjects	 are	 driven	 by	 the	 desire	 to	 be	 socially	 recognised,	 and	 such	 a	 process	may	involve	violence	(death	even)	(Butler,	2011:	91),	with	bodies	emerging	as	the	site	of	“discriminatory	 exclusionary	 practices	 and	 violence”	 (Fotaki	 et	 al,	 2014:	 1241),	suggesting	that	struggle	may	 lie	at	 the	heart	of	performed	democratic	practice.	 In	sum,	we	are	both	identified	and	dis-identified	by,	and	in	relation	to,	reiterative	existing	norms.	But	how	does	the	process	of	recognition	occur	in	the	first	place?			Butler	draws	on	Althusser’s	([1970]	2008)	concept	of	interpellation	to	demonstrate	the	process	 by	which	 a	 subject	 becomes	 socially	 constructed	 (Butler,	 2011).	 She	 provides	Althusser’s	example	of	a	police	officer	hailing	the	subject	in	the	street:	 ‘Hey,	you	there!’	as	an	example	of	ideology	at	work,	through	which	a	subject	is	formed	(ibid).	The	moment	the	 subject	 recognises	 the	 call	 of	 the	 law,	 s/he	becomes	 interpellated,	 s/he	becomes	 a	subject.	 The	 subject	 sees	 her/himself	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 law	 and	 a	 symbolic	 fabric	 that	positions	 people	 in	 certain	 ways	 (criminals,	 helpful	 citizens,	 and	 so	 on):	 the	 law	 (the	
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norm)	calls	the	subject	and	the	subject,	in	turn,	by	virtue	of	answering	the	call,	complies	with	the	law	(Butler,	2011;	Harding	et	al,	2014).			This	 moment	 of	 compliance	 to	 the	 law	 is	 the	 moment	 where	 Butler	 departs	 from	Althusser.	 Butler	 provides	 her	 own	 example	 of	 being	 interpellated	 at	 birth:	 when	 a	nurse/	a	doctor	enacts	a	process	of	identification	upon	a	baby	e.g.	by	naming	it	‘a	girl’.	It	is	at	this	very	moment,	Butler	argues,	that	the	process	of	“girling”	begins	(Butler,	2011:	xvii).	 She	 agrees	with	 Althusser	 that	 norms	 exist	 prior	 to	 our	 entering	 the	world	 but,	unlike	Althusser,	Butler	 argues	 that	norms	may	not	necessarily	have	a	 totalising	effect	upon	the	subject.	Some	interpellated	girls	may	happily	(or	nor	so	happily)	be	recognised	by	existing	social	norms	and	may	in	turn	‘answer’	to	that	call	by	complying	with	existing	norms.	 Yet,	 some	 may	 find	 “the	 terms	 by	 which	 [they	 are]	 recognised	 make	 life	unliveable”	(Butler,	2004:	4)	and	may	attempt	to	dis-identify.	Fear	of	punishment	due	to	a	lack	of	compliance	to	norms	may	become	overturned	by	a	fear	of	living	a	life	under	the	conditions	 that	 norms	 provide	 (Butler,	 2011:	 82).	 One	 could	 draw	 on	 this	 account	 of	recognition	 to	 enrich	 understanding	 of	 practitioners’	 relationship	 with	 norms	 of	democracy.	 Practitioners,	 for	 example,	may	 recognise	 existing	 norms	 of	 democracy	 as	‘unliveable’,	a	system	that	does	not	recognise	them	as	viable	subjects,	and	may	embark	on	a	process	of	re-inscribing	and	challenging	such	norms	through	counter-practices.		Depending	 on	 context,	 Butler	 argues,	 some	 individuals	 are	 deemed	more	 ‘viable’	 than	others	 –	 in	 Ranciére’s	 (2012)	 terms,	 more	 ‘sensible’	 than	 others.	 To	 illustrate	 her	argument,	 Butler	 (2004)	 elaborates	 upon	 what	 makes	 us	 ‘human’	 and	 concludes	 that	some	 of	 us	 are,	 in	 certain	 contexts,	 more	 or	 less	 human	 depending	 on	 socially	intelligible/acceptable	 notions	 of	 gender,	 race,	 ethnicity,	 and	 other	 socially	 accepted	
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categories	of	‘human’.	However,	the	conditions	under	which	we	are	recognised	as	‘viable’	are	constructed	via	discursive	embodiments	and	are	thus	open	to	change	(Butler,	2009).			In	this	process	of	re-performing	norms,	subject	formation	is	still	driven	by	the	desire	to	be	recognised	as	“socially	viable	being[s]”	(Butler,	2004:	2)	but	also	by	what	Butler	refers	to	as	fantasy.	Fantasy	is	not	contrasted	with	reality	for	Butler,	though.	Rather,	“it	is	what	reality	 forecloses,	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 it	 defines	 the	 limits	 of	 reality”;	 reality	 is	 fantasy’s	“constitutive	 outside”	 that	 enables	 us	 to	 “imagine	 ourselves	 and	 others	 otherwise”	(Butler,	2004:	29).	Envisaging	the	future	is	a	process	of	striving	towards	something	that	cannot	be	fully	predicted	and	is	not	therefore	presented	as	a	smooth	process.	Envisaging	a	 future	 ‘self’	 is	 a	 process	 whose	 ‘realisation’	 suggests	 “a	 certain	 agonism	 and	contestation”	(ibid:	39):	an	imagined	version	of	the	 ‘self’	may	(and	probably	will)	clash	with	existing	frameworks	of	recognition	offered	in	the	form	of	social	norms.			It	 is	 worth	 noting	 here	 that	 the	 initial	 recognition	 of	 the	 subject	 can	 never	 be	 fully	secured	and	that	it	is	impossible	to	“fully	inhabit	the	name	by	which	one’s	social	identity	is	 inaugurated	and	mobilised”	 (Butler,	2011:	171).	This	means	 that	 the	 ‘citation’	of	 the	norm	is	never	repeated	in	its	entirety	(each	repetition	of	the	norm	may	not	be	the	same).	This	imperfect	citation	“implies	the	instability	and	incompleteness”	(ibid)	of	norms	and	of	identity.	Such	instability	further	implies	that	a	subject	may	not	feel	fully	recognised	by	the	 social	 norm	 and	may,	 in	 turn,	 seek	 out	 further	 reinscription	 and	 recitation	 of	 the	norm	in	order	to	secure	her/his	self,	which	is	always	self-defeating	(Clarke	and	Knights,	2015).			
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In	sum,	an	 ‘I’	 is	 first	and	foremost	 formed	through	the	act	of	address,	which	“mobilises	[its]	place	in	speech”	(Butler,	2011:	171),	which	in	turn	implies	that	social	recognition	is	prior	to	subject	 formation.	The	recognised	subject	may	reject	such	recognition	 later	on	and	 attempt	 to	 dis-identify.	 Yet	 the	 very	 process	 of	 disidentification	 will	 always	 be	performed	 in	 relation	 to	 that	 initial	 recognition	 (initial	 social	 norms)	 via	 which	 the	subject	was	formed.			An	emphasis	on	performativity	and	recognition	 for	 this	research	raises	questions	as	 to	which	linguistic/embodied	acts	are	regarded	as	intelligible	within	the	scene	of	study.	For	example,	certain	ways	of	communicating	and	enacting	democratic	practice	drawn	from	feminism	may	 be	 regarded	 by	 broader	 discursive	 communities	 as	 entirely	 foreign,	 or	even	threatening.	Or,	this	perspective	might	offer	ways	of	analysing	how	people	strive	to	make	 themselves	 intelligible	 through	democratic	practice	and	 the	extent	 to	which	 they	are	prepared	to	compromise	with	their	democratic	allies	and	adversaries	in	order	to	do	so.			
4.4.	Performativity	and	body		Butler’s	 account	 of	 the	 body	 enables	 a	 view	 of	 democratic	 practice	 as	 performed	 in	embodied	ways	that	are	disciplined	by,	but	that	also	cut	across	and	through,	discourses	of	democracy,	foregrounding	the	bodies	of	practitioners	as	sites	of	democratic	practice.	This	is	a	valuable	perspective	because,	as	Knights	and	Clarke	(2017:	340)	argue,	notions	of	self	are	primarily	constituted	in	disembodied	ways	in	the	academic	literature,	“largely	through…dominant	 discursive,	 linguistic	 and	 often	 masculine	 narratives”	 (see	 also	
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Brown	 and	 Coupland;	 Clarke	 and	 Knights,	 2015;	 Coupland,	 2015;	 Fotaki	 et	 al,	 2014;	Harding	et	al,	2014;	Kachtan	and	Wasserman,	2015;	Kenny	and	Fotaki,	2015;	Pullen	and	Rhodes,	 2014).	 Likewise,	 theories	 of	 democratic	 practice	 assume	 that	 engagement	between	democratic	 actors	unfolds	 largely	 though	 language,	overlooking	 the	 corporeal	aspects	of	such	interactions.	While	it	is	credible	to	assume	that	democratic	practice	does	take	place	 through	 the	 language	of	debating	 (within	parliamentary	sessions,	 legislative	committees	 and	 town	 hall	 meetings),	 even	 this	 relatively	 narrow	 segment	 of	 practice	requires	speaking	or	signalling	bodies	for	its	effects	to	become	intelligible.	Practice	and	practitioners,	 therefore,	 need	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 “negotiated,	 created,	 threatened,	bolstered,	 reproduced	 [and]	 overhauled…through	 ongoing,	 embodied	 interaction”	(Alvesson	and	Robertson,	2015:	11).			Referring	 to	bodies	as	 ‘sites’	can	create	an	 impression	of	subjects	as	passive.	However,	Butler	provides	an	agentic	account	of	bodies	that	can	offer	a	much-needed	supplement	to	the	 underdeveloped	 account	 within	 the	 democratic	 practice	 and	 NGO	 literatures.	 She	argues	 that	 performativity	 is	 not	 solely	 enacted	 via	 speech	 acts,	 but	 also,	 and	simultaneously,	 via	 “bodily	 acts”	 (Butler,	 2004:	 198):	 we	 ‘park’	 our	 bodies	 amongst	others,	in	the	street,	workplace	and	social	spaces,	and	in	doing	so	bodies	enact	a	certain	meaning	 (Butler,	 2015).	 The	 body	 conveys	 and	 enacts	 meaning	 through	 its	 presence,	even	 when	 seemingly	 passive	 (Coupland,	 2015)	 –	 it	 is	 always	 performative,	 in	 other	words.						
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Contested	bodies		Butler	 theorises	 the	body	 through	 the	 sex/gender	binary	 (1999;	2004;	2011)	with	 the	aim	 of	 subverting	 this	 very	 binary	 –	 to	 problematise	 the	 binary	 understanding	 of	 sex	(body)	 and	 gender	 (discursive	 practices	 related	 to	 sex	 as	 understood	 via	 the	 natural	sciences)	 and,	 given	 the	 gendered	 nature	 of	 the	 organisation	 I	 research,	 it	 is	 worth	bearing	with	Butler’s	elaboration,	as	 it	offers	conceptual	and	analytical	 insight	 into	 the	practices	of	a	women’s	organisation	within	a	scene	of	patriarchy.	Butler	argues	that	sex	has	been	traditionally	understood	through	discursive	practices	of	biology	and	medicine,	i.e.	 the	chromosomal	and	hormonal	composition	of	bodies,	 reproductive	organs	and	so	on	(Butler,	2011;	de	Souza	et	al,	2016).	Repetitive	inscription	of	such	discursive	practices	(via	 the	proliferation	of	 textbooks	 that	offer	 ‘facts’	about	bodies,	medical	practices	and	instruments,	 etc.)	 became	 naturalised	 over	 time	 and	 are	 constitutive	 of	 the	 ways	 in	which	we	understand	gender	(Bowring	and	Brewis,	2009).			Butler	(1999)	sets	herself	 two	objectives	 in	relation	 to	embodiment	 in	general	and	sex	and	gender	in	particular.	The	first	is	to	deconstruct	important	social	constructs,	such	as	sex	 and	gender,	 as	neither	purely	material	 nor	discursive.	 Instead,	 they	 constitute	one	another	 in	 complex,	 contested	 and	 interdependent	 ways.	 This	 interpretation	 runs	somewhat	 counter	 to	 the	 “linguistic	 idealism”	 (Butler,	 2011:	 4)	 of	 some	poststructuralists,	 who	 insist	 that	 “everything	 [including	 the	 material]	 is	 language”	(Elliot,	 2014:	 40).	 In	 contrast,	 Butler	 argues	 that	 “to	 deconstruct	 the	matter	 is	 not	 to	negate	or	to	do	away	with	the	usefulness	of	the	term”	(2015:	5).			
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In	 Bodies	 that	 Matter	 (2011),	 Butler	 problematises	 the	 accounts19	of	 Plato,	 Aristotle,	Freud	and	Lacan	 in	order	 to	deconstruct	 the	historical	 terrain	on	and	via	which	sexual	difference	 is	 inscribed.	 Understanding	 of	 social	 constructs	 is	 reinforced	 through	repetitive	 bodily	 practices	 and	 through	 the	 very	 construction	 of	 a	 symbolic	 realm	 via	which	 we	 come	 to	 know	 and	 experience	 ourselves	 in	 everyday	 life	 (Cabantous	 et	 al,	2016).			To	counter	the	discourse	of	naturalised	sex	difference,	Butler	states	that	“a	good	ten	per	cent	of	 the	population	has	 chromosomal	 variation	 that	does	not	 fit	 neatly	 into	 the	XX-female	 and	 XY-male	 set	 of	 categories”	 (1999:	 145).	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 difference	between	 the	 sexes	 could	 have	 been	 constructed	 otherwise,	which	would,	 in	 turn,	 bear	differently	on	language	and	thus	the	social	construction	of	gender.	The	‘truth’	of	sex,	she	argues,	 is	 echoed	not	only	 in	 the	 academic	 literature	but	 also	 in	how	male	 and	 female	sex/gender	 is	 perceived	 socially	 and	 known	 through	 a	 reproduction	 of	 material	 and	symbolic	 norms.	 Therefore,	 for	 Butler,	 “to	 invoke	 matter	 is	 to	 invoke	 a	 sedimented	history	 of	 sexual	 hierarchy	 and	 sexual	 erasures”	 (2011:	 22)	 and	 thus	 any	 recourse	 to	matter	in	theory	“requires	that	we	return	to	matter	as	a	sign	which	in	its	redoublings	and	contradictions	enacts	an	 inchoate	drama	of	sexual	difference”	 (ibid).	Butler	claims	 that	the	 body	 as	 we	 know	 it	 is	 not	 merely	 a	 “mute	 facticity”	 (Butler,	 1999:	 50)	 but	 is	 a	discursively	regulated	inscription,	its	“materiality	arises	in	a	matrix	of	power	relations”	(ibid.).		
																																																								19	Specifically,	Butler	critically	assesses	the	accounts	of	cosmology	(Plato),	hyle	(Aristotle),	the	Oedipus	
complex	(Freud)	and	the	name-of-the-father	(Lacan).	
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Butler’s	 reading	 offers	 insight	 to	 this	 research	 as	 it	 enables	 a	 view	 of	 the	 bodies	 of	practitioners	 as	 dynamic	 and	 continuous	 entanglements	 of	 social/material	 acts	 that	reproduce	 and	 reconfigure	 one	 another	 through	 democratic	 practice.	 Studying	 bodies	separately	 from	their	social	construction	would	only	entrench	 further	 the	binaries	 that	Butler	seeks	to	problematise	(Thanem	and	Knights,	2012).	Additionally,	bodies	should	be	understood	 not	 only	 through	 their	 interaction	 with	 the	 observed	 context	 but	 as	sedimented	enactments	of	social/material	practices	through	time.	Therefore,	it	becomes	possible	 to	 interpret	 the	 bodies	 of	 democratic	 practitioners	 as	 sites	 of	 democratic	practices,	which	could	challenge	certain	patriarchal	practices	through	engagement	with	predominantly	male	politicians	and	a	patriarchal	normative	culture.			
Language	and	the	body		Butler	 does	 not	 deny	 the	 existence	 of	 the	material	 body	 that	 undermines	 and	 informs	linguistic	 practices	 and	 is,	 to	 borrow	 her	 phrase	 from	 elsewhere,	 not	 completely	‘intelligible’	 via	 language	 (Butler,	 2011:	 xv).	 This	 infers	 that	 language	 fails	 to	 entirely	signify	what	 it	 refers	 to	via	 the	 term	 ‘body’	 (Cabantous	et	al,	2016;	Fotaki	et	al,	2014).	That	said,	Butler	does	argue	that	language	has	a	regulatory	power	over	bodies	and	that	the	 effects	 of	 language	 on	 the	 body	 are	 often	 tangible	 (Butler,	 2004).	 For	 example,	language	privileging	male	offspring	in	Montenegro	has	a	tangible	effect	on	the	bodies	of	women	who	are	pressured	to	abort	female	foetuses.		The	 impression	 gathered	 from	 the	 conception	 of	 language	 as	 regulatory	 force	 is	 that	language	 somehow	 imprints	 on,	 and	 writes	 a	 history	 over,	 ‘the	 body’;	 that	 body	 is	
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something	experienced	viscerally	(we	hurt,	we	die,	etc.),	yet	something	whose	meaning	is	also	externally	imposed	via	language	–	“site[s]	in	which	relations	of	power	[intersect]”	(Brown	 and	 Coupland,	 2015:	 1330).	 Yet,	 Butler	 argues	 that	 the	 body	 is	 a	 “construct	which	 is	 forcibly	materialised	 through	 time	 [via]	 regulatory	 norms”	 (Butler,	 2011:	 xi).	‘Sex’	 (traditionally	 assumed	 to	 be	 exclusively	 of	 the	 body)	 is	 itself	 a	 “process	 of	materialisation	 that	 stabilises	 over	 time	 to	produce	 the	 effects	 of	 boundary,	 fixity,	 and	surface	we	call	matter”	(ibid:	xviii).			Butler	 has	 been	 criticised	 for	making	 recourse	 to	 language	whenever	 she	 attempts	 to	provide	an	account	of	the	body	(Barad,	2007;	Salih,	2002),	because	“she	reduces	bodies	to	 effects	 of	 discourse”	 (Knights	 and	 Thanem,	 2011:	 26).	 Indeed,	 Butler	 argues	 that	language	not	only	inscribes	onto	a	surface	but	also	produces	the	surface	itself.	Language	is	 constitutive	 of	 body.	 However,	 she	 also	 argues	 that	 bodies	 can	 resist	 and	 subvert	discursive	 practices,	 such	 that	 bodies	 and	 discourse	 are	 intertwined,	 entangled	 and	impossible	to	separate	(Butler,	2011:	37-39).			Butler	admits	that	it	is	difficult	to	talk	about	‘the	body’	in	general	as	“grammar	fails	us”	(Butler,	2011:	13).	The	body	 is	best	understood	 if	we	attempt	 to	see	 language	 itself	as	material	and	explore	how	its	materiality	bears	upon	the	materiality	of	the	body	and	vice	versa.	Speaking	 is	a	bodily	act	 that	requires	“larynx,	 the	 lungs,	 the	 lips	and	the	mouth”	(Butler,	2004:	172).	Sound,	digital,	written	and	sign	 language	are	also	material,	 relying	on	 the	body	 for	communicative	effect.	When	we	speak	we	also	perform	something,	we	assert	 our	presence:	 “[speaking]	 constitutes	 a	 certain	presentation	of	 the	 body”	 (ibid).	We	 convey	 meaning	 via	 speech	 and	 impact	 upon	 others	 not	 only	 through	 words	themselves	but	also	through	the	embodied	presentation	of	that	meaning,	and	that	which	
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is	 not	 intended	 to	 be	 conveyed	 at	 all	 (Cabantous	 et	 al.,	 2016;	 Jenkins	 and	 Finneman,	2018).	On	the	other	hand,	our	interlocutors	evoke	different	responses	in	us	(e.g.	make	us	cry	or	laugh,	intentionally	or	not).	Speaking	therefore	requires	the	body	and	affects	the	body.	 Each	 discursive/bodily	 act	 begets	more	materialities,	 influencing	 the	 basis	 upon	which	further	acts	and	bodily	presences	will	be	performed	and	understood.	We	cannot,	for	example,	enact	democratic	practice	outside	our	bodies	–	both	in	terms	of	conveying	or	 receiving	 meaning,	 and	 we	 also	 enact	 practice	 through	 our	 bodies	 (e.g.	 occupying	streets	 in	 protests,	 blocking	 police	 cordons,	 inserting	 ourselves	 into	 parliaments,	government	buildings,	etc.)			Yet,	there	will	always	be	“a	dimension	of	bodily	life	that	cannot	be	fully	represented”	via	language	 (Butler,	 2004:	 199).	While	we	 are	 aware	 of	 that	which	we	 term	 ‘body’	 at	 all	times	 (e.g.	 via	 pleasure	 or	 pain),	 and	while	we	 experience	 the	world	 in	 the	 embodied	manner,	bodies	somehow	still	escape	our	systems	of	knowing.	There	will	always	be	an	excess	of	a	signified	referent	that	is	“never	fully	of	language”	(Butler,	2011:	37)	and,	thus,	falls	out	of	the	analysis.			Such	 an	 unknowing	 of	 the	 body	might	 present	 a	 significant	 challenge	 for	 research,	 in	terms	of	what	it	is	possible	to	notice,	describe	and	analyse.	What	we	can	study,	however,	is	the	signification	that	“produces	an	effect	of	its	own	procedure”	(Butler,	2011:	6),	that	is,	the	body	that	signification	“simultaneously	claim[s]	to	discover	as	that	which	precedes	its	own	action”	(ibid.).	We	might	explore	how	bodies	are	positioned	in	certain	ways	via	language	 but	 also	 how	 bodies	 seem	 to	 ‘respond’	 to	 and	 subvert	 such	 positioning.	Signification	 “contours”	 the	 body	 and	 so	 “produces	 it”	 (ibid);	 signification	 and	 the	referents	it	produces	“have	history	and	historicity”	(ibid:	36)	that	can	be	problematised,	
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as	 such	 a	 historicity	 is	 always	 a	 construct	 of	 something	 that	 we	 may	 have	 come	 to	perceive	as	‘natural’	(Joy	et	al,	2015).			Some	authors	suggest	that	 ‘embodiment’	 is	a	more	satisfactory	term	than	‘the	body’,	as	the	 latter	 can	be	 said	 to	 further	 reinforce	 a	 body	 and	mind	binary,	while	 embodiment	denotes	 the	 continuous	 process	 of	 the	 dynamic	 enactments	 of	 the	 two,	 their	 co-constitutive	 character	 (Knights	 and	 Thanem,	 2011;	 Riach	 et	 al,	 2016;	 Thanem	 and	Knights,	2012).	Moreover,	these	authors	suggest	that	it	is	not	enough	to	speak	and	write	about	embodiment	but	that	researchers	need	to	account	for	their	own	bodily	presence	in	the	field,	and	not	only	in	nominal	terms	such	as	being	‘happy’,	‘nervous’,	‘bored’,	etc.	but	through	providing	 a	 reflexive	 and	descriptive	 account	 of	 those	 feelings:	 “of	 your	 heart	pumping,	 eye-lids	 closing,	 armpits	 sweating,	 stomach	 aching,	 your	 mouth	 drying	 out”	(Thanem	and	Knights,	2012:	22).	Incorporating	the	researcher’s	embodiments	can	help	not	 merely	 to	 deconstruct	 the	 binaries	 between	 mind/body,	 reason/emotions,	nature/culture	but	also	to	“dissolve”	them	(Knights	and	Thanem,	2011:	3).			
Plural	embodied	performativity		Butler	 (2015)	 argues	 that	 “embodied	 and	 plural	 performativity”	 (p.12)	 is	 crucial	 for	understanding	“the	people”	(ibid.)	 in	democratic	practice,	especially	 in	an	environment	where	 social	 forms	 of	 democracy	 have	 been	 replaced	 by	 “entrepreneurial	 modalities	supported	by	fierce	ideologies	of	individual	responsibility	and	the	obligation	to	maximise	one’s	own	market	value”	(p.15).	What	Butler	means	by	plural	embodied	performativity	is	salient	for	this	research	and	so	its	overlapping	dimensions	will	now	need	to	be	unpacked.			
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The	 first	 dimension	 to	 highlight	 is	 Butler’s	 account	 of	 participants	 in	 public	 assembly	exposing	 their	 bodies	 and	 making	 them	 vulnerable.	 The	 notion	 of	 protestors	 opening	their	 bodies	 to	 harm	 and	 abuses	 of	 power	 as	 a	 form	of	 democratic	 practice	will	 seem	familiar	 for	 people	 who	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 public	 demonstrations,	 which	 always	contain	within	them	the	potential	for	a	degree	of	violence	(Graeber,	2014).	Vulnerability,	for	Butler,	is	“understood	as	a	deliberate	exposure	to	power”	(2016:	22)	and	represents	the	mobilising	 force	behind	collective	 resistance	–	without	people	making	 their	bodies	vulnerable	together	in	public,	assembly	loses	its	performative	power.		The	 second	 dimension	 is	 that	 of	 relationality,	 a	 concept	 in	 co-dependent	 relation	 in	Butler	to	vulnerability.	Vulnerability	holds	the	potential,	according	to	Butler	(2015	and	2016),	 to	bring	people	 together	 through	a	 form	of	empathetic	 relationality.	Underlying	this	relationship	in	Butler	(2006	and	2016)	is	her	embodied	concern	with	what	counts	as	a	 liveable	 life.	The	experiences	of	 the	marginalised,	oppressed	and	underprivileged	are	significant	 for	 Butler	 (2006)	 because	 they	 highlight	 the	 precarious	 conditions	experienced	under	purportedly	liberal	and	democratic	frameworks.	Yet	the	precarity	of	bodies	holds	a	more	general	salience	for	Butler	(2006),	in	the	sense	that	precarity	makes	visible	 a	 common	ontological	 condition	of	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 the	human	 in	 general,	 a	commonality	 that	 can	 serve	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 connection,	 understanding	 and	 solidarity	(Butler,	2015).	However,	vulnerability	here	should	not	be	mistaken	for	weakness,	as	for	Butler,	 such	 shared	 vulnerability	 is	 constitutive	 of	 agency:	 “receptivity	 and	responsiveness	become	the	basis	for	mobilising	vulnerability	rather	than	engaging	in	its	destructive	denial”	(2016:	25).			
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The	 third	 and	 final	 dimension	 of	 relevance	 here	 is	 that	 of	 a	 relational	 infrastructure.	Moments	 where	 another’s	 vulnerability,	 or	 one’s	 own	 vulnerability,	 are	 surfaced,	 for	Butler,	 underline	 the	 inherently	 relational	 condition	of	 all	 subjects:	 “each	 ‘I’	 brings	 the	‘we	 along”	 (2015:	 51).	 Experiences	 of	 loss	 can	 bring	 to	 light	 how	 any	 subject	 is	dependent	 upon	 an	 “infrastructure”	 (2016:	 21)	 of	 others	 –	 their	 physical	 presence,	words	 and	 affective	 support.	 In	moments	when	 such	 an	 infrastructure	 is	 removed,	we	see	in	sharp	focus	our	intra-dependencies	on	others	in	constituting	what	we	know	as	‘I’,	or	‘we’.	Understood	in	this	way	“the	body	is	less	an	entity	than	a	relation,	and	it	cannot	be	fully	 dissociated	 from	 the	 infrastructural	 and	 environmental	 conditions	 of	 its	 living”	(Butler,	 2016:	 19).	 Generative	 experiences	 of	 assembly	 are	 capable	 of	 building	 a	powerful	 form	of	 democratic	 agency	precisely	because	 they	 create	 instances	 of	 people	forming	 infrastructures	 of	 dependence	 between	 one	 another	 on	 egalitarian	 terms,	 as	they	experience	a	collective	form	of	vulnerability.		In	 conclusion,	 embodied	 enactments	 of	 democratic	 practice	 seem	particularly	 relevant	bearing	 in	 mind	 that	 the	 public-democratic	 life	 of	 Montenegro	 is	 predominantly	considered	a	male	domain	(see	CEDAW,	2017).	Drawing	out	the	embodied	experiences	of	practitioners	opens	the	possibility	of	engaging	with	the	ways	in	which	practitioners	use	their	bodies	in	ways	that	defy	the	democratic	norms	of	the	setting,	as	well	as	the	ways	in	which	 their	bodies	may	be	disciplined	by	 certain	masculine	norms.	 Focusing	on	plural	embodiment	enables	me	to	draw	out	the	ways	in	which	practitioners	make	themselves	vulnerable	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 relate	 to	 others	 through	 such	 vulnerability.	Finally,	Butler	 allows	me	 to	perceive	how	vulnerability	may	be	 turned	 into	 strength,	 a	force	that	holds	the	potential	to	mobilise	large	bodies	of	people.		
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IV	Summary			This	 chapter	 has	 outlined	 Judith	 Butler’s	 theory	 of	 performativity	 as	 a	 means	 of	deepening	understanding	of	how	democratic	practice	 is	enacted	by	particular	subjects,	who	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 operating	 within	 a	 field	 of	 re-iterative	 norms	 and	 who	‘respond’	 and	 act	 in	 embodied	 ways.	 It	 was	 positioned	 as	 particularly	 salient	 in	 a	research	 setting	 that	 is	 as	dominated	by	patriarchal	norms	as	Montenegro.	The	 theory	thus	 supplements	 the	 accounts	 of	 democratic	 practice	 offered	 by,	 predominantly,	Habermas	and	Mouffe,	understanding	them	as	enacted	through	a	fluid	and	ongoing	web	of	 practices,	 not	 necessarily	 only	 within	 formal	 and	 discrete	 spaces	 for	 democratic	engagement.	Adopting	Butler’s	account	of	performativity	enables	a	reading	of	Habermas	and	 Mouffe	 as	 offering	 a	 framework	 of	 regulative	 norms	 under	 which	 democratic	practice	 could	 be	 enacted.	 The	 theory	 provides	 a	 novel	 way	 of	 understanding	 the	‘agentic’	 enactment	 of	 democratic	 practice	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 re-iterative	 norms	that	 may	 result	 in	 different	 subjects/practices.	 Moreover,	 through	 the	 concept	 of	recognition,	 Butler	 provides	 a	 framework	 for	 understanding	 why	 some	practices/subjects	 may	 be	 more	 intelligible	 than	 others	 and	 how	 the	 process	 of	‘intelligising’	 new	 formations	 unfolds.	 A	 performative	 focus	 also	 offers	 a	 way	 of	understanding	 how	 subjects	 can	 resist	 norms	 in	 embodied	 and	 unexpected	 ways	 –	crafting	 a	 more	 nuanced	 and	 novel	 form	 of	 democratic	 practice/subjectivities	 that	escapes	neat	linguistic	capture.	From	Butler,	we	can	re-interpret	democratic	practices	(of	deliberation,	 agonism	 or	 something	 else)	 as	 embodied/discursive,	 entangled	 in	 a	continuous	 relationship	 of	 co-production.	 Finally,	 her	 plural	 account	 of	 embodiment	makes	possible	a	relational	reading	of	bodies	as	ontologically	entangled,	joined	together	in	vulnerability,	something	that	may	be	utilised	as	a	strength	in	democratic	practice.	
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V	Methodology	–	Discourse-based	ethnography		
Introduction		This	chapter	sets	out	the	methodology	adopted	as	a	means	of	addressing	the	RQ	and	the	performative	 conceptual	 focus	 of	 the	 research.	Underlying	 the	RQ	 are	 some	 important	points	 of	 emphasis,	 namely:	 how	 those	 enacting	 democratic	 practice	 influence	 and	inform	practice	and	how	practice	bears	on	practitioners;	how	practitioners	 inter-relate	with	the	dominant	discursive	fabric	of	the	context	in	which	they	live	and	work;	and	how	these	enactments	of	practice	relate	to	larger	discourses	and	norms	of	democracy	within	a	setting	of	deeply	unequal	power	relationships.			I	 pursue	 the	 RQ	 and	 related	 objectives	 by	 adopting	 a	 poststructuralist	 ontology	 and	epistemology.	 Poststructuralism	 is	 an	 onto-epistemological	 position	 in	 itself,	 yet	 it	 is	often	situated	within	the	ontology	of	social	constructionism,	so	that	it	assumes	multiple,	socially	constructed	and	contested	realities	(Denzin	and	Lincoln,	2011).	Such	a	reading	of	‘reality’	is	a	consequence	of	conflating	ontology	and	epistemology.	Namely,	ontology,	or	assumptions	 made	 about	 reality,	 within	 poststructuralism	 are	 inseparable	 from	 its	epistemological	assumptions,	i.e.	‘reality’	is	inseparable	from	theory	(Erickson,	2011),	so	how	we	 come	 to	 know	 ‘reality’	will	 influence	 the	 ‘reality’	 produced	 and	 vice	 versa.	 In	sum,	 poststructuralism	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 subject	 (the	person	 subjected	 to	 and	 re-performing	 knowledge),	 knowledge	 itself	 (what	 kind	 of	knowledge	is	being	produced)	and	language	(how	that	knowledge	is	produced	and	how	it	 shapes	 meaning),	 and	 aims	 to	 analyse	 the	 interplay	 between	 micro	 adoption	 and	
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subversion	of	discourse	within	the	broader	discursive	environment.	
Following	 the	 poststructuralist	 and	 performative	 nature	 of	 the	 research,	 practitioners	are	approached	as	people	with	voice,	those	who	generate	‘democratic’	practices	via	their	day-to-day	work	–	people	intertwined	with	a	context	of	democratic	and	social	practice,	a	context	that	also	 inhibits,	marginalises	and	oppresses	women.	Practices	are	adopted	as	the	empirical	focus	of	this	research	as	they	hold	the	potential	to	illuminate	people’s	sense	of	 self	within	 a	 larger	discursive	 environment	 (Clarke	 and	Knights,	 2015;	Ybema	et	 al,	2009:	300).	Remaining	 faithful	 to	 the	performative	emphasis	of	 the	 research,	 I	 seek	 to	draw	 out	 the	 rich	 dimensions	 at	 play	 in	 enactments	 of	 democratic	 practices	 –	 the	embodied	visual	and	linguistic	components.			I	 combine	 discourse	 analysis	with	 ethnography	 as	 a	 suitable	means	 of	 generating	 and	representing	data	 related	 to	democratic	practice,	 allowing	me	 to	 explore	 its	discursive	(linguistic	and	visual)	tapestry	through	immersive	and	reflexive	engagement.	Discursive	forms	of	ethnography	are	situated	within	a	constructionist	paradigm	that	assumes	truth	as	being	 “continually	constructed	and	reconstructed”,	 reality	as	multiple	and	meanings	attached	 to	 any	 social	 phenomena	 as	 numerous	 (Hammersley	 and	 Atkinson,	 2007:	 8).	Van	Maanen	(2010:	248)	refers	to	such	ethnographies	as	“poststructural	tales”,	which	is	an	appropriate	description	of	my	approach	to	generating	research	data	in	the	sense	that	knowledge	is	co-produced	between	researcher	and	participants.			The	research	focuses	on	one	setting,	the	Women’s	Rights	Centre	(WRC).	Focusing	on	one	research	setting	enables	an	exploration	of	the	context-bound	social	phenomena	at	play,	obtaining	 ‘intimate’	 knowledge	of	 the	 research	 scene	 (Harding	 et	 al,	 2014;	 Lucas	 et	 al,	
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2017),	 brought	 to	 life	 through	 the	 diverse	 voices,	 bodies	 and	 interpretations	 that	constitute	 the	 field.	 Yet,	 the	 primary	 intention	 informing	 the	 approach	 adopted	 is	 to	allow	the	reader	the	opportunity	to	experience	what	 it	 is	 like	to	 inhabit	 the	embodied-discursive	reality	of	practitioners	in	WRC.		The	 chapter	 is	 structured	 through	 a	 general	 explanation	 of	 the	 methodology	 and	methods	adopted,	followed	by	my	description	of	how	I	adopted	and	adapted	these.	First,	I	 justify	my	 ethnographic	methodology	 and,	 second,	 continue	 by	 exploring	 and	 setting	out	 the	 relevant	 aspects	 of	 a	 discourse-based	 ethnography.	 Third,	 I	 outline	 my	 data	collection	methods.	Fourth,	I	describe	my	abductive,	reflexive	and	discourse-based	data	analysis	of	linguistic	and	visual	material.	Finally,	I	offer	an	account	of	the	research	ethics	procedure	I	followed.			
5.1.	Ethnography	and	discourse	analysis		I	 adopted	 a	 combination	 of	 ethnography	 and	 discourse	 analysis	 (Bardon	 et	 al,	 2017,	Cooren	et	al,	2008,	Hodgson,	2005,	Kenny	2010,	Nicholson	and	Carroll,	2013;	Symon	and	Pritchard,	 2015)	 as	 a	 suitable	 means	 of	 investigating	 the	 rich	 and	 multidimensional	performative	 practice	 of	 NGO	workers.	 It	 is	 an	 approach	 that	 attempts	 to	 gain	 insight	from	a	depth	of	immersion	in	a	community	of	language	and	materiality	(Pritchard,	2012).	Such	 an	 approach	 is	 a	 suitable	 methodology	 because	 it	 combines	 a	 rich	 account	 of	 a	scene	of	study	with	the	textual	rigour	of	discourse	analysis	(Pritchard,	2012;	Watson	and	Watson,	2012).		
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Ethnography	is	particularly	valuable	for	“establish[ing]	the	context	of	the	discourse	one	wants	 to	 study”	 (Oberhuber	and	Krzyzanowski,	2008:	190),	 and	discourse	analysis,	 on	the	other	hand,	can	help	one	understand	the	entanglement	of	 the	discursive/embodied	practices	that	constitute	any	context	(Kenny,	2010).	Ethnographic	research	can	go	hand	in	hand	with	discourse	analysis	because	“everything	encountered	[in	the	field]	has	to	be	treated	 as	 potentially	 meaningful”	 (Oberhuber	 and	 Krzyzanowski,	 2008:	 188)	 and	discursively	 ‘read’	by	talking,	asking	questions,	conversing,	describing	and	deciphering.	Through	 engaging	with	 one	 another	 in	 a	 particular	 context,	 research	 participants	 and	researcher	 “actively	 co-construct	 the	 texts’	 meaning”	 (Koller,	 2012:	 23)	 according	 to	their	relation	to	the	context,	which	is	filtered	through	their	own	background	experiences	and	knowledge.				
5.1.1.	An	ethnographic	approach	to	research:	theory	and	method		Ethnography	 is	 perhaps	 best	 described	 as	 a	 versatile	 research	 strategy	 that	 may	encompass	 a	 number	 of	 ontologies	 and	 epistemologies,	 including	 poststructuralism	(Hammersley	 and	 Atkinson,	 2007).	 It	 is	 sometimes	 likened	 to	 documentary	 through	virtue	 of	 “the	 fact	 that	 somebody	 actually	 goes	 out	 beyond	 the	 ivory	 towers	 of	employment…to	 live	 like	 those	who	 are	 studied”	 (Van	Maanen,	 2010:	 242).	 The	most	significant	 characteristic	 of	 ethnography	 is	 therefore	 its	 prioritisation	 of	 an	 in-depth	account	of	a	 scene	of	 study	and	 the	 lived	experiences	of	participants	within	 that	 scene	(Taylor,	2010;	Yanow,	2012).	Through	 immersion,	ethnography	enables	 the	researcher	to	learn	about	the	subjective	experiences	of	participants	first-hand	(Watson,	2011:	202),	seeking	to	experience	and	observe	the	“real-time	practices”	(Symon	and	Pritchard,	2015:	
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246)	of	subjects.	The	aim	of	ethnographic	research	is	to	offer	the	reader	a	“room	with	a	view”	(Cunliffe,	2010:	226)	–	a	convincing	perspective	on	what	 it	means	 to	 inhabit	 the	world	 of	 a	 particular	 community,	 to	 see	 through	 their	 categories	 of	 sensemaking	(Watson,	2011).		Ethnography	requires	a	rich	familiarity	with	a	scene	of	study.	Hammersley	and	Atkinson	(2007)	state	that	researchers	need	to	identify	and	study	the	setting(s)	their	research	is	to	be	based	within	as	well	as	 to	select	participants	 for	 their	research	project.	This	can	be	achieved	by	 “opportunistic	observation”	 (Taylor,	2010:	72),	where	 the	 researcher	uses	every	opportunity	available	 to	observe	 the	potential	 research	settings	and	participants	before	deciding	where,	how	or	whom	to	approach.		Becoming	part	of	the	WRC	community:		The	 ethnographic	 tenor	 of	 my	 research	 started	 early,	 through	 initial	 scouting	 for	 a	suitable	research	setting	and	subsequent	early	immersion	in	that	setting.	I	began	actively	searching	 for	 an	 organisation	 to	 base	my	 research	 in	 as	 early	 as	 2014.	After	 receiving	numerous	recommendations	about	WRC’s	‘good	practice’	from	a	number	of	practitioners	and	citizens	I	began	profiling	the	organisation	in	January	2015.	This	involved	performing	an	 “online	 ethnography”	 (Courpasson,	 2017:	 1282)	 -	 tracking	 the	 organisation’s	activities	 via	 its	 website,	 social	 media	 page	 and	 third	 party	media	 outlets	 in	 order	 to	familiarise	myself	with	the	kind	of	practice	that	WRC	performs,	before	establishing	first	contact	in	July	2015.			
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At	 this	point	 in	 time	I	was	already	convinced	that	WRC	was	a	suitable	organisation	 for	study,	as	its	mission,	as	well	as	purported	practice,	aligned	well	with	the	requirements	of	the	RQ.	For	example,	I	was	particularly	struck	by	the	critical	assessment	of	the	proposed	law	on	social	protection	that	WRC	offered	(see	Chapter	6),	as	well	as	with	its	campaign	to	familiarise	 the	 general	 public	 with	 the	 topic.	 Most	 importantly,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 this	example,	what	attracted	my	attention	was	WRC’s	active	engagement	 in	 influencing	and	creating	democratic	practice	in	the	country.		I	 initially	made	contact	via	the	head	of	the	organisation,	through	online	messaging.	Our	conversations	 focused	on	sharing	and	exploring	one	another’s	worldviews,	particularly	in	relation	to	gender-equal	politics,	and	experiences	of	activism.	Having	established	that	we	possessed	a	shared	set	of	interests	and	values,	the	head	of	the	organisation	agreed	to	meet	 me	 while	 I	 was	 in	 Montenegro.	What	 was	 supposed	 to	 be	 a	 short,	 introductory	coffee	 turned	 into	 a	 long	 exchange	 on	 the	ways	 in	which	Montenegro	 could	 become	 a	more	democratic	society	were	gender	equality	widely	accepted	and	supported.	Leaving	our	plans	open-ended,	we	agreed	to	keep	avenues	of	communication	open.			After	 this	 encounter,	 I	 continued	with	 the	 online	 ethnography,	 but	 now	with	 less	 of	 a	distance	 between	 the	 organisation	 and	 me	 (Holm	 and	 Fairhurst,	 2017)	 –	 instead	 of	observing	the	organisation’s	activities	online,	I	started	engaging	in	conversations	either	via	 email,	 Messenger	 or	 through	 the	 comments	 section	 on	 its	 social	 media	 page.	 In	retrospect,	although	I	was	drawn	in	by	common	interests,	and	the	exercise	felt	more	like	fun	 than	 work,	 engaging	 with	 the	 pre-fieldwork	 online	 ethnography	 was	 a	 sensible	strategy,	as	I	managed	to	familiarise	myself	with	events	and	causes	that	were	significant	
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for	 WRC	 practitioners,	 enabling	 me	 to	 more	 effectively	 become	 familiar	 with	 the	discursive	community:	its	language,	norms	and	relationships	with	external	stakeholders.			As	 soon	 as	 the	 beginning	 of	March	 2016	 I	met	 the	 rest	 of	 the	WRC	 team.	 I	 thought	 it	important	 to	 try	 to	build	relationships	with	research	participants	gradually	 in	order	 to	make	the	transition	from	the	virtual	to	the	‘actual’	more	organic.	I	called	into	its	premises	once	 more	 before	 joining	 the	 team	 in	 October	 2016,	 while	 maintaining	 regular	communication	 with	 the	 organisation	 throughout.	 After	 obtaining	 institutional	 ethics	approval,	I	officially	assumed	a	participant-observer	role	in	WRC,	on	October	1,	2016.		I	 explained	my	 role	 (what	 I	was	 attempting	 to	 learn	 and	how),	 after	which	 one	 of	 the	participants	suggested	that	each	member	of	the	organisation	should	provide	me	with	“a	brief	walk-through”	(Nikola)	of	 their	day-to-day	work.	Others,	 including	myself,	agreed	to	 the	 idea	 and	 in	 the	 following	 few	days	 each	of	 the	participants	provided	me	with	 a	short	 induction	 relating	 to	 their	 role.	 This	 strategy	was	useful,	 as	 it	 gave	me	 a	 clearer	idea	of	what	I	could	expect	to	learn	but	also	provided	us	with	the	opportunity	to	get	to	know	one	other	in	more	depth.	Throughout	the	fieldwork,	but	especially	in	the	first	few	weeks,	I	noticed	how	they	picked	up	on	my	body	language	(e.g.	when	they	perceived	that	I	was	 confused,	 they	would	 stop	whatever	 they	were	doing	and	patiently	elaborate	on	the	context	in	order	to	help	me	understand).	The	transition	from	online	ethnography	to	on-the-ground	fieldwork	felt	seamless;	the	beginning	of	my	work	in	the	organisation	was	experienced	as	one	of	familiarity,	and	an	invitation	to	observe	and	engage	in	a	meeting	with	one	of	the	organisation’s	important	international	stakeholders	on	my	first	day	in	the	field	suggests	that	the	feeling	was	mutual.			
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Ethnographer	identity:		A	typical	characteristic	of	ethnographic	research	is	an	awareness	the	researcher	brings	concerning	how	their	own	experiences	and	values	relate	to	the	scene	being	researched	and	 how	 these	 identifications	 and	 experiences	 might	 affect	 interpretation	 (Cunliffe,	2010;	Hammersley	and	Atkinson,	2007;	Taylor	and	Smith,	2008).	The	ethnographer	not	only	 has	 to	 be	 aware	 that	 they	 are	 a	 part	 of	 the	 research	 process	 but	 also	 how	 their	presence	 in	 the	 research	 setting	 might	 bear	 on	 the	 participants’	 behaviour	 and	responses.	This	process	of	active	and	critical	examination	of	one’s	subjective	positioning,	and	 the	 potential	 impact	 it	may	 have	 on	 the	 research	 process,	 is	 known	 as	 reflexivity	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson,	2007;	Koch	et	al,	2014).			Not	 engaging	 in	 the	 process	 of	 reflexivity	 can	 be	 harmful	 towards	 participants.	 Taylor	and	 Smith	 (2008)	 provide	 an	 example	 of	 how	 anthropologists	 from	 the	 global	 North	misrepresented	kinship	relations	and	gender	roles	in	the	global	South,	engaging,	thus,	in	a	 process	 of	 ‘misrecognition’	 and	misrepresentation	 of	 particular	 cultures	 (see	 Taylor,	1994).	 Projecting	 a	 particular,	 perceived	 identity	 onto	 participants	 may	 hold	consequences	for	how	readers	observe	certain	groups	but	also	for	how	participants	view	themselves.	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 here	 that	 this	 discussion	 is	 not	 reserved	 only	 for	ethnographic	 research	 but	 is	 relevant	 to	 research	 in	 general	 (Hammersley,	 2013;	Hammersley	and	Atkinson,	2007).	The	danger	of	perceived	misrecognition	exists	even	in	poststructuralist	 ethnographic	 research,	 where,	 despite	 an	 orientation	 to	 co-construction,	the	experiences	of	the	researcher	are,	to	a	degree,	privileged:	ultimately,	in	a	 single-authored	 ethnography,	 the	 researcher	 must	 write	 up	 the	 findings	 and	 frame	them	within	a	narrative	(Bardon	et	al,	2017).		
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	Hammersley	 and	 Atkinson	 (2007)	 outline	 a	 range	 of	 potential	 research	 identities	 for	ethnographers,	 ranging	 from	detached	and	 ‘neutral’	 to	highly	 immersed	 in	 the	work	of	the	researched	scene.	A	participant-observer	identity	can	be	viewed	as	a	suitable	fit	with	a	poststructuralist	research	paradigm,	as	 it	seeks	 to	observe	the	scene	as	a	researcher,	focusing	 on	 the	 body/speech	 acts	 of	 others	 as	 a	 primary	 source	 of	 data,	 but	 is	 also	committed	 to	 understanding	 the	 enacted	 practices	 of	 the	 community	 through	participation.	 Being	 a	 participant-observer	 therefore	 offers	 first-hand,	 embodied	knowledge	of	 life	 in	 the	 community	 (Brannan,	2017:	662).	 It	means	accepting	 that	 the	researcher	and	the	researched	cannot	be	separated	–	acknowledging	that	my	“personal	opinions	on	events”	(Courpasson,	2017:	1283),	as	well	as	my	more	general	presence	in	the	 field,	 inevitably	 shape	 the	 researched	phenomena,	 resulting	 in	a	 co-construction	of	meaning	 between	 research	 participants	 and	 I	 (Nicholson	 and	 Carroll,	 2013).	 Being	 a	participant-observer	 of	 course	 also	 surfaces	 issues	 of	 identity	 confusion	 and	 potential	conflicts	of	interest,	as	one	can	become	too	close	to	a	community	and	its	values,	an	issue	I	explore	in	the	sub-section	on	research	ethics.				My	research	identity:		I	agreed	with	WRC	members	that	I	would	engage	as	much	as	possible	in	their	day-to-day	work	while	simultaneously	acting	as	a	researcher.	My	identity	in	the	field	and	the	impact	of	 my	 presence	 on	 the	 observed	 phenomena	 was	 a	 matter	 for	 reflexive	 exchange	between	participants	and	I,	as	well	as	a	matter	for	ongoing	reflection	in	my	ethnographic	journal.	 However,	 I	 was	 always	 cautious	 not	 to	 impose	 my	 views	 on	 others,	 instead	
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subjecting	them	to	the	same	forms	of	democratic	exchange	as	were	practiced	throughout	the	organisation.	Similarly,	I	was	cautious	about	being	drawn	to	parts	of	the	organisation	I	felt	a	closer	affinity	with	and	therefore	sought	to	‘distribute’	myself	as	much	as	possible	across	the	organisation’s	programmes	and	related	events,	so	as	to	enable	a	more	diverse	co-construction	of	meaning.	Moving	between	 initiatives	 also	had	 the	practical	 effect	 of	not	imposing	my	views	too	deeply	on	any	one	area	of	the	organisation.			Having	said	 that,	some	days	 in	 the	organisation	were	so	hectic	 that	 it	 left	us	with	 little	time	 for	 reflexive	 engagement.	Moreover,	WRC	practitioners	 encourage	 confrontations	and	 playing	 ‘devil’s	 advocate’	 as	 a	 strategy	 in	 debates,	 which	 meant	 that	 we	 often	engaged	 in	 heated	 and	 passionate	 discussions,	 usually	 on	 the	 go,	 discussing	 one	 thing	whilst	 performing	 another.	 Yet	 the	 approach	 enabled	 me	 to	 identify	 the	 prevailing	discourses	of	democratic	practice	as	they	emerged,	were	contested	and	gained	traction;	it	enabled	me	 to	 track	how	WRC	members	engaged	with	 them	and	 to	gain	 insight	 into	how	 the	 discourses	 of	 democratic	 practice	 present	 in	 the	 field	 interwove	 with	 the	practical	struggles	and	projects	of	the	organisation.			Most	importantly,	adopting	a	participant-observer	role	enabled	me	to	develop	a	rich	and	embodied	 sense	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 perform	 democratic	 practice	 in	 an	 engaged	organisation,	 with	 real	 material	 and	 emotional	 pressures	 and	 incentives;	 to	 gain	 a	present	and	embodied	sense	of	 “people’s	practices,	 feelings	and	experiences”	 (Thanem	and	Knights,	2012:	4).				
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5.1.2.	Discourse	analysis	and	its	relevance		Discourse	 analysis	 is	 often	 referred	 to,	 broadly,	 as	 a	 research	 strategy	 for	 analysis		(Bardon	 et	 al,	 2017;	 Dougherty	 and	 Hode,	 2016;	 Elraz,	 2017);	 however,	 discourse	analysis	must	be	approached	as	“a	complete	package”	(Jørgensen	and	Phillips,	2002:2),	with	 its	 philosophical	 assumptions	 (ontology	 and	 epistemology)	 offering	 a	 way	 of	reading	 one’s	 surroundings	 in	 the	 field	 and	 immersing	 oneself	 within	 a	 discursive	community	(Pritchard,	2012).		Types	 of	 discourse	 analyses	 are	 multiple	 (Taylor,	 2013);	 however,	 within	 a	constructionist	ontology,	which	informs	this	research,	there	are	two	broad	approaches	of	relevance,	 each	 of	 them	 carrying	 somewhat	 different	 assumptions:	 critical	 discourse	analysis	 and	 poststructuralist	 discourse	 analysis	 (Jørgensen	 and	 Phillips,	 2002).	 These	approaches	are	 interested	 in	 language	as	evidence	of	how	social	 life	 comes	 into	being;	however,	they	tend	to	approach	the	structuring	nature	of	language	differently	(Fougère	et	al,	2017;	Taylor,	2013).	I	will	briefly	outline	the	main	assumptions	of	CDA	of	relevance	to	this	ethnographic	research	before	unpacking	the	approach	adopted,	poststructuralist	discourse	analysis	(PDA),	in	more	depth.			Critical	Discourse	Analysis	(CDA):		I	 drew	 on	 methods	 within	 CDA	 that	 were	 consistent	 with	 my	 onto-epistemological	approach	 but	 excluded	 elements	 that	were	 not.	 CDA	 is	 closely	 associated	with	 critical	theory	(Taylor,	2013:	17),	which	focuses	on	identifying	and	unearthing	power	relations	
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embedded	 in	 social	 phenomena.	 Such	 a	 focus	 is	 aimed	 at	 making	 visible	 power	constellations	of	certain	groups,	individuals	and	institutional	structures	for	the	purposes	of	 instigating	 social	 change	 (Denzin	 and	Lincoln,	 2011;	Fairclough,	2003;	Hammersley,	2013).	Discourse	is	“not	only	seen	as	constitutive	but	also	as	constituted”	by	other	social	structures	 and	 practices	 (Jørgensen	 and	 Phillips,	 2002:	 65).	 However,	 CDA	 has	 been	criticised	for	rarely	 in	practice	either	analysing	or	conceptualising	the	 ‘real’	power	that	sits	behind	the	production	of	discourse	and	for	failing	to	propose	how	its	insights	can	be	drawn	upon	to	enact	social	change	(Machin	and	Mayr,	2012).			The	more	prevalent	analytical	approach	of	CDA	researchers	tends	to	be	a	micro-focus	on	talk	 and	 text	 (Jørgensen	 and	 Phillips,	 2002;	 Taylor,	 2013;	 Wetherell	 et	 al,	 2001):	 for	example	 a	 textual	 analysis	 focusing	 on	 grammar	 units	 (verbs,	 nouns,	 pronouns,	adjectives,	 etc.)	 and	 argumentation	 nuances	 tracked	 through	 text	 (see	 Dougherty	 and	Hode,	 2016;	 Harding,	 2008;	 Wodak	 et	 al,	 2011).	 As	 CDA	 studies	 focus	 largely	 on	 the	linguistic,	many	of	its	textual	techniques,	such	as	analysis	of	grammar,	are	also	valid	for	a	poststructuralist	 study	 (Jørgensen	and	Phillips,	2002)	and	can	 therefore	be	adopted	 in	this	study.			Importantly	for	this	study,	some	researchers	within	a	CDA	tradition	also	seek	to	analyse	the	visual	communication	of	discourses,	an	approach	called	multimodal	critical	discourse	analysis	 (MCDA)	 (Alcadipani	 and	 Islam,	2017;	Heizmann	and	Liu,	2018;	Machin,	2016;	Machin	and	Mayr,	2012).	The	aim	of	this	approach	is	to	demonstrate	how	language	and	image	interweave	and	are	co-constitutive	of	meaning,	with	aspects	of	written	grammar	also	perceptible	in	the	‘visual	grammar’	of	imagery	(Kress	and	van	Leeuwen,	1996).	Such	techniques	 are	 adopted	 to	 analyse	 the	 deployment	 of	 imagery	 from	 organisations	 and	
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institutions,	 rather	 than	 the	 imagery	 captured	 by	 the	 field	 researcher.	 I	 adopted	 such	techniques	to	analyse	the	deployment	of	imagery	from	WRC,	although	I	used	some	of	my	own	photographs	and	those	taken	by	news	reporters	in	order	to	enhance	understanding	of	the	enacted	practice.	In	addition,	embodiment	may	be	thought	of	as	an	intensely	visual	and	performed	experience,	which	is	why	I	employed	some	techniques	from	MCDA	in	the	study,	where	they	 integrated	well	with	the	conceptual	and	methodological	emphasis	of	the	research.				Poststructuralist	Discourse	Analysis	(PDA):		Poststructuralist	 discourse	 analysts	 acknowledge	 the	 existence	 of	 macro-social	discourses	that	may	limit	the	agency	of	social	actors,	but	 interpret	these	as	normalised	and	contested	via	continuous	micro	adherence	and	resistances	(Alvesson	and	Kärreman,	2000).	One	 of	 the	most	 significant	 distinctions	 between	 the	PDA	 approach	 and	CDA	 is	that	PDA	proponents	do	not	distinguish	between	the	discursive	and	material.	This	is	not	to	 say	 that	 the	material	 is	 unrecognised	 but	 that,	 ultimately,	 the	material	 can	 only	 be	known	 and	 analysed	 through	 “the	 discursive	 condition	 of	 emergence”	 (Laclau	 and	Mouffe,	1985:	108).	Discourses	are	made	of	both	material	and	linguistic	practices,	yet	we	can	conceive	the	material	only	via	the	discursive	(Hardy	and	Thomas,	2015).	Discourse	is	defined	 as	 a	 “structured	 totality	 resulting	 from	 articulatory	 practices”	 (Laclau	 and	Mouffe,	 1985:	 105),	 where	 articulation	 is	 understood	 as	 “any	 practice	 establishing	 a	relation	among	elements”	 (ibid.)	 in	which	 the	 identity	of	 the	 ‘element’	 is	modified	as	a	result	of	this	articulation.			
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This	 is	 why	 in	 this	 research	 I	 analyse	 material	 artefacts	 using	 discourse	 analysis,	 as,	following	Butler	(1999;	2004,	2011),	I	interpret	the	material	and	linguistic	as	entangled	and	 inseparable.	 Through	 the	 process	 of	 articulating	 practices	 in	my	 findings,	 I	weave	together	the	visual	and	linguistic	in	order	to	evoke	the	embodied	aspects	of	democratic	practice.	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 also	 aim	 to	 induce	 in	 the	 reader	 the	 sensory	 experiences	 that	practitioners	 and	 I	 may	 have	 experienced:	 feelings	 of	 triumph,	 defeat,	 frustration,	embarrassment,	tiredness,	despair,	sorrow,	happiness,	loss,	etc.		PDA	 does	 not	 constitute	 a	 singular	 approach	 to	 research,	 with	 various	 differences	 in	emphasis	 existing	within	 the	 poststructuralism	 umbrella.	 Largely	 used	within	 political	studies,	but	also	increasingly	present	in	organisation	studies,	Laclau	and	Mouffe’s	(1985)	discourse	 theory	 is	 envisaged	 as	 a	 response	 to	Marxism’s	 seeming	over-preoccupation	with	class	as	a	 system	of	material	 relations.	Acknowledging	 the	 increasing	 tendency	of	people	 to	relate	 to	and	experience	power	 in	 terms	of	 identities	–	gender,	sexuality	and	race,	 but	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 social	movements	 –	 Laclau	 and	Mouffe	 develop	 a	 theory	 of	discourse	 that	 establishes	 contingency	 as	 its	 guiding	 premise	 (Cederström	 and	 Spicer,	2014).	 Laclau	 and	 Mouffe’s	 discourse	 theory	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 form	 of	 ‘neo-Gramscianism’	(McLaughlin	and	Bridgman,	2017:	572),	as	it	is	interested	in	the	dynamic	nature	of	how	hegemonic	constellations	of	power	are	formed,	challenged	and	defeated.			Discourse	 theory	has	 largely	been	adopted	as	a	means	of	understanding	 the	 formation	and	development	of	campaign	groups,	with	analysis	focusing	on	the	range	of	discourses,	alliances	 and	 antagonisms	 at	 play.	 For	 example,	Griggs	 and	Howarth	 (2004	 and	2008)	explore	 how	 disparate	 people	 come	 together	 and	 work	 in	 tension	 within	 chains	 of	equivalence	 to	 oppose	 airport	 expansion	 plans.	 In	 more	 micro	 organisational	 terms,	
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Smolović	 Jones	 et	 al	 (2016)	 draw	 on	 discourse	 theory	 to	 posit	 identity	 in	 leadership	development	 as	 a	 contingent	 and	 political	 process	 assembled	 from	 various	 discourses	and	interests,	as	something	that	stretches	beyond	the	formal	boundaries	of	organisation,	into	people’s	social	and	cultural	identifications.	In	terms	of	this	study,	the	proposition	of	contingent	 identity	 and	meaning	 in	 discourse	 is	 of	 value.	Bearing	 in	mind	 the	broader	discursive	 and	 hegemonic	 shifts	 and	 positioning	 –	 and	 how	 these	 may	 manifest	 and	organise	 groups	 in	 the	 field	 -	 may	 also	 be	 of	 use	 in	 better	 understanding	 the	 larger	political	moves	at	play	within	performative	practices.		Within	 organisation	 studies,	 a	 Foucauldian	 approach	 to	 discourse	 seeks	 to	 explore	people’s	 subjection	 and	 regulation	 to	 organisational	 and	 societal	 discourses,	 practices	and	technologies	(e.g.	Townley,	1993).	For	example,	Knights	and	Clarke	(2014)	explore	how	 professional	 academics	 experience	 insecurity	 of	 self	 in	 relation	 to	 contemporary	discourses	 of	 the	 entrepreneurial	 and	 career-driven	 academic.	 More	 recently,	researchers	have	turned	to	Foucault’s	later	writings	to	explore	the	potential	for	subjects	to	resist	disciplinary	discourse	and	to	work	on	the	self	as	an	ethical	project	(Clarke	and	Knights,	 2015),	 an	 ‘art	 of	 living’	 (Munro,	 2014:	 1143),	 co-opting	 and	 transforming	existing	discourses	and	practices	in	novel	and	more	emancipatory	ways.		The	work	 of	 Judith	 Butler,	 adopted	 as	my	 theoretical	 framework,	 builds	 on	 Foucault’s	writings,	 and	 has	 already	 been	 discussed,	 but	 given	 her	 centrality	 to	 this	 study,	 it	 is	worth	briefly	revisiting	her	work,	specifically	its	more	applied	use	in	discourse	studies.	A	Butlerian	account	of	discourse	is	similar	to	discourse	theory	in	as	much	as	it	is	interested	in	discourse	within	a	field	of	contested	hegemony,	and	it	is	akin	to	Foucauldian	discourse	analysis	 as	 it	 explores	 the	 subjectivation	 of	 people	 within	 a	 field	 of	 discourse.	
	 145	
Nevertheless,	 it	could	be	claimed	that	Butler	offers	a	more	sophisticated	account	of	the	subject	in	discourse,	through	her	theory	of	performativity.	The	focus	is	far	more	on	the	lived	and	qualitative	experiences	of	the	subject.	While	Butler	is	interested	in	the	“power	of	discourse	to	produce	the	phenomena	that	it	regulates	and	constrains”	(2011:	xii),	she	is	 equally	 focused	 on	 “the	 persistence	 of	 disidentification”	 (ibid:	 xiii)	 with	 prescribed	identities,	 something	 she	 explicitly	 connects	 to	 ‘democratic’	 life	 and	 democratic	performativities	 (ibid).	 In	 keeping	 with	 her	 embodied	 and	 discursive-material	preferences,	Butler’s	focus	is	upon	the	body	and	subjectivity	within	discourse,	and	so	it	is	important	 for	 understanding	 how	 practitioners	 navigate	 norms	 and	 tensions	 in	 an	embodied	 way,	 feeling	 their	 constraints	 and	 oppressions,	 yet	 striving	 to	 generate	democratic	practice	through	such	an	environment.			Within	 organisation	 studies,	 a	 Butlerian	 approach	 to	 discourse	 analysis	 has	 been	adopted	 to	 better	 understand	 people’s	 embodied	 experiences	 within	 a	 regime	 of	discourse	 (Ford	 et	 al,	 2017a).	 Analytical	 focus	 moves	 between	 analysis	 of	 discourses	present	 in	 the	 field	 and	 the	 subject’s	 performance	 or	 rejection	 of	 these	 discourses	 in	practice	 (Kenny,	 2010	 and	 2018).	 In	 practical	 terms,	 such	 studies	 usually	 combine	 a	reflexive	account	of	self	in	a	scene	of	study	(ibid.)	with	a	focus	on	the	language	adopted	by	participants	to	perform	a	certain	sense	of	embodied	self.	In	terms	of	language,	and	in	common	with	CDA,	Butlerean	studies	analyse	micro	uses	of	language	but	tend	to	focus	on	people’s	 everyday	 and	 subjective	 accounts,	 rather	 than	 drawing	 out	 the	 workings	 of	ideology	through	language.			In	 terms	 of	 methods,	 Butlerian	 accounts	 usually	 work	 more	 with	 interview	 and	ethnographic	 accounts	 that	 surface	 people’s	 identifications.	 In	 common	 with	 CDA,	
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Butlerian	 researchers	 are	 interested	 in	 verbs	 and	 nouns	 (e.g.	 Nicholson	 and	 Carroll,	2013),	 but	 also	 foreground	 pronouns,	 as	 these	 are	 taken	 to	 signal	 the	 presence	 of	discursive	 identity	work,	 as	participants	 construct	 a	 sense	of	 themselves	 in	 relation	 to	organisation	 through	 their	 talk	 (Ford	 et	 al,	 2017;	 Harding	 et	 al,	 2017;	 Harding	 et	 al,	2014).	In	addition	to	language,	Riach	et	al	(2014)	adopt	visual	aids	and	prompts	in	their	interview-based	study,	in	keeping	with	the	sense	in	Butler	that	discourse	is	experienced	in	embodied,	sensory-rich	ways.			Discourse	approach	adopted:		The	 discourse	 approach	 adopted	 in	 this	 study	 is	 strongly	 shaped	 by	 Butlerian	poststructuralism,	 due	 to	 the	 research	 focus	 on	 the	 embodied	 enactment	 of	 practice.	Viewing	 the	 identity	 of	 a	 subject	 as	 an	 ‘incomplete’	 achievement,	 in	 the	 words	 of	Howarth	 (2013),	 enables	 a	 certain	 ‘democratisation’	 of	 the	 self	 through	 research,	 of	making	 accessible	 and	 analysable	 the	 identity	 and	 practice	 of	 those	 who	 perform	democratic	practice	within	NGOs	(Glendinning,	2011:	40).	This	 is	because	practice	and	identity,	 as	 incomplete	 and	 contingent,	 are	 approached	 as	 necessarily	 relational	 and	discursive	 phenomena	 (Knights	 and	 Clarke,	 2017).	 With	 its	 focus	 on	 performative	discourse,	 Butler’s	 account	 allows	 me	 to	 explore	 the	 discourses	 that	 are	 involved	 in	shaping	 the	enactments	of	practitioners;	 it	 enables	me	 to	understand	how	a	 subject	of	democratic	practice	is	itself	enacted	through	the	mixing	of	these	discourses	and	also	how	the	 subject	 agentically	 ‘configures’	 a	 practice	 through	 drawing	 on	 available	 discursive	resources	beyond	those	of	the	strictly	‘democratic’	(Butler,	1999:	89).			
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Nevertheless,	 insights	from	broader	poststructuralism	are	also	incorporated	when	they	align	with	the	Butlerian	approach	adopted	–	chiefly,	a	recognition	of	the	contingency	of	language	 and	 the	 salience	 of	 certain	 signifiers	 in	 assembling	 political	 coalitions	 and	identifications.	 Furthermore,	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 broader	 constructionist	 ontology	adopted,	 certain	 analytical	 techniques,	 predominantly	 from	 CDA,	 are	 adopted,	 such	 as	the	 analysis	 of	 grammatical	 units	 of	 speech	 and	 the	 overlap	 between	 language	 and	visuals.	These	techniques	are	employed	as	they	help	enrich	a	sense	of	how	practice	and	self	are	constructed	relationally	and	in	embodied	ways	over	time.			
5.1.3.	Data	collection		Methods	 utilised	 in	 both	 ethnographic	 research	 and	 discourse	 analysis	 are	 diverse,	 a	collection	 of	 techniques	 that	 can	 be	 brought	 together	 in	 a	way	 that	makes	 conceptual	sense	 and	 will	 help	 illuminate	 the	 research	 question	 (Lazaraton,	 2002;	 Taylor,	 2013;	Willis	and	Trondman,	2000:	7).	My	focus	for	selecting	methods	was	guided	by	the	need	to	generate	data	that	illuminated	the	discursively	constituted	experiences	of	participants	in	 the	 field	as	 they	enacted	democratic	practice	over	 time.	With	 these	 requirements	 in	mind	 I	 chose	 observations	 and	 interviews	 as	 the	 primary	 forms	 of	 data	 generation	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson,	2007;	Lucas	et	al,	2017;	Wodak	et	al,	2011).			What	all	ethnographies	have	in	common	is	that	they	are	“rooted	in	observation”	(Zickar	and	 Carter,	 2010:	 305),	 a	 method	 often	 coupled	 with	 interviews,	 be	 they	 structured,	semi-structured	or	open	(Brannan	et	al,	2012).	Moreover,	the	researcher’s	reflections	on	the	positioning	of	 their	own	“bod[y]	on	site”	(Yanow,	2012:	33)	and	their	own	identity	
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(Hammersley	and	Atkinson,	2007:	14)	is	also	considered	data	that	merits	analysis.	This	latter	 aspect	 of	 ethnography	 is	 viewed	 as	 crucial	 in	 avoiding	 problems	 of	 unconscious	bias	and	the	transmission	of	privileged	norms	onto	the	data	(Driver,	2016).		I	will	now	briefly	outline	the	principles	of	each	method	of	data	generation	before	offering	an	account	of	how	I	adopted	these	in	practice.			Observations:		Employing	 observation	 as	 a	 method	 provides	 the	 researcher	 with	 the	 opportunity	 to	explore	 a	 matrix	 of	 “roles,	 rules,	 norms,	 unofficial	 practices,	 politics,	 discourses,	 and	cultures	 to	 be	 found	 in	 organisations”	 (Watson,	 2011:	 209).	 Specifically,	 observations	provide	 the	opportunity	 to	 investigate	how	practices	are	enacted	within	 such	a	matrix	(Harding	et	al,	2014;	Paring	et	al,	2017).			Through	 immersive,	 experiential	 observation,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 trace	 certain	 norms	 and	practices,	such	as	participation	or	dialogue,	to	theories	of	democracy.	However,	besides	these	‘imported’	norms,	I	was	able	to	learn	about	WRC’s	own	norms,	rules,	practices	and	discourses	that	informed	the	performance	of	particular	subjects	(Butler,	2004).	It	was	of	value	to	observe	practitioners	in	a	range	of	everyday	work	contexts,	paying	attention	to	how	 they	 used,	 and	 were	 constrained	 by,	 discourses/embodiments.	 Such	 contexts	 in	practice	 involved	 a	mix	 of	 formal	 (meetings	 and	 events)	 and	 informal	 (conversations,	coffee	breaks	etc.)	settings.			
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In	terms	of	participation,	 I	engaged	 in	regular	organisational	activities,	 from	helping	to	organise	 events,	 writing	 speeches	 and	 statements,	 working	 with	 stakeholders	 and	producing	 research	 for	 reports,	 to	more	mundane	 activities,	 such	 as	 printing,	 cleaning	and	carrying.		Throughout	my	fieldwork,	in	common	with	Paring	et	al	(2017),	Cooren	et	al	 (2008)	and	Kenny	 (2010),	 I	 took	detailed	 fieldnotes	within	an	ethnographic	 journal.	These	 notes	 contain	 a	 record	 of	 extra-linguistic	 impressions,	 such	 as	 body	 language,	overall	dynamics	and	‘materialities’	(e.g.	room	layout,	participant	use	of	specific	‘props’)	(Paring	et	al,	2017;	Wodak	et	al,	2011).	 I	made	daily	entries	 in	 the	 journal,	 sometimes	throughout	the	day,	in	longhand	and	on	paper,	and	in	the	evenings,	electronically.	These	sessions	allowed	me	time	to	reflect	on	my	own	identity	in	the	scene,	to	what	extent	I	had	become	integrated	into	the	norms	of	WRC,	but	also	to	take	a	step	back	and	try	to	view	the	 scene	 in	 the	 capacity	 of	 a	 researcher-observer	 rather	 than	 a	 participant-observer.	The	individual	entries	varied	from	a	few	paragraphs	to	several	pages,	depending	on	the	relevance	 of	 the	 organisation’s	 activities.	 However,	 I	 often	 returned	 to	 various	 entries	and	added	material	 to	 them	retrospectively,	whenever	 I	gained	 fresh	 insight	about	 the	observed	event.			In	total,	 the	 journal	contains	343	pages	(approximately	70,000	words)	of	typed-up	text	and	a	full	notebook	of	longhand	impressions.	In	terms	of	observed	meetings,	workshops	and	events,	besides	noting	thoughts	in	the	journal,	I	also	audio-recorded	many	of	them,	after	seeking	approval.	In	total,	I	have	31	audio-files	in	this	category,	which	amounts	to	4.33GB,	or	approximately	79	hours,	of	data.	I	transcribed	those	of	most	relevance	to	the	RQ	for	further	analysis,	amounting	to	121	pages	and	42,000	words.	Meetings,	events	and	workshops	make	much	more	sense	when	listened	to,	due	to	the	ability	of	the	listener	to	appreciate	 the	dynamics	of	 the	unfolding	 conversations,	 different	 kinds	of	 interactions	
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and	exchanges	between	interlocutors,	the	sound	and	pitch	of	voices,	the	noise	made	by	people’s	 movements	 in	 the	 room,	 etc.	 I	 found	 that	 listening	 to	 a	 recording	 had	 the	capacity	to	transport	me	back	to	the	event	so	that	I	could	relive	it,	allowing	me	sensory	insight	that	a	transcript	alone	would	not	be	able	to	provide.			I	 also	 compiled	 a	 folder	 with	 material	 produced	 by	 WRC	 containing	 various	 videos,	reports,	posters,	photographs,	public	announcements,	and	so	on,	the	content	of	which	I	analysed	over	the	course	of	three	years,	particularly	bearing	in	mind	my	emphasis	on	the	embodied	(and	therefore	also	the	visual).	This	data	provided	contextual	background	for	the	research	setting	but	also	valuable	texture	for	analysing	the	prominent	discourses	of	democratic	 practice	 WRC	 practitioners	 engaged	 with,	 as	 well	 as	 insight	 into	 the	particularities	of	their	engagements.				Post-event	interviews:		Data	 obtained	 via	 observation	 is	 often	 supplemented	 with	 interview	 data	 in	ethnographic	approaches,	allowing	participants	to	elaborate	or	reflect	upon	action,	or	to	clarify	certain	events	that	may	have	caused	a	researcher	some	confusion	(Alcadipani	and	Islam,	 2017;	 Hammersley	 and	 Atkinson,	 2007;	 Ybema	 and	Horvers,	 2017;	 Smith	 et	 al,	2017;	 Taylor	 and	 Smith,	 2008).	 Interviews	 can	 provide	 additional	 ‘texture’	 to	observations,	 i.e.	participants’	 “views,	 thoughts,	 reflections,	 and	 feelings”	 (Cooren	et	al,	2008:	1348)	can	supplement	the	impressions	of	an	observer.	Interviews	may	be	salient	in	 providing	 a	 forum	 for	 the	 co-construction	 of	 an	 account	 of	 events,	 helping	 the	
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interviewer	 and	 interviewee	 to	 reflexively	 make	 “sense	 of	 self	 and	dominant…discourses”	within	a	particular	setting	(Kenny,	2010:	864).			In	 this	 research,	 post-event	 interviews	 were	 important	 for	 understanding	 how	practitioners	 identified	 with	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 democratic	 practice,	 especially	 as	democratic	practices	can	be	said,	by	definition,	to	be	complex	enactments	constituted	by	a	 range	 of	 diverse,	 often	 disagreeing,	 agents	 within	 a	 matrix	 of	 diverse	 discourses.	Interviews	 were	 designed	 in	 a	 semi-structured	 manner,	 with	 the	 structure	 being	provided	by	 impressions	of	events	observed.	This	approach	to	 interviews	was	adopted	due	 to	 the	 inevitability	 of	 certain	 themes	 emerging	 during	 observations,	which	would	require	further	exploration.	Identified	themes	served	to	guide	further	inquiry,	but	these	interviews	 often	 transformed	 into	 open-ended	 conversations,	 allowing	 research	participants	 to	 talk	 at	 length	 about	 a	 particular	 topic	 or	 current	 concern	 (Holm	 and	Fairhurst,	2017;	Knights	and	Clarke,	2014).	Overall,	the	interviews	gave	participants	an	opportunity	 to	 provide	 a	 more	 thorough	 account	 of	 their	 relationship	 to	 unfolding	events,	 exploring	 how	 they	 formed	 their	 “sense	 of	 self	 in	 the	 process”	 (Kenny	 et	 al,	2011:27),	 as	 well	 as	 how	 they	 related	 to	 certain	 events,	 people,	 artefacts	 and	organisational	arrangements	(Paring	et	al,	2017).		Over	 the	 course	 of	 11	 months,	 I	 conducted	 and	 transcribed	 28	 interviews,	 25	 with	women	 and	 three	 with	 men,	 all	 aged	 between	 25	 and	 45.	 Each	 of	 them	 lasted	approximately	1.5	hours,	amounting	to	around	35	hours	of	audio	data.	I	interviewed	the	staff	 members	 of	 WRC	 (18),	 associates	 of	 the	 organisation	 (6),	 as	 well	 as	 some	government	 employees	 (2)	 and	 international	 organisation	 practitioners	 (2)	 who	regularly	collaborate	with	WRC.	Interviewing	people	who	associate	themselves	with	the	
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organisation	(e.g.	volunteers)	and	those	with	whom	WRC	practitioners	collaborate	was	important	 for	 obtaining	 a	 richer	 understanding	 of	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 democratic	practice,	as	well	as	for	gleaning	others’	perceptions	of	WRC	and	how	they	negotiate	and	enact	democratic	practices	together.				
5.1.4.	Data	analysis	strategy	in	practice		Even	though	data	collection	and	analysis	are	usually	discussed	as	two	separate	stages	of	the	 research	 process,	 the	 division	 in	 discourse-based	 ethnographic	 research	 is	 not	 so	straightforward,	in	keeping	with	ethnography’s	preference	for	induction20	or	abduction21	(Cunliffe,	2010).	Taylor	and	Smith	(2008:	36)	argue	that	both	data	collection	and	analysis	may	 involve	 a	 “dialectical”	 interconnection	between	 collection	 and	 analysis,	where	 the	two	stages	of	research	inform	one	another.	Analysis	of	ethnographic	data	is	iterative	in	nature	and	usually	guided	by	the	aims	and	purposes	of	the	research,	which	can	shift	as	the	 engagement	 progresses	 (Hammersley	 and	 Atkinson,	 2007).	 In	 other	 words,	 the	researcher	 needs	 to	 repeatedly	 return	 back	 and	 forth	 between	 the	 data	 and	 the	issues/concepts	 to	 be	 researched,	 while	 drawing	 provisional	 interpretations	 and	conclusions	 in	 the	 process.	 Effective	 interpretation	 is	 dependent	 upon	 continuous	questioning;	 the	 researcher	 needs	 to	 approach	 the	 data	 from	 new	 angles	 and	 to	experiment	with	different	viewpoints	(Taylor	and	Smith,	2008).																																																										20	Induction	refers	to	a	“grounded	theory-like”	approach	to	analysis	(Alvesson,	2010:	197)	where	a	researcher	engages	in	building	“contextual	theory”	(Arcidiacono	et	al,	2009:	165),	giving	priority	to	insights	provided	directly	from	data	(Bednarek	and	Cape,	2014).	The	approach	is	often	contrasted	with	deduction,	where	the	priority	in	data	analysis	is	given	to	preexisting	theoretical	knowledge	(Alvesson,	2010).			21	More	is	provided	on	abduction	in	the	following	section.	
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	In	 what	 follows	 I	 first	 reflect	 on	 the	 broad	 analytical	 approach	 adopted,	 namely,	abduction.	 Second,	 I	 offer	 detail	 on	 the	 discourse	 analysis	 strategy	 employed,	poststructural	 discourse	 analysis,	 drawing	 on	 some	 conventions	 from	 CDA	 where	appropriate	to	the	RQ	and	conceptual	and	methodological	approach	pursued.				
An	abductive	and	reflexive	approach		Taylor	 and	 Smith	 (2008:36)	 argue	 for	 a	 “dialectical”	 interconnection	 between	 data	collection	 and	 analysis,	 where	 the	 two	 inform	 one	 another	 in	 an	 iterative	 cycle	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson,	2007).	Abduction	 is	 an	 iterative	approach	 to	data	analysis	(Nicholson	and	Caroll,	 2013),	which	 involves	 “reading	and	 re-reading	data,	 looking	 for	surprises”	(Cunliffe	and	Eriksen,	2011:	1431).	However,	such	a	process	does	not	involve	a	 deliberately	 ‘naive’	 search	 for	 themes	 but	 an	 informed	 one,	 rooted	 in	 a	 broad	understanding	of	the	theoretical	 literature	(Alvesson	and	Kärreman,	2007).	This	means	that	 the	 researcher	 needs	 to	 go	 back	 and	 forth	 between	 the	 empirical	 material	 and	theory	in	search	of	emerging	themes,	which	abide	by	or	question	existing	theory,	but	also	be	 open	 to	 themes	 that	 do	 not	 fit	 neatly	within	 existing	 theoretical	 frameworks	 (ibid:	1270).	 Such	 instances	 of	 not	 fitting	 are	 potential	 sources	 of	 “surprises”	 (Cunliffe	 and	Eriksen,	2011:	1431)	and	“mysteries”	(Alvesson	and	Kärreman,	2007:	1272),	or	points	in	the	data	that	indicate	areas	for	further	investigation	through	fieldwork.	Such	a	process	is	enacted	consistently	and	continuously	during	the	field	engagement.			
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In	 practice,	 my	 approach	 to	 data	 analysis	 overlapped	 with	 data	 collection.	 Nightly	reflections	on	the	data	generated	via	recordings,	fieldnotes	and	documentation	enabled	a	gradual	 and	 iterative	 process	 of	 interpretation.	 I	 began	 by	 noting	 down	 ideas	 and	associations	gained	in	the	process	of	reading	and	re-reading	my	data.	Sometimes	these	ideas	 and	 associations	 would	 be	 informed	 by	 the	 literature	 (e.g.	 ‘agonistic	 conflict’,	‘rational	dialogue’,	etc.),	but	sometimes	I	would	simply	note	‘themes’,	or	rather	‘prompts’,	provoked	 by	 certain	 episodes	 I	 participated	 in,	 without	 necessarily	 having	 previous	theoretical	 knowledge	 concerning	 these.	 It	 soon	 became	 apparent	 that	 the	 themes	identified	did	not	 fit	neatly	within	 the	 theoretical	boundaries	offered	by	 the	 literature:	some	 overlapped	 and	 others	 defied	 them.	 Coming	 to	 this	 realisation	 led	 me	 to	 being	more	comfortable	with	allowing	myself	to	be	“challenged,	surprised,	bewildered”	by	the	data	(Alvesson	and	Kärreman,	2007:	1269).		Through	 continuous	 iterative	 engagement	 I	 gradually	 began	 noticing	 patterns,	 which	helped	me	code	the	data	into	provisional	themes.	I	tinkered	with	different	associations	I	gained	through	reading	the	data:	noting	them	down,	exploring	synonyms	in	an	attempt	to	prompt	 further	 associations,	 as	well	 as	 looking	 for	 clues	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 could	provide	me	with	new	ideas	and	insights.	 I	would	then	take	a	step	back,	trying	to	relate	these	 to	 the	data.	Often,	 I	would	notice	synonyms	and	metonyms	scattered	 throughout	the	margins	of	my	data	and	these	would	act	as	a	kind	of	assurance	that	I	was	circling	an	emerging	 theme.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 I	 was	 surprised	 by	 how	 many	 times	 my	impressions/associations	could	not	be	supported	by	the	actual	data	or	would	represent	a	somewhat	 augmented	version	of	 the	 impressions	 conveyed	by	 the	participants	 in,	 say,	interviews.	These	points	 signalled	 the	necessity	 for	 reflexivity	 and	 interrogation	of	my	own	worldview	and	identity.	
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	Indeed,	 Nicholson	 and	 Carroll	 (2013)	 and	 Alvesson	 and	 Kärreman	 (2007)	 suggest	employing	 reflexivity	 from	 the	 onset	 of	 a	 research	 project	 as	 a	 useful	 strategy	 for	interrogating	 one’s	 own	 subject-positions	 while	 in	 the	 field,	 as	 well	 as	 one’s	 own	interpretation	 of	 events	 –	 and	 within	 an	 abductive	 approach,	 this	 strategy	 is	 an	important	part	of	the	data	analysis	process.	I	was	born	in	Montenegro,	where	I	lived	for	around	20	years,	which	means	that	I	am	culturally	attuned	to	the	context.	Namely,	I	am	a	native	speaker;	I	am	familiar	with	the	broader	socio-political	context,	 including	bearing	witness	to	the	introduction	of	democracy	as	a	form	of	governance	(albeit	as	a	child),	as	well	as	the	subsequent	development	of	this	system.	I	have	experienced	being	a	woman	in	the	newly	established	democracy	and	repatriarchalised	country	of	Montenegro,	and	seen	first-hand	 how	 far	 the	 democratic	 principles	 of	 liberty	 and	 equality	 stretch	 in	 reality	when	it	comes	to	everyday	life.		Until	the	age	of	10	I	was	raised	to	believe	in	equality	and	was	encouraged,	along	with	my	classmates,	siblings	and	friends,	to	be	a	‘productive	member	of	the	community’	(a	phrase	commonly	used	by	parents	and	teachers),	which	meant	that	we	were	expected	to	be	the	best	students	we	could	be	and	should	find	a	way	of	contributing	to	the	community	in	the	future	 (as	 doctors,	 engineers,	 scientists,	 builders,	 etc.),	 regardless	 of	 our	 genders.	However,	attitudes	towards	women	soon	started	to	change	and	by	the	time	I	turned	13	it	became	 common	 to	 hear	 teachers	 (usually	 male)	 say	 that	 investing	 in	 girls’	 higher	education	was	‘wasteful’,	as	their	‘destiny’	led	them	to	the	proverbial	kitchen.	Such	views	coincided	with	the	 increasing	revival	of	 toxic	ethno-nationalist	and	religious	narratives	and	practices,	dictating	traditional	gender	divisions	and	encompassing	all	spheres	of	life.			
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By	 the	 age	 of	 18	 I	 became	 accustomed	 to	 inequality	 –	 having	 to	 prove	my	worth	 as	 a	woman,	 be	 it	 at	 university,	 work	 or	 at	 family	 and	 friends’	 gatherings,	 and	 to	 be	repeatedly	 told	 what	 I	 could	 and	 could	 not	 do	 as	 a	 woman,	 which	 shaped	 me	 as	 a	feminist.	Furthermore,	such	experiences	prompted	me	to	 learn	more	about	democracy,	as	 I	 intuitively	 felt	 that	 the	 purported	 narrative	 about	 liberty	 and	 equality	 and	 the	opportunity	to	participate	in	political	decision-making,	which	democracy	was	supposed	to	entail,	was	dramatically	incongruent	with	what	I	was	experiencing	in	practice.	Having	said	 that,	 I	 was	 aware	 that	 the	 knowledge	 and	 experiences	 I	 had	 could	 have	 been	different	to	those	of	others.	Such	awareness	was	a	first	step	in	engaging	in	the	process	of	identifying	 and	 interrogating	 the	 taken-for-granted	 ‘truths’	 I	 held	 about	 myself	 and	others	(Cunliffe,	2002),	which	was	an	unsettling	task	but	a	necessary	one	nevertheless.			Returning	 to	 my	 fieldwork,	 one	 of	 my	 reflexive	 strategies	 was	 to	 ask	 research	participants	 to	help	by	 treating	me	as	a	novice	 in	 the	organisation	and	to	explain	 their	engagements	as	they	would	to	someone	who	had	no	experience	with	the	civil	sector	 in	Montenegro.	Luckily,	instead	of	finding	this	process	cumbersome	and	strange,	they	found	it	amusing	at	 first	and	a	 few	participants	even	stated,	 later	on,	 that	 they	 learned	much	about	 their	work	simply	 through	 trying	 to	articulate	 it	 to	 ‘a	novice’.	On	my	part,	 I	was	glad	they	agreed	to	such	a	strategy	because	I	began	to	notice	certain	divergences	in	my	understanding	 of	 aspects	 of	 practice	 and	 others’	 understanding	 of	 it,	 which	 was	undeniably	 shaped	 by	 our	 respective	 worldviews	 and	 experiences.	 These	 divergences	instigated	 dynamic	 dialogues	 and	 often	 a	 battle	 of	 identifications,	 resulting	 in	 identity	shifts	from	both	parties.			
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For	 instance,	during	our	 internal	debates	about	 the	provision	of	support	 for	protesting	mothers	(more	detail	provided	 in	the	 findings),	 I	realised	how	much	resentment	I	held	towards	the	elder	generation	of	women	and	that	I	was	blinded	by	that	to	the	point	of	not	being	able	to	empathise	sufficiently	with	their	hardship	to	enter	into	a	political	alliance	with	 them.	 I	 was	 adamant	 that	 they	 had	 put	 themselves,	 and	 others,	 into	 a	 difficult	position	by	succumbing	to	conservative	political	propaganda	and	not	protesting	against	the	tide	of	suspicious	privatisations	that	had	ended	with	them	being	unemployed.	It	was	through	numerous	debates	with	practitioners,	as	well	as	subsequent	conversations	with	protestors,	that	I	became	aware	of	my	entrenched	views:	they	had	less	to	do	with	my	left	political	 stance,	 as	 I	 claimed,	 and	 were	 more	 related	 to	 my	 view	 of	 the	 perceived	injustices	visited	upon	younger	generations.			However,	 there	are	many	aspects	of	my	identity	that	are	not	accessible	to	me	and	thus	cannot	 easily	 be	 reflected	 upon	 by	 me.	 In	 this	 sense,	 reflexivity	 assumes	 that	 “a	researcher	 can	extricate	herself	 and…assume	 the	position	of	an	outsider”	 (Fotaki	et	 al,	2014:	 1252)	 from	 which	 she	 can	 dissect	 and	 critically	 evaluate	 her	 complexity	 and	contradictions.	 This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 reflexivity	 can	 be	 rejected	 entirely	 but	 rather	acknowledges	how	the	‘real’	subject	does	not	exist	in	poststructuralist	research:	that	I,	as	a	subject,	am	“equally	[as]	contrived	and	constructed	as	the	research	 ‘subject’”	(Driver,	2016:	733)	 I	strive	 to	discern,	and	that	 the	reflexivity	strategies	we	choose	 to	undergo	are	 simply	 different	 approaches	 to	 a	 co-construction	 of	 meaning.	 The	 underlying	approach	 I	 adopted	 to	 challenge	 my	 own	 preconceptions	 was	 dialogic,	 to	 share	 with	research	 participants	 and	 to	 make	 myself	 as	 open	 to	 democratic	 questioning	 as	 the	organisation’s	workers.		
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In	 keeping	 with	 an	 abductive	 approach,	 my	 data	 coding,	 un-coding	 and	 re-coding,	including	 my	 own	 reflexive	 notes,	 took	 place	 continuously	 throughout	 the	 fieldwork.	When	 I	 recognised	 enough	 repeated	 discursive	 resources	 and	 enactments,	 which	corresponded	 broadly	 to	 the	 provisionally	 marked	 themes,	 I	 would	 embark	 on	scheduling	 interviews	 alongside	 continued	 observations,	 so	 that	 I	 could	 discuss	 the	provisional	 themes	 with	 participants,	 amongst	 other	 issues	 that	 emerged	 from	observations.	 Such	 an	 iterative	 engagement	 with	 the	 data,	 assisted	 by	 the	 active	engagement	 of	 research	 participants,	 allowed	 for	 a	 more	 meaningful	 formation	 of	themes;	namely,	these	conversations	did	not	serve	the	purpose	of	merely	confirming	the	themes	 I	 provisionally	 marked	 as	 significant,	 but	 also	 acted	 as	 a	 medium	 via	 which	reflexivity	 took	 place.	 Sometimes	 the	 theme	 would	 deepen	 as	 a	 result	 of	 these	conversations;	sometimes	it	would	transform	into	something	else	and	every	time	more	data	would	be	generated.	For	example,	one	of	the	main	themes,	now	termed	‘aesthetics’,	originally	 had	 a	 rather	 different	 provisional	 tag	 –	 ‘political	 engagement’;	 however,	 the	theme	 was	 assigned	 an	 alternative	 label	 following	 numerous	 conversations	 (via	 the	interviews	and	informally)	between	the	participants	and	me.				
Post-fieldwork	analysis		In	 line	 with	 the	 assumptions	 of	 poststructural	 discourse	 analysis,	 I	 approached	 the	written/spoken	material,	 as	 well	 as	 the	material	 artefacts,	 discursively.	 This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 everything	 is	 reduced	 to	 language,	 but	 that	 “our	 access	 to	 [the	material]	 is	always	 mediated	 by	 systems	 of	 meaning	 in	 the	 form	 of	 discourses”	 (Jørgensen	 and	Phillips,	2002:	35),	with	discourses	interpreted	as	an	amalgam	of	language	and	sensory	
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resources.	 Following	 Kenny	 (2010)	 and	 Pritchard	 (2012),	 data	 generated	 via	observation,	in	the	form	of	an	ethnographic	journal,	visual	material	and	transcribed	data,	were	 all	 merged	 into	 a	 single	 electronic	 database,	 which	 were	 then	 treated	 as	 texts	meriting	analysis.			All	data	was	generated	in	the	Montenegrin	language	and	it	was	important	to	analyse	it	in	its	original	form,	especially	when	it	came	to	textual	discourse	analysis,	as	the	translation	to	 English	 would	 alter	 not	 only	 the	 syntagmatic	 configuration	 of	 text	 but	 would	 also	distribute	 the	performativity	of	 the	 language	differently.	For	example,	 the	Montenegrin	language	 is	 less	 amenable	 to	 nominalisation,	 where	 the	 noun	 or	 the	 noun-phrase	 is	derived	 from	 another	 grammar	 unit	 such	 as	 verbs	 or	 adjectives	 (e.g.	 strange	 –	strangeness),	or	to	converting	nouns	into	adjectives	(e.g.	mess	-	messy)22	(Billig,	2008).	Such	performativity	of	the	language	in	practice	meant	that	translation	to	English	prior	to	analysis	would	 place	 an	 action	 upon	 the	 subject	 or	 replace	 the	 subject	 action	with	 an	ergative	form	(e.g.	the	poster	is	made),	displacing	the	action	elsewhere	(Dreyfus,	2017).	Moreover,	some	of	the	terms	that	have	the	synonym	equivalents	in	English	have	evolved	in	different	contexts,	and	the	meanings	 they	 incite	have	sedimented	differently	(Laclau	and	Mouffe,	1985).		Bearing	 the	 translation	 issues	 in	 mind,	 and	 following	 Holm	 and	 Fairhurst	 (2017),	Jammaers	et	al	(2016),	Zanoni	et	al	(2017),	I	analysed	data	in	the	Montenegrin	language	and	subsequently	translated	selected	extracts	into	English,	paying	close	attention	to	the	
																																																								22	In	cases	when	such	a	conversion	can	take	place	technically,	the	word	would	not	sit	well	with	the	rest	of	the	sentence	and	often	it	would	affect	the	entire	structure	of	the	sentence.		
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word	 order	 in	 sentences	 and	 making	 sure	 to	 replace	 each	 grammar	 unit	 with	 its	equivalent	 in	 English.	 Admittedly,	 such	 a	 strategy	 sometimes	 resulted	 in	 ungainly	constructions	 that	 could	 not	 be	 avoided.	 I	 provided	 additional	 explanations	 when	 the	word	 replacements	 could	not	be	performed	 faithfully	 and/or	where	 the	 term	required	additional	description.			As	 stated	 earlier,	 I	 performed	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 analysis	 throughout	 the	 ethnographic	fieldwork	 and	 by	 the	 end	 of	 my	 engagement	 in	 the	 field	 I	 already	 had	 three	themes/practices	 identified.	After	completing	 the	 fieldwork,	 I	went	once	again	 through	my	data	for	the	purpose	of	populating	each	of	the	practices	with	ethnographic	episodes,	this	 time	 within	 separate	 documents.	 This	 strategy	 was	 valuable	 as	 it	 enabled	 me	 to	focus	more	on	each	of	the	respective	practices,	but	it	also	provided	me	with	insight	into	how	much	overlap	there	was	between	them,	not	only	 in	 terms	of	how	they	manifested	within	the	same	episodes	but	how	the	three	practices	presented	in	the	findings	section	were	entangled	and	in	struggle	with	one	another.		Once	 I	populated	the	practices	 I	embarked	on	a	second	stage	of	data	analysis	–	a	close	textual	and	visual	analysis.	Here,	I	first	tracked	argumentation	by	tracing	the	connections	participants	 made	 in	 relation	 to	 dominant	 discourses/practices.	 Second,	 I	 explored	language	and	visual	performativity.	 In	 terms	of	 language,	 I	paid	particular	 attention	 to	grammar	 units	 and	 how	 they	 related	 to	 one	 another	 to	 build	 performative	 practices	(Butler,	 2011;	 Harding,	 2008;	Wodak	 et	 al,	 2011).	 In	 terms	 of	 visuals,	 I	 analysed	 the	performativity	of	the	visual	material,	looking	at	how	it	supported	or	inhibited	democratic	practices	 in	 relation	 to	 dominant	 discourses.	 Next,	 I	 describe	 in	 detail	 the	 textual	 and	visual	analysis	adopted.	
	 161	
Argumentation:		Analysing	 argumentation	 enabled	me	 to	 understand	 the	meaning	 and	 purpose	 people	attributed	 to	 democratic	 practice,	 as	 well	 as	 how	 such	 arguments	 were	 contested	 in	practice.	Such	an	analysis	allowed	insight	into	the	contested	nature	of	people’s	identities	in	relation	to	democratic	practices	(Smolović	Jones	et	al,	2016),	as	actors	advocated	and	competed	for	what	it	meant	to	be	a	‘woman’	and	‘man’	in	a	democratic	society.	It	was	of	particular	 importance	 here	 to	 note	 the	 discursive	 repertoires	 drawn	 upon	 by	participants,	 systems	 of	 language	 deployed	 to	 bolster	 the	meaning	 of	 salient	 signifiers	(Butler,	 2009)	 and	 how	 such	 systems	 were	 also	 communicated	 visually.	 Adopting	 a	Butlerian	 approach	 to	 analysing	 argumentation,	 I	 sought	 to	 analyse	 how	meaning	was	grounded	through	the	repetition	of	arguments	and	the	ways	 in	which	some	repetitions	(in	 language	and	visually)	went	awry,	creating	alternative	possibilities	 for	constructing	democratic	practices.			Performativity	of	the	text:		Taking	 a	 fine-grained	 approach	 to	 the	 data,	 this	 aspect	 of	 analysis	 deals	 with	 an	exploration	of	individual	grammatical	units	of	speech	and	how	they	relate	to	one	another	and	the	arguments	constructed	by	participants.	This	is	a	particularly	salient	strategy	for	exploring	 the	 enactment	 of	 practices	 and	 the	 entanglement	 of	 identifications	 and	discourse	 these	 practices	 are	 embedded	 within.	 Unlike	 CDA	 analysts,	 who	 focus	predominantly	 on	 transitivity,	 or	 how	 verbs	 relate	 to	 the	 object(s)	 in	 a	 sentence	 (see	Alvaro,	 2013;	 Krzyzanowski	 and	Wodak,	 2008;	 Machin	 and	Mayr,	 2012;	Wodak	 et	 al,	
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2011),	I	expanded	the	analysis	to	include	other	units	of	speech,	such	as	nouns,	pronouns,	adjectives,	 prepositions,	 conjunctions	 and	 interjections	 (Harding,	 2008;	 Harding	 et	 al,	2014;	Koller,	2012;	Lirola	and	Chovanec,	2012;	Wagner	and	Wodak,	2006).	This	decision	was	made	because	of	the	performative	focus	of	the	research,	an	acknowledgment	of	the	rich	repertoire	drawn	upon	to	articulate	practices/subjectivity	(Butler,	1999:	159).	I	now	elaborate	on	each	unit	of	analysis	employed	but	it	is	worth	noting	that	not	every	unit	or	visual	 aspect	 was	 analysed	 for	 each	 episode,	 in	 recognition	 that	 some	 were	 more	prominent	or	salient	than	others	at	particular	times.				Verbs:		Verbs	are	important	for	understanding	performative	doing	(Butler,	2004),	because	they	signal	 action	 and	 activity,	 the	 very	 things	 that	 perform	meaning,	 practice	 and	 self,	 but	they	also	provide	a	sense	of	the	broader	context	(Wodak	and	Meyer,	2009).	Verbs	tell	us	how	 a	 subject	 is	 positioned	 in	 relation	 to	 an	 object	 (Wodak	 et	 al,	 2011);	 for	 instance,	whether	a	speaker	is	deflecting	responsibility,	as	in,	‘I	told	her	to	do	it,	but	she	did	not’,	where	a	subject	‘I’	is	placing	responsibility	onto	the	object	‘her’.			However,	the	form	of	verbs	is	telling	as	well.	For	example,	the	adoption	of	a	progressive	form	 of	 verb	 (e.g.	 devising,	 building,	 thinking)	 may	 suggest	 an	 ongoing	process/phenomena,	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 participant	 constructing	 phenomena	 in	 a	 more	settled	way	 (devised,	 built,	 thought).	 Passive	 and	 active	 forms	 of	 verbs	 can	 signal	 felt	agency,	or	a	 lack	of	 it	 (Billig,	2008).	For	example,	 in	active	voice	 sentences	 the	 subject	performs	the	action	stated	by	a	verb,	e.g.	 ‘the	police	force	removed	the	protestors	from	
	 163	
the	plateau	in	front	of	the	government	building’;	however,	in	passive	voice	sentences	the	subject	 is	 acted	 upon	 by	 a	 verb,	 which	 can	 conceal	 the	 agent	 at	 work	 in	 the	 action	(Fairclough,	2003),	e.g.	‘the	protestors	had	been	removed	from	the	plateau	in	front	of	the	government	building’.			Tenses	denote	how	 the	action	 stated	by	 the	verb	 is	performed	 in	 relation	 to	 time,	 and	this	grammar	unit	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	‘aspect’	(Binnick,	2006).	The	verb	aspect	can	 signal	 how	 a	 subject	 is	 positioned	 towards	 the	 phenomenon	 they	 are	 referring	 to	(Wodak	 and	Meyer,	 2009).	 For	 example,	 different	members	 of	WRC	may	 perceive	 the	same	issue	in	a	different	way	in	terms	of	temporality:	as	something	that	is	completed	and	established,	as	something	that	is	ongoing	or	as	something	that	is	yet	to	be	performed.			The	 mood	 of	 a	 verb,	 such	 as	 indicative,	 imperative,	 interrogative,	 conditional	 and	subjunctive,	 can	 signal	 the	 attitude	of	 the	 subject	 towards	 the	object	of	 their	 attention	(Hewings,	2005).	For	example,	indicative	verbs	are	used	to	describe	a	state	of	affairs,	e.g.	‘gender	equality	is	established’	and	can	denote	the	speaker’s	attitude	towards	the	issue	discussed.	 The	 imperative	 mood	 of	 a	 verb,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 a	 demand	 from	 an	interlocutor,	 although	 the	 interlocutor	 might	 be	 concealed/abstracted:	 e.g.	 ‘give	 me	evidence!’	or	 ‘evidence	 is	needed!’	Depending	on	whether	 the	addressee	 is	 concrete	or	concealed,	an	imperative	may	signal	a	form	of	antagonism	and	open	up	possibilities	for	further	 conflict	 when	 the	 interlocutor	 is	 identified	 but	 encourage	 a	 more	 passive	 or	confused	response	when	the	agent	of	the	command	is	concealed.	Interrogative	verbs	also	place	a	demand	on	the	addressee,	however,	in	a	less	antagonistic	manner.	For	instance,	in	the	sentence:	‘would	you	pass	me	the	pen?’	the	speaker	places	a	polite	plea,	whereas	in	the	sentence,	‘will	you	leave	me	now?’	the	speaker	expresses	a	more	antagonistic	mood.	
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A	 conditional	mood	 states	 a	 course	 of	 action	 as	 dependent	 upon	 other	 action;	 such	 a	mood	can	range	from	a	simple	declaration,	e.g.	‘if	it	rains,	the	ground	will	become	wet’,	to	a	 more	 threatening	 mood,	 e.g.	 ‘if	 you	 submit	 that	 report,	 I	 will	 fire	 you!’	 Finally,	 the	subjunctive	mood	denotes	a	desire	on	the	part	of	the	speaker,	e.g.	‘I	wish	we	were	more	equal’,	and	can	therefore	be	a	window	into	observing	affective	commitment	in	language.		Aside	from	the	technical	performance	of	verbs,	it	is	also	important	to	pay	attention	to	the	choice	of	verbs	adopted	 to	denote	action,	e.g.	 the	 ‘mildness’	or	 ‘strength’	of	a	verb,	but	also	 to	 analyse	 verbs	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 immediate	 (syntagmatic)	 or	 wider	 narrative	context	(Wodak	and	Meyer,	2009).			Pronouns:		The	analysis	of	pronouns	 in	Butlerian	research	has	been	developed	by	Harding	(2008)	and	 Harding	 et	 al	 (2014	 and	 2017b).	 Harding	 (2008)	 claims	 that	 different	 ways	 of	speaking	about	self	signify	a	moving	process	where	participants	develop	“theories	of	the	self”	 (ibid:	48).	 In	more	detail,	Harding	 (2008:	47)	argues	 that	adopting	 ‘I’	denotes	 the	felt	 agentic	power	of	 the	 subject;	 the	 feeling	of	being	 able	 to	 actively	 shape	one’s	 own	subject	 positions.	 ‘Me’,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 suggestive	 of	 what	 subjects	 “believe”	 of	themselves	 (ibid).	 This	 is	 a	 more	 detached	 position,	 where	 subjects	 reflect	 back	 to	theorise	about	themselves.	‘You’	may	stand	for	other	person(s)	but	it	can	also	suggest	a	speaker’s	 intention	 to	 connect	 with	 others	 (audience,	 interlocutor	 or	 even	 inanimate	objects):	to	generalise	a	proposition	to	include	a	collective	identity,	rather	than	simply	a	personal	one.	It	can	be	an	indication	that	our	‘self’	exists	with	reference	to	a	community	
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of	others,	in	“oneness	within	a	collective”	(ibid:	47)	or	it	may	reflect	the	habit	of	talking	on	behalf	of	others	(Shuman,	2005).	Similarly,	‘we’	suggests	belonging	to	a	collective	but	can	 also	 “diminish	 the	 speaker’s	 responsibility	 for	 what	 is	 said”	 (ibid),	 shrinking	 a	personal	identity	within	a	collective	one.	Rather	than	view	the	presentation	of	personal	pronouns	in	isolation,	and	following	the	guidance	of	Harding,	I	sought	to	track	down	the	appearances	and	disappearances	of	pronouns,	as	well	as	their	overlaps.		It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 consider	 the	 context	 that	 the	 articulation	 of	 a	 pronoun	 is	embedded	 within.	 Pauses	 and	 extra-linguistic	 manifestations	 of	 communication	(intonation,	 gestures,	 etc.)	 are	 useful	 in	 understanding	 the	 performance	 of	 a	 subject	position	 (Harding	 et	 al,	 2014).	 For	 example,	 pauses	 in	 talk	 may	 insinuate	 that	participants	 are	 “engaged	 in	 an	 internal	 dialogue	 devoted	 to	 theorising	 the	 self”	(Harding,	 2008:	 47).	 Furthermore,	 interrogating	 choices	 and	 usage	 of	 nouns	 and	adjectives	alongside	pronouns	is	indicative	of	how	subjects	build	their	identities	in	talk	(Harding,	2008;	Harding	et	al,	2014).				Nouns:		Nouns	are	grammar	categories	that	perform	the	function	of	 identification,	 identifying	a	person,	 a	 thing,	 but	 also	 a	 state,	 an	 idea	 or	 a	 quality	 (Hewings,	 2005),	 providing	important	 insight	 into	how	participants	name	or	 identify	particular	practices	or	people	within	 practices.	 The	 choices	 of	 nouns	 speakers	 use	 to	 denote	 what	 they	 identify	 is	telling,	as	nouns	provide	texture	to	the	context	(Bednarek	and	Caple,	2014;	Harding	et	al,	
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2014,	 Wodak	 et	 al,	 2011).	 For	 instance,	 referring	 to	 a	 woman	 as	 a	 ‘girl’	 can	 appear	patronising	or	derogatory	in	some	contexts	and	endearing	in	others.		Nouns	may	 seem	 as	 though	 they	 convey	 neutral	meaning	 but	may	 connote	 and	 signal	particular	 identifications	 and	 exercises	 of	 power.	 For	 instance,	 common	 nouns	(signifying	 general	 things	 or	 people,	 e.g.	 a	 bike,	 a	man,	 etc.),	 proper	 nouns	 (signifying	particular	 things	or	people,	 e.g.	 London,	Nela)	 and	 concrete	nouns	 (signifying	material	things,	e.g.	snow)	predominantly	serve	to	denote	a	general	or	more	particular	person	or	thing,	but	also	have	the	power	to	connote	an	idea	or	value	in	relation	to	the	context	they	are	situated	within	(Machin	and	Meyr,	2012;	Perović,	2012).	For	example,	stating	‘she	is	from	the	north	of	Montenegro’,	in	certain	contexts	may	evoke	an	image	of	a	‘naïve’,	‘rural’	and	 somewhat	 ‘rough’	 person,	 even	 though	 ‘the	 north’	 denotes	 simply	 a	 particular	geographical	region	(see	Perović,	2012).			Abstract	nouns,	those	that	refer	to	phenomena	that	do	not	have	material	property,	such	as	qualities	(e.g.	goodness,	soundness,	etc.)	and	ideas	(e.g.	truth,	democracy,	leadership,	etc.),	 often	 have	 more	 ambiguous	 signification	 to	 the	 ones	 explored	 above	 (Dreyfus,	2017;	 Van	 Leeuwen,	 2008).	 Similarly,	 abstract	 nouns	 may	 ‘accrue’	 meaning	 through	history	(Koveshnikov	et	al,	2016),	and	their	meaning	is	likely	to	be	conditioned	by	other	nouns	 closely	 linked	 to	 them	 in	 a	particular	 context	 (Laclau	and	Mouffe,	 1985).	 It	was	therefore	necessary	to	take	into	account	historical	and	contextual	properties	of	abstract	nouns	 in	 the	 analysis.	 For	 example,	 notions	 of	 ‘equality’	 and	 ‘liberty’	 could	 potentially	hold	dramatically	different	meanings	depending	on	context	and	intent.			
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Adjectives	and	Adverbs:		Adjectives	often	act	as	embellishers	of	nouns	in	a	sentence;	they	could	give	texture	to	a	noun	and	increase	or	decrease	the	value	of	the	nouns	they	aim	to	characterise	(Brubaker,	2000).	When	a	noun	is	accompanied	by	a	“string	of	adjectives”	(ibid:	34)	in	talk	about	the	self,	 especially	 if	 those	 adjectives	 stand	 in	 contradiction	 to	 one	 another,	 this	 could	potentially	 signify	 a	 struggle	 to	 identify	 within	 a	matrix	 of	 practices.	 In	more	 general	terms,	 choice	of	adjectives	 can	be	 indicative	of	 the	nature/intensity	of	 the	 relationship	between	subjects	and	their	environment.	For	example,	‘strong’,	‘weak’,	‘equal’,	and	so	on,	may	 be	 employed	 to	 intensify	 the	 performances	 of	 democratic	 practice	 participants	engage	in.			Adverbs,	on	 the	other	hand,	could	modify	 the	meaning	of	adjectives,	but	also	verbs,	by	denoting	 the	 place,	 time,	 manner	 and	 degree	 of	 an	 action	 and/or	 quality.	 Stating,	 for	example,	that	‘policies	are	freely	accessed	here	and	now,	which	is	very	good’,	provides	an	extra	texture	to	the	context	provided	by	the	sentence,	in	comparison	to	the	adverb-free	‘policies	are	accessed,	which	is	good’.				Prepositions,	Conjunctions	and	Interjections:		Prepositions	are	perhaps	the	least	ambiguous	speech	units	and	denote	location	(e.g.	 in,	on),	direction	(to)	and	relation	(with)	(Hewings,	2005).	However,	their	omission	from	a	text	may	be	significant,	e.g.	omitting	that	a	certain	policy	 is	drafted	with	another	party,	could	 potentially	 signal	 a	 deliberate	 concealment	 but	 might	 equally	 be	 unintentional.	
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Prepositions	need	to	be	analysed	in	relation	to	contextual	knowledge	and	other	forms	of	data,	 in	other	words.	Conjunctions,	on	the	other	hand	are	more	 immediately	 insightful.	The	 conjunction	 ‘but’	 may	 signal	 a	 disagreement	 and	 if	 it	 is	 used	 repetitively	 may	indicate	a	more	persistent	divergence	 in	opinions,	attitudes	and	views	 in	 the	 field.	The	conjunction	 ‘if’	 denotes	 that	 something	 is	 conditioned	 by	 something	 else,	 yet	 frequent	use	 may	 imply	 a	 degree	 of	 deflection	 or	 a	 postponement	 of	 action.	 Finally,	 the	conjunction	‘and’	may	imply	the	struggle	of	a	speaker	to	fully	articulate	a	phenomenon,	when	 it	 is	 repeated	numerous	 times	 in	a	sentence,	e.g.	 ‘the	protest	 is	good,	and	useful,	and	 it	 allows	 people	 to	 voice	 their	 demands,	 and	 it	 is	 just,	 and	 it’s	 just	 correct…’	 (a	protestor	in	the	‘protest	of	mothers’	I	observed).				
Visual	performativity		Ethnographic	 research	 often	 combines	 both	 linguistic	 and	 material	 data;	 it	 requires	“attention	to…material	features”	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson,	2007:	134),	a	description	of	how	 people	 relate	 to	 “physical	 things”	 (ibid.).	 This	 means	 that	 artefacts	 such	 as	photographs,	videos	and	props	are	important	(Taylor,	2010;	Zickar	and	Carter,	2010)	in	providing	a	richer	account	of	subjectivity	within	a	scene.			As	stated	earlier,	I	treat	visual	material	as	a	discursive	resource,	as	performativities	are	inherently	sensed,	as	well	as	read,	and	I	draw	on	multimodal	discourse	analysis	as	a	tool	for	 analysing	 the	 deployment	 of	 visual	 imagery	 in	 democratic	 practice.	 I	 see	 a	 visual	element	 of	 the	 methodology	 as	 salient	 in	 representing	 the	 embodied	 aspects	 of	democratic	practice,	drawing	out	the	sensory	range	through	which	democracy	is	enacted	
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and	 related	 to.	 In	 relation	 to	 WRC	 more	 specifically,	 it	 is	 an	 organisation	 that	 offers	primacy	 to	 the	 visual	 and	 aesthetics.	 Exploring	 the	 visual	 performativity	 of	 WRC’s	practices	 opens	 possibilities	 for	 studying	 and	 understanding	 democratic	 engagement	outside	 the	 conventional	 language-dominated	 methods,	 aspects	 that	 would	 remain	predominantly	hidden	had	the	analysis	focused	only	on	linguistic	aspects	of	data.			Visual	 resources	 are	 particularly	 important	 for	 exploring	 “identities,	 values	 and	activities”	(Machin	and	Mayr,	2012:	15),	as	they	offer	a	series	of	associations	that	could	be	further	interrogated	and	that	are	sometimes	more	potent	than	words	in	engaging	or	conveying	 a	message	 (Linstead,	 2018).	Visual	material	 is	 used	 “to	 communicate	 things	that	may	 be	more	 difficult	 to	 express	 through	 language”	 (ibid:	 31)	 alone.	 This	 is	 why	Ranciére	 (2009),	 in	 relation	 to	 political	 and	 democratic	 art,	 talks	 of	 the	 aesthetic	potential	 of	 a	 ‘sentence-image’.	 By	 this	 he	 means	 that	 combinations	 of	 language	 and	images	 hold	 the	 potential	 to	 ‘undo’	 (ibid:	 46)	 dominant	 representative	 connections,	opening	the	way	for	disruption	and	the	creation	of	fresh	associations	(new	areas	of	the	‘sayable’	 in	 Ranciérean	 terms)	 (see	 also	 Linstead,	 2018;	 Michels	 and	 Steyaert,	 2017;	Munro	 and	 Jordan,	 2013).	 Sentences	 in	 this	 configuration	 offer	 a	 certain	 stability,	 an	anchoring	 of	 familiarity,	 with	 images	 generating	 incongruence	 –	 and	 sentence-images	therefore	hold	a	similar	function	to	montage,	with	its	“clash	of	heterogeneous	elements”	(ibid:	55).			Considering	 that	 the	 visual	 does	 not	 possess	 its	 own	 grammar	 in	 the	 same	 way	 that	language	does,	it	is	useful	to	think	about	the	visual	in	terms	of	what	kind	of	“affordances”	(Alcadipani	 and	 Islam,	 2017:	 866)	 it	 constructs	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 context	 explored,	 as	well	as	its	“meaning	potential”	(Machin,	2016:31),	i.e.	the	symbolic	associations	a	visual	
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artefact	 might	 provoke	 (Ewenstein	 and	 Whyte,	 2009).	 Nevertheless,	 similarly	 to	language,	 visual	 material,	 e.g.	 images,	 can	 denote	 (depict	 certain	 things/persons),	 but	also	 connote	 (provide	 a	 meaning	 beyond	 the	 literal)	 (Krzyzanowski	 and	 Forchtner,	2016).	For	example,	an	 image	depicting	a	 large	exclamation	mark	within	a	triangle	can	connote	danger	on	 the	 road	ahead	without	providing	great	detail	 about	 the	 content	of	the	danger.			Some	visual	imagery	has	a	more	historically	sedimented	meaning	and	can	be	more	easily	‘read’	(e.g.	a	white	dove	with	an	olive	branch	in	its	beak	symbolises	peace).		Other	forms	of	imagery	have	dramatically	different	meanings,	discursive	context	depending	(e.g.	the	colour	red	could	symbolise	love	but	also	danger	or	anger).	However,	even	those	images	whose	meaning	is	sedimented	to	a	degree	could	be	used	subversively,	which	would	make	analysis	 less	 straightforward	 (Machin,	 2016).	 This	 is	 why	 an	 iconographical	 analysis	explores	 the	way	 that	 “individual	elements	 in	 images,	 such	as	objects	and	settings,	 are	able	 to	 signify	 discourses”	 (Machin	 and	 Mayr,	 2012:	 31),	 bearing	 in	 mind	 that	 such	individual	 objects	 should	 never	 be	 analysed	 in	 isolation	 from	 their	 wider	 discursive	context	(Machin,	2016).	The	meaning	of	imagery	can	never	be	precise	and	finite	because,	just	as	in	language,	the	meaning	of	the	visual	is	contingent	(Macgilchrist,	2016).		Visual	 performativity	 can	 be	 gleaned	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 objects,	 settings	 and	 people	presented	in	visual	material	(e.g.	images,	posters,	video	frames,	paintings,	banners,	etc.)	and	 the	relationships	 they	are	situated	within	(Machin,	2016).	Settings	and	objects	are	analysed	 predominantly	 via	 analytical	 categories	 such	 as:	 size,	 colour,	 tone,	 focus	 and	foregrounding	(ibid).	The	representation	of	people	can,	 in	addition,	be	analysed	via	the	analytical	categories	of:	gaze,	angle,	distance,	agency	and	transitivity	(Machin	and	Mayr,	
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2012).	 However,	 visual	 performativity	 can	 also	 be	 gleaned	 from	 attempts	 to	 ‘ground’	certain	discourses	via	“exclusionary	moves”	made	within	images,	or	by	analysing	what	is	absent	from	a	visual	(Macgilchrist,	2016:	264).				Settings:		Settings	 can	 be	 important	 points	 of	 analysis	 as	 they	 can	 reveal	 the	 intentions	 –	 or	perceived	intentions	-	of	the	designers	of	images	(Machin	and	Mayr,	2012).	Settings	can	range	from	abstract	 to	concrete	and	they	can	act	as	a	means	of	(de)contextualising	the	subject/phenomena.	For	example,	 leaflets	promoting	 learning	could	depict	a	classroom	featuring	children	and	 teachers	and	 in	 this	case	 the	classroom	would	be	considered	as	depicting	 a	more	 concrete	 setting	 for	 the	 topic	 it	 aims	 to	 promote.	 However,	 in	 some	cases	the	choice	of	setting	may	be	misleading.	For	example,	Lirola	and	Chovanec	(2012)	demonstrate	how	cosmetic	 surgery	 leaflets	 often	depict	 settings	of	medical	 and	health	care,	encouraging	a	view	that	such	procedures	are	“health-oriented”	(p.494),	disguising	the	 consumerist	 pressures	 underlying	 many	 people’s	 choices	 to	 pursue	 bodily	alterations.			Objects:		Visual	 artefacts	 “carry	meanings	 but	 also	 affect	 practice	 through	 shaping	 the	 types	 of	possible	expressions	from	which	actors	can	choose”	(Alcadipani	and	Islam,	2017:	868).	Objects	in	images	can	be	used	to	denote	objects	in	the	material	world,	e.g.	an	image	of	an	
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apple	in	a	market	stall	is	likely	to	denote	apples;	however,	sometimes	objects	in	an	image	may	serve	a	different	performative	character,	e.g.	an	apple	may	invoke	a	sense	of	‘sin’	if	situated	 in	 a	 religious	 setting	 or	 can	 symbolise	 health	 if	 it	 is	 placed	 on,	 say,	 a	 health	promotion	leaflet.	In	such	cases	objects	draw	their	connotative	power	from	sedimented	symbolic	associations	(Machin,	2016).			Objects	can	be	used	to	frame	intended	impressions	of	a	scene	and	such	framing	can	be	evaluated	by	analysing	uses	of	colour,	 size,	 focus,	 foregrounding	and	degree	of	overlap	between	 objects	 (Machin	 and	 Mayr,	 2012,	 Machin,	 2016).	 For	 example,	 colours	 can	connote	 a	 different	meaning	 and	 trigger	 different	 associations,	 similarly	 to	 nouns.	 For	example,	the	colour	white	may	be	used	to	connote	innocence,	black	–	mourning	(at	least	in	 a	 European	 and	North	American	 context),	 green	 –	 health,	 and	 so	 on.	 Size	may	 lend	prominence	to	some	objects	and	detract	prominence	from	others	(Bednarek	and	Caple,	2014).	Focus	can	signal	which	object	the	author	wants	the	viewer	to	think	about	(Doerr,	2017).	 Foregrounding/backgrounding	 and	 the	 overlapping	 of	 objects	 are	 useful	techniques	 to	guide	a	viewer’s	gaze	 to	what	 the	author	 thinks	 is	 important	 (Lirola	and	Chovanec,	 2012).	 All	 these	 categories	 could	 be	 used	 in	 combination	 to	 elicit	 a	 certain	reaction.				People:		In	 considering	 the	 representation	 of	 people,	 a	 few	 categories	 might	 be	 useful	 for	 the	analysis	of	visual	performativity	in	democratic	practice:	pose,	angle,	distance,	agency	and	transitivity	(Machin	and	Mayr,	2012;	Machin,	2016).	Analysing	pose	and	angle	can	place	
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the	viewer	and	 the	 represented	 in	 a	particular	 relationship,	 e.g.	 the	 image	author	may	deliberately	place	a	demand	on	the	viewer	by	posing	the	represented	in	the	middle	of	the	composition,	 directly	 facing	 the	 viewer,	 demanding	 the	 viewer’s	 engagement;	 or	 the	viewer	can	be	placed	merely	in	a	‘voyeur’	position,	as	a	witness	to	a	scene	in	which	the	represented	is	engaged	(Malherbe	et	al,	2016).	Distance	can	be	used	as	a	tool	to	suggest	“intimacy	 or	 remoteness”	 (Machin,	 2016:	 110).	 For	 example,	 a	 close-up	 of	 the	represented	can	create	a	sense	of	intimacy/familiarity,	as	the	viewer	is	‘forced’	to	engage	with	facial	expression	and	‘feelings’	(the	recent	example	of	the	shell-shocked	Syrian	boy	covered	 in	 dust	 and	 blood	 in	 the	 news	 would	 be	 a	 case	 in	 point	 here	 (see	 Narayan,	2016)).	Alternatively,	 close-ups	can	generate	 feelings	of	 intimidation.	 Images	of	people	presented	at	a	distance	can	create	a	sense	of	detachment	or	anonymity	(e.g.	the	depiction	of	 refugee	 boats	 filled	 with	 ‘foreign’	 people	 can	 create	 a	 sense	 of	 anonymity	 and	dehumanisation	 in	relation	to	the	represented	people,	while	simultaneously	generating	threat	through	the	presence	of	a	large	number	of	anonymous	figures).			The	 intended	 illustration	of	people’s	agency	can	also	be	gauged	 through	an	analysis	of	representation	(Van	Dijk,	2000).	For	instance,	some	of	the	recent	promotional	videos	of	an	opposition	party	in	Montenegro,	Demokrate,	depict	a	leader	of	the	party	in	the	setting	of	 the	 family	 homes	 of	 his	 voters,	 where	 the	 leader	 sits	 at	 tables	 with	male	 heads	 of	households	 and	 discusses	 policies	 while	 women	 are	 represented	 as	 silent	 servants,	quietly	washing	dishes,	cleaning	and	serving	in	the	background.	In	this	case	it	is	safe	to	say	that	the	agency	of	the	women	is	silenced.	In	relation	to	agency,	transitivity	(Wodak,	et	al,	2011)	can	be	gleaned	from	visual	material.	Transitivity	is	an	analysis	of	who	does	what	to	whom,	in	a	sentence	or	image.	Transitivity	analysis	can	thus	foreground	aspects	such	as	who	is	held	responsible	for	action,	who	is	granted	agency	and	who	is	silenced:	in	
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other	 words,	 verbs	 and	 those	 enacting	 them	 can	 be	 visually	 as	 well	 as	 linguistically	represented.			As	 stated	 earlier,	 WRC	 produces	 various	 artefacts	 as	 part	 of	 its	 day-to-day	 practice,	which	it	uses	to	illustrate	its	campaigns	and	work.	I	analysed	the	visual	performativity	of	these	 artefacts	 via	 the	 analytical	 tools	 offered	 here	 but	 also	 in	 conversation	 with	participants,	where	we	discussed	the	‘logic’	that	guided	them	in	crafting	these	items,	as	well	as	the	intention,	i.e.	what	they	hoped	to	accomplish	with	each	of	the	visual	items.	In	particular,	 the	 multimodal	 techniques	 were	 useful	 in	 unpacking	 the	 emerging	 and	embodied	 enactments	 of	 democratic	 practice,	 analysing	 how	 the	 words	 uttered	 by	subjects	 connected	 with	 visual	 cues	 and	 positioning	 to	 create	 a	 form	 of	 democratic	agency.			
5.2	Research	ethics		Ethical	approval	for	this	research	was	sought	and	granted	by	the	Open	University	Ethics	Committee	prior	to	commencing	the	fieldwork.	In	addition	to	explaining	the	nature	of	my	engagement	to	my	research	participants	before	undertaking	the	field	research,	I	shared	a	copy	of	the	participant	information	sheet	and	consent	form	with	each	participant,	while	also	 taking	 the	 time	 to	explain	 the	content	of	each	verbally.	Throughout	 the	research	 I	ensured	 that	 information	 regarding	 the	 research	 topic	 and	 our	 respective	 roles	 was	sufficiently	clear	and	understood	by	all	the	participants.	I	made	sure	to	highlight	ethical	concerns	they	might	think	about,	such	as	anonymity,	confidentiality,	as	well	as	potential	diverging	interpretations	that	might	cause	points	of	tension	between	us.		
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	Participants	expressed	 the	desire	 for	me	 to	keep	 the	original	name	of	 the	organisation	but	we	collectively	agreed	to	anonymise	their	names,	as	well	as	to	remove	from	the	data	their	 personal	 details.	 This	 was	 a	 decision	 that	 sat	 uncomfortably	 with	me	 and	 one	 I	revisited	with	them	throughout	the	 fieldwork,	with	the	same	result,	 their	 insistence	on	maintaining	their	organisational	identity.	The	data	used	in	the	analysis	is	stripped	of	any	personal	 information	 that	 could	 provide	 insight	 into	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 research	participants,	their	names	substituted	with	pseudonyms	and	sometimes	other	techniques	employed	to	further	blur	identities	(e.g.	variable	gender	assignation,	a	narrative	divided	between	two	people,	etc.).		My	 ethnographic	 journal	 is	 kept	 on	 a	 password-protected	 server	 and	 the	 handwritten	journal	 is	 stored	 in	 a	 private	 drawer	 to	 which	 I	 am	 the	 only	 key	 holder.	 As	 with	 the	journal,	 and	 audio	 recordings	 of	 meetings,	 workshops	 and	 events,	 the	 interviews,	including	the	transcripts,	are	also	stored	on	a	password-protected	server	to	which	I	have	exclusive	access.				
V	Summary		I	introduced	the	methodology	of	discourse-based	ethnography	as	suitable	for	generating	and	analysing	the	rich	practices	of	NGO	practitioners.	I	presented	the	methodology	as	a	means	 of	 exploring	 the	 discursive	 (linguistic	 and	 visual)	 tapestry	 of	 the	 enactment	 of	democratic	 practice	 through	 immersive	 and	 reflexive	 engagement.	 I	 posited	 a	combination	 of	 poststructuralist	 discourse	 analysis	 and	 ethnography	 as	 a	 way	 of	
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foregrounding	the	dynamics	of	practitioners	and	their	practices	within	a	broader	context	of	 nascent	 democracy	 –	 but	 also	 of	 patriarchy	 and	 corruption.	 I	 proposed	 being	 a	participant-observer	as	a	suitable	research	identity	for	offering	an	immersive	account	of	democratic	practice,	a	mode	that	allows	the	researcher	to	embody	and	enact	democratic	practice	with	practitioners.	I	justified	a	mix	of	observations	and	post-event	interviews	as	suitable	 for	 generating	 data	 in	 co-construction	with	 research	 participants.	 In	 terms	 of	data	 analysis,	 I	 described	 an	 abductive	 approach	 as	 implying	 an	 iterative	 and	 gradual	approach	 to	 analysis.	 Finally,	 I	 stated	 my	 intention	 to	 draw	 on	 the	 micro-analysis	 of	language	and	images	as	a	means	of	unpacking	the	fine-grained	performative	enactments	of	 democratic	 practice	 in	 the	 field,	 with	 the	 visual	 and	 linguistic	 approached	 as	overlapping	and	co-constitutive	of	democratic	enactment.			
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VI		Findings	–	Embodying	Democratic	Practice	
	
Overview	of	overall	findings	structure	and	presentation		My	 findings	 are	 organised	 into	 three	 chapters,	 each	 denoting	 a	 particular	 democratic	practice	enacted,	as	per	my	main	objective	stated	at	the	outset	of	the	thesis.	In	line	with	the	 research	question	and	objectives,	 I	 offer	 first-hand	 insights	 into	what	 it	 felt	 like	 to	enact	democratic	practice	in	embodied	ways	with	practitioners,	as	we	worked	to	actively	shape	and	 challenge	norms.	 I	 do	 so	 through	a	 reflexive	 engagement	with	 the	 language	and	visuals	of	the	scene.		The	data	is	presented	in	each	chapter	in	the	following	way:	I	first	offer	a	brief	overview	of	 the	 practice	 and	 sub-practices	 contained	 within	 it;	 second,	 I	 provide	 a	 table	summarising	 each	 sub-practice	 and	 its	 dimensions,	 connecting	 these	 to	 empirical	examples;	third,	 I	explore	each	sub-practice	through	an	in-depth	ethnographic	episode;	finally,	 I	 offer	 a	 summary	 of	 each	 practice.	 While	 other	 episodes	 could	 have	 been	selected,	and	indeed	many	were,	and	subsequently	removed	due	to	constraints	of	space,	the	ones	finally	included	were	selected	for	their	evocative	power	in	the	hope	they	would	provoke	an	embodied	response	from	the	reader,	similar	to	those	I	felt	in	the	field.							
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Embodying	democratic	practice:	Introduction		During	 my	 time	 in	 the	 field	 I	 was	 struck	 by	 the	 embodied	 character	 of	 democratic	practice,	which	was	enacted	through	and	upon	the	bodies	of	practitioners,	as	well	as	my	own.	Democratic	practice	took	its	toll	on	the	bodies	of	practitioners	but	their	embodied	approach	 also	 opened	 the	 way	 to	 meaningful,	 relational	 and	 generative	 enactments.	Analytically,	 embodiment	 is	 an	under-developed	aspect	of	 the	democratic	practice	 and	NGO	 literatures	 and	 in	 this	 chapter	 I	 seek	 to	 enrich	 these	 bodies	 of	 work	 through	drawing	out	a	range	of	embodied	enactments	by	practitioners	in	their	day-to-day	work.	I	call	the	chapter	embodying	democratic	practice	in	order	to	highlight	practitioners’	bodies	as	sites	of	such	practice,	where	the	possibilities	and	tensions	of	democratic	practice	are	played	out	with	and	through	bodily	acts.	Specifically,	I	explore	three	sub-practices	of	this	embodiment	that	emerged	from	the	data:	transversing,	foregoing	and	shielding.			The	first	sub-practice,	transversing,	refers	to	establishing	a	basis	upon	which	groups	are	able	 to	 work	 together,	 and	 is	 explored	 as	 an	 embodied	 discovery,	 of	 making	 oneself	vulnerable	and	open	to	change.	Transversing	conveys	a	sense	of	practitioners	and	their	collaborators	moving	between	one	another’s	subject	positions	over	time,	as	they	learn	in	embodied	and	experiential	ways	about	one	another’s	claims	and	where	they	come	from.	The	 second	 sub-practice,	 foregoing,	 offers	 a	 closer	 view	 of	 bodies	 as	 sites	 of	 agonistic	democratic	 practice,	 in	 which	 different	 subjectivities	 battle	 for	 domination	 in	practitioners’	 day-to-day	 work.	 Finally,	 the	 sub-practice	 of	 shielding	 denotes	practitioners’	 sophisticated	 movements	 between	 agonistic	 and	 antagonistic	 relations	with	government	institutions	in	their	attempts	to	protect	the	clients	they	work	with	and	
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for	–	a	process	in	which	they	‘supplement’	and	extend	the	embodied	subjectivity	of	those	they	aim	to	shield.				
6.1.	Transversing		WRC	practitioners	do	not	always	share	similar	views	with	the	individuals	or	groups	they	engage	with.	Such	discrepancies	bear	on	the	practice	produced;	yet	the	practitioners	of	WRC	do	not	perceive	this	incongruity	as	an	inhibitor	and	do	not	necessarily	attempt	to	erase	 differences,	 but	 perceive	 these	 as	 a	 regular	 state	 of	 affairs,	 unavoidable	circumstances	 under	which	 they	 perform	 their	work.	While	 the	worldviews	 they	 each	hold	often	 clash,	 the	 encounters	WRC	has	with	 clients,	 and	 those	 it	works	with,	 rarely	escalate	into	conflicts	that	cannot	be	resolved.			Transversing	 is	 a	 sub-practice	 that	 refers	 to	 establishing	 the	 basis	 upon	which	 groups	and	 organisations	 cultivate	 collective	 democratic	 agency	 through	 difference.	 The	 sub-practice	 highlights	 the	 movement	 between	 different	 subjectivities	 in	 order	 to	accommodate	assembly	between	diverse	people.	My	experience	in	the	field	suggests	that	the	 process	 is	 relational	 and	 a	 form	 of	 everyday	 embodied	 deliberation,	where	 actors	shift	between	 subjectivities,	 testing	assumptions	and	 resistances.	Deliberative	dialogue	here	is	piecemeal	and	spans	time,	settings	and	subjectivities.	These	deliberative	dialogic	acts	can	be	spontaneous	and	occur	 in	 improvised	situations	across	a	range	of	different	settings.	 The	 ethnographic	 episode	 I	 use	 to	 illustrate	 transversing	 and	 its	 dimensions	concerns	‘the	protest	of	mothers’.	The	protest	of	mothers	proved	to	be	a	dominant	series	of	events	from	my	time	in	the	field	and	therefore	necessitates	a	summary.		
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Protest	of	mothers	
	In	 April	 2015,	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 general	 election,	 the	 government	 proposed	amendments	to	the	Law	on	Social	and	Child	Protection	that	would	guarantee	mothers	of	three	 or	 more	 children	 a	 lifetime	 of	 financial	 benefits.	 Perceiving	 this	 proposition	 as	antagonistic	 towards	 women,	 WRC,	 alongside	 a	 few	 other	 organisations23,	 protested	against	 it	 in	 an	 open	 letter	 to	 the	 government	 and	 the	 parliament,	 arguing	 that	 the	amendments	 ran	 counter	 to	 the	 democratic	 principles	 of	 liberty	 and	 equality	 and	therefore	 stood	 in	 direct	 conflict	with	 the	 country’s	 constitution.	 Rather	 than	 creating	opportunities	 for	 women	 to	 both	 work	 and	 become	 parents,	 WRC	 argued	 that	 the	government	 was	 proposing	 to	 fence	 mothers	 off	 from	 the	 public	 sphere,	 thereby	reducing	women	 to	 their	 reproductive	 roles,	 incentivising	 them	 to	withdraw	 from	 the	labour	 market	 and	 remain	 at	 home.	 Moreover,	 WRC	 judged	 the	 proposition	discriminatory	 due	 to	 its	 favouritism	 towards	 one	 category	 of	women	 –	mothers.	 The	introduction	of	such	benefits,	 it	added,	only	served	to	paper	over	 the	privatisation	and	corrupt	investments	that	left	women	unemployed	and/or	trapped	in	the	grey	economy.	WRC	appealed	to	the	government	to	conduct	a	gender	and	financial	impact	analysis	prior	to	 the	 vote	 on	 the	 amendments	 so	 that	MPs	 could	make	 a	 sound	decision	based	upon	research	rather	than	unsubstantiated	and	misguided	sentiments24.			In	defiance	of	the	protest	against	the	proposed	amendments,	parliament	voted	for	their	adoption	without	conducting	a	gender	and	financial	impact	analysis,	and	the	new	Law	on	
																																																								23	The	other	two	organisations	that	signed	the	appeal	letter	were	ANIMA	and	Safe	Women’s	House.	24	The	campaign	for	the	adoption	of	the	amendments	was	wrapped	in	the	discourse	of	care	for	the	women-mothers	as	marginalised	and	subaltern	(see	Pejović,	06/03/2015)	
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Social	 and	 Child	 Protection	 was	 put	 into	 force	 in	 January	 2016.	 As	 a	 consequence,	approximately	22,000	women	with	three	or	more	children	abandoned	their	employment	and	 renounced	 their	 pensions	 in	 order	 to	 become	 eligible	 for	 benefits.	 However,	 after	securing	 yet	 another	 electoral	 victory	 in	 October	 2016,	 the	 government	 admitted	 to	making	an	incorrect	assessment	of	the	number	of	women	who	might	be	eligible	for	the	benefits,	which	had	resulted	in	a	significant	budget	increase	from	the	initially	estimated	€15	 million	 to	 €75	 million	 (WRC,	 27/03/2017).	 To	 ameliorate	 this	 oversight,	 the	government	 proposed	 a	 decrease	 in	 benefits	 of	 25%	 under	 the	 pretext	 of	 general	austerity	measures	(Komatina,	20/12/2016).			This	 proposition	 instigated	 the	 protest(s)	 of	 mothers,	 which	 started	 as	 a	 series	 of	fragmented	gatherings	across	the	municipalities	and	subsequently	grew	into	a	wholesale	national	protest	that	resumed	20	times	between	February	2017	and	January	2018,	and	was	 still	 ongoing	at	 the	 time	of	writing	 (Dan,	01/01/2018).	The	 short	breaks	between	protests	occurred	only	during	 the	deliberations	of	 the	Constitutional	Court,	Parliament	and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Labour	 and	 Social	 Welfare,	 which	 were	 supposed	 to	 resolve	 the	mothers’	grievances.	The	longest	protest	took	place	in	March,	in	front	of	the	parliament	building.	 The	 March	 protest	 lasted	 26	 days,	 during	 which	 women,	 including	 some	practitioners,	resorted	to	a	hunger	strike	that	lasted	for	11	days.	All	of	the	efforts	were	in	vain	as	the	government	failed	to	meet	the	mothers’	demands.	After	the	initial	decrease	of	benefits,	 the	 amendments	 to	 the	 Law	 via	 which	 these	 benefits	 were	 guaranteed	 was	pronounced	 unconstitutional	 by	 the	 Constitutional	 Court,	 leaving	 around	 16,000	
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women25 	stranded	 without	 benefits,	 but	 also	 without	 the	 jobs	 and	 pensions	 they	previously	renounced	in	favour	of	becoming	eligible	for	lifetime	aid.		The	message	the	mothers	conveyed	in	their	public	speeches	was	that	the	injustice	they	suffered	was	financial.	They	also	stated	the	strong	belief	that	they	should	be	privileged	within	society	on	the	basis	of	being	mothers.	WRC	practitioners	did	not	share	either	of	these	 views.	 They	 believed	 the	 mothers	 were	 economically	 impoverished,	 not	 only	because	 their	 benefits	 were	 revoked,	 but	 mainly	 by	 the	 privatisation	 and	 corrupt	investments	 from	 government	 that	 left	 them	 without	 any	 means	 of	 supporting	themselves.			Before	 presenting	 the	 details	 of	 the	 episode	 used	 for	 analysis,	 I	 summarise	 the	 sub-practice	and	dimensions	of	transversing	in	the	following	table:		
Sub-practice	of	embodying	
democratic	practice	
	
Dimensions	of	the	sub-
practice	
Illustrative	examples	
Transversing		Embodied	movement	in	building	collective	democratic	agency	towards	a	position	that	enables	assembly	to	be	formed	and	demands	made.		
Exposing		Denotes	exposing	one’s	body	to	the	precarious	and	embodied	experiences	of	others,	facilitating	a	relational	emergence	of	democratic	agency.	Practitioners	seek	out	these	opportunities	and	deliberate	upon	them,	aware	of	the	bounded	and	particular	nature	of	their	own	stances.		
Ethnographic	journal	extract:			I	was	aware	that	I	would	never	be	able	to	explain	to	any	of	these	women	why	I	was	against	the	benefits,	as	saying	that	would	mean	that	I	was	standing	against	them	putting	food	on	the	table	for	their	families…	The	rationalised	political	stance	I	came	to	the	protest	with	started	to	wobble	and	become	overpowered	by	feelings	of	compassion	towards	these	women.		
Inhabiting		Denotes	going	a	step	further	 Sanja,	interview	extract:			“…If	you	don’t	feel	the	injustice,	if	it																																																									25	Some	women	managed	to	reclaim	their	right	to	pensions	and	some	were	issued	temporary	welfare	status,	which	allowed	them	to	keep	their	benefits	for	an	additional	five	years	(Dan,	01/01/2018)	
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than	exposing,	inhabiting	the	embodied	subjectivity	of	others.	This	is	a	relational	aspect	of	the	sub-practice,	whereby	the	subjectivities	of	those	represented	and	the	representing	practitioner	are	influenced	and	changed	in	the	process.	It	is	also	a	process	marked	by	care	for	the	other’s	vulnerability.		
doesn’t	torment	you,	then	you	won’t	be	able	to	fight	against	it…I	live	with	them…carry	them	home…	and	as	a	human	being	I	feel	obligated	to	help…	“	
Citing		Denotes	asserting	agency	in	visual	and	bodily	ways.	It	always	denotes	collective	agency,	an	absorption	and	re-appropriation	of	others’	subjectivity.	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		Early	on,	the	protest	was	abundant	with	messages	celebrating	motherhood	(e.g.	“Mothers	are	the	Law”).	Yet,	as	a	result	of	numerous	conversations	with	practitioners,	mothers	started	to	absorb	the	signifiers	offered	by	WRC	relating	to	the	rule	of	law	(e.g.	“We	only	want	what	belongs	to	us	by	law”)		
Table	1:	Sub-practice	of	transversing			
Ethnographic	episode	(transversing):	The	protest	of	mothers		WRC	 premises	 were	 buzzing	 with	 preparations	 for	 the	 International	 Women’s	 Day	March,	when	Lara,	one	of	the	organisation’s	workers,	exclaimed:	“People,	quickly!	Check	out	the	 link	I	sent.	The	mothers	have	gathered!	Tonnes	of	them!”	The	live	streaming	of	the	video	by	one	of	the	participants	was	poor	quality	but	we	could	see	a	large	number	of	women	 carrying	 banners	 and	 standing	 peacefully	 in	 front	 of	 the	 government	 building.	The	 phone	 camera	 wobbled	 at	 one	 point,	 making	 the	 picture	 blurry,	 followed	 by	 a	cacophony	of	muffled	but	 raised	voices.	 I	was	 itching	 to	go	out	and	see	 the	protest	 for	myself	but	I	bit	my	tongue	as	I	remembered	that	WRC	opposed	the	amendments	to	the	Law	that	guaranteed	benefits	to	mothers	in	the	first	place.	Before	I	finished	my	thought,	Luka,	Lara	and	Marija	exclaimed	almost	simultaneously:	‘Pack	up,	we	need	to	be	there!’		
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	Exposing:		We	walked	to	the	protest	where	we	met	with	the	rest	of	the	activists:	WRC	practitioners,	associates	and	volunteers.	We	dispersed	deliberately	and	spent	an	entire	day	talking	to	protestors,	learning	about	their	life	stories	in	an	attempt	to	discern	what	kind	of	support	they	needed	and	what	we	could	do	to	contribute.	I	stepped	into	the	crowd	confident	of	my	view	 that	 the	 amendments	 to	 the	 law	on	 social	 and	 child	protection	were	outright	wrong	and	that	the	harmful	consequences	of	their	adoption	would	take	years	to	change.	In	my	mind	I	was	rehearsing	a	script	for	conveying	my	views	in	a	friendly	manner	in	case	I	 was	 asked	 about	 them.	 However,	 squeezing	 between	 grids	 of	 raised	 arms	 gripping	banners	with	calloused	hands,	which	perfectly	framed	their	determined	but	weary	faces,	my	confidence	started	 to	erode.	Suddenly,	being	exposed	 to	all	 the	clues	 indicating	 the	kind	of	lives	many	of	the	women	here	lived	rushed	to	my	attention	like	a	meteor	storm:	wrinkles	 on	 relatively	 young	 faces	matching	 those	 on	 the	more	mature	 in	 all	 but	 the	depth	of	creases,	worn	out	shoes	and	jackets,	no	jackets	at	all,	swollen	bags	underneath	eyes,	an	 intricate	web	of	 tiny	cuts	and	scars	on	their	knotty	hands	 induced	by	years	of	manual	labour,	solemn	and	exhausted	facial	expressions.	The	rationalised	political	stance	I	 came	 to	 the	 protest	with	 started	 to	wobble	 and	 became	 overpowered	 by	 feelings	 of	compassion	towards	these	women.			My	heart	raced	when	I	noticed	a	woman	smiling	and	moving	in	my	direction	as	I	realised	that	 the	script	 I	was	working	 through	 in	my	head	was	rapidly	dissolving	 in	 the	 face	of	these	new	realisations.	The	women	I	had	visualised	in	my	mind	previously	did	not	wear	the	marks	of	living	in	poverty.	I	was	aware	that	I	would	never	be	able	to	explain	to	any	of	
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these	 women	 why	 I	 was	 against	 the	 benefits,	 as	 saying	 that	 would	 mean	 that	 I	 was	standing	 against	 them	putting	 food	on	 the	 table	 for	 their	 families,	 providing	books	 for	their	children	or	being	able	to	pay	their	utility	bills.	I	made	small-talk	with	the	woman,	during	which	I	learned	that	she	was	a	mother	of	four	children	and	wife	to	a	partner	who	suffered	 permanent	 spinal	 damage	 from	 performing	 construction	 work,	 and	 how	benefits	had	been	the	only	source	of	income	for	them	in	the	past	months.	The	realisation	of	 the	 burden	 of	 her	 hardship	 prompted	 me	 to	 re-evaluate	 and	 reframe	 my	 political	stance.	When	I	answered	in	the	negative	to	her	question	about	whether	I	had	children,	an	expression	 of	 puzzlement	 briefly	 washed	 over	 her	 face	 before	 she	 offered	 a	 form	 of	empathetic	 understanding,	 saying	 that:	 “It’s	 cruel	 that	 young	 women	 can’t	 afford	motherhood.”	Afraid	to	say	anything	that	might	give	me	away	as	an	 ‘outsider’,	 I	simply	thanked	her	and	continued	to	move	amongst	the	crowd,	further	feelings	of	guilt	creeping	in.	This	was	agonistic	engagement	–	 it	was	confrontational	 in	 identity	terms	-	and	yet	I	kept	 thinking,	 while	 walking	 between	 the	 mothers,	 that	 the	 theory	 itself	 could	 not	capture	the	embodied,	visceral	and	relational	ways	in	which	my	own	commitments	were	being	challenged.			Inhabiting:		Exposing	ourselves	 to	 the	mothers	and	their	stories	of	deprivation	was	no	simple	 fact-finding	 exercise.	 Their	 stories	 changed	 us	 and	 propelled	 a	 proactive	 reworking	 of	 our	democratic	agency,	our	sense	of	 ‘we’	(Butler,	2003),	forcing	us	to	call	into	question	and	adapt	our	prior	political	commitments,	challenging	what	we	viewed	as	a	breach	of	 law	from	the	government.		
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When	the	other	practitioners	spoke	to	the	protestors	about	the	hardships	they	had	been	enduring	 for	 years,	 “the	 brutal	 reality	 hit	 home”	 (Andrea).	 She	 added	 that:	 “All	 those	political	 stances	 we	 have	 adopted	 must	 be	 reframed	 as	 they	 are	 empty	 against	 the	suffering	these	women	endure”.	Mina	said	it	was	no	wonder	these	mothers	thought	the	way	 they	 did	 as	 they	 were	 “simply	 a	 product	 of	 decades	 of	 patriarchalisation”,	experiencing	 constant	 repetition	 of	 the	 same	 message	 about	 the	 role	 of	 mothers	 in	society,	such	as	a	woman’s	place	being	in	the	home	and	“the	reward	or	punishment	that	comes	 with	 upholding	 or	 defying	 such	 a	 system”.	 It	 was	 Sanja	 who	 described	 the	experience	of	inhabiting	in	most	depth:		
Supporting	mothers	was	a	terribly	risky	move	because	many	of	them	flirted	with	the	right	
wing,	neo-fascist	parties.	On	the	other	hand…they’re	women	who	have	the	right	to	fight	for	
their	rights.	In	some	ways	it	was	completely	natural	to	support	them,	but	on	the	other…well,	
you	 remember,	 we	 didn’t	 feel	 good	 being	 there.	 But	 it	 was	 heart-breaking	 seeing	 them	
suffering	 like	 that…The	conversations	we	had	with	organisers	of	 the	protests	also	weren’t	
easy.	We	made	a	judgement	to	support	them	because	this	government	impoverished	them,	
toyed	with	them	and	then	discarded	them.	That	goes	beyond	the	 immediate	value	systems	
mothers	 and	 we	 may	 have.	 Such	 an	 act	 from	 the	 government	 has	 breached	 a	 system	 of	
values	that	concerns	us	all	–	the	rule	of	law.	Now,	we	understood	that,	but	those	women	just	
wanted	their	benefits	back.	And	how	do	you	support	those	with	whom	you	do	not	speak	the	
same	language?	Via	the	language	of	compassion,	like	we	did.	If	you	don’t	feel	the	injustice,	if	
it	 doesn’t	 torment	 you,	 then	 you	won’t	 be	 able	 to	 fight	 against	 it.	 You	 can	 throw	 all	 the	
knowledge	you	have	through	the	window.	People	who	do	what	we	do	can’t	leave	the	office	
at	 5pm	and	 lock	 their	 activism	 there.	 That	would	 be	 insincere…When	 things	 such	 as	 this	
happen,	 I	 live	with	 them,	 I	 carry	 them	home,	 I	 think	about	 it	and	as	a	human	being	 I	 feel	
obligated	to	help	as	much	as	I	possibly	can.	That	kind	of	empathy	is	actually	something	that	
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separates	 the	 truthful	 people,	 truly	 motivated	 fighters	 for	 democracy,	 from	 those	 who	
are…stage	 fighters.	 You	 simply	 have	 to	 live	 it	 24/7.	 If	 we	 fail	 to	 protect	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	
what’s	 the	point	of	anything?	Nobody’s	 safe	 in	a	 lawless	country.	Not	mothers,	not	us,	not	
anybody.	So	that	was	my	thinking	-	that	and	compassion	drove	my	decision.	Mothers	didn’t	
get	 that	all	 the	time,	but	we	were	all	 in	 the	same	pickle.	Today	 it	was	mothers,	 tomorrow	
somebody	else…		Sanja	 begins	 by	 stating	 the	 difference	 between	 WRC	 practitioners	 and	 protestors,	flagging	 what	 in	 her	 view	 presents	 the	 biggest	 risk	 of	 supporting	 the	 protestors	 –	mothers	 “flirting	 with	 the…neo-fascist	 parties”.	 She	 proceeds	 by	 traversing	 back	 and	forth	 between	 the	 pros	 and	 cons	 of	 lending	 support,	 weighing	 this	 risk	 against	 the	injustices	these	women	are	subjected	to.	What	surfaces	through	this	traversing	is	Sanja’s	interplay	 between	 the	 emotional	 and	 rational:	 a	 struggle	 to	 justify	 the	 support	 she	 is	emotionally	 inclined	 to	provide	 for	 those	who	hold	a	different	 “value	 system”,	without	damaging	 the	 organisation’s	 reputation.	 While	 her	 inclination	 to	 join	 the	 mothers	 in	protest	 is	 initially	 driven	 by	 compassion	 for	 those	 who	 “suffer”,	 her	 argumentation	gradually	surfaces	another,	rational	subjectivity,	via	which	Sanja	frames	the	protest	as	a	fight	 for	“the	rule	of	 law”	rather	than	a	 fight	 for	“benefits”.	We	 learn	that	neither	Sanja	nor	the	mothers	she	was	talking	to	have	changed	their	views	regarding	the	benefits,	but	that	 Sanja	 has	 rationalised	 a	way	 of	 supporting	 the	 protest	without	 damaging	 anyone	involved.	She	closes	her	story	by	returning	to	an	emotional	subjectivity,	which	she	posits	as	 an	 enabler	 of	 action,	 where	 one	 has	 “to	 feel	 the	 injustice”	 in	 order	 to	 “fight	 for	democracy”.			
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Sanja’s	 use	 of	 verbs	 denotes	 the	 embodied	 way	 in	 which	 she	 comes	 to	 inhabit	 the	subjectivity	of	mothers.	Sanja	positions	the	mothers	as	“impoverished”,	“toyed”	with	and	“discarded”	 by	 the	 government,	 as	 people	 who	 are	 “suffering”	 injustice,	 but	 also	 who	“didn’t	get”	the	political	scope	of	such	injustice.	The	practitioners	are	posited	as	people	who	“feel”	the	injustice,	“fight”	against	it	and	are	“tormented”	by	it,	who	“carry”	suffering	home	 and	 who	 “live”	 their	 democratic	 practice.	 Inhabiting	 is	 therefore	 a	 difficult,	conflictual,	uncomfortable	and	irrational	experience.		Inhabiting	is	evident	in	the	way	Sanja	utilises	pronouns	in	her	talk.	She	begins	with	the	solitary	 ‘I’	 where	 she	 positions	 herself	 apart	 from	 the	 protestors.	 Very	 quickly	 she	includes	me26	in	the	story	via	the	pronoun	‘you’	(and	soon	the	rest	of	the	organisation	is	denoted	 by	 ‘we’	 and	 ‘us’),	 as	 someone	 who	 might	 recognise	 the	 stated	 differences	between	‘us’	(the	organisation)	and	‘them’	–	(the	mothers).	‘Us’	and	‘them’	are	posited	as	standing	on	diametrically	opposite	sides	of	the	spectrum:	fighters	for	democracy	versus	those	others,	some	of	whom	“flirted	with	nationalist,	neo-fascist	parties”.	However,	Sanja	frames	another	‘they’	–	the	corrupt	government	that	breached	the	rule	of	law,	those	that	Sanja	 paints	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 “us	 all”.	 At	 this	 moment,	 the	 practice	 of	 transversing	 is	complete,	temporarily:	“us	all”	(mothers,	practitioners,	“somebody	else”)	are	positioned	as	united	against	“them”	–	the	government	that	breaches	the	rule	of	law.																																																												26	By	this	time	in	the	field	I	was	fully	integrated	as	a	member	of	the	organisation	and	referring	to	it	via	the	pronoun	‘we’	became	a	normalised	practice	for	WRC	practitioners	and	I.	This	is	why	I	believe	that	Sanja	in	this	case	was	not	adopting	a	collective	pronoun	to	disperse	her	responsibility	for	actions	and	decisions	made	(Harding,	2008;	2014)	but	was	rather	–	and	probably	quite	unconsciously	–	including	me	within	her	building	of	the	subjectivity	involved.		
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Citing:		WRC	 members	 and	 their	 associates	 wanted	 to	 support	 the	 mothers	 despite	 their	differences,	 but	 they	 also	 had	 to	 create	 a	 basis	 upon	 which	 such	 support	 could	 be	enacted.	With	this	 in	mind,	 they	engaged	in	numerous	and	long	conversations	with	the	protestors	about	the	ways	in	which	they	could	be	supported	and	while	the	mothers	were	polite,	they	were	reluctant	to	accept	assistance.	For	some	time,	the	protestors	and	WRC	remained	locked	in	some	sort	of	political	stasis:	WRC	wanted	to	offer	support	but	no	one	was	 certain	how	such	 support	 could	be	 enacted	 in	practice.	Practitioners	 continued	 to	bring	food,	water	and	ideas	about	various	ways	in	which	they	thought	the	mothers	could	be	 assisted,	 such	as	 incorporating	mothers’	 issues	 into	 the	 International	Women’s	Day	March,	 writing	 numerous	 appeals	 to	 representatives	 of	 relevant	 institutions	 and	reaching	out	to	EU	representatives.	However,	 for	a	number	of	weeks	dialogue	between	representatives	of	the	two	groups	jarred.	For	a	large	portion	of	time	during	the	protests	the	mothers	simply	wanted	their	benefits	restored,	while	WRC	wanted	to	protect	the	rule	of	law	by	drawing	attention	to	the	point	that	the	government	could	not	guarantee	rights	and	then	take	them	away	on	a	“whim”.			Eventually,	 the	 ‘inter-subjective’	 space	 in	 which	 resolution	 was	 reached	 about	 the	legitimacy	 of	 the	 protest	 took	 place	 between	 various	 subjectivities,	 where	 the	compassion	 of	 practitioners	 aligned	 with	 their	 political	 commitments	 to	 more	 radical	forms	of	equality.	The	mothers’	subjectivity	moved	towards	the	larger	anti-authoritarian	position	of	WRC	and	its	opposition	allies.	As	a	result	of	numerous	conversations	between	the	two	groups,	the	mothers	began	to	incorporate	some	of	the	rule-of-law	argumentation	
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of	WRC	 into	 their	 speeches,	which	brought	 them	and	 the	practitioners	 closer	 together,	albeit	differences	were	not	collapsed.		Divergences	between	WRC	and	the	mothers	were	not	constituted	through	words	alone.	Some	 of	 the	 tensions	 inherent	 in	 the	 transversing	 of	 the	 mothers	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	following	picture	of	a	mother	during	the	action.		
				Photo	1	credit:	Savo	Prelević,	Vijesti	newspaper		In	 the	 picture,	 taken	 in	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 the	 protest,	 a	 woman	 holds	 a	 sign	 saying:	“Mothers	are	the	Law”,	a	pun	which	roughly	translates	as	“mothers	rule”	and	denotes	the	citing	of	a	powerful	social	norm	–	the	importance	attributed	to	the	status	and	authority	of	‘mother’,	a	particular	concern	in	Laclau’s	(2007)	terms,	rather	than	a	universalised	one	incorporated	and	adapted	into	a	broader	chain	of	equivalence.	The	norm	of	motherhood	as	privileged	becomes	even	more	pronounced	through	the	underlined	red	lettering,	as	if	the	words	could	have	been	written	and	sanctified	in	blood.	The	staging	of	the	photograph	
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re-enforces	 the	 message	 of	 the	 ‘sanctity	 of	 motherhood’	 discourse.	 The	 gaze	 of	 the	mother	 is	 directed	 at	 the	 viewer	 –	 an	 engaging	 look	 that	 seems	 to	 demand	 a	 kind	 of	confirmation.	When	connected	with	the	 ‘sanctity	of	motherhood’	discourse,	which	 is	so	prevalent	 and	 powerful	 in	 Montenegro,	 we	 can	 plausibly	 assume	 that	 the	 anticipated	response	is	an	act	of	validation	on	the	part	of	the	viewer	and	this	interpretation	would	be	congruent	with	the	published	location	of	the	photograph,	in	a	national	newspaper,	where	such	norms	are	abundant	and	continuously	recited.		Indeed,	 in	 the	 first	weeks	of	 the	protest	most	of	 the	protestors	 framed	their	narratives	around	 the	 privileged	 status	 of	 mothers,	 as	 if	 they	 were	 attempting	 to	 remind	 the	government	 of	 their	 sanctity	 and	 to	 instigate	 a	 sense	 of	 shame.	 The	 banners	 and	speeches	 featured	 messages	 such	 as:	 “Prime	 minister,	 don’t	 you	 have	 a	 mother?”;	“Remember,	 you	 all	 came	 from	 mothers”;	 “Hurting	 a	 mother	 is	 the	 greatest	 sin”,	 etc.	However,	 after	 failing	 to	 provoke	 the	 desired	 response	 from	 the	 government,	 and	engaging	in	prolonged	dialogue	with	WRC,	some	of	them	began	shifting	their	narrative.	The	photograph	below	is	interesting	as	it	uses	the	same	staging	techniques	but	delivers	a	subtly	different	message.	
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				Photo	2	credit:	ИН4С	Portal,	online	media	outlet			In	this	photograph	the	sign	says:	‘We	only	ask	for	what	belongs	to	us	according	to	law’.	Here	 the	message	 of	 the	mother	 to	 the	 viewer	 is	 universalised	 through	 a	 request	 for	empathy:	the	feeling	that	one	has	been	deprived	of	one’s	rights	in	law	by	an	antagonist	government	is	common	across	numerous	causes	and	people	in	the	country,	so	the	appeal	is	to	view	the	mother	as	suffering	injustices	‘like	you’.	In	terms	of	the	political	shift	of	the	mothers,	we	can	note	 that	 the	photograph	demonstrates	a	 transversal,	 at	 least	 for	 this	mother,	from	the	particular	subjectivity	‘maligned	mother’	to	a	more	universalised	one	of	‘maligned	 mother	 who	 has	 been	 wronged	 just	 like	 you’.	 Her	 positioning	 is	 conveyed	neither	through	word	or	image	alone,	but	through	an	accumulation:	the	mother’s	body	is	brought	to	bear	on	the	visual	of	the	sign	and	the	words	communicated.	The	mother	cites	the	 words	 of	 WRC	 but	 also,	 through	 her	 bodily	 presence	 (she	 looks	 tired,	 even	 run	down),	she	enhances	and	reconfigures	the	words	into	a	new	political	stance.		
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The	extent	of	the	transversing	experienced	and	undertaken	by	the	mothers	can	be	seen	in	the	following	picture:	
				Photo	3	credit:	Savo	Prelević,	Slobodna	Evropa,	online	news	agency		Here,	 we	 see	 a	 mother	 in	 one	 of	 the	 later	 protests	 holding	 a	 flag	 designed	 by	 a	progressive	 and	 feminist	 NGO	 (Anima),	 denoting	 love	 and	 solidarity.	 The	 citing	 that	occurs	 here	 is	 obviously	 far	 more	 general	 and	 broadly	 progressive	 than	 the	 original	language	of	the	mothers	and	one	might	also	note	that	the	effect	of	a	mother	holding	the	flag	carries	a	more	encompassing	and	perhaps	impactful	message	than	had	a	practitioner	been	 holding	 it.	 Furthermore,	 the	 picture	 itself	 denotes	 equivalence	 between	 diverse	people	 and	 groups	 –	 there	 are	 many	 people	 in	 frame	 and	 the	 angle	 of	 the	 picture	 is	downwards	to	emphasise	the	number	of	people	present:	people’s	individual	features	are	less	important	than	the	mass	of	people	and	the	prominence	of	the	flag	they	congregate	beneath.				
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Transversing	summary		I	positioned	the	sub-practice	of	transversing	as	establishing	a	basis	upon	which	diverse	groups	were	able	to	work	together.	I	explored	the	sub-practice	as	one	of	embodied	and	relational	 discovery,	 of	 making	 oneself	 vulnerable	 and	 open	 to	 change	 by	 exposing	oneself	 to	 the	 hardship	 of	 others.	 I	 elaborated	 upon	 how	 practitioners	 and	 their	collaborators	moved	between	one	another’s	subject	positions	over	time,	as	they	learned	in	embodied	and	experiential	ways	about	alternative	political	 stances.	 I	 introduced	 the	notion	of	inhabiting	one	another’s	subjectivity	as	relational,	enacted	through	the	feeling	and	 appreciation	 of	 others’	 vulnerability.	 Finally,	 I	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 movement	between	subjectivities	was	enacted	in	visual	and	bodily	ways,	through	the	dimension	of	citing,	which	fostered	the	construction	of	collective	agency.				
6.2.	Foregoing		Foregoing	 is	 a	 sub-practice	 that	 highlights	 the	 experience	 of	 offering	 one’s	 body	 for	someone	else’s	cause	but	also	of	supressing	aspects	of	self	for	others.	This	is	experienced	as	 an	 antagonistic	 struggle,	 as	 bodies	 appear	 as	 sites	 of	 democratic	 practice.	 The	unremitting	 capitulation	 of	 practitioners	 to	 the	 perceived	 needs	 of	 others	 is	 enacted	through	 a	matrix	 of	 repetitive	 norms,	 of	masculine	 rationalisation	 but	 also	 of	 care	 for	others,	which	bears	vigorously	onto	practitioners’	bodies.	Underlining	repetitive	norms	in	 this	 sub-practice	 is	 important	 as	 it	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 enactment	 of	 democratic	struggle	within	the	self	of	practitioners	in	daily	routines,	not	in	big,	theatrical	and	public	sacrificial	acts.	
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Sub-practice	 of	 embodying	
democratic	practice	
	
Dimensions	of	sub-practice	 Illustrative	examples	
Foregoing		The	notion	of	the	self	of	practitioners	as	the	site	of	democratic	struggle,	where	competing	subjectivities	vie	for	recognition.	The	struggle	is	experienced	in	embodied	ways	through	the	vulnerable	bodies	of	practitioners.		
Self-conflict		Denotes	the	emerging	agency	of	practitioners.	Such	agency	emerges	out	of	conflict	between	subjectivities	and	always	favours	the	posited	needs	and	subjectivity	of	the	‘other’	–	the	client	or	ally	in	WRC’s	case.	
Marija,	interview	extract:		“There’s	nothing	rational	about	it…I	am	sorry	that…how	come	everything	and	everyone	else	was	more	important	to	me	than	me?...How	come	I	didn’t	think	of	my	wellbeing	first?	Believe	me,	I…I	feel	so	guilty,	I	feel…but…I	just	had	this	feeling	that	somebody’s	counting	on	me…”			
Normalising		Highlights	that	foregoing	does	not	take	place	in	formalised	and	official	spaces	designated	for	democratic	engagement	(e.g.	roundtable	discussions,	workshops,	conferences,	etc.),	but	in	the	routinised	work	of	practitioners	(such	as	running	chores	and	managing	time).		Normalising	is	a	pull	back	to	the	rational	and	masculine	norms	of	order	and	routine.		
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		Marija’s	miscarriage	happened	as	she	was	busy	with	the	everyday	routinised	work	of	the	organisation	(running	errands	for	people	in	need,	driving	between	commitments,	lifting	a	heavy	printing	press).	
Table	2:	Sub-practice	of	foregoing			Organisation	members	performed	foregoing	as	a	taken-for-granted,	normalised	practice,	which	they	rarely	questioned	and	often	dismissed	as	something	that	was	‘not	a	big	deal’	whenever	I	would	bring	it	up.	Purely	in	terms	of	stamina,	I	experienced	what	it	was	like	to	rise	early	every	day,	return	late	from	the	office	each	evening	or	later	at	night,	have	a	rushed	 dinner	 and	 then	 join	 online	 discussions	 between	 colleagues	 –	 it	 was	 often	exhilarating,	 but	 also	 physically	 and	 emotionally	 draining	 work,	 performed	 for	 little	financial	reward.	I	now	explore	how	we	can	understand	such	foregoing	of	certain	aspects	of	self	through	a	democratic	lens.	Instances	of	foregoing	are	abundant	in	the	practice	of	WRC	 and	 I	 will	 outline	 their	 main	 features	 through	 a	 single,	 in-depth	 ethnographic	episode	–	the	story	of	Marija.	
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Ethnographic	episode	(foregoing):	“There	are	worse	things	in	life”	–	Marija’s	story		This	 episode	 illustrates	 an	 act	 of	 bodily	 foregoing,	 that	 of	 a	 practitioner	 foregoing	 her	own	wellbeing	for	others,	which	materialised	in	the	form	of	her	miscarrying	a	pregnancy.	In	this	extract,	the	practitioner,	Marija,	struggles	to	understand	her	actions	and	feels	torn	between	guilt	relating	to	losing	a	pregnancy	and	a	felt	necessity	to	help	others	who	are	in	need.			Marija	 worked	 across	 the	 main	 organisational	 programmes,	 which	 involved:	 meeting	clients,	 performing	 administrative	 tasks	 for	 the	 programme	 of	 psychological	 and	 legal	help,	 conducting	 research	 for	 the	 advocacy	 programme,	 running	 errands	 within	 the	cultural	 programme,	 and	 so	 on,	 hoping	 that	 by	 experiencing	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	organisation’s	work	 she	might	 learn	where	 she	 could	 contribute	 the	most.	 In	 between	these	tasks	she	would	strive	to	learn	more	about	issues	preoccupying	feminists,	reading	various	articles	and	often	 translating	 them	for	one	of	 the	organisation’s	web	pages.	On	several	occasions,	Marija	expressed	concern	that	she	might	be	‘underperforming’	despite	the	 fact	 that	 her	 ‘performance’	 was	 not	 assessed,	 and	 she	 was	 always	 spoken	 of	 in	positive	terms	by	her	colleagues.			Often,	 the	 sub-practice	 of	 foregoing	would	 bear	 so	 vigorously	 onto	 her	 body	 that	 she	would	be	on	the	verge	of	crying	every	time	she	believed	that	her	performance	was	not	up	to	 standard.	 The	 practice	 of	 foregoing,	 coupled	 with	 the	 stress	 that	 comes	 with	 the	regular	 practices	 of	 WRC,	 through	 encounters	 with	 people	 who	 suffer	 injustice,	inequality,	 poverty	 and	 violence,	 often	 brought	Marija	 to	 a	 state	 of	 “hopelessness	 and	despair”,	 as	 she	 stated	 several	 times.	 It	 also	 imbued	 her	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 “heightened	
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responsibility”	 towards	 those	 perceived	 to	 be	 in	 need.	 The	 series	 of	 actions	 that	eventually	led	to	Marija	miscarrying	were	not	entirely	deliberate,	but	performed	through	enacted	and	repetitive	impulses	of	the	body:	focused	on	helping	others	and	performing	‘well’	against	the	demands	posited	by	her	maternal	and	emotional	selves.			During	our	exchange,	her	body	language	was	incongruent	and	conflicted,	as	though	her	various	selves	were	in	a	state	of	disagreement	and	adversarial	dialogue:	she	appeared	to	be	 struggling	 to	 present	 a	 brave	 face,	 but	 her	 body	 presented	 a	 different	 self.	 She	clutched	her	 hands	nervously,	 braced	herself	 as	 if	 cold,	 bent	 her	 torso	 forwards	while	sitting,	as	if	in	pain,	and	yet	kept	smiling	as	if	in	defiance	of	this	aspect	of	herself.	I	asked	her	if	she	was	all	right	and	she	assured	me	she	was	fine,	maintaining	her	smile.	I	backed	off	because	I	believed	she	wanted	me	to,	and	we	continued	to	talk.	The	expression	on	her	face	 relaxed	a	 little,	 seeming	only	 slightly	 relieved,	 and	 I	 realised	 she	had	 secured	one	victory	–	I	was	one	less	person	she	needed	to	convince	that	she	was	‘fine’	and	‘resilient’.	I	briefly	 reflected	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 saying	 she	 was	 ‘fine’	 was	 a	 kind	 of	 signature	 and	rationalised	statement	from	Marija	and	her	colleagues.	Marija	recounted	her	story:		
I	was	under	so	much	stress…I	don’t	know	if	[a	colleague]	told	you	but	we	drove	to	those	two	
women...No	one	should	be	brought	to…such	an	inhumane	condition…They	are	starving,	all	
of	 them,	 so	 malnourished!	 We	 brought	 the	 food	 supplies	 for	 perhaps	 a	 week,	
tops…Anyway…I	was…I’m	under	stress.	It	 is…I	can’t…I	didn’t	quite	know	how	to	process	it.	
I’m	 learning,	 you	 know…It’s	 not	 that…I	 just…I’m	 still	 learning.	 Anyway,	 that	 day	 […]	 we	
were	supposed	to	pick	up	the	printing	press.	We	needed	my	car	for	that,	so	[a	colleague]	and	
I	went	to	get	it…I	wasn’t	really	thinking	about	it,	I	was	just	focused	on	getting	things	done,	
to	make	some	contribution.	So	I	bent,	lifted	it	and	realised	how	heavy...I	really	don’t	blame	
anybody,	I	completely	erased	it	from	my	mind,	it’s	all	my	fault.	It	was	an	early	pregnancy,	I	
just	worked	as	normal,	I	didn’t	feel	unwell…it	was	really	too	heavy,	like	a	washing	machine	
filled	with	water…but	we	managed	somehow	to	lift	it	and	load	it	into	the	car	and	then	when	
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we	sat	down,	it	dawned	on	me.	I	thought:	‘Oh	my	god,	I’m	pregnant	and	I	did	this!	[clutching	
her	 stomach]	 Oh,	 I	 felt	 awful…I	 still	 don’t	 know…I	 can’t	 believe	 myself!	 Then,	 suddenly	 I	
started	 to	 feel	 an	 excruciating	 pain…terrible	 pain	 and	 I	 felt…I	 ran	 to	 the	 toilet	 and	 I	
realised…I	saw…and	I	just	said	to	[a	colleague]	‘I	need	to	pop	out	quickly’.	I	did	not	explain	
anything	 to	 anybody…The	 doctor	 took	me	 in,	 did	 the	 necessary	 checks	 and	 said	 –	 ‘Yes,	 it	
seems	like	this	pregnancy	will	go,	unfortunately.’	And	then	I	started	to	sob	uncontrollably…I	
don’t	know	why	 I	 think	 the	way	 I	do	and	why	 I	act	 the	way	 I	do	and	trust	me	 I	did	 try	 to	
provide	an	answer	 to	 that	but	 it	was	 simply	 something	 stronger.	There’s	nothing	rational	
about	it…I	am	sorry	that…how	come	everything	and	everyone	else	was	more	important	to	
me	than	me?	How’s	that	possible?	How	come	I	didn’t	think	of	my	wellbeing	first?	Believe	me,	
I…I	 feel	 so	 guilty,	 I	 feel…but…I	 have	 no	 answer.	 I	 just	 had	 this	 feeling	 that	 somebody’s	
counting	on	me,	 like	 those	women	who	have	nobody	 else	 there	 to	help	 them	and	 it	 never	
occurred	to	me	that	a	person	counting	on	me	was,	in	fact	-	me.	Do	you	understand	what	I’m	
trying	to	say?	I	let	myself	down	and	I	let	others	down…Now	I	can’t	be	of	help…[bursting	into	
tears]…I	 have	 no	 one	 to	 blame	 but	 myself.	 Uh…sorry…I	 should	 pull	 myself	 together!	 […]	
there	are	worse	things	in	life.	[straightens	her	back	and	adjusts	her	top]		Analysing	 the	 language	 used	 by	Marija	 to	make	 sense	 of	 her	 experience	 helps	 surface	some	of	 the	ways	 in	which	 foregoing	 is	normalised,	patterns	replicated	 throughout	my	time	in	the	field	by	other	WRC	practitioners.	The	body	becomes	the	site	of	contestation	between	demands,	with	the	posited	 ‘other’	and	the	 ‘rational’	professional	self	of	Marija	prevailing.	The	first	thing	to	note	about	Marija’s	story	is	that	it	takes	place	in	a	mundane	environment	 of	 office	 routines,	 rather	 than	 being	 experienced	 in	 a	 space	 specifically	designated	for	democratic	practice.	Her	routines	are	never	explicitly	reflected	upon	but	seem	to	act	like	a	constant	pull	back	to	the	masculine,	to	order,	combined	with	a	sense	of	push	 and	 pull	 of	 the	 various	 ‘others’	 who	 need	 her	 attention.	 Marija’s	 story	 is	fragmented,	 indicative	 of	 the	 other	 dimension	 of	 this	 sub-practice	 –	 that	 of	 an	antagonistic	 struggle	 of	 self,	 immediately	 obvious	 in	 this	 episode	 in	 the	 numerous	pauses,	 breaks	 and	 fragmented	 sentences	 she	 enacts	 in	 her	 attempt	 to	 explicate	 the	series	 of	 actions	 that	 take	 place	 the	 day	 she	 loses	 her	 pregnancy.	 To	 see	 the	 broader	
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contours	 of	 this	 struggle	 of	 self,	 we	 can	 analyse	 the	 argumentation	 and	 related	positioning	of	subjectivity	in	the	text.			Marija	is	struggling	to	understand	the	events	that	lead	to	her	foregoing	and	lifting	of	the	heavy	 printing	 press.	 She	 jumps	 between	 several	 competing	 subjectivities:	 her	emotional,	 maternal,	 professional	 and	 routinised	 selves,	 the	 women	 whose	circumstances	shook	her	and	the	organisation,	finding	it	hard	to	achieve	coherence,	with	all	 of	 these	 manifesting	 in	 a	 form	 of	 conflictual	 dialogue,	 vying	 for	 prominence	 and	legitimacy.	 She	 starts	 the	 argumentation	 by	 stating	 that	 she	 had	 been	 under	 a	 lot	 of	stress	 in	 the	weeks	 running	up	 to	her	miscarriage,	 suggesting	 that	 stress	might	be	 the	culprit	for	the	lack	of	concentration	she	exhibited	in	deciding	to	lift	the	device.	She	first	concentrates	 on	 her	 emotional	 self,	 pointing	 to	 the	 stress	 she	 experiences,	 yet	 her	thoughts	 suddenly	 shift	 to	 the	hardship	 that	 the	women	she	visits	have	 to	endure	and	then,	returning	to	her	professional	self	as	if	to	reassure	me	that	she	is	not	sensitive	but	that	she	 is	rather	still	 learning	about	dealing	with	 the	stress	 that	 the	 job	entails,	a	pull	back	to	the	masculine	norms	of	order	and	‘professionalism’.			She	expands	her	argument	with	details	 relating	 to	 the	clients	 she	visited	 that	day,	 and	how	their	living	conditions	shook	her.	Such	a	shift	to	other	women’s	experience	amidst	reflection	on	her	own	acts	suggests	that	Marija	might	feel	guilty	for	trying	to	justify	her	behaviour	through	the	explanation	of	stress.	However,	she	quickly	shakes	the	thought	off	and	returns	to	listing	the	things	she	was	supposed	to	do,	falling	back	upon	the	mundane	norms	of	work.	The	organisation	forms	a	sense	of	agency	and	self	here,	as	she	yet	again	makes	recourse	to	a	professional	self,	as	if	trying	to	rationally	explain	her	actions,	before	blaming	her	maternal	self	 for	not	 intervening,	 in	the	most	 intense	passage	of	the	story,	
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which	is	heightened	by	her	tears.	But	even	here	she	chastises	herself	for	such	behaviour,	reminding	 us	 that	 ‘there	 are	 worse	 things	 in	 life’,	 suggesting	 that	 whatever	 she	 feels	should	be	 regarded	as	 insignificant	 in	 the	 larger	 scheme	of	 things	where	people	 suffer	‘inhumane	 conditions’.	 The	 episode	 is	 therefore	 ‘resolved’	 as	 her	 professional	 self	 and	the	selves	of	her	clients	endure	and	are	privileged.		Looking	more	closely	at	 the	utilisation	of	 speech	units	and	 the	ways	 in	which	 they	are	tied	 together	 into	 a	 syntagmatic	 configuration	 surfaces	 even	more	 starkly	 the	 struggle	Marija	feels	in	relation	to	herself.	In	terms	of	how	this	struggle	is	built	through	language,	the	subject	she	 is	 the	most	preoccupied	with	 ‘theorising’	 (Harding,	2008:	48)	 is	clearly	herself,	as	she	makes	reference	to	herself	52	times	within	this	particular	excerpt	via	the	pronouns	‘I’,	‘me’	and	‘myself’.27		Yet,	even	though	Marija	makes	frequent	recourse	to	self,	she	is	struggling	to	surface	her	thinking	 and	 feelings	 about	 self,	 evident	 not	 solely	 in	 the	 fragmented	 and	 unfinished	clauses,	but	also	in	traversing	from	past	to	present	tense.	Namely,	she	begins	by	saying	that	she	was	under	stress	but	soon	afterwards	she	changes	her	mind,	stating	that	she	is	under	stress,	suggesting	that	the	stress	she	is	referring	to	 is	not	necessarily	 linked	to	a	particular	 day/event	 but	 to	 a	 more	 persistent	 state	 of	 being	 for	 her.	 She	 continues	shifting	between	present	and	past	tenses	in	fragmented	clauses,	in	an	attempt	to	explain	herself	and	her	actions	before,	again,	seemingly	settling	on	the	past	tense.	This	suggests																																																									27	Although	the	pronoun	‘I’	appears	52	times	in	the	selected	excerpt,	this	pronoun	appears	only	14	times	in	the	Montenegrin	version	due	to	a	specific	character	of	language	where	the	pronoun	‘I’	is	often	omitted	from	constructions,	as	the	speaker’s	reference	to	a	particular	person(s)	is	denoted	through	the	auxiliary	verb	‘to	be’.	For	example,	instead	of	saying	‘Ja	sam	uradila	to’/’I	did	that’,	it	is	sufficient	to	say	‘uradila	sam	to’	omitting	the	prounoun	‘Ja’/’I’,	as	the	form	of	the	auxiliary	verb	‘to	be’	–	sam	–	denotes	reference	to	the	first	person,	or	self.		
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that	 she	 ‘did	 not	 know’	 how	 to	 deal	 with	 stress	 on	 that	 particular	 day,	 immediately	followed	 by	 a	 statement	 featuring	 a	 progressive	 verb	 form,	which	 indicates	 that	 even	though	 she	 would	 like	 to	 be	 more	 resilient,	 she	 is	 still	 ‘learning’	 how	 to	 process	 the	struggle,	as	if	the	solution	might	be	to	become	more	adept	at	rationalising	her	demands.			Focusing	on	the	transitivity	of	the	extract,	we	can	see	more	clearly	the	commands	issued	by	 the	 professional,	 masculinised	 subject	 position	 and	 those	 of	 her	 clients.	 These	 are	materialised	 in	 the	 clauses	 ‘getting	 things	 done’	 and	 ‘making	 some	 contribution’,	suggesting	that	the	command	to	contribute	and	to	finish	the	task	she	is	‘supposed	to	do’	challenges	her	maternal	and	emotional	selves.	It	 is	worth	noting	here	that	she	uses	the	verb	 phrase	 ‘supposed	 to’	 without	 actually	 naming	 the	 agent	 of	 ‘supposition’,	 which	could	 indicate	 that	 she	 performs	 an	 act	 of	 self-responsibilisation,	where	 she	 regulates	her	 behaviour	 according	 to	 what	 she	 believes	 is	 ‘supposed	 to	 be	 done’.	 Such	 self-responsibilisation	 is	 fortified	 by	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 the	 women	 she	 visited,	 whom	 she	represents	 in	 speech	 as	 ‘counting’	 on	 her.	 The	 progressive	 form	 of	 the	 verb	 ‘to	 count’	suggests	that	she	feels	that	she	is	adjusting	herself	to	be	in	a	constant	state	of	alertness	should	 someone	 require	 ‘help’.	 At	 one	 brief	 moment,	 Marija	 engages	 in	 a	 moment	 of	reflexivity,	 which	 brings	 her	 to	 the	 realisation	 that	 she	 managed	 to	 forget	 about	 one	person	who	was	counting	on	her	–	her	maternal	self	–	which	leaves	her	perplexed.	Yet,	rather	 than	 attempting	 to	 discern	 the	 reasons	 for	 this,	 and	 potentially	 resolving	 the	perplexity,	 she	denies	herself	 an	opportunity	 to	empathise	with	her	own	maternal	 self	and	reaches	for	the	self-directed	(masculine)	imperative	instead	–	‘pull	myself	together!’			It	 is	worth	noting	 the	 choice	 of	 nouns	 and	 adjectives,	 as	well	 as	 the	omission	of	 these	from	 parts	 of	 the	 excerpt,	 because	 they	 surface	 some	 of	 the	 embodied	 struggles	 of	
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subjectivity	 experienced	 by	 Marija.	 The	 most	 prominently	 used	 nouns	 in	 the	 text	 are	‘stress’	and	‘pain’,	each	denoting	a	corporeal	experience,	yet	each	of	which	are	not	fully	articulated,	 as	 if	 Marija	 struggles	 to	 translate	 her	 bodily	 experience	 into	 words.	 She	makes	an	attempt	 to	underline	 the	pain	she	 feels	by	painting	 the	noun	with	adjectives	such	 as	 ‘excruciating’	 and	 ‘terrible’	 but	 her	 experience	 still	 remains	 incomplete	 in	 the	text,	 which	 is	 indicated	 by	 unfinished	 sentences	 and	 fragmented	 clauses.	 Yet,	 on	 the	other	hand,	Marija	appears	 reluctant	 to	put	 certain	bodily	experiences	 into	words.	For	example,	she	describes	how	she	ran	to	the	toilet	after	she	felt	pain	and	abruptly	cuts	the	sentence	mid-way	through,	unable	to	say	that	she	saw	blood,	as	if	the	more	rational	and	masculine	aspects	of	self	want	to	erase	this	embodied	experience.			She	opts	for	the	third-person-neutral	pronoun	‘it’	to	denote	something	that	is	‘stronger’	than	her	‘rational’	side	–	empathy	–	that	guides	her	actions	and	eventually	instigates	the	feeling	 of	 ‘guilt’.	 The	 under-developed	 and	 neutral	 nature	 of	 ‘it’	 contrarily	 signals	 its	weight	and	authority,	as	the	dominant	aspect	of	her	agency.	The	equating	of	rationality	with	empathy	in	a	speech	act	is	seemingly	an	oxymoron	but	within	the	agency	of	Marija	underlines	the	dominance	of	her	empathetic	and	professional	selves.			The	choice	of	nouns	and	adjectives	all	point	to	the	bodily	experiences	of	Marija,	yet	her	characterisation	 of	 these	 experiences	 as	 something	 ‘irrational’,	 coupled	 with	 her	conflicting	body	language,	points	to	Marija’s	desire	to	perform	rationally	and	composedly	as	a	means	of	avoiding	feelings	of	 ‘guilt’,	 ‘blame’,	 ‘stress’,	 ‘pain’	and	‘it’	–	the	heightened	sense	 of	 empathy	 that	 guided	 her	 actions	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Such	 a	 desire	 is	 almost	immediately	 translated	 into	 her	 bodily	 performativity	 at	 the	 end	 of	 our	 conversation	
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when	 she	 ‘pulls	 [herself]	 together’,	 wipes	 her	 tears	 away,	 straightens	 her	 back	 and	readjusts	her	top,	as	if	putting	everything	back	into	a	‘rational’	order.			
Foregoing	summary		The	sub-practice	of	foregoing	highlighted	how	democratic	practice	was	played	out	upon	the	 bodies	 of	 practitioners.	 Foregoing	 denoted	 putting	 one’s	 body	 into	 the	 service	 of	others	 and,	 in	 the	process,	 supressing	aspects	of	 self	 that	were	perceived	as	not	being	‘adequate’	 for	 the	task.	 In	 the	ethnographic	episode	above,	 I	explored	how	a	masculine	subjectivity	emerged	through	a	process	of	conflict	between	different	subjectivities	vying	for	dominance.	The	agency	 that	 surfaced	 from	such	 conflict	 enacted	a	 subjectivity	 that	favoured	 the	 other	who	was	 posited	 as	 being	 in	 need.	 Finally,	 I	 highlighted	 how	 such	agentic	 enactment	 represented	 a	 rational	 pull	 to	 the	 masculine	 norms	 of	 order	 and	discipline,	which	was	normalised	through	the	routine	work	of	practitioners	rather	than	taking	place	in	more	formally	designated	spaces	for	democratic	engagement.				
6.3.	Shielding		In	generating	democratic	practice	WRC	practitioners	often	find	themselves	in	the	role	of	defender,	 trying	 to	 shield	 people	 from	 various	 forms	 of	 antagonism.	 In	 doing	 so,	 they	seek	to	navigate	antagonism,	often	suffering	by	putting	themselves	–	and	their	bodies	-	at	risk,	experiencing	threats	and	slander,	in	order	to	agonistically	support	those	they	shield.	Conceptually,	 the	 practice	 of	 shielding	 refers	 to	 the	 substituting	 and	 extending	 of	 the	subjectivity,	 and	bodily	presence,	 of	 the	people	WRC	supports,	 in	order	 to	protect	 and	
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advocate	for	them	with	antagonistic	state	institutions	and	other	hostile	actors.	I	explore	two	dimensions	of	shielding.	Each	is	defined	and	summarised	in	the	following	table.		
Sub-practice	of	embodying	
democratic	practice	
	
Dimensions	of	the	sub-
practice	
Illustrative	examples	
Shielding		Practitioners’	enactments	of	a	series	of	shields,	each	offering	a	different	form	of	protection	in	a	given	situation.	Shielding	helps	an	emerging	agency	develop	through	allying	embodied	experience	with	knowledge	of	democratic	practice	and	activism	established	over	time.			
Supplementing		Offering	an	authority	of	experience,	in	activism	and	professional	expertise,	when	such	knowledge	is	not	possessed	by	the	people	practitioners	seek	to	support.	This	dimension	is	embodied,	as	it	denotes	a	movement	between	knowing	when	a	corporeal	presence	is	necessary	and	when	a	more	disembodied	form	of	expertise	might	be	needed.		
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		Protesting	shoulder-to-shoulder	with	mothers,	practitioners	acted	as	witnesses	against	potential	abuses	of	power,	occupying	the	space	between	special	forces	and	protestors	(forming	a	live	shield).			In	addition,	they	engaged	in	writing	appeals	to	relevant	national	institutions	and	informing	supranational	institutions	about	the	government’s	breach	of	the	rule	of	law,	as	a	means	of	applying	pressure	to	the	government	to	address	the	problem.	They	strove	to	“defend	the	mothers	in	those	fields	where	they	are	not	present”	(Andrea),	as	practitioners	were	convinced	“that	the	government	won’t	consider	them	at	all”	(Jana).		
Absorption		Instances	where	practitioners	absorb	the	deprivations	experienced	by	the	people	they	support,	rather	than	helping	from	a	distance,	making	themselves	vulnerable	in	order	to	fortify	the	‘shield’	protecting	them	from	antagonists.	New	subjectivities	arise	through	absorption,	which	insist	upon	democratic	acknowledgement.			
Mina,	interview	extract:		“I	put	my	body	out	there	as	a	political	tool…	First,	I	wanted	to	prove	to	mothers…that	our	support	is	sincere,	that	we’re	in	it	together.	Second,	I	wanted	to	soften	the	blows	they	were	suffering	from	everywhere…to	erect	another	wall	of	support.”	
Table	3:	Sub-practice	of	shielding		To	 illustrate	 the	 sub-practice	 of	 shielding	 I	 now	 unpack	 its	 dimensions	 through	 an	ethnographic	episode	from	the	protest	of	mothers.			
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Ethnographic	episode	(shielding):	advocacy,	protests	and	hunger	strikes		Experiencing	national	media	attention,	the	ire	of	establishment	politicians,	their	financial	interests	and	coercive	apparatus,	posed	a	real	antagonistic	threat	to	the	mothers,	most	of	whom	 had	 not	 previously	 expressed	 their	 political	 agency	 to	 this	 degree.	 WRC	practitioners	 knew	 early	 on	 that	 the	mothers’	 discursive	 strategy	 of	 seeking	 to	 shame	political	 leaders	 into	reinstating	 their	benefits	would	 fall	upon	 the	deaf	ears	of	corrupt	government	 actors	 and	 that	 the	 mothers	 would	 need	 some	 kind	 of	 protection	 and	support,	fortification	that	would	also	respect	their	agency.	Below	I	expand	upon	the	two	dimensions	of	shielding,	supplementing	and	absorption.		Supplementing:		We	sat	in	the	office	watching	a	live	stream	video	of	the	mothers	congregating	in	front	of	the	government	building.	On	the	video	someone’s	voice	shouted	‘special	forces!’	and	we	caught	a	glimpse	of	 the	police	unit’s	shields	 though	a	shaky	camera	shot.	We	 looked	at	one	 another,	 all	 thinking	 what	 Lara	 said	 next:	 “I	 hope	 the	 police	 will	 refrain	 from	‘protecting’28	the	mothers!”		We	 dashed	 out	 of	 the	 door	 and	 straight	 to	 the	 protest.	 Passing	 through	 the	 crowd,	 I	spotted	a	 group	of	 activists	 standing	 in	 front	of	 the	 row	of	 special	 forces	officers,	 as	 if																																																									28	In	October	2015	a	controversial	anti-government	peaceful	protest	organised	by	opposition	parties	and	groups	turned	into	a	violent	clash	between	police	and	protestors	in	which	40	people	sustained	injuries	(see	Vijesti	25/10/2015).			
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shielding	protestors	 from	potential	 conflict	with	 the	police.	 I	made	my	way	 through	 to	them	to	ask	 if	 that	was	what	 they	were	doing	and	Mina,	a	 seasoned	activist,	 explained	that	she	did	not	think	that	conflict	would	occur,	as	the	police	were	there	just	as	“a	tool	of	intimidation”.	But	 should	 it	 come	 to	 a	 clash,	Mina	 further	 explained,	we	were	 there	 as	“witnesses”	who	could	provide	testimony	to	the	media	and	courts,	as	the	mothers	had	no	experience	of	working	 in	 these	kinds	of	 situations.	 Jovana	added	 that	 she	was	 familiar	with	the	ruling	party’s	tactics	of	sabotaging	and	dismantling	protests,	and	stressed	that	it	was	 “our	 duty	 to	 protect	 the	 protestors,	 by	 being	 their	 eyes	 and	 ears”.	 I	 asked	 what	would	happen	if	they,	the	practitioners,	got	injured,	and	Mina	promptly	answered	with	a	question:	 “Would	 that	 be	 any	 worse	 than	 what	 these	 women	 are	 going	 through?”	 I	understood	 that	 feelings	 of	 responsibility	 and	 compassion	were	 driving	 their	 practice,	and	that	in	their	eyes	protecting	protestors	was	more	important	than	their	own	safety.			This	 was	 an	 example	 of	 practitioners	 supplementing	 the	 position	 of	 protestors	 with	knowledge	generated	throughout	numerous	antagonistic	government	engagements.	The	immediate	 reaction	 of	 practitioners	 was	 to	 shield	 the	 protestors	 from	 potential	 (but	familiar)	 forms	of	abuse.	 In	doing	so,	 they	placed	 themselves	at	 risk,	 and	shielding	 the	protestors	 took	priority	over	 their	own	safety.	 I	 squeezed	 in	between	the	practitioners	and	special	forces,	taking	this	photograph:	
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					Photo	4:	Special	Forces	in	front	of	the	government	building		My	motivation	 in	 taking	 the	 photograph	was	 to	 document	 the	 police	 presence,	 which	seemed	excessive	for	a	peaceful	protest	by	ailing	mothers.	I	wanted	to	capture	the	mass	of	police,	with	an	angle	to	the	side	to	emphasise	the	point.	The	act	of	documentation,	in	retrospect,	 was	 a	 modest	 and	 perhaps	 obvious	 form	 of	 shielding,	 perhaps	 an	 ironic	labelling	given	the	prominence	of	‘official’	police	shields	in	the	picture.		As	I	continued	to	move	through	the	mass	of	people,	I	met	Nina,	who	greeted	me	with	a	myriad	of	semi-devised	action	plans	regarding	how	to	assist	the	mothers,	even	then,	as	we	 stood	 amidst	 the	 action.	 Always	 ready	 on	 her	 feet,	 she	 rapidly	 listed	 things	 that	should	 be	 done:	 letters	 to	 be	 written,	 food	 and	 water	 to	 be	 procured,	 tracking	 the	narrative	 in	 the	media	about	 the	event,	and	so	on.	When	she	noticed	 that	 I	was	barely	following,	 she	 stopped	 and	 asked	 if	 something	 was	 wrong.	 I	 expressed	 my	 conflicted	feelings	regarding	the	protest	 in	relation	to	my	opposition	to	the	 law,	and	my	empathy	towards	mothers,	after	which	she	urged	me	to	take	a	good	look	around,	as	what	she	saw	
	208	
was	 “the	 average	 woman	 in	 Montenegro…impoverished,	 tortured,	 disempowered	 and	disfranchised”.	 She	 admitted	 to	 feeling	 the	 same	way	but	 that	 it	was	 “our	duty	 to	 side	with	these	women	and	to	support	them”	and	routinely	continued	to	 list	 the	things	that	“ought	to	be	done”.		We	spent	the	following	weeks	stretched	between	our	preparations	for	the	International	Women’s	Day	March	and	formulating	a	narrative	and	action	plan	to	support	protestors,	as	 we	 thought	 that	 one	 important	 way	 of	 shielding	 the	mothers	was	 to	 connect	 their	cause	 in	 an	 organised	way	with	 other	women’s	 issues	 and	 groups.	We	 combined	 this	work	with	protesting	on	the	street	until	 late	at	night.	Practitioners	were	accustomed	to	the	stamina	required	in	such	‘shielding’	work.			After	weeks	of	this	work	tempo,	Sanja,	a	WRC	practitioner,	suggested	that	standing	in	the	street,	albeit	an	 important	way	to	provide	support,	should	be	secondary	 to	doing	what	WRC	 does	 best:	 writing	 appeals	 to	 relevant	 national	 institutions	 and	 informing	supranational	institutions	about	the	government’s	breach	of	the	rule	of	law,	as	a	means	of	 applying	 pressure	 to	 the	 government	 to	 address	 the	 problem.	 She	 believed,	 after	having	numerous	conversations	with	the	mothers,	that	WRC	could	aid	women	more	by	“stretching	 the	 mothers’	 presence”.	 This	 involved	 making	 sure	 that	 their	 message	reached	 both	 the	 public	 and	 relevant	 political	 actors,	 “defending	 the	mothers	 in	 those	fields	where	 they	are	not	present”	 (Andrea),	 as	practitioners	were	 convinced	 “that	 the	government	 won’t	 consider	 them	 at	 all”	 (Jana).	 The	 supplementing	 work	 here	 meant	concentrating	 all	 efforts	 on	 supporting	 mothers	 through	 advocacy	 with	 relevant	stakeholders,	 surveying	 media	 reports	 and	 reacting	 to	 misinformation,	 but	 also	continuously	conversing	with	people	who	had	joined	the	protest	in	solidarity,	in	order	to	
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make	sure	that	they	did	not	overstep	or	suppress	the	voices	of	mothers.	It	was	a	strategic	and	partial	withdrawal	of	bodies	in	order	to	better	protect	and	supplement	the	mothers	in	 other	 ways.	 The	 shield	 became	 extended:	 practitioners	 did	 not	 only	 support	 the	protestors	 with	 their	 bodies,	 in	 the	 streets,	 but	 such	 support	 was	 supplemented	 by	making	 their	 grievances	 known	 in	 areas	 they	 did	 not	 have	 access	 to	 previously	 (e.g.	CEDAW	committee,	GREVIO,	the	EU	delegation,	etc.).																Absorption:		Another	practitioner,	Mina,	held	the	view	that	the	way	to	offer	support	was	to	continue	to	 “put	 our	 bodies	 to	 good	 use”.	 Therefore,	 after	 the	 protestors	 announced	 a	 hunger	strike,	Mina	expressed	her	wish	to	help	the	women	endure	the	protest	by	providing	them	with	professional	psychological	assistance.	This	was	envisaged	as	a	way	of	shielding	the	mothers	through	alleviating	some	of	their	psychological	pain.					She	soon	realised,	however,	that	providing	advice	felt	like	too	distanced	a	response.	She	decided	 to	 take	 a	 further	 step	 and	 join	 the	 hunger	 strike,	 absorbing	 the	 pain	 of	 the	mothers.	Mina	is	a	seasoned	activist	with	a	high	profile	and	long	history	of	participation	in	 various	 protests	 and	 street	 actions,	 possessing	 a	 long	 memory	 of	 the	 gradual	“degradation	of	women’s	political	power”,	which	she	referred	to	succinctly	as	 “the	war	on	women”.	When	 I	asked	her	 if	 she	could	explain	what	drove	her	decision	 to	 join	 the	hunger	strike,	she	responded:			
	210	
We	were	against	these	benefits…but	these	women	were	used	and	deceived…	it	just	became	
clear	to	me	that	they	are	all	alone…	sustaining	blows	from	everywhere…I	wanted	our	civil	
society	to	stand	in	solidarity	with	these	mothers,	and	not	only	us.	What	I	hoped	to	achieve	by	
my	participation	 in	 the	hunger	 strike	didn’t	 happen	at	 all,	 but	 I	 hoped	 that	 others	would	
recognise	another	political	dimension	of	the	protest,	that	the	mothers	were	not	alone,	that	
the	civil	sector	supported	them.	This	effort	to	fortify	the	protest,	to	add	an	additional	buffer	
to	mothers…I	wanted	 to	be	 there	as	an	activist	 from	 the	 civil	 sector	but	 I	 also	hoped	 this	
engagement	would	motivate	other	civil	society	members	to	support	the	mothers.	 I	wanted	
them	to	understand	that	what	these	women	were	doing	was	relevant	to	the	entire	society,	
and	I	wanted	us	to	sustain	their	engagement.	I	put	my	body	out	there	as	a	political	tool,	if	
you	like…First,	I	wanted	to	prove	to	mothers	that	we	meant	it,	that	our	support	was	sincere,	
that	we	were	in	it	together.	Second,	I	wanted	to	soften	the	blows	they	were	suffering	from	
everywhere,	you	know,	to	erect	another	wall	of	support	so	to	speak…So	I	placed	my	body	on	
the	 crossroads	 of	 political	 streams:	 civil	 sector	 activists	 who	 were	 against	 the	 hunger	
strike…because	 they	knew	 that	 the	 corrupt	politicians	wouldn’t	give	a	damn	about	 it,	 but	
this	was	the	mothers’	decision,	so	if	we	were	to	support	their	cause	we	had	to	respect	their	
means	 of	 protesting.	 Then	 there	were	 institutions	with	 their	 rotten	 politicians	 and	media	
who	tried	to	diminish	the	efforts	of	women	where	we	wanted	to	amplify	them	and,	finally,	I	
wanted	 to	 prove	 to	 these	women	 that	 I	was	 on	 their	 side,	 our	 side,	 to	 break	 that	wall	 of	
suspicion.	 These	 women	 represented	 everything	 worth	 fighting	 for…they	 were	 a	
manifestation	 of	 our	 society’s	 hardships	 and	 they	 had	 to	 endure	 these	 because	 of	 our	
corrupt	government,	 suffering	 the	biggest	brunt	of	 it	all	 their	 lives…I	didn’t	want	 them	to	
suffer	alone	and	fight	alone.	Their	problem	was	my	problem,	our	problem.		Mina	 suggests	 that	 her	 decision	 to	 support	 the	 mothers	 is	 grounded	 in	 a	 sense	 of	solidarity	for	those	who	have	been	abandoned,	rather	than	a	political	decision	to	either	support	or	oppose	the	benefits.	In	the	face	of	the	present	political	reality,	she	judges	that	mothers	 have	 been	 “used	 and	 deceived”	 and	 exposing	 and	 correcting	 the	 injustice	becomes	a	priority	for	Mina,	the	basis	upon	which	she	frames	her	actions.	She	assumes	‘adversarial’	 relations	with	 the	mothers,	 albeit	 rooted	 in	 solidarity,	 and,	 by	 default,	 an	‘enemy’	position	towards	the	state.	We	learn	that	mothers	are	not	merely	alone	but	that	they	are	also	 “sustaining	blows	 from	everywhere”	and	 in	a	myriad	of	ways	 (disregard,	
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deceit,	manipulation,	slander,	etc.),	which	partly	explains	Mina’s	desire	to	protect	them.	Throughout	the	rest	of	the	excerpt	she	details	what	she	hoped	to	gain	by	participating	in	the	hunger	strike:	to	navigate	between	the	three	political	‘streams’	(mothers,	the	broader	civil	 sector	 and	 institutions)	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 secure	 trust,	 increase	 participation,	 and	‘fortify’	the	power	of	the	protest.			The	 ways	 in	 which	 Mina	 uses	 pronouns	 is	 insightful	 for	 understanding	 her	 shielding	practice.	 She	 shifts	 between	 the	 single	 person	 ‘I’/’me’/’my’	 and	 collective	 pronouns	‘we’/’us’/’our’	when	she	speaks	about	the	protestors,	as	well	as	when	she	speaks	about	the	civil	sector	activists.	This	movement	may	denote	a	confused	sense	of	belonging.	Yet,	in	 light	 of	 the	 argumentation	 offered,	 this	 crossing	 back	 and	 forth	 between	 different	subjectivities	indicates	a	gradual	absorption	into	the	subjectivity	of	others.	She	expresses	her	wish	that	other	members	of	 the	civil	sector	could	 feel	 the	same	sense	of	solidarity,	because	 their	 joint	 and	wholesale	 support	would	provide	 that	much	needed	 ‘buffer’	 to	the	 ‘lone’,	 ‘used’	and	 ‘deceived’	mothers.	Mina	uses	her	body	 to	blur	 the	 lines	between	the	mothers	and	the	civil	sector	activists	in	order	to	demonstrate	the	strength	inherent	in	 the	 two	 absorbed	 subjectivities.	 Therefore,	 her	moving	 between	 pronouns	may	 not	indicate	 confused	 belonging.	 Her	 bodily	 performativity	 enacts	 a	 new	 subjectivity	 in	which	 the	 ‘I’	and	 the	 ‘we’	are	entangled,	which	 in	Mina’s	view	provides	strength	 to	 the	protest.			The	perceived	strength	of	this	new	absorbed	subjectivity,	and	the	agency	arising	from	it,	is	 further	 reinforced	 by	 the	 choice	 of	 verbs	Mina	 employs.	 There	 is	 a	 visible	 contrast	between	 the	 verbs	 relating	 to	 the	 activity	 of	 the	 ‘enemies’	 (Mouffe,	 2013)	 who	 ‘use’,	‘deceive’,	 ‘slander’,	 ‘erase’,	 ‘overlook’,	 ‘diminish’	 and	 induce	 suffering	 and	 those	 of	 the	
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‘adversaries’	 (ibid.)	who	are	described	 in	relational	 terms:	 ‘support’,	 fortify’,	 ‘motivate’,	soften’	 (the	blow),	 ‘erect’	 (a	wall	of	defence),	 ‘amplify’	 (strength),	 ‘fight’	 (injustice)	and	‘prove’	(worth).	The	potency	of	the	envisaged	unity	between	the	civil	sector	activists	and	protestors	is	indicated	by	the	gradation	of	the	verbs	Mina	utilises,	painting	a	picture	of	a	‘political	 subject’,	 with	 each	 new	 image	 constructed	 appearing	 stronger	 than	 the	previous	one.	Namely,	the	unity	would	‘soften’	the	blows	sustained	(a	passive	object),	but	it	would	also	‘erect’	a	defensive	wall	and	‘amplify’	strength	(empowered	subject)	and,	so	strengthened,	they	would	‘fight’	jointly	against	the	injustice	(active	subject).		
Shielding	summary		The	sub-practice	of	shielding	denoted	an	embodied	enactment	of	a	series	of	shields,	each	of	which	offered	a	different	form	of	protection	in	a	given	situation.	Shielding	fostered	the	formation	of	agency	through	allying	embodied	experience	with	knowledge	of	democratic	practice	 and	 activism.	 Through	 the	 ethnographic	 episode	 of	 the	 mothers’	 protest,	 I	highlighted	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 practitioners	 supplemented	 the	 strength	 of	 those	 they	sought	 to	 protect	 by	 applying	 knowledge	 gained	 through	 long-standing	 experience	 in	engaging	with,	 often,	 antagonistic	 stakeholders	 (the	 government	 in	 this	 instance).	 Yet,	paradoxically,	 the	 biggest	 strength	 of	 the	 shield	 lay	 in	 vulnerability:	 by	 exposing	themselves	to	the	hardship	of	others,	and	absorbing	deprivations	experienced	by	people,	they	supported	and	enabled	new	subjectivities	to	arise,	which	insisted	upon	democratic	acknowledgement.				
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VII	Findings	–	Navigating	corruption		
Introduction		The	NGO	and	democracy	literatures	seem	to	assume	a	benign	environment,	or	at	least	do	not	consider	that	democratic	practices	may	be	pursued	through	and	around	contexts	of	intense	and	widespread	corruption	that	are	impossible	to	avoid.	Indeed,	throughout	my	time	 in	 the	 field,	 the	 issue	 of	 corruption	 in	 influencing	 democratic	 practice	 was	inescapable.	 This	 chapter	 therefore	 explores	 how	WRC	 practitioners	 seek	 to	 confront	and	 work	 around	 corruption	 in	 their	 everyday	 practice.	 I	 refer	 to	 this	 as	 navigating	
corruption	 to	denote	the	subtle	and	sophisticated	ways	in	which	practitioners	 live	with	corruption	 and	 its	 ubiquity,	 yet	 still	 manage	 to	 pursue	 democratic	 practices.	 In	 this	chapter,	 I	 first	 provide	 insight	 into	 the	 corrupt	 practices	 NGO	members	work	 against,	through	and	with,	before	exploring	practitioners’	counter-practices	 in	relation	to	them.	These	 practices	 are	 paired	 in	 order	 to	 draw	 out	 the	 responsive	 quality	 of	 democratic	practices	in	relation	to	corrupt	practices:	the	practices	are	co-constitutive.		I	organise	these	practices	into	three	sections.	In	the	first,	I	explore	gaslighting,	a	practice	adopted	by	institutional	representatives	to	divert	and	confuse,	and	practitioners’	means	of	navigating	it	in	their	day-to-day	work,	which	I	call	dispelling.	The	second	section	also	provides	insight	into	the	corruption	of	institutional	representatives	through	enactments	of	 norms	 informed	 by	 patriarchy,	 which	 I	 refer	 to	 as	 privatising,	 the	 seep	 of	 private	relations	 of	 oppression	 into	 the	 public	 sphere,	 and	 practitioners’	 responses	 to	 these	 –	
publicising.	 In	 the	 third	 section,	 I	 explore	 the	 corruption	 of	 GONGOs.	 I	 label	 these	
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practices	colonising	to	denote	GONGOs’	tendencies	to	infiltrate	NGO	spaces	and	sabotage	their	work	and,	in	contrast,	I	term	the	counter-practices	of	WRC	unsettling,	to	denote	its	efforts	in	disrupting	the	colonising.				
7.1.	Dispelling	vs.	Gaslighting		The	 verb	 gaslighting	 is	 derived	 from	 its	 original	 etymon	 ‘gaslight’,	 which	 entered	 the	English	 language	 after	 the	 screening	 of	 George	 Cukor’s	 1944	 film	Gaslight	 in	 which	 a	husband	 “manipulates	 his	 wife	 into	 believing	 she	 is	 going	 insane”	 (Oxford	 English	Dictionary,	 2002).	 This	 attempt	 to	 convince	 his	 wife	 that	 she	 is	 losing	 her	 sanity	(Thomas,	 2018)	 takes	 place	 through	 a	 series	 of	 manipulative	 acts,	 including	 the	adjustment	of	a	literal	gaslight	to	flicker	and	dim.	The	term	is	now	used	by	feminists	to	denote	a	predominantly	masculine	practice	of	control:		 a	form	of	emotional	manipulation	in	which	the	gaslighter	tries…to	induce	in	someone	the	sense	that	her	reactions,	perceptions,	memories	and/or	beliefs	are	not	just	mistaken,	but	utterly	 without	 grounds	 —	 paradigmatically,	 so	 unfounded	 as	 to	 qualify	 as	crazy…gaslighting	 is	 aimed	 at	 getting	 another	 not	 to	 take	 herself	 seriously	 as	 an	interlocutor	(Abramson,	2014:	2).		I	selected	this	term	to	denote	the	difficulty	of	generating	democratic	practice	amidst	the	often	 abstract,	 obscure	 and	 surreal	 performances	 of	 institutional	 representatives.	 I	theorise	 four	dimensions	of	 gaslighting	 from	my	ethnographic	data,	which	 are	defined	and	summarised	in	the	following	table.		
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Corrupt	sub-practice	
	
Dimensions	of	sub-practice	 Illustrative	example	
Gaslighting		
	Corrupt	enactments	of	institutional	representatives,	which	are	deployed	to	make	practitioners	question	their	own	sanity	and	competence.		
Weaponising	victimhood	
	Denotes	institutional	representatives’	attempts	to	assume	the	status	of	victim.	This	aspect	of	gaslighting	distracts	and	confuses,	re-aligning	customary	categories	and	identity	boundaries	in	relation	to	situations	of	violence	against	women	and	advocacy.	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		During	a	meeting	to	address	family	violence	with	the	police,	officers	refocused	attention	to	their	purported	grievances	about	a	practitioner’s	‘abusive’	behaviour,	deflecting	from	the	accusation	that	a	child	suffered	violence	due	to	police	negligence.	They	labelled	a	practitioner	as	“aggressive”,	“assertive	and	inconsiderate”,	each	time	she	attempted	to	discuss	the	case.		
Ruling	
	Denotes	the	introduction	of	arbitrary	and	unspoken	rules	into	procedures	and	spaces,	which	are	employed	to	confuse	and	inhibit		meaningful	participation	in	deliberation.		
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		During	a	roundtable	discussion,	institutional	representatives	introduced	a	number	of	unspoken	rules	for	discussion,	which	made	participation	in	dialogue	almost	impossible.	They:	pretended	not	to	see	a	raised	hand;	decided	arbitrarily	who	could	speak;	limited	speaking	time;	and,	made	resisters	doubt	the	appropriateness	of	their	questioning.		
Disparaging	
	Acts	of	rendering	practitioners	inept	in	front	of	an	audience	when	they	raise	queries	and	questions	regarding	corrupt	practices.	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		Institutional	representatives	persistently	strove	to	deflect	from	the	issue	in	question	(the	suffering	of	a	child	due	to	police	negligence),	by	‘disparaging’	a	practitioner	as	unhinged	and	volatile	and	trying	to	‘calm	down’	a	completely	composed	person.		
Collective	affirmation	
	Shifting	the	practice	of	gaslighting	to	a	collective	level	through	drawing	in	the	wisdom	of	a	crowd	to	affirm	the	logic	and	sense	of	an	otherwise	seemingly	corrupt	practice.	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		She	shot	me	a	lingering	and	perplexed	look,	exposing	me…	as	somehow	foolish	for	asking	questions,	before	scanning	the	rest	of	the	audience	for	support,	which	she	received	in	the	form	of	a	number	of	eyes	rolled	and	several	sighs	exhaled	in	my	direction,	gaining	collective	affirmation	for	my	‘foolishness’.		
Table	4:	Sub-practice	of	gaslighting		
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In	response,	dispelling	involves	the	perseverance	and	stamina	of	practitioners	in	finding	a	way	 through.	Dispelling	 is	a	 transitive	verb,	which	means	 “to	drive	away	 in	different	directions	 or	 in	 scattered	 order;	 to	 disperse	 by	 force,	 dissipate”	 (Oxford	 English	Dictionary,	2002).	I	chose	this	verb	predominantly	for	its	evocative	power,	to	denote	the	sub-practice	 of	 undoing	 a	 ‘spell’,	 a	 gaslighting	 mirage	 created	 by	 institutional	representatives	 for	 the	purpose	 of	 preventing	 civil	 sector	members	 from	meaningfully	participating.	 This	 sub-practice	 features	 four	 dimensions,	 which	 are	 defined	 and	summarised	in	the	following	table.	
Sub-practice	of	navigating	
corruption	
	
Dimensions	of	the	sub-
practice	
Illustrative	examples	
Dispelling	
	Aimed	at	dissipating	the	abstract,	obscure	and	surreal	weave	of	corrupt	gaslighting	enactments	of	institutional	representatives.	
Reiteration	
	Repetition	of	the	same	message,	almost	word	for	word,	for	the	purposes	of	refocussing	the	discussion	on	the	needs	of	people	being	represented.	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		While	the	police	officers	attempted	to	force	the	discussion	onto	the	‘deviant’	behaviour	of	the	practitioner,	she	kept	repeating	in	a	monotone	that	they	were	gathered	together	to	“talk	about	the	case	of	a	minor	who	suffered	more	violence	due	to	police	negligence”.			
Presenting	evidence	
	The	introduction	of	reports,	analyses,	witness	statements,	and	so	on,	in	an	attempt	to	dispel	the	effects	of	gaslighting	and	refocus	the	discussion.	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		When	a	police	officer	claimed	that	she	acted	according	to	the	law	and	insisted	on	talking	about	her	grievances	instead	of	police	practice,	the	practitioner	started	methodically	citing	statements	made	by	the	victim	and	her	mother,	legal	rules	and	procedures,	firmly	trying	to	shift	the	discussion	back	to	the	case	of	the	minor.		
Tactical	withdrawal	
	Those	instances	where	practitioners	consciously	concede	to	an	unfair	and/or	inaccurate	criticism	in	order	to	redirect	a	conversation	back	to	their	area	of	concern.	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		[The	practitioner]	nodded,	reluctantly	accepting	part	of	the	blame	for	the	‘abuse’	she	had	not	committed,	as	it	was	“the	only	way	to	move	past	the	stupid	thing	and	focus	on	the	real	abuse”.		
Instigating	compassion		Seeks	to	dispel	corrupt	 Ethnographic	journal	extract:		The	practitioner	painted	a	detailed	
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practice	by	provoking	empathetic	feelings	from	institutional	representatives.	 picture	of	the	history	of	violence	the	minor	and	her	mother	had	sustained	over	the	years,	the	consequences	such	a	life	had	borne	on	the	victims,	while	continuously	urging	the	police	officer	to	imagine	such	violence	happening	to	her	daughter.		
Table	5:	Sub-practice	of	dispelling		In	 this	 subsection	 I	 explore	 the	 practices	 of	 gaslighting	 and	 dispelling	 through	 two	episodes.	The	first	offers	a	first-person	experience	of	gaslighting,	my	own	encounter	with	representatives	of	institutions	during	a	roundtable	discussion	of	a	document	no	one	had	read	 and	 that	 was	 not	 circulated	 in	 advance.	 This	 particular	 episode	 draws	 out	 the	dimensions	of	gaslighting	but	also	the	absence	of	a	sub-practice	of	dispelling,	as	I	was	an	inexperienced	 practitioner	 caught	 up	 in	 the	 befuddling	 weave.	 The	 second	 episode	provides	 an	 example	 of	 both	 gaslighting	 and	 dispelling,	 as	 Nina	 (a	WRC	 practitioner)	deals	 with	 police	 officers	 employing	 gaslighting	 practices	 as	 a	 strategy	 to	 close	 down	meaningful	dialogue,	distracting	and	shifting	the	narrative	axis	from	the	victim	of	family	violence	to	a	synthetic	conflict.			
Ethnographic	episode	(gaslighting):	Am	I	going	mad?		It	 was	 not	 until	 I	 experienced	 the	 practice	 of	 gaslighting	 first-hand	 that	 I	 truly	understood	what	practitioners	went	 through	 routinely	 in	 interaction	with	 institutional	representatives	and	how	difficult	 it	 is	 to	dispel	such	practices.	My	experience	occurred	during	a	 roundtable	discussion	about	 the	 application	of	 a	 law	on	gender	 equality	with	government	 representatives.	 I	was	 surprised	 to	 learn	 that	 the	authors	of	 the	 law	were	the	 same	 people	 who	 posed	 as	 the	 sole	 commentators	 on	 the	 law’s	 application	 in	
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practice.	 Moreover,	 the	 roundtable	 discussion	 was	 organised	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	evaluating	 the	 ‘Commentary	 to	 the	 Application	 of	 the	 Law	 on	 Gender	 Equality’	 -	 a	document	that	no	one	present,	apart	from	its	authors,	had	laid	eyes	upon	before.	I	kept	re-reading	 the	 discussion	 agenda,	 as	 I	 could	 not	 believe	 that	 a	 group	 of	 people	 could	stage	a	discussion	about	something	no	one	was	familiar	with.	The	authors-commentators	provided	an	elaborate	introduction	about	the	importance	of	having	such	a	law	within	the	legal	 framework,	 underlining	 the	 status	 of	 the	 law	 as	 a	 “cherished	 milestone	 in	 the	history	of	the	country”,	before	opening	the	floor	for	questions	and	comments.			Doubting	my	own	sanity,	 I	sent	a	panicky	text	to	Lana	(WRC	practitioner)	asking	if	she	was	absolutely	 sure	 the	organisation	had	never	 received	and	read	 the	Commentary,	 to	which	she	texted	back	that	WRC	asked	the	authors	about	the	document	several	times	and	each	 time	 received	 the	 same	 answer:	 “The	 document	 is	 not	 ready	 for	 distribution”.	 I	listened	to	the	audience	comments,	which	were	variants	of	the	same	type	of	praise	and	admiration,	wrapped	in	the	discourse	of	victory	and	historical	significance,	of	collective	affirmation.	Not	one	person	posed	the	obvious	questions	about	whether	the	law	worked	in	practice	and	what	the	experiences	of	NGO	practitioners	were	with	its	application.		I	raised	my	hand	only	to	realise	that	I	was	invisible,	lost	in	whatever	rules	the	facilitator	had	determined	 for	 selecting	 speakers.	After	numerous	unsuccessful	 attempts	 to	make	eye	contact	with	the	facilitator,	I	stood	up	and	walked	to	her,	asking	for	an	opportunity	to	comment.	She	politely	acknowledged	my	request	and	continued	to	ignore	me,	exposing	me	as	‘irrelevant’,	or	a	‘nuisance’	(how	I	noted	my	feelings	at	the	time).	From	the	vantage	point	of	more	experience,	I	later	learned	that	this	was	a	common	practice	of	gaslighting,	where	 institutional	 representatives	 render	 certain	participants	 invisible	 and	 irrelevant	
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through	 the	 subtle	 tactics	 of	 ruling	 the	 deliberation	 spaces	 with	 their	 own	 unspoken	rules,	 such	 as	 pretending	 not	 to	 see	 raised	 hands,	 deciding	who	 can	 speak	 and	when,	delaying	and	setting	arbitrary	limits	on	speaking	time,	as	well	as	making	people	question	the	appropriateness	of	their	acts	(e.g.	Was	my	hand	raised	enough?	Did	I	formulate	my	request	 clearly?	 Was	 I	 allowed	 to	 ask	 questions?).	 After	 drawing	 her	 attention	 once	again,	 she	 approached	 me	 and	 asked	 if	 I	 could	 allow	 a	 ministry	 representative	 to	comment	first.	I	agreed	but	wanted	to	know	why	she	was	insisting	on	it.	“She	is	from	the	ministry”,	 she	 enunciated,	 expecting	 me	 to	 understand,	 which	 I	 did	 not	 at	 the	 time.	Visibly	irritated	with	my	reaction,	she	passed	the	microphone	over	my	shoulder.			It	was	reverence	for	a	‘higher’	authority	that	informed	the	practice	of	the	facilitator.	Even	though	 the	 topic	 was	 equality,	 the	 entire	 event	 was	 abundant	 with	 unequal	 practice	where	the	floor	was	offered	to	institutional	representatives	before	anyone	else.	Speakers	used	 the	masculine	 gender	 in	 speech	 as	 a	 form	of	 neutral	 gender	 (a	 practice	which	 is	legally	sanctioned	by	the	same	law	that	was	being	discussed,	 ironically)	and	addressed	one	 another	 in	 the	 plural	 –	 a	 kind	 of	 formal	 address	 that	 places	 the	 addressed	 at	 a	distance	from	the	addressee	and	can	sometimes	constitute	a	power	imbalance	between	interlocutors.	 For	 instance,	 one	 of	 the	 authors-commentators	 addressed	 some	 of	 the	participants	 using	 the	 singular	 personal	 pronoun	 ‘you’	 (ti),	 while	 they	 in	 turn	 kept	addressing	 the	 authors	 in	 the	 plural	 ‘you’	 (Vi)–	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 demonstrative	 respect,	simultaneously	affirming	 their	own	position	as	 inferior,	which	was	another	 instance	of	ruling	the	deliberation	space	with	subtle	tactics	of	power	(ti	as	inferior,	Vi	as	superior).			When	I	finally	had	the	opportunity	to	speak,	I	asked	the	convenors	to	elaborate	on	their	rationale	 for	providing	the	commentary	for	the	 law	they	had	also	drafted,	as	well	as	to	
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explain	why	we	did	not	receive	the	document	prior	to	the	discussion.	The	main	speaker	amongst	 the	 convenors	 shot	 me	 a	 lingering	 and	 perplexed	 look,	 exposing	 me	 as	somehow	 foolish	 for	 asking	questions,	 before	 she	 scanned	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 audience	 for	support,	which	she	received	in	the	form	of	a	number	of	eyes	rolled	and	sighs	exhaled	in	my	direction,	gaining	collective	affirmation	of	my	‘foolishness’.	My	palms	were	sweating	because	 the	 body	 language	 of	 the	 speaker	 and	 others	 impressed	 upon	 me	 that	 I	 had	asked	 something	entirely	 stupid.	Finally,	 she	 cleared	her	 throat,	 smiled	 innocently	and	said:	“Sorry,	I	don’t	understand”,	another	way	of	exposing	me	as	confused,	or	incapable	of	keeping	up.	When	I	repeated	my	questions,	she	shrugged	and	apologised	for	“simply	not	 understanding”,	 appearing	 confused	 herself	 now,	 as	 if	 I	 was	 speaking	 a	 foreign	language,	and	tried	to	move	the	discussion	on.	But	as	I	saw	the	microphone	being	carried	away,	 I	shouted	across	the	room:	“You	are	the	people	who	wrote	the	 law	and	now	you	have	written	a	 commentary	on	 it	without	 the	 input	of	 those	people	who	actually	have	experience	with	the	application	of	such	laws	in	practice.	Moreover,	no	one	knows	what	aspects	 of	 the	 law	 you	 commented	 on	 because	 no	 one	 has	 read	 it.	Would	 you	 care	 to	comment?”		She	was	visibly	startled	by	 this	 form	of	 confrontation	and	provided	a	clumsy	response	that	the	document	was	not	printed	until	late	the	previous	evening,	making	offended	and	hurt	 facial	 expressions,	 and	 then	she	glanced	around	 the	 room	 for	 support	once	again,	looking	 for	 collective	 affirmation.	 I	 realised	 after	 reflection	 that	 she	was	 assuming	 the	identity	 of	 a	 victim,	 even	 weaponising	 victimhood,	 which	 would	 in	 turn	 render	 me	 a	bully.	However,	before	I	could	say	anything,	people	started	praising	the	Commentary	as	“one	 of	 the	 best	 documents”,	 as	 “a	 document	 we	 will	 be	 returning	 to	 over	 and	 over	again”.	By	this	point	I	was	bathing	in	adrenaline	and	had	lost	all	sense	of	propriety,	so	I	
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shouted	back	 like	a	 feisty	drunkard:	“How	the	hell	do	you	know	it’s	 the	best	when	you	haven’t	read	it?”	Yet,	instead	of	the	kind	of	cinematic	resolution	I	was	hoping	for,	where	the	audience	cracks	under	the	burden	of	a	pointed	question	and	admits	the	fallacy	of	the	staged	event,	my	voice,	alongside	my	sense	of	pride,	drowned	in	a	cacophony	of	the	ode	to	 the	 Commentary.	 I	was	made	 to	 feel	 crazy	 and	 then	 I	 acted	 crazily,	 confirming	 the	identity	subtly	assigned	to	me.			After	 the	 event,	 a	 few	 participants	 approached	 me	 to	 express	 their	 support.	 They	“completely	 agreed”	 with	 me,	 they	 said,	 yet,	 none	 of	 them	 said	 anything	 during	 the	discussion.	“You’re	Nina’s	sister	right?	You	girls	are	feisty!”	one	of	them	said	with	a	smile.	I	remembered	that	a	few	other	people	thought	that	Nina,	a	WRC	practitioner,	and	I	might	be	 related	 and	 only	 then	 did	 I	 panic,	 fearing	 that	 I	 may	 have	 compromised	 WRC’s	relationship	with	these	institutional	representatives.	I	walked	back	to	the	office,	feeling	altogether	stupid,	ashamed	and	angry.	Upon	arrival	a	couple	of	people	asked	me	how	the	discussion	 went.	 I	 came	 clean	 about	 everything,	 expecting	 the	 worst.	 However,	 they	cheered,	laughed	and	congratulated	me	on	my	“baptism	by	fire”.	Luka	and	Andrea	shared	their	 “firsts”	 of	 similar	 situations	 that	 hauntingly	 resembled	 my	 recent	 experience.	Andrea	explained:		
They	want	 you	 to	 feel	 ignorant,	 as	 if	 you’re	 losing	 your	mind…It’s	 their	 tactic	 for	
defeating	you.	My	first	encounter	with	[one	of	the	institutional	representatives]	was	
so	 surreal,	 I	 had	 to	 check	 and	 re-check	myself	 to	make	 sure	 I	 was	 saying	what	 I	
thought	I	was	saying	because	her	reaction	was	completely	incongruent	to	what	was	
coming	 out	 of	my	mouth…She	wanted	 to	 confuse	me	 and	 shut	me	 up…It’s	 a	 well	
rehearsed	 network	 of	 practices:	 destroying	 the	 evidence	 that	we’ve	 seen	with	 our	
own	eyes	and	claiming	it	never	existed,	retracting	and	denying	something	they	said,	
pinning	something	on	us	that	we	didn’t	do,	slandering	us	in	the	media	as	‘enemies	of	
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state’,	inventing	meetings	and	agreement	that	never	happened…you	name	it!	Tactic	
upon	tactic.	But	in	time	we	learned	how	to	counteract:	by	making	sure	there	was	a	
physical,	 written	 trail	 of	 conversations,	 agreements,	 never	 agree	 stuff	 over	 the	
phone…Be	prepared	that	they	will	try	to	turn	the	political	into	a	personal	issue	and	
try	 to	 blame	 you	 for	 everything,	 that	 they	 will	 try	 to	 discredit	 you	 and	 so	
on…Always,	 always	 stay	 on	 mission	 and	 don’t	 get	 caught	 up	 in	 their	 game.	 Be	
guided	 by	 justice,	 know	 your	 laws,	 and	 beat	 them	 through	 evidence…It’s	 tiresome	
and	often	 I	 think	 this	energy	could	be	better	spent	elsewhere,	but	 I	don’t	 think	we	
have	a	choice	in	this	society	eyeballs	deep	in	corruption.		In	the	excerpt	offered	by	Andrea	above,	it	is	evident	that	collaboration	with	institutional	representatives	can	often	be	demanding	and	‘tiresome’,	exerting	‘energy’	that	could	have	been	spent	 in	more	constructive	ways.	By	hijacking	the	time	and	spaces	designated	for	generating	democratic	practice	(deliberation	groups,	meetings,	conferences,	round-table	discussions,	 etc.)	 with	 gaslighting	 practices,	 the	 institutional	 representatives	 actively	restrict	 opportunities	 for	 practitioners	 to	 engage	 meaningfully	 in	 democratisation	processes.	Practitioners	are	forced	to	be	vigilant,	to	stay	ahead	of	corrupt	practices	and	to	 dispel	 those	 already	 enacted.	 Next,	 I	 illustrate	 the	 interplay	 between	 dispelling	 and	gaslighting	with	an	account	of	Nina’s	experiences.			
Ethnographic	episode	(dispelling):	‘Brutalising’	the	police		Throughout	my	fieldwork	I	often	heard	practitioners	complaining	about	being	made	to	“feel	crazy”,	as	if	they	were	“losing	it”,	or	as	if	they	“participated	in	a	completely	different	event”	to	that	of	institutional	representatives.	For	example,	Nina	once	challenged	a	police	officer	 for	neglecting	a	victim	of	domestic	violence	and	exposing	her	 to	 further	abuses.	
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The	 victim	was	 a	minor	 so	 the	 officer	 could	 not	 take	 a	 statement	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	representative	 from	 the	 Centre	 for	 Social	 Protection.	However,	 instead	 of	 advising	 the	victim	to	contact	the	Centre	first,	the	officer	simply	stated	in	the	report	that	there	were	“no	legal	grounds	for	undertaking	further	action”	and	sent	the	victim	home.	When	Nina	reacted	to	this	negligence	by	phoning	the	police	officer	in	question,	and	followed	up	the	call	 with	 a	 visit	 to	 the	 police	 station,	 accompanied	 by	 the	 victim,	 the	 police	 officer	deflected	by	accusing	Nina	of	verbal	abuse.			This	 was	 an	 instance	 of	 weaponising	 victimhood.	 Instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 the	 case	 in	question,	the	officer	refocused	attention	to	her	grievances	and	Nina’s	‘abusive’	behaviour,	distracting	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 a	minor	had	suffered	violence	due	 to	police	negligence.	 I	was	present	during	the	phone	call	made,	alongside	other	members	of	WRC,	and	we	heard	Nina	asking	for	an	explanation,	reiterating	the	legal	obligations	of	police	officers	in	such	cases;	 voices	were	 raised	 on	 both	 sides,	 but	 to	 us	 there	was	 no	 abuse.	 Yet	 the	 police	officer	complained	about	Nina’s	behaviour	to	the	civic	police	monitor29,	as	well	as	to	the	police	inspector,	which	took	a	long	time	to	dispel.	The	issue	was	raised	in	meetings	with	the	 civic	 police	 monitor,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 ‘conferences	 on	 complex	 cases’30,	 and	 it	 was	suggested	 that	 Nina	 was	 “aggressive”,	 “too	 emotional”,	 “assertive	 and	 inconsiderate”,	“out	of	control”,	that	she	should	“curb	her	emotions”,	each	time	she	attempted	to	discuss	the	predicament	of	the	minor.																																																									29	The	civic	police	monitor	is	a	person	who	performs	external	oversight	of	police	practice	on	behalf	of	a	body	called	the	Council	for	Civil	Control.		30	The	conference	on	complex	cases	is	a	long	established	forum	for	the	police	and	WRC	to	discuss	the	most	complex	cases	and	jointly	seek	resolution.	It	is	a	learning	space	where	practitioners	familiarise	themselves	with	police	practice	and	where	members	of	the	police	learn	about	the	ways	in	which	they	could	improve	their	practice.		
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	Each	time,	Nina	had	to	deny	her	stated	abuse,	patiently	comparing	the	police	report	with	the	victim’s	statement	and	explaining	the	 legal	obligations	of	 the	police	 in	dealing	with	minors,	 as	 a	 form	 of	 repeated	 reiteration.	 I	 was	 struck	 by	 her	 calm	 demeanour	 and	patience	at	the	time,	but	later	on	Nina	explained	it	was	important	to	stay	composed,	as	“it	is	their	tactics	to	provoke	you	into	losing	your	temper	so	they	can	dismiss	you	as	crazy”.	She	continued	to	present	the	evidence:	reports,	victim	statements	and	legal	obligations,	as	 if	a	proper	 ‘dialogue’	was	unfolding.	Yet	the	officers	acted	as	 if	 they	had	not	heard	a	word;	they	would	simply	continue	steering	a	different	‘dialogue’,	placing	guilt	upon	Nina,	like	 a	 song	 caught	 in	 a	 loop.	 This	was	 an	 example	 of	 gaslighting,	where	police	 officers	persistently	strove	to	deflect	from	the	issue	in	question	by	‘exposing’	Nina	as	somewhat	unhinged	and	volatile.	The	entire	interaction	resembled	a	dream	sequence	in	which	you	try	 to	 scream	but	no	one	 can	hear	you,	 and	you	 can	make	no	 impact	on	 the	unfolding	event.			Below	is	a	short	excerpt	of	a	verbal	exchange	between	participants	of	a	 ‘conference	on	complex	cases’.	This	conference,	organised	to	discuss	the	case	of	the	minor,	was	almost	entirely	taken	up	with	the	conflict	between	the	police	officer	and	Nina.	It	was	clear	that	the	officer	had	not	acted	according	to	the	law,	yet	both	the	police	and	the	civic	monitor	employed	gaslighting	tactics	to	avoid	talking	about	it:			 Nina:	I	think	we’re	at	risk	of	losing	track	of	the	real	issue	here,	which	is	the	illegal	practice	
in	relation	to	the	minor	and	how	we	can	prevent	it	from	happening	in	the	future…	Civic	monitor:	Nina,	there’s	no	need	for	raised	voices,	we’re	all	friends	here…	Nina:	Who’s	raising	a	voice?	I’m	just…	
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Police	 inspector:	Nina	cares	about	her	clients	and	sometimes	that	leads	her	to	react	in	an	
explosive	manner,	as	a	woman	she	can	be	sometimes	too	emotional	and	can	act	irrationally,	
but	she	has	to	understand	that	we’re	on	the	same	side	here…	Police	officer	who	broke	 the	 law:	I’m	not	a	child	she	can	yell	at…I	have	feelings…I	did	my	
job	conscientiously…she	is	too	assertive	and	bossy…			In	this	extract	different	dimensions	of	gaslighting	intersect	with	one	another.	They	first	expose	Nina	as	unstable,	as	soon	as	she	raises	 the	 issue	regarding	 the	minor,	and	then	collectively	 affirm	 this	 description	 through	 coordinated	 remarks.	 Importantly,	 it	 is	through	 the	 practice	 of	 ruling	 that	 Nina	 becomes	 the	 main	 topic	 of	 the	 conference	 –	through	the	unspoken	decision	to	use	the	time	and	space	reserved	for	a	dialogue	about	a	complex	case	for	an	analysis	of	the	apparently	deviant	behaviour	of	Nina.			She	 is	 exposed	 as	 a	 bully	 –	 someone	 who	 “raises	 [her]	 voice”,	 acts	 in	 an	 “explosive	manner”,	 is	 “too	 emotional”,	 “irrational”,	 who	 “yells”	 at	 “friends”,	 disregards	 their	“feelings”	and	is	“too	assertive”	and	“bossy”.	Simultaneously,	the	police	officers,	as	well	as	the	civic	monitor,	are	portrayed	as	victims	who	suffer	from	Nina’s	“irrational”	outbursts.	It	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 the	 repetition	 of	 the	 noun	 ‘friends’,	 which	 is	 employed	 as	 a	pacifying	 (and	patronising)	 tactic	by	 the	police	 inspector	 and	 civic	monitor	 –	 a	way	 to	position	Nina	as	someone	who	needs	calming	and	to	convey	that	she	should	not	‘attack’	them,	 as	 they	 are	 “on	 the	 same	 side”.	 Such	 positioning	 serves	 to	 transform	 Nina’s	objection	 to	 the	 illegal	 practice	 into	 a	 personal	 conflict.	 The	 exposition	 stages	 a	 stark	polarity	between	‘the	good	guys’	and	a	‘villain’,	and	the	case	of	the	minor	is	pushed	aside	through	 the	 concerted	 action	 of	 police	 officers	 and	 civic	monitor,	 a	 form	 of	 collective	affirmation.		
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	One	 of	 the	 inspectors	 suggests	 a	 “resolution”,	 where	 “[Nina]	 has	 to	 understand	 that	police	 officers	 are	 made	 of	 flesh	 and	 blood;	 they	 make	 mistakes,	 have	 feelings	 and	dignity”,	suggesting	that	Nina	should	be	gentler	in	communication	with	the	police.	At	this	point	Nina	nods,	reluctantly	accepting	part	of	the	blame,	as	it	was	“the	only	way	to	move	past	the	stupid	thing	and	focus	on	the	real	abuse”,	as	she	later	told	me.	This	is	an	example	of	a	tactical	withdrawal,	where	Nina	can	see	no	point	in	resistance	to	gaslighting,	as	that	would	mean	more	time	wasted.			As	the	conversation	continued	past	this	extract,	it	was	finally	redirected	to	the	case	of	the	minor,	 and	 Nina	 used	 the	 opportunity	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 repercussions	 of	 the	negligent	practice,	instigating	an	emotional	response	from	the	challenged	police	officer.	Nina	painted	a	detailed	picture	of	the	history	of	violence	the	minor	and	her	mother	had	sustained	over	the	years,	presenting	evidence	and	describing	the	consequences	of	such	a	life	for	the	victims,	while	continuously	urging	the	police	officer	to	imagine	such	violence	happening	 to	 her	 daughter	 –	 a	 form	of	 seeking	 to	 instigate	 compassion.	 People’s	 body	language	visibly	changed	around	the	room	as	a	consequence,	and	the	officer	responsible	for	the	negligent	practice	dropped	her	eyes,	blood	rushing	to	her	cheeks.	In	the	end,	Nina	offered	 help	 in	 a	 carefully	 worded	 question:	 “How	 can	 we	 assist	 you	 in	 improving	practice,	drawing	on	our	experience?”	This	was	tactical	withdrawal,	framing	the	question	around	 ‘improvement	 of	 practice’	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 placing	 blame	 on	 the	 individual	officer.	 The	 participants	 agreed	 on	 a	 series	 of	 educational	 sessions	 and	 workshops	provided	by	WRC	for	the	police,	a	practice	that	is	still	ongoing.		
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Gaslighting	and	dispelling	summary	
	I	 explored	 the	 corrupt	 practice	 of	 ‘gaslighting’.	 First,	 I	 highlighted	 the	 ways	 in	 which	institutional	representatives	ruled	the	spaces	designated	for	deliberation	with	unspoken,	yet	well-rehearsed	acts	(delaying,	ignoring,	asserting	power	through	styles	of	addressing	others,	 etc.),	 in	 order	 to	 confuse	 and	 sabotage	 practitioners.	 Second,	 I	 explored	 how	representatives	 engaged	 in	 weaponising	 victimhood,	 assuming	 the	 identity	 of	 victim	when	faced	with	difficult	questions	–	a	strategy	that	redirected	focus.	Third,	I	underlined	the	ways	 in	which	representatives	exposed	practitioners	 in	 front	of	others	as	somehow	inept	 or	 unstable	 in	 order	 to	 weaken	 their	 credibility.	 Finally,	 I	 highlighted	 how	gaslighting	gained	traction	through	collective	affirmation,	where	perpetrators	teamed	up	against	the	‘target’.				In	 contrast,	 I	 explored	 the	 sub-practice	 of	 practitioners	 –	 ‘dispelling’.	 First,	 I	 analysed	how	practitioners	combated	corruption	through	reiteration	–	relentless	repetition	of	the	issues	 they	wished	 to	 convey.	 This	 dimension	 of	 dispelling	 was	 closely	 related	 to	 the	second	 –	 presenting	 evidence,	 where	 practitioners	 engaged	 in	 counterbalancing	gaslighting	by	repetitive	 listing	of	evidence	(reports,	victim	statements,	protocols,	etc.).	The	third	dimension	was	tactical	withdrawal,	where	practitioners	tactically	conceded	to	gaslighting,	accepting	the	‘blame’	in	order	to	shift	the	discussion	back	on	track.	Finally,	I	explored	 how	 practitioners	 instigated	 compassion	 from	 their	 interlocutors,	 a	 tactic	devised	to	dispel	corruption	in	an	embodied	way.			
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I	now	move	on	to	the	next	subsection,	where	I	explore	the	creep	of	‘private’	patriarchal	norms	into	public	spaces,	and	‘publicising’	responses.			
7.2.	Publicising	vs.	Privatising			I	 refer	 to	 the	 enactment	 of	 patriarchal	 norms	 by	 institutional	 representatives	 as	
privatising,	denoting	the	corrupt	creep	of	purportedly	‘private’	and	‘domestic’	norms	into	the	 public	 sphere.	 Such	 patriarchal	 social	 norms	 shape	 gender	 relations,	 and	 are	communicated	 through	 nationalist	 politics,	 religion,	 a	 gendered	 interpretation	 of	 past	events	 and	 everyday	humour	based	 on	 traditional	 stereotypes	 concerning	women	 and	men.	Such	norms	dictate	the	preservation	of	a	male-dominated	family	unit	and	condemn	divorce,	 regardless	of	 circumstances	such	as	violence.	Through	 these	norms,	males	are	posited	 as	 the	 rightful	 heirs	 to	 property;	 male	 children	 have	 preferential	 status	 in	 a	household,	 where	 they	 are	 pampered	 and	 often	 exempted	 from	 domestic	 duties	(CEDAW,	2017).	Meanwhile,	women’s	bodies	are	violated	due	to	an	informal	pressure	to	produce	 male	 offspring,	 with	 female	 pregnancies	 often	 aborted	 (GREVIO,	 2017).	 The	problems	such	patriarchal	norms	or	gender	relations	instigate	(e.g.	family	violence)	are	often	 perceived	 as	 ‘private’	 matters,	 something	 that	 should	 be	 confined	 to	 people’s	homes,	outside	the	domain	of	institutions	and	hidden	from	public	view.			Yet,	Montenegro	is	a	formal	liberal	democracy	where	liberty	and	equality	are	guaranteed	by	 the	 constitution,	 various	 international	 conventions	 and	 local	 legislation.	 Patriarchal	norms,	 however,	 often	 seep	 into	 the	 institutional	 fabric	 and	 hold	 greater	 power	 in	guiding	the	practice	of	institutional	representatives	than	legal	prescriptions	do.		
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In	 contrast,	 I	 call	 the	 sub-practice	 of	 NGO	 practitioners	 seeking	 to	 reform	 ‘privatising’	tendencies	 as	publicising	 (public-ising),	 a	 performative	 practice	 that	 seeks	 to	 close	 the	gap	 between	 professed	 public	 standards	 of	 liberty	 and	 equality	 and	 the	 ‘privatised’	practice	of	public	officials.	Here,	 the	bodies	of	practitioners	 come	 to	mark	 the	physical	distinction	between	private	and	public,	challenging	identity	through	bodily	acts.	This	 is	also	a	practice	that	gains	power	through	repetition,	instigating	and	normalising	a	series	of	alternative	performativities	to	the	‘private’.			I	illustrate	the	corrupt	practice	of	privatising	through	an	ethnographic	episode	featuring	Lara’s	experience	with	the	Centre	for	Social	Protection	(CSP).	Lara’s	experience	with	CSP	offers	 insight	 into	 how	 the	 seepage	 of	 patriarchal	 norms	 into	 institutional	 practice	exposes	 women	 to	 violence.	 This	 episode,	 in	 particular,	 depicts	 the	 precarious	 living	conditions	of	women	 in	corrupt	 settings.	 I	 then	explore	publicising	 through	an	episode	concerning	 Andrea	 and	 the	 police	 in	 order	 to	 surface	 the	ways	 in	which	 practitioners	combat	 such	 corrupt	 practice.	 In	 situations	 such	 as	 this	 one,	 practitioners	 often	 put	themselves	 in	harm’s	way	 in	order	 to	exemplify	and	demonstrate	 the	professed	public	standards	of	tending	to	issues	of	family	violence.				
Ethnographic	episode	(privatising):	The	Centre	for	Social	Protection	(CSP)		In	 this	 episode	 I	 explore	 a	 recurring	 issue	 concerning	 CSP	 -	 the	 tendency	 of	 social	workers	to	protect	abusers	instead	of	victims	of	family	violence.	WRC	practitioners	often	complained	 how	 social	 workers	 tended	 to	 confuse	 mediation	 with	 reconciliation,	 or	more	precisely,	“forcing	women	to	stay	with	their	abusers	no	matter	what”	(Lara)	–	an	
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attitude	 that	 often	 leaves	 women	 trapped	 in	 violent	 homes	 without	 means	 of	 escape.	Moreover,	 CSP	 often	 disregards	 legal	 protocol	 and	 by	 doing	 so	 enables	more	 violence.	The	corrupt	sub-practice	of	privatising	features	three	dimensions,	which	are	defined	and	summarised	in	the	following	table:		
Corrupt	sub-practice	
	
Dimensions	of	sub-practice	 Illustrative	examples	
Privatising		Institutional	representatives’	tendency	to	allow	patriarchal	norms	to	guide	their	practice	instead	of	legal	regulations.	
Dismissing		The	process	of	inhibiting	women’s	agency	through	cynicism,	doubt	and	ignorance.	Such	dismissal	always	privileges	men	(often	an	abuser)	over	women.		
A	victim	of	family	violence	talking	about	CSP	representatives:			“I	have	a	feeling	that	if	he	killed	me	in	front	of	them	they	would	claim	he	didn’t…”	
Arbitrariness		Applying	legal	procedures	and	protocols	in	an	arbitrary	and	selective	way	so	that	they	fit	patriarchal	norms.	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		When	the	victim	continued	to	report	violence,	CSP	representatives	informed	the	police	without	conducting	a	prior	risk	assessment	or	providing	a	protection	plan	(recording	a	history	of	violence),	exposing	the	victim	to	more	abuse	at	home	when	her	husband	found	out	she	had	reported	him.			
Perpetuating	violence	
	Institutional	representatives	actively	contributing	to	the	culture	of	gender-based	and	domestic	violence	by	siding	with	male	abusers	rather	than	the	victims	of	violence.	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		Having	no	recorded	history	of	abuse,	the	woman	could	not	provide	evidence	of	violence	to	the	court	and	instead	was	found	guilty	of	‘verbal	abuse’	after	her	husband	filed	charges	against	her.			
Table	6:	Sub-practice	of	privatising		A	 woman	 came	 to	 the	 WRC	 premises	 to	 seek	 assistance	 in	 relation	 to	 her	 abusive	partner.	 She	wanted	 a	 divorce	 and	 to	 assume	 custody	 over	 her	 children,	which	meant	that	WRC	was	 supposed	 to	 help	 her	 navigate	 the	 institutional	 system,	 assisting	 her	 to	
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part	 ways	 with	 her	 partner	 and	 ensuring	 further	 protection.	 Cases	 such	 as	 this	 are	standard	 in	WRC’s	work	 and	 assisting	 the	woman	 in	 question	was	 not	 perceived	 as	 a	particularly	 unusual	 task.	However,	 the	woman	 revealed	 that	 she	 had	 already	 tried	 to	leave	 her	 partner	 before	 seeking	 WRC’s	 help	 but	 that	 CSP	 had	 hindered	 her	 by	encouraging	a	reconciliation	with	her	partner.	In	the	words	of	the	woman:		
They	want	us	to	get	back	together,	allegedly	for	our	children’s	sake,	but	our	children	suffer	
because	 of	 him,	 as	 well	 as	 my	 parents,	 my	 friends…CSP	 treats	 him	 like	 some	 deity	 and	
dismisses	everything	I	say.	I	have	a	feeling	that	if	he	killed	me	in	front	of	them	they	would	
claim	he	didn’t…		In	 this	brief	extract	we	see	 the	creep	of	 the	private	 into	 the	public,	as	CSP	assumes	 its	role	is	to	repair	a	‘private’	matter.	Furthermore,	the	woman	posits	CSP	as	siding	with	her	abusive	husband	to	the	extent	that	it	would	not	believe	her	even	if	“he	killed”	her,	which	denotes	a	complete	erasure	of	her	agency.	WRC	soon	discovered	that	CSP	had	informed	the	police	of	the	abuse,	standard	practice	in	such	situations.	However,	it	did	so	without	conducting	 a	 risk	 assessment	 or	 producing	 a	 protection	 plan	 –	 important	 documents,	which	record	the	type	of	violence	a	woman/family	suffers,	the	profile	of	the	abuser	(e.g.	whether	he	has	a	history	of	violence)	and	further	assessment	(e.g.	whether	a	woman	and	children	need	to	be	taken	to	a	shelter).	These	are	crucial	steps	in	cases	of	family	violence	because	they	ensure	a	sort	of	public	accountability	and	record	of	abuse,	chronicling	that	the	violence	has	occurred	but	also	guiding	the	decisions	of	the	police	and	judiciary	(e.g.	how	to	protect	the	victim	before	tipping	off	the	abuser	that	she	has	reported	him,	etc.).	Disregarding	elements	of	 legal	protocol	denotes	the	tendency	of	CSP	representatives	to	favour	abusive	men	rather	than	victims	of	violence.	
	232	
	Upon	being	informed	by	CSP	about	the	case,	the	police	phoned	the	abuser	to	invite	him	to	 an	 “informative	 conversation”,	 which	 in	 turn	 sparked	 further	 family	 violence	 –	 the	abuser	 physically	 assaulted	 the	 victim	 as	 punishment	 for	 reporting	 the	 violence.	Suspecting	that	the	woman	would	report	the	assault,	 the	husband	filed	charges	against	her	(for	verbal	abuse)	and	due	to	a	lack	of	faithfully	recorded	history	of	abuse	from	CSP,	the	 court	 ruled	 against	 the	 woman.	 What	 this	 example	 reveals	 is	 that	 the	 woman	 in	question	 is	 condemned	 to	 victimhood	 by	 both	 her	 partner	 and	 the	 institutions	 that	protect	him.	CSP	actively	participated	 in	perpetuating	violence	 through	 its	dismissal	of	the	woman’s	testimony,	as	well	as	its	arbitrary	application	of	rules	and	procedures.	CSP	not	only	rendered	her	suffering	invisible,	 it	also	disregarded	legal	protocol	 in	favour	of	‘private’	 patriarchal	 norms,	 and	 therefore	 subjected	 her	 to	 even	 more	 violence	 and	injustice.		Immediately	after	hearing	about	 the	violence	 the	woman	had	 to	endure	 from	both	her	partner	and	the	institutions	that	were	supposed	to	protect	her,	Lara	cleared	her	schedule	and	urgently	initiated	a	series	of	processes,	where	she:	briefed	a	lawyer	about	the	case,	allowing	 her	 to	 immediately	 appeal	 the	 ruling;	 drafted	 the	 necessary	 paperwork;	compiled	a	risk	assessment	and	contacted	the	police,	CSP	and	the	prosecutor;	and	made	enquiries	about	potential	employment	for	the	woman.	In	addition,	Lara	discovered	that	the	partner	was	an	influential	figure	in	Montenegrin	society,	a	fact	she	suspected	played	a	role	in	influencing	the	practice	of	CSP,	the	police	and	judiciary.	Lara	said:			
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We’re	talking	about	a	particularly	cruel	person	employing	all	forms	of	violence	recognised	
by	 law,	 but	 that	 obviously	 didn’t	 matter.	 She	 needed	 assistance	 to	 break	 away	 from	 the	
violence	but	she	didn’t	get	it	because	CSP	was	bullying	her,	pressuring	her	to	go	back	to	him,	
trapping	her	like	a	prisoner.	She	revealed	her	husband	is	actually	[a	prominent	member	of	
the	 community].	 And	 then	 we	 understood…CSP	 found	 out	 who	 he	 was	 and	 started	
pressuring	 the	 poor	woman	 to	 go	 back	 to	 him.	 And	 the	 ruling	 against	 her	 –	 I	 can’t	 even	
explain	how	furious	that	makes	me	feel.	Better	not	run	afoul	of	the	Big	Man,	you	know	–	he	
must	 be	 protected	 and	 preserved,	 you	 know.	 Horror!	 So	 we	 acted	 quickly,	 no	 time	 to	
lose…working	days,	nights,	weekends…		Here	we	 see	 an	 example	 of	 a	 public	 institution	distorting	 its	 role	 to	 accommodate	 the	interests	 of	 the	 patriarchal	 ‘Big	 Man’.	 A	 social	 norm	 has	 seeped	 into	 the	 institutional	fabric.	The	status	of	the	woman	is	evocatively	constructed	through	employing	the	noun	“prisoner”,	a	woman	trapped	in	a	society	where	the	male	authority	of	the	Big	Man	rules	both	 public	 and	 private	 spheres.	 Under	 pressure	 from	 a	 society	 that	 favours	 men,	 as	manifested	through	the	 irresponsible	and	ultimately	 illegal	practice	of	CSP,	 the	woman	whom	 the	 practitioners	 want	 to	 protect	 has	 given	 up	 fighting	 the	 abuser	 and	‘surrendered’	herself	to	patriarchal	forces.	Andrea	said:		
in	the	end	she	gave	up,	surrendered…too	much	violence	and	injustice	for	her	to	handle…We	
can	only	help	if	she	wants	to	be	helped,	but	that	doesn’t	mean	I’m	ok	with	it.	I’m	gutted	and	
angry	and	scared	for	her	wellbeing…we	came	too	late	in	the	process,	I	think.	If	it	wasn’t	for	
the	 ignorant	 CSP	 she	 could	 have	 been	 helped,	we	would	 have	 had	more	 time	 to	 help	 her	
empower	 herself	 through	 our	 psychological	 programme	 and	 employment	 and	we’d	make	
the	institutions	do	their	jobs	and	detain	the	abuser,	however	‘important’	he	might	be.			Both	 the	 spouse	and	CSP	are	positioned	as	malefactors	against	 the	woman	 (posited	as	“trapping”,	 “pressuring”,	 “bullying”	 the	 woman),	 who	 is	 rendered	 a	 victim	 twice	 over.	With	 noticeable	 lament	 in	 her	 voice,	 Andrea’s	 story	 reflects	 the	 problem	 –	 that	 of	 the	
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privatising	 practice	 of	 institutional	 representatives,	 which	 act	 similarly	 to	 abusive	partners.	 By	 dismissing	women’s	 suffering	 and	 testimonies	 as	 irrelevant,	 and	 through	arbitrary	 application	 of	 existing	 rules	 and	 procedures,	 institutional	 representatives	merely	perpetuate	violence,	imprisoning	victims	in	a	vicious	cycle	of	abuse.				
Ethnographic	episode	(publicising):	challenging	police	practice		While	 in	 the	 previous	 episode	 I	 highlighted	 the	 corrupt	 practice	 of	 institutional	representatives,	in	this	episode	I	focus	predominantly	on	the	practice	of	practitioners	in	response	 –	 publicising,	 the	ways	 in	which	WRC	members	 enact	 the	 publicly	 professed	standards	 of	 legal	 practice.	 In	 particular,	 I	 explore	 Andrea’s	 experience	 with	 police	officers,	who	can	be	guided	in	their	practice	by	patriarchal	norms	rather	than	legal	ones.	The	 definition	 of	 this	 sub-practice,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 dimensions,	 are	 summarised	 in	 the	following	table:		
Sub-practice	of	navigating	
corruption	
	
Dimensions	of	sub-practice	 Illustrative	examples	
Publicising		The	ways	in	which	practitioners	enact	standards	of	legal	practice	in	response	to	the	corrupt	sub-practice	of	privatising.	
Renegotiating	borders	
between	‘private’	and	
‘public’			Practitioners’	deployment	of	their	own	bodies	for	the	purpose	of	marking	the	border	between	private	and	public	spheres.	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		When	police	officers	attempted	to	ignore	the	law,	a	practitioner	physically	wedged	herself	between	the	victim	on	the	one	side,	and	the	abuser	and	the	police	on	the	other,	in	order	to	demonstrate	that	violence	is	a	matter	for	the	police	and	that	it	should	not	be	hidden	behind	the	closed	doors	of	a	private	home.		
Repetition		Denotes	the	repetitive	citing	of	rules	and	procedures,	as	defined	in	law,	in	front	of	the	
Andrea,	interview	extract:		“I	spelled	out	to	them	[the	police]	special	measures	which	state	that	the	abuser	has	to	be	removed	from	the	
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institutional	representatives	in	an	attempt	to	break	through	the	patriarchal	mindset	and	normalise	legally	prescribed	practice.	
house	immediately	without	a	court	order…I	reminded	them	about	the	protection	of	victims	and	about	family	safety	over	and	over	again…”			
Embodying	the	discourse	of	
law		Practitioners’	enactment	of	laws,	established	rules	and	procedures,	through	their	body/speech	acts,	for	the	purpose	of	exemplifying	the	law	in	practice.		
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		By	positioning	herself	between	the	victim	and	abuser	the	practitioner	enacted	the	law	through	her	own	bodily	placement	-	the	procedure	that	police	officers	should	follow	–	providing	a	demonstrative	example	for	them	to	follow.	Simultaneously,	she	cited	the	legal	rules	and	procedures.			
Table	7:	Sub-practice	of	publicising		I	had	an	opportunity	to	observe	and	listen	to	police	officers	during	one	of	the	numerous	educational	 seminars	 provided	 by	 WRC,	 held	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 improving	 police	practice.	 I	noticed	that	while	the	police	officers	appeared	attentive	and	engaged	during	the	seminars,	some	of	them	would	often	exhibit	resistance	towards	the	teaching	material	during	breaks.	During	one	of	 these,	 I	 joined	a	group	of	officers.	One	 complained	about	how	practices	they	were	taught	“would	never	be	applicable	to	Montenegro”,	as	they	were	“too	human-rightsy	and	rigid”.	I	asked	him	to	clarify	what	he	meant	and	he	proceeded	to	list	some	stereotypical	opinions	about	a	man	being	the	“head	of	the	family”	who	“decides	on	everything”,	and	concluded	that	“whether	and	how	a	husband	is	going	to	argue	with	his	wife	 is	no	one’s	business”,	 suggesting	 that	violence	 is	a	private	matter.	He	received	support	in	the	form	of	a	nod	from	another	male	colleague,	which	encouraged	him	to	tell	us	about	a	case	from	his	work:		
Yeah…this	bloke	came	in	to	complain	about	his	wife.	His	wife!	A	hero,	eh?	So	I	started	jotting	
down	 things	 he	 was	 saying,	 my	 superior	 was	 there	 and	 all…so	 I	 write	 and	 listen	 to	 this	
chicken	whimpering	about	his	wife	assaulting	him	 [mocking	 laughter]	and	 I	 can’t	 believe	
the	crap	I’m	hearing…but	I	do	my	duty	–	the	boss	is	there.	After	we	finished,	I	took	him	aside	
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and	told	him	in	the	friendliest	possible	manner:	‘Listen,	mate,	don’t	embarrass	yourself	like	
this	 –	 next	 time	 [incomprehensible	 mutter]!	 Show	 her	 her	 place!’	 [collective	 laughter,	
excluding	the	woman	police	officer	present].			What	 is	evident	 in	this	excerpt	 is	 that	 the	police	officer	 is	guided	 in	his	practice	by	the	patriarchal	norms	of	masculinity,	where	men	‘cannot’	be	recognised	as	victims	of	family	violence,	 as	 it	 is	 somehow	 shameful	 and	 ‘anti-heroic’,	 “whimpering”	 and	“embarrass[ing]”.	Women,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 are	 posited	 as	 the	 ‘natural’	 receivers	 of	violence	–	a	medium	through	which	male	authority	is	assumed	and	women	are	“shown	[their]	 place”.	 Not	 only	 does	 the	 police	 officer	 dismiss	 the	 testimony	 of	 the	 victim	 of	violence	and	disregard	rules	and	procedures,	applying	 them	arbitrarily	(only	when	the	“superior”	is	present),	but	he	also	encourages	more	violence.	Furthermore,	it	 is	evident	from	 the	 ‘advice’	 the	 police	 officer	 gives	 to	 the	 victim	 that	 he	 wishes	 to	 ‘correct’	 the	direction	of	violence	so	that	it	fits	the	patriarchal	framework	of	violent	relations.	Below,	Andrea	recounts	her	experience	with	the	police	in	a	case	of	domestic	violence:			
After	 receiving	a	 call	 I	 rushed	 to	 the	 victim’s	address.	 I	 found	 the	police	at	 the	 front	door	
chatting	casually	with	the	abuser,	while	the	woman	pleaded	for	help,	distressed,	bruised	and	
in	tears.	They	were	trying	to	force	reconciliation!	Upon	my	insisting,	one	of	them	admitted	
that	the	abuser	promised	he	wouldn’t	do	it	again.	I	kept	listing	the	rules	on	a	loop	so	they	
could	 hear	well…It	was	 a	 guy	with	 a	 history	 of	 violent	 behaviour	 on	 his	 record!	 To	 their	
surprise,	I	stood	between	the	woman	on	the	one	side	and	the	abuser	and	the	police	on	the	
other	 side.	 I	 entered	 the	 house	 and	 so	 breached	 the	 law,	 could	 have	 been	 arrested,	 but	 I	
didn’t	 care	and	 I	guess	 the	 fact	 that	 the	police	aren’t	 familiar	with	 the	 laws	played	 in	my	
favour	this	time,	ironically.	Anyway,	I	spelled	out	to	them	special	measures	which	state	that	
the	abuser	has	to	be	removed	from	the	house	immediately	without	a	court	order…I	shouted	
at	 them,	reminded	 them	about	 the	protection	of	victims	and	about	 family	 safety	over	and	
over	 again…They	 must	 have	 thought	 I	 had	 lost	 my	 mind	 but	 luckily	 for	 all	 of	 us	 they	
arrested	 him,	 so	 my	 intervention	 worked.	 It	 was	 risky,	 I’m	 aware,	 but	 it	 worked,	 and	
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sometimes	we	need	to	get	out	on	the	line	and	face	the	violence,	use	whatever	means	possible	
to	prevent	it	from	happening	in	the	future.		The	episode	illustrates	that	publicising	practice	includes	placing	oneself	in	a	vulnerable	position,	 exposed	 to	 violence,	 and	 even,	 paradoxically,	 breaching	 the	 law	 in	 order	 to	enforce	it.		The	interplay	between	privatising	and	publicising	is	particularly	visible	in	the	selection	of	verbs	in	Andrea’s	story.	Upon	Andrea’s	repeated	enquiring	as	to	why	the	abuser	has	not	been	detained,	as	per	law,	one	of	the	police	officers	states	that	the	abuser	“promised”	he	“wouldn’t”	do	it	again.	Such	an	answer	denotes	an	enactment	of	the	patriarchal	norms	through	which	violence	is	normalised	and	tolerated	and	where	a	‘promise’	given	by	the	abuser	 (man-to-man)	has	greater	 influence	over	police	practice	 than	 the	 law.	Andrea’s	rejection	of	such	an	answer	as	unacceptable	(unsound),	leaves	them	“surprise[d]”,	which	further	denotes	the	degree	to	which	patriarchal	norms	are	entrenched	in	police	practice	–	they	cannot	perceive	the	flaw	in	their	logic.	However,	it	also	prompts	Andrea	to	cite	the	“rules”,	repeating	them	“on	a	loop”	as	if	trying	to	drill	the	words	of	the	law	through	the	patriarchal	mindset	of	police	officers.		Andrea’s	 further	 response	 is	 to	 physically	 wedge	 herself	 between	 the	 police	 and	 the	abuser	 on	 the	 one	 side	 and	 the	 victim	 of	 family	 violence	 on	 the	 other.	 She	 “stands”	between	them,	renegotiating	the	border	between	public	and	private:	by	positioning	the	abuser	and	 the	police	on	 the	one	side,	Andrea	signals	 that	abuse	 is	a	matter	 for	public	institutions	and	that	the	police	need	to	address	it.	Simultaneously,	by	shielding	the	victim	with	her	body	in	the	family	home,	Andrea	denotes	that	the	woman	should	remain	in	the	
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home	 and	 be	 protected,	 while	 the	 abuser	 should	 be	 “removed”	 from	 it	 and	 detained.	Positioning	herself	in	this	way,	she	enacts	the	legal	procedure	that	police	officers	should	follow	through	her	own	bodily	placement,	a	demonstrative	example	for	them	to	follow.	Moreover,	 Andrea	 transforms	 into	 an	 embodiment	 of	 the	 ‘letter	 of	 the	 law’	 by	simultaneously	 “spell[ing]	 out”	 the	 legal	 prescriptions	 that	 should	 be	 applied	 in	situations	such	as	this	one.	She	repeatedly	“reminds”	the	officers	of	their	legal	obligations	while	 placing	 herself	 in	 jeopardy	 (“get	 out	 on	 the	 line”),	 as	 she	 risks	 “arrest”	 and	“violence”.		It	is	interesting	to	note	here	Andrea’s	stated	fear	of	being	arrested.	She	admits	a	“breach”	of	 the	 law	 by	 interfering	 in	 police	 practice	 and	 in	 this	 respect	 her	 fear	 is	 justifiable.	However,	 her	 fear	 also	 denotes	 the	 perceived	 likeliness	 that	 the	 police	 will	 be	 more	disposed	 to	 arrest	 a	woman	 for	 breaching	 the	 law	 than	 a	man	who	 commits	 a	 violent	crime.	The	fear	of	arrest	on	Andrea’s	part	further	signals	an	expectation	that	the	rule	of	law	 is	more	 likely	 to	be	enacted	when	 it	aligns	with	 the	rule	of	patriarchal	norms	 that	shape	gender	relations.			In	terms	of	 the	nouns	Andrea	employs,	 it	 is	worth	noting	the	abundance	of	 legal	 terms	such	 as:	 “law”,	 “special	 measures”,	 “court	 order”,	 “family	 safety”,	 “intervention”,	“protection”.	Such	vocabulary,	mingled	with	her	embodied	acts,	seems	to	compensate	for	the	lack	of	legal	foundation	for	police	practice,	as	if	she	is	trying	to	trigger	the	memory	of	officers	about	the	legal	obligations	they	suppress	in	favour	of	patriarchal	norms.	This	is	where	we	learn	that	she	enacts	the	law	not	solely	by	placing	her	body	at	the	scene	of	the	crime,	 but	 also	 through	 particular	 speech	 acts,	 hoping	 to	 prevent	 further	 “violence”.	Employing	the	adverbial	phrase	“over	and	over	again”	denotes	that	the	speech	acts	are	
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repeated,	which	signals	Andrea’s	desire	to	make	sure	that	the	message	will	be	received,	but	also	that	she	will	be	persistent	and	undeterred	in	this	matter.			
Privatising	and	publicising	summary		I	provided	insight	into	the	corrupt	sub-practices	of	institutional	representatives,	termed	
privatising,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 counter-practice	 of	 publicising.	 I	 explored	 how	 institutional	representatives	 mimicked	 ‘private’	 patriarchal	 norms	 of	 gender	 relations,	 making	violence	performed	by	men	 invisible,	and	therefore	protecting	and	 further	entrenching	the	male	authority	of	the	abuser.	I	then	provided	a	glimpse	into	the	consequences	of	such	‘privatising’	 for	 those	 who	 suffered	 violence.	 Namely,	 in	 ‘privatising’	 the	 institutional	environment,	 access	 to	 legal	 norms	 became	 increasingly	 closed	 off,	 which	 rendered	women	and	children	prisoners	of	a	patriarchal	and	violent	normative	framework.		I	explored	the	sub-practice	of	WRC	practitioners	as	publicising	 -	 their	attempts	to	close	the	gap	between	the	professed	public	standards	of	liberty	and	equality	and	the	practice	of	public	officials.	I	explored	three	dimensions	to	the	sub-practice	of	publicising.	First,	I	explored	how	practitioners	renegotiated	the	border	between	private	and	public	spheres.	This	was	an	embodied	practice	where	 the	bodies	of	practitioners	 symbolically	marked	the	distinction	between	public	and	private	(as	stated	in	law),	challenging	the	identities	of	institutional	 representatives	 in	 the	 process.	 Second,	 I	 demonstrated	 that	 this	 was	 a	practice	 that	 gained	 power	 through	 repetition,	 instigating	 and	 normalising	 a	 series	 of	alternative	 performativities	 to	 the	 ‘private’.	 Finally,	 I	 explored	 practitioners’	 efforts	 to	exert	authority	through	embodying	the	discourse	of	law.		
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7.3.	Unsettling	vs.	Colonising		While	 carrying	 out	 my	 fieldwork	 I	 often	 encountered	 practitioners	 using	 the	 term	‘GONGO’	 to	 describe	 corrupt	 NGOs	 that	 uncritically	 promote	 government	 policies	 and	practices,	 regardless	of	how	controversial,	and	which	are	amply	compensated	 for	 their	efforts.	Such	organisations	are	formally	no	different	to	any	other	NGO,	in	the	sense	that	that	 they	 are	 registered	 as	 NGOs	 in	 Ministry	 of	 Interior	 records,	 have	 a	 mission	 and	vision,	run	programmes	and	projects	and	can	be	partially	funded	by	foreign	donors.	It	is	therefore	 difficult	 to	 prove	 that	 an	 organisation	 is	 indeed	 a	 GONGO,	 but	 “for	 an	experienced	observer	there	are	clues	that	could	indicate	whether	an	organisation	is	a	bot	or	not”,	in	the	words	of	Luka,	a	practitioner.	GONGOs	do	not	necessarily	try	to	hide	their	loyalty	 to	 the	 government,	 although	 they	 do	 not	 claim	 it	 explicitly	 either,	 as	 such	revelations	might	instigate	open	challenge.		In	 this	 subsection	 I	 explore	 the	 interplay	 between	 corrupt	 GONGO	 practices	 I	 term	
colonising	and	those	of	WRC	practitioners,	which	I	refer	to	as	unsettling.	I	chose	the	term	‘colonising’	 in	 order	 to	 denote	 GONGOs’	 practice	 of	 infiltrating	 NGO	 spaces	 and	sabotaging	 their	work.	 Colonising	manifests	 across	 three	 dimensions	 that	 I	 define	 and	illustrate	in	the	following	table.		
Corrupt	sub-practice	
	
Dimensions	of	corrupt	sub-
practice	
	
Illustrative	examples	
Colonising		Denotes	the	ways	in	which	GONGOs	sabotage	the	work	of	NGOs	by	infiltrating	spaces	
Erosion		Manoeuvres	employed	for	the	purpose	of	discrediting	NGO	members,	but	also	hijacking	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		The	GONGO	representative	obstructed	our	work	by	ignoring	and	avoiding	us	when	we	were	required	to	draft	
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designed	for	the	generation	of	democratic	practice.	 their	time,	energy	and	space,	eroding	their	capacity	to	generate	democratic	practice.	 documents	together,	eroding	time.	When	she	involved	herself	in	the	work	she	kept	producing	large	documents	for	us	to	read	and	proof-check,	eroding	our	energy.			
Foreclosure		The	deployment	of	strategies	aimed	at	closing	down	meaningful	dialogue	and	disabling	challenge	and	opposition.		
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		When	challenged	to	support	her	claims	and	stances	in	face-to-face	encounters,	a	GONGO	representative	deflected,	became	evasive	and	then	completely	halted	the	discussion	by	refusing	to	provide	justifications.		
Self-exclusion		Abandoning	conversations	when	challenged	and	obstructing	meaningful	resolution	of	an	issue	or	project.			
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		When	practitioners	were	required	to	draft	a	joint	statement	for	the	UN	committee,	the	GONGO	practitioner	delayed,	stalled	and	avoided	meeting	us.			
Table	8:	Sub-practice	of	colonising		I	term	the	sub-practice	of	WRC	‘unsettling’	in	order	to	highlight	the	arduousness	of	such	endeavours,	where	practitioners	have	to	be	constantly	vigilant	of	GONGOs’	manoeuvring	and	 be	 prepared	 to	 respond.	 Such	 engagement	 is	 time-consuming	 and	 tiresome,	 as	practitioners	have	 to	 actively	prevent	 colonising	 from	settling	 and	becoming	a	norm.	 I	explore	 unsettling	 through	 three	 dimensions,	 which	 are	 defined	 and	 illustrated	 in	 the	following	table.		
Sub-practice	of	navigating	
corruption	
	
Dimensions	of	sub-practice	 Illustrative	examples	
Unsettling		Proactive	exposing	and	undermining	of	the	corrupt	practice	of	colonising.	
Sleuthing		Practitioners’	engagement	in	investigative	work	to	intercept	harmful	practices.	
Nikola,	interview	extract:		“…she	spelled	out	the	name	[of	the	NGO].	I	investigated	and	couldn’t	find	anything	about	it...	I’m	from	the	same	small	town	where	this	NGO	is	apparently	based…it	was	impossible	for	me	not	to	know	of	such	an	organisation…I	asked	her	in	what	capacity	she	would	attend	the	conference	–	as	an	NGO	member	or	as	a	public	official,	and	she	refused	to	
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say…”			
Confrontation		This	dimension	is	enacted	when	sleuthing	fails,	as	a	strategy	for	provoking	and	instigating	dialogue.			
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		After	many	unsuccessful	attempts	to	engage	Kristina	(a	GONGO	representative)	in	dialogue	about	the	legalisation	of	prostitution...she	avoided	and	ignored	us.	In	our	first	face-to-face	meeting,	we	openly	confronted	her	with	questions	aimed	at	teasing	out	her	arguments,	hoping	to	provoke	a	discussion.		
Marginalisation		Employed	when	confronting	fails,	and	refers	to	practitioners’	efforts	to	shrink	the	space	available	to	GONGOs	–	a	distinctly	undemocratic	means	of	protecting	democratic	norms.		
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		Unlike	Kristina,	we	knew	that	the	microphone	was	linked	to	the	clock.	So	we	spoke	until	only	five	minutes	remained	and	Kristina	could	not	go	on	any	longer.			
Table	9:	Sub-practice	of	unsettling		In	 the	 following	 episode	 I	 explore	 the	 interplay	 between	 the	 different	 dimensions	 of	
colonising	 and	 unsettling	 in	 order	 to	 highlight	 difficulties	 in	 combating	 corruption	 in	instances	involving	GONGOs.			
Ethnographic	episode	(colonising	and	unsettling):	“Because	I	say	so!”			Fairly	often,	GONGOs	and	 their	 representatives	do	manage	 to	 slip	 through	 the	net	 and	colonise	 the	 same	 spaces	 as	 NGOs,	 according	 to	 the	 experience	 of	 practitioners.	 I	encountered	 an	 example	 of	 this	 during	 the	 process	 of	 reporting	 on	 the	 government’s	fulfilment	 of	 its	 obligations	 relating	 to	 gender	 equality,	 stated	 in	 one	 of	 the	 UN	conventions.	 The	 reporting	 was	 made	 to	 one	 of	 the	 UN	 bodies	 overseeing	 the	advancement	 of	 the	 liberty	 and	 equality	 of	women.	 Each	member	 state	 is	 required	 to	
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report	 to	 the	 committee	 and,	 customarily,	 civil	 sector	 organisations	 draft	 a	supplementary	Shadow	Report,	which	 is	presented	 to	a	committee	and	compared	with	the	official	government	account.	WRC	initiated	the	process	of	shadow	reporting	as	early	as	 2011	 and	 I	 was	 fortunate	 to	 be	 doing	my	 fieldwork	 at	 a	 time	 when	 I	 was	 able	 to	participate	 in	 preparations,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 presentation	 process	 itself,	 in	 Switzerland,	alongside	Nina,	a	WRC	practitioner.		Nina	spent	weeks	compiling	the	document,	researching,	 integrating	the	inputs	received	from	 other	NGOs	 and	 editing.	 She	was	 also	 in	 charge	 of	 communicating	with	 relevant	stakeholders	based	in	Switzerland	and	Montenegro	and	was	feverishly	fighting	for	time	in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 deadline,	 working	 long	 days	 at	 first,	 then	 long	 days	 and	 nights,	eventually	 abandoning	 sleep	 entirely	 for	 some	 days.	 Shortly	 before	 the	 submission	deadline,	an	email	arrived	announcing	that	another	NGO	had	registered	as	a	presenter	of	the	 report.	 Instead	 of	 contributing	 to	 the	 joint	 shadow	 report	 Nina	 was	 working	 on,	however,	 the	 head	 of	 this	 organisation,	 Kristina,	 revealed	 that	 she	 would	 submit	 a	separate	report.	Alarm	bells	sounded.			Once	in	Switzerland,	Nina	and	I	met	Kristina	in	the	preparatory	workshop	organised	for	the	 shadow	 reporters.	 Very	 soon	we	 realised	 that	 she	 had	 little	 knowledge	 of	 this	 UN	body	or	the	reporting	process	in	general.	A	hint	at	how	little	she	knew	was	visible	in	her	incorrect	 pronunciation	 of	 the	 very	 UN	 body	 we	 were	 to	 report	 to,	 and	 in	 her	demonstrated	unfamiliarity	with	the	Convention	in	relation	to	which	practitioners	had	to	evaluate	 the	practice	of	 their	home	government.	The	organisers	of	 the	workshops	also	revealed	that	the	committee	had	not	received	the	shadow	report	from	the	organisation	Kristina	 represented,	which	made	 us	more	 curious	 about	 her	 reasons	 for	 being	 there.	
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After	 the	 workshops	 were	 over,	 the	 organisers	 advised	 us	 to	 draft	 a	 joint	 statement,	which	 meant	 that	 Kristina,	 Nina	 and	 I	 had	 to	 work	 together.	 This	 is	 when	 problems	started	to	arise:	from	obstructing	work	to	introducing	non-discussed	‘surprises’	into	the	joint	statement.		Despite	the	fact	that	we	were	situated	in	the	same	small	hotel,	Kristina	always	managed	to	be	late	for	briefings	and	meetings,	stalled	the	running	of	errands	we	had	to	undertake	before	 the	presentation	or	 simply	went	missing	at	 some	crucial	moments,	 for	example	when	 Nina	 asked	 her	 to	 provide	 input	 for	 the	 final	 statement	 the	 night	 before	 the	presentation.	She	knew	that	we	were	required	to	work	together	but	employed	the	tactic	of	self-exclusion,	actively	eroding	our	time,	which	meant	that	we	would	have	to	write	the	document	 in	 haste.	 She	was	 also	 secretive	 about	 the	 report	 she	 claimed	 she	was	 still	editing	 the	 day	 before	 the	 actual	 presentation.	 Ordinarily,	 even	 though	 Nina	 was	 in	charge	of	compiling	the	document,	the	shadow	report	is	circulated	for	comment	amongst	various	women’s	groups	prior	to	submission	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	most	important	issues	of	each	respective	group	of	women	are	represented.	However,	no	one	knew	the	content	 of	 Kristina’s	 report,	 not	 even	 the	 committee	 the	 report	 was	 written	 for,	 until	after	 the	 presenting	 period	 was	 over.	 While	 Kristina	 appeared	 laid	 back	 and	unconcerned	about	the	importance	of	producing	joint	work	(a	practice	common	to	other	GONGO	representatives),	Nina	and	 I	 tried	 to	 interest	her	 in	collaboration	and	 to	stress	the	 importance	of	 keeping	up	with	deadlines	 in	 the	 short	 span	of	 time	 assigned	 to	us.	However,	she	continued	eroding	our	time	and	energy	through	delaying	and	us	having	to	dote	over	her,	instead	of	working	on	our	document.	Finally,	we	agreed	upon	a	time	and	place	for	writing	a	joint	statement	and	Nina	and	I	made	sure	not	to	lose	Kristina	from	our	sights,	as	time	was	quickly	running	out.		
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	Once	we	sat	down	to	write,	Kristina	announced	that	she	would	let	us	do	our	part	of	the	statement	 and	 that	 she	 would	 add	 hers	 at	 the	 end,	 relating	 to	 vulnerable	 groups	 of		“Roma,	 rural,	 disabled,	 imprisoned	 and	HIV/AIDS	 suffering	women”.	 Issues	 relating	 to	these	 vulnerable	 groups	 were	 already	 covered	 in	 our	 shadow	 report	 by	 the	 women	representing	them,	but	we	welcomed	her	contribution	as	we	hoped	it	might	enrich	the	existing	account.	Nina	and	I	drafted	the	statement	relatively	quickly	but	then	spent	time	waiting	 for	 Kristina’s	 contribution,	which	 again	 eroded	 our	 time	 and	 energy.	 After	we	had	waited	some	hours,	Kristina	finally	forwarded	her	part	to	me	so	that	I	could	“brush	up	her	language”.	To	the	surprise	of	Nina	and	I,	her	statement	comprised	of	only	a	single	sentence,	 which	 lumped	 many	 vulnerable	 groups	 together	 and	 did	 not	 convey	 much	substance:		 The	 special	 focus	 of	 the	 committee	 should	 be	 on	 the	 position	 of	 women	 from	 other	disadvantaged	 groups,	 such	 as:	 Roma	 women,	 rural	 women,	 women	 with	 disabilities,	women	in	prison	and	women	living	with	HIV/AIDS.			The	 rest	 of	 the	 statement,	 comprising	 several	 paragraphs,	 covered	 “sex	 workers”	 and	their	rights,	far	from	the	stated	concerns	of	the	‘NGO’	at	the	outset	of	the	process.	After	conducting	 some	 quick	 sleuthing,	 I	 discovered	 that	 the	 organisation	 was	 frequently	funded	 through	 the	 government,	 an	 unusual	 occurrence	 in	 the	 context	 of	Montenegro,	where	government	has	a	long	history	of	restricting	funds	to	NGOs	(Đonović,	et	al,	2016).	The	question	of	legalising	prostitution	and	introducing	‘sex	work’	as	a	legal	category	is	a	highly	contentious	issue	in	Montenegro,	tied	to	the	interests	of	organised	crime	and	the	private	interests	of	government	officials.	Recently,	for	example,	prominent	social	figures,	
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including	 some	 politicians31,	 publicly	 proposed	 the	 idea	 of	 legalising	 prostitution	 as	 a	means	of	revitalising	 the	economy	(see	Perović-Korać,	2014).	The	collective	attitude	of	women’s	NGOs	was	that	since	prostitution	tends	to	enrich	organised	crime,	legalising	it	would	only	protect	the	criminals,	not	the	women.			Nevertheless,	we	were	 curious	 about	Kristina’s	 position,	 so	we	 tried	 for	 over	 an	hour,	while	in	the	same	room,	to	instigate	a	conversation.	Eventually	we	‘succeeded’	and	below	is	an	extract	of	the	confrontation	from	my	journal:			 N:	So	you	are	saying	you	support	legalising	prostitution?	Why?	K:	Because	I	do.	Me:	But	what	are	your	reasons	for	supporting	it?		K:	I	have	my	own	reasons.	N:	Which	are?	K:	They	are	bullied	as	sex	workers	and	I	want	them	protected.	N:	So	you	think	that	legalising	prostitution	would	protect	them	from	being	bullied?	K:	Yes.	Me:	How?	What	do	you	base	your	stance	on?	I’m	curious	that’s	all.	K:	 I	 spoke	 to	 some	women	who	were	arrested	and	police	officers	asked	 them	 for	 free	 sex.	
Imagine	if	somebody	came	to	you	and	asked	for	a	report	free	of	charge!		N:	 I	 don’t	 think	 that	 compares	 and	 besides	 this	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 a	 joint	 statement.	 You	
should	 have	 raised	 this	 when	 we	 were	 drafting	 the	 report	 with	 other	 women’s	 groups,	
people	this	issue	concerns	directly…Listen,	there’s	no	doubt	these	women	suffer	violence	and	
we	could	draw	attention	to	it	without…	K:	I	did	some	research	and	that’s	what	sex	workers	want.	Me:	Can	you	show	us?		K:	We	talk	to	these	women	all	the	time.																																																										31	Legalising	prostitution	was	proposed	for	the	first	time	by	the	Liberal	Party	in	2012,	which	was	a	partner	in	the	ruling	coalition	at	the	time	with	the	Democratic	Party	of	Socialists	(DPS	-	the	long-standing	governing	party),	and	supported	by	some	DPS	politicians,	including	the	former	deputy	prosecutor	Zoran	Piperović,	accused	of	involvement	in	the	controversial	trafficking	case	of	Svetlana	Čabotarenko	(see	Jovanović,	17/08/2014)	
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Me:	Ok.	Can	we	read	it?		K:	Listen,	I	don’t	care	how	we	appear	or	not	but	this	is	my	part	of	the	statement	and	I	will	
use	terms	that	I	wish	to	use…I	didn’t	question	yours	so…	N:	 But	 that’s	 exactly	 the	 point,	 we	 included	 all	 the	 groups	 who	 wished	 to	 provide	 a	
contribution	 in	 the	 drafting	 process	 so	 it’s	 not	 ‘ours’,	 and	 you	 appear	 to	 be	 on	 some	 solo	
mission…	Me:	Just	please	tell	us	your	reasons	for	including	legalising	prostitution	in	the	statement…	K:	Because	I	say	so.	And	it	stays	in.			Kristina	makes	recourse	to	self	12	times	through	employing	the	first-person	pronoun	‘I’	and	the	possessive	pronoun	‘my’.	Such	a	preoccupation	with	‘self’	signals	that	Kristina’s	judgement	on	the	topic	of	‘sex	workers’	and	‘legalising	prostitution’	is	derived	from	her	own	 person,	 rather	 than	 evidence.	 She	 positions	 herself	 as	 the	 main	 authority	 who	decides	on	the	issue	and	so	employs	the	tactic	of	self-exclusion	from	the	larger	collective	of	people	supposed	to	participate	in	drafting	the	report.	On	the	other	hand,	Nina	employs	the	 pronouns	 ‘we’	 and	 ‘ours’	 to	 underline	 the	 collective	 character	 of	 reporting	 and	 to	convey	 the	 obligation	 reporters	 have	 towards	 the	 groups	 they	 represent,	 a	 form	 of	confronting	Kristina’s	‘self’	with	a	collective	stance	from	informed	NGOs.			The	authority	of	‘self’	in	conversation	is	further	fortified	by	the	selection	of	verbs	Kristina	employs.	She	“doesn’t	care”	about	the	misleading	nature	of	using	‘sex	worker’	as	a	phrase	in	 the	 statement	 and	 about	 how	 we	 “appear”,	 because	 pushing	 for	 legalisation	 is	something	 she	 “want[s]”,	 “wish[es]”,	 “know[s]”	 and	 she	 “say[s]”	 so.	 By	 virtue	 of	 not	“question[ing]”	 the	 part	 of	 the	 statement	 Nina	 and	 I	 produced,	 she	 expects	 us	 not	 to	question	hers	and	this	rule	is	posited	as	the	precondition	under	which	Kristina	is	willing	to	 ‘converse’.	 Yet,	 such	 a	 condition	 only	 serves	 to	 foreclose	 dialogue	 and	 disable	challenge	towards	the	political	stance	assumed.		
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	Whereas	Kristina	aims	to	foreclose	the	dialogue,	Nina	and	I	persistently	try	to	open	it	up,	to	 confront	 her,	 denoted	 by	 the	 abundant	 employment	 of	 interrogative	 pronouns	(“what”,	“which”)	and	interrogative	adverbs	(“when”,	“why”	and	“how”)	in	the	text.	In	the	process,	Nina	draws	attention	to	the	importance	of	collaboration	and	fair	representation,	as	 if	 trying	 to	 provoke	 a	 sense	 of	 responsibility	 in	 Kristina.	 This	 is	 indicated	 by	 the	adjective	 “joint”	 and	 adverb	 “together”,	 signalling	 to	Kristina	 that	 the	 strength	of	 good	reporting	 lies	 in	collective	work,	while	 simultaneously	 reminding	her	 that	 she	 rejected	the	offer	to	be	included.			After	 failing	 to	 deepen	 the	 conversation	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 legalising	 prostitution,	 we	switched	attention	 to	 the	 technical	 issues	 relating	 to	 the	 joint	 statement.	The	previous	discussion	was,	in	a	way,	confirmation	that	Kristina	represented	a	GONGO,	as	she	did	not	bother	 to	 even	 feign	 participation	 in	 dialogue,	 employing	 self-exclusion	 and	 actively	foreclosing	dialogue	throughout	the	attempt	at	discussion	–	something	that	was	common	to	 other	 GONGO	 representatives	 encountered	 in	 the	 field.	 Nina	 and	 I	 locked	 eyes	 and	gave	 each	 other	 a	 well-rehearsed	 silent	 sign,	 signalling	 a	 change	 of	 tactics.	 Time	 was	running	 out	 and	 so	many	women	back	 at	 home	were	 counting	 on	us	 to	 fight	 for	 their	causes.	What	we	did	from	that	moment	on	resembled	a	game	of	tug-of-war,	in	which	we	were	grabbing	more	rope	each	time	we	tugged,	until	Kristina	held	onto	only	threads.			Dropping	 the	politeness,	 attempts	at	 inclusion	and	dialogue,	 the	 first	 thing	we	 insisted	upon	 was	 the	 allocation	 of	 more	 space	 for	 women	 from	 the	 other	 vulnerable	 groups	Kristina	 initially	 claimed	 to	 represent.	 I	 used	 my	 editing	 role,	 alongside	 Nina,	 to	discretely	 shape	 the	 parts	 relating	 to	 vulnerable	 groups	 according	 to	 the	 information	
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provided	in	the	shadow	report	and	to	subdue	and	shorten	the	part	relating	to	‘sex	work’.	The	 next	 step	 included	 discussing	 speaking	 time.	 As	 previously	 agreed,	 Nina	 was	 to	speak	 first,	which	 gave	 us	 an	 advantage	 in	 negotiating	 time	 allocations.	We	 suggested	Nina	 took	 two	 thirds	 of	 the	 allocated	 time	 because	 her	 part	 of	 the	 statement	 covered	most	of	the	issues	raised	by	various	groups	of	women,	whereas	Kristina’s	covered	only	a	few.	They	both	agreed.			However,	 Kristina	 insisted	 on	 redrafting	 her	 section,	 every	 time	 producing	 a	 slightly	longer	version	relating	to	sex	work,	trying	to	secure	more	space	and	time,	most	likely	an	attempted	 filibustering	 tactic,	as	 there	were	many	 instances	of	 repeated	sentences	and	abundant	synonyms	in	her	text.	We	suspected	that	Kristina	had	not	been	attentive	when	the	workshop	organisers	had	explained	the	setup	for	the	presentations	to	us.	We	knew	that	the	microphone	was	linked	to	the	clock	so	that	it	would	immediately	shut	off	when	the	time	allocated	for	the	presentation	expired,	a	detail	we	thought	Kristina	had	probably	missed.	Meanwhile,	Nina	 and	 I	worked	out	 that	Kristina’s	preoccupation	with	 growing	her	section	on	sex	work	was	at	least	keeping	her	busy	and	away	from	sabotaging	us,	so	we	kept	quiet.	Not	reminding	Kristina	of	the	presentation	rules	was	our	way	of	squeezing	her	 out	 to	 the	 margins,	 of	 employing	 undemocratic	 means	 to	 generate	 democratic	practice.				Before	 the	 presentation,	we	were	 to	meet	with	members	 of	 the	 committee	 to	 provide	additional	 information	 regarding	 the	 shadow	report.	 I	was	supposed	 to	be	a	 facilitator	and	Kristina	and	Nina	were	meant	to	provide	answers	within	their	selected	areas.	During	the	meeting,	however,	Kristina	quickly	demonstrated	a	lack	of	knowledge	regarding	the	groups	 she	 claimed	 to	 represent,	 eroding	 the	 credibility	 of	 NGOs	 from	Montenegro	 in	
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general,	we	thought,	 in	front	of	the	UN	committee,	and	questions	had	to	be	deferred	to	Nina.	Yet,	even	though	Kristina	did	not	know	the	answers	to	the	questions,	she	tried	to	colonise	 the	 short	 time	 assigned	 for	 the	meeting	with	 filibustering.	 I	 used	my	 role	 as	facilitator	 to	 squeeze	 her	 out	 as	much	 as	 possible.	 I	 directed	most	 questions	 towards	Nina	and	provided	her	with	significantly	more	time	to	speak,	actively	ignoring	the	signals	sent	to	me	by	Kristina,	who	tapped	me	repeatedly	on	the	leg	under	the	table.	When	the	time	came	for	the	actual	presentation,	Nina	spoke	first	and	used	more	than	two	thirds	of	the	 time,	 as	 she	 represented	all	women	 from	Montenegro	who	wanted	 to	be	 included.	When	it	was	time	for	Kristina	to	speak,	she	was	only	able	to	address	the	committee	for	about	five	minutes	before	the	microphone	cut	out.	‘You	don’t	bring	a	knife	to	a	gunfight’,	I	thought	smugly	for	a	second,	before	my	conscience	kicked	in.			
Colonising	and	unsettling	summary		I	 explored	 the	 GONGO	 practice	 of	 ‘colonising’	 and	 how	 it	 affected	 the	 regular	work	 of	NGOs.	 I	 described	 how	GONGO	 representatives	 actively	 sabotaged	NGOs	 by	 colonising	their	 work	 under	 the	 pretext	 of	 collaboration	 and,	 then,	 pushed	 the	 government’s	agenda.	Through	colonising,	GONGO	representatives	engaged	in	a	process	of	eroding	the	time,	 energy	 and	 credibility	 of	 NGOs,	 foreclosed	 meaningful	 dialogue	 and	 excluded	themselves	when	joint	work	was	necessary	or	when	they	were	challenged.			In	 contrast,	 I	 described	 the	 engagement	 of	 WRC	 practitioners	 with	 corrupt	 GONGO	practices	as	 ‘unsettling’.	They	were	forced	to	stay	vigilant	about	the	potential	scheming	of	 GONGOs,	 a	 dimension	 I	 referred	 to	 as	 sleuthing.	 I	 argued	 that	 WRC	 practitioners	engaged	 with	 GONGO	 practitioners	 through	 challenge,	 conflictual	 dialogue	 that	
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contrasted	 and	 exposed	 the	 ‘personal’	 voices	 of	 GONGO	 representatives	 with	 the	collective	 body	 of	 evidence	 and	 causes	 represented	 by	 NGOs.	 As	 a	 final	 resort,	practitioners	 engaged	 in	 shrinking	 the	 available	 space	 for	 GONGOs	 –	 marginalising,	 a	distinctly	undemocratic	means	adopted	to	protect	democratic	norms.					
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VIII	Findings	–	The	aesthetics	of	assembling		During	my	time	in	the	field	it	was	clear	that	democratic	practice	involved	a	considerable	amount	 of	 artful	 practice,	 appeals	 to	 the	 senses	 that	 escaped	 the	 bounds	 of	 pure	language.	 I	 term	this	practice	the	aesthetics	of	assembling	 in	order	to	denote	the	artful	aspects	 of	 the	 acts	 of	 public	 assembly,	 and	 how	 practitioners	 engage	 in	 facilitating,	shaping	 and	 influencing	 assembly.	 People	 gathering	 in	 streets	 to	 voice	 their	 political	demands,	 carrying	 placards	 and	 various	 other	 artefacts,	 chanting	 and	 delivering	speeches,	linking	with	one	another,	are	aesthetic	acts,	which	hold	a	performative	power	to	enact	certain	practices	and	subjectivities.	I	explore	two	sub-practices	of	the	aesthetics	of	assembling:	aestheticising	equivalence	and	embodied	reordering.			Outlining	 the	 sub-practice	 of	 aestheticising	 equivalence,	 I	 analyse	 the	 ways	 in	 which	practitioners	 assemble	 a	 chain	 of	 equivalence	 (Laclau,	 2007)	 between	 people	 voicing	different	demands,	using	aesthetics	as	a	medium	for	achieving	this	(Ranciére,	2009).	At	play	 in	 the	 sub-practice	 is	 the	 artful	 connection	of	particular	 experiences	with	 general	causes	 and	meaning.	 I	 term	 the	 second	 sub-practice	 embodied	 reordering,	 drawing	 on	Ranciére’s	concept	of	‘the	distribution	of	the	sensible’	(2012:	12),	which	broadly	refers	to	the	 aesthetic	 regime	 that	 renders	 the	world	 intelligible	 (forms	of	 art,	 language,	 bodies	and	 the	material).	Whereas	Ranciére	discusses	 the	order	of	 the	 sensible	and	 the	act	of	disrupting	such	an	order	in	somewhat	homogenous	terms,	of	a	person	or	group	seeking	to	be	recognised	within	a	particular	order	 (e.g.	women	demanding	 to	be	recognised	as	full	 human	 beings,	 equal	 to	 men),	 I	 offer	 a	 performative	 analysis	 to	 unpack	 the	
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heterogeneous,	 diverse	 and	 dynamic	 nature	 of	 the	 struggle	 amongst	 insurgent	 actors	seeking	recognition.			To	illustrate	these	sub-practices	and	their	dimensions	I	draw	on	the	preparations	made	by	WRC	for	the	International	Women’s	Day	(IWD)	campaign	and	march.	Three	years	ago,	WRC	 practitioners	 had	 the	 idea	 of	 revitalising	 IWD	 –	 to	 reclaim	 it	 from	 the	 grip	 of	capitalist-patriarchal 32 	interests	 and	 posit	 IWD	 as	 a	 celebration	 of	 women’s	achievements	 and	 a	 platform	 for	 voicing	 new	 demands,	 instead	 of	 as	 a	 lucrative	celebration	 of	mothers,	which	 is	what	 IWD	had	 become	 over	 previous	 decades,	 in	 the	view	of	practitioners.	My	mother’s	generation,	and	those	before,	remember	IWD	as	being	closely	tied	with	the	socialist	struggle	for	women’s	liberation,	Clara	Zetkin33,	the	fight	for	the	 rights	of	working-class	women	and	 the	efforts	of	 the	Anti-Fascist	Front	 (AFŽ).	The	link	between	 IWD	and	working-class	 struggle	was	 symbolised	 through	 the	adoption	of	the	 red	 carnation,	 a	 flower	 that	was	 initially	 used	 to	mark	 International	Workers’	Day	(see	Korrf	and	Drost,	1993).			My	generation,	however,	born	during	the	fall	of	Yugoslavia,	the	rise	of	ethno-nationalism	and	revival	of	religious	narratives,	remembers	IWD	as	a	celebration	of	mothers	and	the	red	 carnation	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 motherhood.	 An	 image	 of	 my	 neighbour	 holding,	 in	 a	superior	way,	an	enormous	bunch	of	red	carnations	every	8th	of	March	–	something	she	perceived	 as	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 reward	 for	 birthing	 five	 sons	 -	 is	 still	 seared	 in	 my																																																									32	Redefining	IWD	as	a	celebration	of	mothers	throughout	the	1980s	and	1990s	prompted	the	creation	of	an	IWD	gift	market.	Typical	gifts	tend	towards	the	domestic,	such	as	make-up,	flower	arrangements	and	household	items.	This	gifts	market	predominantly	profits	men,	as	only	9.6%	of	businesses	in	Montenegro	are	owned	by	women	(Ministry	for	Human	and	Minority	Rights,	2016:	96).	33	Clara	Zetkin	helped	establish	International	Women’s	Day	alongside	Luise	Zietze	and	Käte	Duncker	at	the	International	Socialist	Women’s	Conference,	Copenhagen,	in	1910.		
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memory.	“The	more	sons,	the	lusher	the	bouquet”,	she	used	to	say,	beaming	with	pride.	Perversely,	the	red	carnation	became	a	symbol	of	corporeal	strength	in	producing	male	offspring,	a	reward	for	upholding	a	patriarchal	system	of	values.			To	 mark	 IWD	 in	 schools,	 we	 would	 be	 tasked	 with	 writing	 poems,	 songs	 and	 essays	dedicated	to	mothers,	which	we	would	then	recite,	sing	and	read.	There	are	only	so	many	words	that	rhyme	with	the	Serbo-Croatian	word	for	‘mother’	(majka),	so	the	challenge	of	writing	 something	 ‘original’	 every	8th	of	March	was	a	 real	 struggle	 for	primary	 school	children	keen	to	 impress.	 I	will	never	 forget	 the	expression	on	my	parents’	 faces	when	my	younger	sister	(aged	six	at	the	time)	publicly	compared	our	mother	to	Lake	Baikal	in	the	 poem	 she	 wrote	 (majka-Bajkal),	 which	 was	 at	 the	 time	 reported	 in	 the	 media	 in	relation	 to	 mercury	 pollution	 that	 had	 rendered	 some	 people	 blind.	 From	 a	 vantage	point,	I	can	better	appreciate	the	subversive,	although	unintentionally	so,	element	of	her	poetry,	as	we	were	truly	rendered	blind	and	made	to	forget	the	historical	importance	of	marking	IWD.			This	 erasure	 of	 the	 other	 aspects	 and	 experiences	 of	women	 in	 favour	 of	motherhood	also	featured	in	the	naming	of	the	day.	The	second	part	of	the	day’s	title	that	read:	“8th	of	March	-	International	Women’s	Day”	was	dropped	and	the	day	was	simply	called	“8th	of	March”.	 While	 it	 is	 important	 to	 WRC	 practitioners	 that	 mothers	 are	 celebrated	 and	motherhood	 appreciated	 (some	 of	 them	 are	 mothers),	 “it	 was	 unfair	 to	 do	 it	 at	 the	expense	of	all	the	other	aspects	of	being	a	woman”	(Andrea).			
As	 women	 we’re	 robbed	 of	 our	 experiences,	 of	 our	 humanity…celebrated	 only	 for	 our	
reproductive	 ability…Being	 reduced	 to	 machines	 for	 reproduction	 by	 nationalist	
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politics…also	 robbed	 us	 of	 a	 sense	 of	 solidarity	 drawn	 from	 our	 history	 of	 fighting	 for	
equality,	fighting	to	become	full	human	beings.	(Marija)		Striving	 to	 problematise	 this	 “mothering	 of	 IWD”	 (Luka)	 and	 to	 revive	 some	 of	 the	narratives	 of	 the	 women’s	 struggle	 to	 attain	 freedom	 and	 equality,	 WRC	 members	decided	 to	 organise	 an	 IWD	 march	 in	 the	 capital	 of	 Montenegro	 in	 cooperation	 with	other	NGOs	and	citizens.	The	IWD	campaign	and	march	is	a	week-long	event.	Each	year,	in	communication	with	residents,	WRC	practitioners	task	themselves	with	mapping	out	the	 particular	 problems	 that	 women	 face,	 which	 are	 subsequently	 articulated	 into	broader	demands	and	voiced	 through	 IWD	activities.	This	practice,	 it	was	explained	 to	me,	 is	 a	way	 for	practitioners	 to	 “make	a	big,	 loud	push”	 (Luka)	about	all	 those	 issues	women	 raise	 during	 a	 particular	 year.	 In	 2017,	 demands	 were	 made	 for	 economic	equality,	dignity	and	peace.				
8.	1.	Aestheticising	equivalence		Aestheticising	equivalence	refers	to	a	sub-practice	of	the	aesthetics	of	assembling,	where	a	chain	of	equivalence	is	articulated	through	diverse	aesthetic	mediums,	with	people	and	symbols	 expressing	 different	 demands.	 I	 identify	 two	 dimensions	 to	 this	 sub-practice.	The	first	is	that	of	grounding-airing.	The	particular	experiences	of	women	are	brought	to	life	through	individual	performative	acts	on	film	but	these	are	offered	a	general	aesthetic	force	 through	their	connection	 in	 the	 ‘air’	of	 the	 internet.	The	second	 is	 that	of	sensory	
imbrication,	 which	 denotes	 the	 aesthetic	 enactments	 of	 equivalence,	 with	 the	equivalence	performed	through	a	diverse	range	of	mediums,	which,	crucially,	gain	their	
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force	by	being	blended	together.	Melody,	text,	image	and	rhythm	merge	in	a	compelling	performance	of	equivalential	democratic	practice,	a	 tapestry	of	sensory	enactment	that	generates	 new	 alliances	 and	 fresh	 associations.	 The	 sub-practice	 of	 aestheticising	equivalence	and	its	two	dimensions	are	defined	and	illustrated	in	the	following	table:			
Sub-practice	of	the	
aesthetics	of	assembly	
	
Dimensions	of	the	sub-
practice	
Illustrative	examples	
Aestheticising	equivalence			Articulating	a	chain	of	equivalence	through	aesthetic	mediums,	with	people	and	symbols	expressing	different	demands.	
Grounding-airing	
	The	generation	of	familiarity	with	certain	women’s	experiences	and	circumstances,	combined	with	the	generalisation	of	such	experiences	into	democratic	principles.	This	allows	for	alliances	to	be	made	across	time	and	in	the	air	of	the	online	space.			
Clip	from	an	online	video	submitted	to	WRC:		“If	my	grandmother	could	say	‘No’	to	fascists,	then	I	have	to	say	‘No’	to	all	those	who	are	trying	to	oppress	women.	I	have	to,	because	of	my	grandmother,	because	of	myself,	because	of	my	daughter…”			Here	the	video	combines	personal	intimacy	with	more	general	associations,	enabling	broader	identification.		
Sensory	imbrication	
	The	generation	of	equivalence	through	the	performative	power	of	a	diverse	range	of	mediums	(image,	text,	movement,	melody),	which	gain	their	force	through	their	blending	and	coming	together	in	a	common,	immediate	and	face-to-face	space.	
Picture	collage	from	the	IWD	march:	
	Andrea,	interview	extract:		“It’s	inscribed	somewhere	in	our	psyche	that	red	is	the	IWD	colour,	with	red	carnations,	our	socialist	past,	working	class,	all	red	in	school	recitals...It’s	a	mechanical	reaction.	Our	school	recitals	were	like	straight	from	the	inside	of	the	uterus!	Remember?”			Sedimented	associations	with	the	colour	red	provide	a	performative	force	to	the	chain	of	equivalence.		
Table	10:	Sub-practice	of	aestheticising	equivalence		
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Ethnographic	episode	(grounding-airing):	IWD	campaign	videos		In	the	run	up	to	IWD	and	as	a	way	of	including	more	diverse	voices	in	the	campaign,	WRC	invited	people	 to	send	videos	of	 themselves	 in	which	they	were	 to	 talk	about	 IWD	and	why	they	thought	it	was	important	to	mark	it.	The	videos	that	arrived	in	the	WRC	inbox,	combined	 with	 the	 grievances	 and	 demands	 made	 by	 protesting	 mothers,	 pointed	predominantly	to	the	problem	of	economic	inequality,	albeit	from	different	perspectives	(that	of	young	people,	working	mothers,	unemployed	women,	etc.).	In	some	videos	and	comments	 posted	 on	 the	 WRC	 Facebook	 page,	 people	 called	 for	 respect	 for	 women	outside	IWD,	recognition	of	women’s	worth	as	human	beings	beyond	their	reproductive	abilities,	 as	well	 as	 the	 necessity	 for	women	 to	 enjoy	 the	 same	 liberty	 and	 equality	 as	men.	 The	 third	major	 problem	 identified,	which	 also	 surfaced	 in	 practitioners’	 contact	with	their	clients	throughout	the	year,	was	the	“endemic	violence	that	pervades	women’s	lives”	(Lara).			Luka	was	 in	charge	of	posting	 the	videos	on	 the	WRC	page,	 in	 the	order	 in	which	 they	arrived,	and	viewers	shared	them	further	on	their	own	profiles.	Moreover,	WRC	hired	a	public	relations	company	that	transcribed	the	messages	and	spread	them	alongside	the	videos	and	other	campaign	material	to	different	social	networks	and	media	outlets.	The	videos	 initiative	 was	 a	 way	 for	WRC	 to	 open	 up	 virtual	 spaces	 for	 people	 to	 express	themselves	 and	 voice	 their	 concerns	 and	 demands,	 spaces	 that	 were	 subsequently	merged	with	other	spaces,	such	as	online	media	outlets,	allowing	for	the	messages	to	be	spread	further.	It	is	important	to	note	that	all	videos	were	indiscriminately	streamed	in	their	 original	 form	 without	 any	 editing	 or	 censorship.	 It	 was	 a	 way	 for	 WRC	 to	demonstrate	 that	 “IWD	 belongs	 to	 all	 of	 us,	 it’s	 not	 a	 property	 of	 WRC	 or	 any	 other	
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NGOs…this	was	an	opportunity	for	people	to	claim	ownership	of	it”	(Nina).	The	balance	to	be	struck	was	therefore	of	‘airing’	a	general	sense	of	solidarity	and	consensus	around	issues	facing	women	but	also	‘grounding’	these	issues	in	the	particular	lived	contexts	of	specific	women.		As	 we	 were	 preparing	 the	 IWD	 campaign	 material,	 videos	 from	 various	 people	 were	steadily	streaming	in:	women	and	men,	young	and	mature,	employed	and	unemployed.	Some	of	the	messages	were	generic	–	framed	as	invitations	to	remember	achievements	related	to	women’s	rights	and	as	a	reminder	 that	 the	8th	of	March	 is	not	mothers’	day	but	 a	 celebration	 of	 all	 women.	 The	 rest	 spoke	 about	 the	 particular	 inequalities	 they	faced	in	Montenegrin	society	as	women-writers,	-parents,	-migrant	workers,	-teachers,	-students,	 -unemployed	 etc.	 The	 diversity	 of	 women,	 who	 had	 never	 met	 but	 were	brought	 together	 in	 an	 online	 space,	 provided	 the	 air,	 but	 the	 specific	 experiences	 of	women,	recounted	on	film,	grounded	the	connections	in	daily	struggle.	To	illustrate	this	dimension	of	aestheticising	equivalence,	I	now	analyse	three	examples.		Below	is	a	video	frame	of	one	of	the	women,	who	reminds	viewers	about	the	importance	of	 IWD,	 which	 she	 perceives	 as	 a	 celebration	 of	 working-class	 women	 and	 peace	advocates.			
	 259	
																											 																														Video	frame:	Jovana			Jovana’s	message:	
Because	of	the	textile	factory	workers,	the	history	of	struggle	behind	us,	we	invite	you	to	join	
the	IWD	march	in	the	name	of	the	present,	the	battle	against	wars,	poverty	and	all	forms	of	
social	injustice.	See	you	there!			Jovana	 reminds	 viewers	 about	 former	 factory	workers,	 waving	 a	 cardboard-made	 red	carnation	 in	 front	 of	 her	 face,	 as	 if	 attempting	 to	 restore	 the	 link	 between	 IWD	 and	working-class	women.	The	textile	factory	Jovana	mentions	consisted	of	a	predominantly	female	workforce.	However,	this	factory,	and	many	others	in	which	women	worked,	has	disappeared	 in	 the	 process	 of	 transition	 and	 with	 them	 a	 formidable	 and	 significant	collective	 female	 voice,	 leaving	 the	majority	 of	 women	 trapped	 in	 either	 the	 low-paid	service	industry,	the	black-market	economy	or	the	trap	of	unemployment	(see	CEDAW,	2017;	GREVIO,	2017).			Jovana	also	reminds	viewers	about	 the	peace	activism	of	women,	many	of	whom	were	workers,	during	the	wars	of	the	1990s	(see	Anima,	2018).	Moreover,	she	draws	attention	
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to	“poverty”	and	“social	injustice”,	which	increased	dramatically	as	a	consequence	of	the	wars.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 Jovana	 opts	 for	 the	 collective	 pronoun	 ‘we’	 in	 her	invitation	 to	viewers	 to	 join	 the	 IWD	march,	which	 signals	her	 sense	of	belonging	 to	a	larger	group	of	women	from	diverse	backgrounds,	in	an	equivalential	chain.	All	of	these	women	suffer	“social	injustice”	and	“poverty”	in	solidarity,	but	also	stand	for	peace	and	the	betterment	of	working	conditions.			In	the	moment	when	she	extends	her	invitation,	she	places	a	red	carnation	in	front	of	her	face,	as	if	to	fortify	this	collective	sense	of	belonging:	her	voice	is	not	only	her	own	–	the	“struggle”	 is	common.	Her	particular	 identity	dissipates	 into	 the	general.	Such	merging	with	the	collective	is	even	more	pronounced	by	the	setting	she	is	situated	within.	Jovana	is	seated	in	front	of	a	book,	in	pyjamas	and	in	the	privacy	of	her	home,	which	prompts	a	sense	of	familiarity.	Yet,	the	lights	are	dimmed	and	the	viewer	can	barely	recognise	the	speaker	–	she	is	both	familiar	(grounded),	but	she	could	be	any	one	of	a	collective	“we”	(in	the	air).																																																		Video	frame:	Jelena																																					
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Jelena’s	message:		
If	my	grandmother	 could	 say	 ‘No’	 to	 fascists,	 then	 I	 have	 to	 say	 ‘No’	 to	 all	 those	who	are	
trying	to	oppress	women.	I	have	to,	because	of	my	grandmother,	because	of	myself,	because	
of	 my	 daughter…We	 have	 to	 enlighten	 ourselves,	 spread	 the	 ideas;	 we	 have	 to	 push	 for	
women’s	rights,	 starting	 in	our	homes	and	amongst	our	 friends	who	could,	 then,	 spread	 it	
further.	Only	then	will	we	be	unstoppable…Persevere!			What	 captures	 one’s	 immediate	 attention	 in	 Jelena’s	 message	 is	 the	 continuity	 of	 the	women’s	 struggle	 against	 oppression	 that	 she	 depicts	 by	 drawing	 a	 link	 between	 her	grandmother	 and	 her	 daughter.	 This	 is	 both	 a	 matter	 of	 grounding	 solidarity	 in	 a	particular	familial	experience	and	also	of	airing	such	a	connection	to	the	extent	that	most	viewers	would	recognise	similar	connections	and	feel	a	sense	of	intimacy	to	them.	Jelena	suggests	 that	 she	 is	 indebted	 to	 her	 grandmother	 for	 resisting	 fascism,	 which	 is	expressed	 through	 the	 conditional	 sentence	 (if	 she…then	 I…).	 By	doing	 so,	 she	 further	strengthens	the	link	between	her	grandmother	and	subsequent	generations	of	women	in	the	family	–	they	are	not	linked	simply	through	blood	ties	but	through	their	fight	against	oppression.	 Intimacy	 is	 accentuated	here	as	 the	 stature	of	 grandparents	 is	particularly	celebrated	in	Montenegrin	culture.	Within	the	collage	of	family	photos	on	the	wall	behind	them,	a	central	place	is	occupied	by	an	old	black	and	white	photo	of	a	woman	holding	a	girl	 upon	 her	 shoulders	 (mother	 holding	 a	 daughter?	 Grandmother	 holding	 a	granddaughter?),	 which	 visually	 fortifies	 the	 idea	 of	 continuity	 and	 bonds	 between	women	past	and	present.			Jelena	 states	 that	 the	 “push	 for	women’s	 rights”	begins	 at	 home,	where	 the	 struggle	 is	grounded	 in	 the	domestic	 sphere,	 strongly	 suggesting	 that	 it	 is	 the	 obligation	of	 every	
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woman	to	take	part	in	it,	which	is	evident	in	the	repetition	of	the	modal	verb	“have	to”.	However,	she	also	exemplifies	how	such	a	 ‘push’	might	manifest	by	sending	a	message	from	her	own	home	to	her	“friends…who	could	spread	it	further”.	Jelena	also	embodies	her	 speech	 acts.	 She	 holds	 her	 daughter	 in	 her	 lap	 as	 she	 enacts	 her	 words,	 and	 so	includes	 her	 in	 the	 proposed	 “unstoppable”	 continuum	 of	 women	 who	 fight	 for	 their	rights.	She	enacts	grounding-airing	in	an	embodied	way,	manifesting	the	general	through	a	corporeal,	cross-generational	presence.		Finally,	 looking	 straight	 at	 the	 viewer,	 Jelena	 commands:	 “Persevere!”	 suggesting	 that	this	perseverance	in	fighting	for	women’s	rights	is	not	optional	but	mandatory.	However,	there	 is	 something	 soothing	 in	 such	 a	 command,	 as	 the	word	 used	 evokes	 a	 sense	 of	solidarity	and	support.	Namely,	“držite	se!”	–	the	Montenegrin	equivalent	of	“persevere”,	prompts	 a	 comforting	 evocation	 of	 people	 physically	 holding	 one	 another	 (as	 in	 an	embrace),	while	simultaneously	boosting	one	another’s	confidence	to	endure.	 	This	 is	a	highly	embodied	image	of	intimacy	and	connection,	the	meeting	of	the	general	with	the	particular.		
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																			 																							Video	frame:	Sanja		Sanja’s	message:		
People	 often	 say	 ‘poverty	 doesn’t	 discriminate’.	 However,	 my	 own	 experience	 and	 the	
experiences	of	my	girlfriends,	 shows	otherwise.	We	had	 to	 leave	our	 country	 in	pursuit	 of	
employment	 and	 career,	 unlike	 our	 male	 peers	 who	 managed	 to	 get	 work	 far	 easier.	 I	
support	 the	 IWD	 march	 because	 I	 wish	 for	 women	 to	 have	 equal	 opportunities	 for	
employment	 and	 career	 in	 our	 country.	 Therefore,	 dear	 women,	 drop	 your	 suitcases	 and	
let’s	get	marching!			Sanja	voices	her	main	concern	–	poverty	and	the	related	issue	of	employment,	something	echoed	in	a	majority	of	videos	received.	Sanja	explicitly	identifies	poverty	as	a	problem	that	 affects	 predominantly	 younger	 generations,	 a	 conclusion	 she	 draws	 by	 observing	her	 own	 and	 her	 female	 friends’	 experiences.	 She	 grounds	 experiences	 of	 poverty	 in	characters	many	will	recognise.	Her	sense	of	solidarity	clearly	rests	with	women	migrant	workers,	whom	she	denotes	by	using	the	collective	pronoun	“we”,	who	“had	to	leave”	the	country	 in	 order	 to	 find	 jobs.	 The	 employment	 of	 the	 past	 tense	modal	 verb	 “had	 to”	
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signals	a	lack	of	choice	–	while	the	privilege	of	staying	is	enjoyed	predominantly	by	“male	peers”.			Interestingly,	 Sanja	 speaks	 whilst	 walking	 towards	 the	 central	 bus	 station,	 an	 all	 too	familiar	place	for	her	and	her	migrant	worker	peers.	As	she	speaks,	we	hear	numerous	suitcases	 rolling	 on	 the	 pavement	 past	 her,	 hauled	 by	 passers-by	 on	 their	 way	 to	 the	station,	as	well	as	a	cacophony	of	traffic	noise.	These	particular	noises	evoke	a	familiar	connection	for	viewers,	of	similar	experiences	and	feelings	while	trudging	to	work.	She	carries	a	rucksack	on	her	back	as	if	to	further	evoke	the	experience	of	travelling	to	work.			She	 concludes	 her	 message	 with	 an	 invitation	 for	 women	 to	 join	 the	 march.	 She	commands	 them	 to	 “drop	 their	 suitcases”,	 which	 once	 more	 confirms	 her	 sense	 of	belonging	 to	 those	women	who	 travel	 in	 pursuit	 of	 employment.	 Yet,	 she	 immediately	follows	 the	 command	 with	 the	 self-inclusive	 exclamatory	 clause:	 “let’s	 get	 marching”,	implicating	herself	with	those	commanded.	Such	a	construction	suggests	 that,	although	pronounced	by	Sanja,	the	command	originates	elsewhere	–	it	is	an	imperative	that	arises	from	the	fact	that	women	suffer	inequality	in	the	Montenegrin	labour	market.			Apparent	in	this	analysis	is	the	way	in	which	online	video	can	open	up	and	extend	virtual	spaces	and	offer	the	basis	for	solidarity	to	be	formed	between	diverse	people.	Namely,	in	the	 videos	 each	woman	 voices	 her	 own	 particular	 concerns	 but	 these	 experiences	 are	also	 familiar	 and	 hold	 the	 potential	 to	 echo	 the	 experiences	 and	 identifications	 of	 a	diverse	 group	 of	 people,	 offering	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 chain	 of	 equivalence	between	 them.	 The	 performances	 are	 enacted	 through	 a	 range	 of	 immediate	 effects	(lighting,	colour,	 familiar	signifiers	 in	 text,	objects)	but	also	 the	aesthetic	of	 the	unique	
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online	space,	where	the	collection	of	diverse	experiences	and	aesthetics	forms	a	kind	of	collective	and	more	general	effect,	of	 inviting	others	 to	 recognise	 themselves	and	 their	own	 experiences	 within	 them.	 Below,	 I	 analyse	 another	 dimension	 of	 aestheticising	equivalence	 –	 sensory	 imbrication	 –	 where	 a	 range	 of	 mediums	 in	 an	 immediate,	embodied	 and	 face-to-face	 setting	 blend	 together	 to	 enact	 a	 chain	 of	 equivalence	between	diverse	people.				
Ethnographic	episode	(sensory	imbrication):	IWD	march		On	the	morning	of	IWD	people	started	flocking	into	the	premises	of	WRC.	Practitioners	cleared	 one	 of	 the	 office	 rooms	 and	 filled	 it	 with	 artefacts	 (flags,	 banners,	 vuvuzelas,	whistles,	 posters,	 t-shirts	 and	 poles)	 for	 people	 to	 choose	 from,	 and	 set	 aside	 blank	canvases,	markers	and	paints	for	people	to	add	new	messages	or	drawings.	This	was	the	practitioners’	way	of	encouraging	people	 to	express	 themselves	creatively	and	“to	 take	part	 in	 something	 that	 already	 belongs	 to	 them,	 although	 people	 are	made	 to	 forget”	(Irena,	a	practitioner).	This	comment	references	 the	purpose	of	 the	event	 for	WRC,	 re-enmeshing	women	in	what	it	sees	as	the	original	set	of	discursive	norms	of	IWD.		Many	 people	 brought	 their	 own	 artefacts	 to	 the	 march	 and	 those	 who	 came	 empty-handed	 looked	 for	 inspiration	 in	 the	 collection	 of	 banners	 and	 placards	 available	 and	crafted	their	own.	Very	quickly	the	offices	transformed	into	a	bustling	workshop:	people	busied	 themselves	 with	 flicking	 through	 the	mountains	 of	 banners,	 adding	 their	 own,	exchanging	 them	 and	 organising	 different	 artefacts	 in	 piles.	 Introductions	 were	made	and	people	grouped	themselves	 into	 little	sub-groups,	as	 far	as	was	possible	 in	a	small	
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office	 space,	 casually	 chatting	 about	 the	 position	 of	 women	 in	 Montenegrin	 society,	exchanging	 personal	 experiences,	 as	 well	 as	 talking	 about	 supporting	 the	 protesting	mothers.			
				Photo	5:	The	‘creative’	room	in	the	WRC	offices	in	the	run-up	to	IWD.		Below	 I	 illustrate	 the	 nuances	 of	 sensory	 imbrication	 through	 the	 story	 of	 the	march,	focusing	 on	 different	 mediums	 and	 their	 moments	 of	 blending.	 Although	 there	 was	 a	significant	overlap	in	the	performance	itself,	I	separate	the	story	into	four	sub-sections,	according	to	the	sensory	aspects	 in	use,	 in	order	to	underline	the	diversity	of	aesthetic	and	sensory	expression.				
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Sensory	imbrication	–	Colour,	bodies	and	artefacts:		
				Photo	6:	Images	of	the	IWD	2017	march		Most	of	the	banners,	flags	and	artefacts	used	in	IWD	featured	red	as	the	dominant	colour.	Artefacts	that	did	not	have	red	as	a	base	featured	it	elsewhere:	as	a	way	of	accentuating	a	written	 message,	 drawn	 symbol	 or	 both.	 A	 cursory	 glance	 at	 the	 collage	 of	 photos	depicting	people	 joining	 the	march	brings	 the	colour	 red	 immediately	 to	attention	and	not	only	on	banners	and	flags,	but	also	on	people’s	clothes	and	accessories	(bags,	scarves,	glasses,	etc.),	and	even	on	the	pavement	of	the	square	people	congregated	on.			In	the	run	up	to	the	march,	practitioners	bought	big	rolls	of	red	paper	on	which	they,	and	other	volunteers,	 inscribed	their	messages	and	turned	them	into	placards	and	banners.	People	 commented	 on	 different	 red	 items	 of	 clothing	 they	 saw	 on	 others	 as	“suitable/fantastic/ideal/spot	 on”	 for	 IWD,	 without	 any	 further	 explanation,	 which	
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signalled	 that	a	certain	 taken-for-granted	assumption	was	 in	operation.	The	colour	red	served	 a	 visually	 unifying	 purpose,	 of	 creating	 a	 sentence-image	 (Ranciére,	 2009)	assembled	by	people,	their	clothes,	accessories,	inscribed	placards	and	banners.		When	I	asked	Andrea,	who	was	in	charge	of	securing	the	material,	why	she	chose	red	as	the	colour	of	the	march,	she	responded:			
…Apart	 from	 it	 being	 a	 shock	 colour,	 one	 that	 draws	 attention,	 it	 just	 felt	 suitable…I	
instinctively	 reached	 for	 red,	 and	 I	 suppose	 others	 did	 as	 well,	 as	 you	 could	 see	 people	
appeared	with	their	own	red	banners,	flags,	clothes.	It’s	inscribed	somewhere	in	our	psyche	
that	red	is	the	IWD	colour,	with	red	carnations,	our	socialist	past,	working	class,	all	red	in	
school	 recitals...It’s	 a	mechanical	 reaction.	Our	 school	 recitals	were	 like	 straight	 from	 the	
inside	of	 the	uterus!	Remember?	[laughter]	Everything	was	red!	So	some	part	of	me	acted	
upon	 that…the	 power	 of	 socialist	 tradition,	 power	 of	 the	 female	 body,	 something	
recognisable	for	all.			The	colours	that	symbolise	IWD	around	the	globe	differ.	For	instance,	the	colours	chosen	in	 the	 UK	 are	 purple,	 white	 and	 green,	 as	 envisaged	 by	 the	 suffragette	 movement	 to	denote	 loyalty,	purity	and	hope	 (see	Blackman,	2015).	However,	 as	Andrea	hinted,	 the	colour	red	came	to	symbolise	IWD	in	the	former	Yugoslavia	through	its	link	to	socialism	and	 class	 struggle.	 Considering	 that	 one	 of	 the	 main	 problems	 raised	 during	 IWD	 in	Montenegro	was	poverty	 and	 economic	 inequality,	 the	dominance	of	 the	 colour	 red	 in	placards	and	flags	could	have	been	interpreted	as	a	deliberate	emphasis	on	the	working	class	struggle.			However,	since	the	selection	of	a	suitable	colour	for	IWD	was	not	discussed	amongst	the	participants	and	organisers	of	the	march,	and	yet	the	majority	selected	it	as	their	colour	
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of	choice,	it	is	more	plausible	that	choosing	to	employ	red	represents	an	involuntary,	yet	agentic	act.	Namely,	it	was	an	act	that	derived	from	the	impetus	of	meaning	sedimented	through	 ongoing	 repetitive	 practices	 (IWD	 celebrations,	 school	 recitals,	 female	 bodily	function,	 etc.).	 As	 Andrea	 explained	 –	 it	 was	 “a	 mechanical	 reaction”	 prompted	 by	“something	recognisable	for	all”,	uniting	the	experiences	of	women	with	the	struggles	of	labour.	Bearing	such	sedimented	practice	in	mind,	the	colour	red	is	more	than	a	means	of	visually	unifying	diverse	groups	of	people.	It	serves	as	an	enabler	of	a	more	meaningful,	performative	 chain	 of	 equivalence	 –	 one	 built	 through	 a	 myriad	 of	 contextually	embedded,	repeatedly	performed	practices.			The	line	“recognisable	for	all”	is	key	for	understanding	the	power	of	the	colour	red	to	link	many	 different	 people	 and	 groups.	 It	 is	 the	 colour	 that	 prompts	 memory	 of	 a	 broad	spectrum	 of	 practices	 (and	 symbols)	 familiar	 to	 people	 in	 different	 kinds	 of	 ways	(worker,	 woman,	 student,	 socialist,	 etc.)	 –	 something	 that	 everyone	 in	 the	 context	 of	Yugoslavia	can	relate	to.	Such	easy	relatability	to	familiar	practices	fostered	through	the	deployment	 of	 the	 colour	 red,	 in	 turn,	 provides	 aesthetic	 impetus	 to	 the	 chain	 of	equivalence.	 Namely,	 not	 only	 does	 the	 colour	 link	 people	 together	 visually	 and	meaningfully	(by	reminding	them	of	a	range	of	practices	they	could	relate	to),	but	it	also	activates	the	chain,	prompting	its	performative	power.			Mina,	another	practitioner,	said:		
In	 a	 way,	 we	 could	 say	 that	 there	 is	 no	more	 appropriate	 colour	 to	 denote	 the	 women’s	
movement	 globally,	 but	 the	 colour	 of	 blood…we	 didn’t	 choose	 it,	 really,	 it	 came	 to	 us	
through	acts	of	struggle,	sacrifice	and	the	flow	of	our	cycles.	It	symbolises	life	and	death	at	
once…		
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	For	 Mina,	 the	 colour	 red	 symbolises	 simultaneously	 “life	 and	 death”	 –	 the	 ability	 of	women’s	bodies	to	create	 life	and	the	sacrifices	women’s	bodies	endure	 in	the	struggle	for	 liberty	 and	 equality.	 For	 her,	 the	 colour	 red	 also	 provides	 a	 sense	 of	 shared	experiences	 and	 solidarity,	 between	women	globally,	 not	 solely	women	 from	Yugoslav	territory.	She	evokes	the	 image	of	a	united	female	population,	coloured	in	red,	 from	all	over	the	world,	significantly	broadening	the	chain	of	equivalence.	Yet,	by	broadening	the	chain,	 she	 ‘targets’	 the	 attention	 of	 a	much	narrower	 group	 –	 the	marching	women	of	Montenegro	–	inciting	an	additional	sense	of	belonging	to	a	collective	of	women	bonded	by	their	bodily	experiences.				Sensory	imbrication	–	Language	and	colour:		
							Photo	7:	IWD	2017	marching	column		
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The	flag	at	the	head	of	the	marching	column	reads:	“And	bread	and	peace	and	roses”,	the	main	slogan	of	IWD	2017,	bringing	the	colour	red,	the	inscription	of	the	slogan	and	the	marching	column	together	 in	a	sentence-image.	The	slogan	was	derived	predominantly	from	 the	 video	 messages	 received,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 demands	 voiced	 in	 the	 protests	 of	mothers	and	those	of	WRC	clients,	which:		
happened	 to	 correspond	 to	 numerous	 IWD	 slogans	 around	 the	 globe	 throughout	
history…messages	repeat,	we	share	issues	with	the	textile	workers	of	Massachusetts	in	1912,	
the	peace	protest	in	Russia	in	1917…	it	was	a	way	to	say	that	yes,	yet	again	we’re	fighting	
for	economic	equality	and	prosperity,	yet	again	fighting	to	maintain	peace,	but	we	also	need	
roses,	some	beauty	and	dignity	in	our	lives…life	should	be	more	than	a	constant	scraping	for	
survival.	(Andrea)		It	is	interesting	to	note	here	the	raised	demand	for	“roses”,	or	as	Andrea	clarifies	“some	beauty	and	dignity	in	our	lives”.	Creating	the	slogan,	Andrea	deliberately	uses	the	word	“roses”	to	provoke	a	memory	of	the	superficial	practice	of	gifting	flowers	to	women	on	IWD,	 while	 simultaneously	 drawing	 reference	 to	 the	 textile	 workers’	 strike	 led	 by	women	 in	 Massachusetts34	in	 1912,	 demanding	 better	 working	 conditions	 but	 also	respect	 and	 dignity	 (Eistenstein,	 1983).	 Andrea’s	 intention	 is	 to	 stress	 that	 there	 is	nothing	 wrong	 with	 gifting	 flowers	 to	 women	 on	 IWD	 but	 that	 women	 should	 be	respected	 and	 should	 enjoy	 dignity	 on	 other	 days	 as	 well.	 The	 slogan’s	 reference	 to	dignity	 builds	 a	 chain	 of	 equivalence	 not	 only	 between	 women	 in	 Montenegro	demanding	 dignity	 and	 respect,	 but	 also	 women	 in	 Russia	 and	 the	 USA,	 who	 raised	similar	demands,	and	so	the	issue	of	dignity	surpasses	national	borders	and	instigates	a	sense	of	international	solidarity.			
																																																								34	The	slogan	of	textile	workers	from	Massachusetts	was	‘Bread	and	Roses’	(see	Eisenstein,	1983)	
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	It	 is	worth	 noting	 that	 the	 textile	workers’	 strike	 is	 infamous	 for	 the	 excessive	 use	 of	force	 used	 against	 the	 peaceful	 protestors	 by	militias	 (Milkman,	 2013).	 The	numerous	pictures	of	US	militia	holding	extended	bayonets	towards	protestors	in	Massachusetts	in	1912	 bears	 a	 haunting	 similarity	with	 the	 image	 of	 special	 forces	 in	 full	 combat	 gear,	surrounding	the	frail,	protesting	mothers	in	Montenegro	(see	photo	No4).	Bearing	this	in	mind,	the	slogan’s	call	for	peace	can	be	interpreted	as	a	caution	against	unnecessary	use	of	force	in	the	case	of	protesting	mothers,	as	well	as	a	generic	demand	for	peace	against	the	prevailing	domestic	and	gender-based	violence	in	the	country.	Yet	again,	the	chain	of	equivalence	 is	 extended	 from	 national	 to	 international	 level	 through	 the	 medium	 of	linguistic	 imagery	 (Massachusetts	 strike	 –	 mothers’	 strike),	 while	 still	 allowing	 for	 a	more	contextual	association	to	be	made	(those	not	familiar	with	the	Massachusetts	strike	would	be	familiar	with	the	prevailing	problem	of	domestic	and	gender-based	violence	in	general).			Each	 noun	 in	 the	 slogan	 links	 to	 another	 by	 the	 conjunction	 “and”,	 which	 gives	 the	impression	of	assembling	a	list	of	things	to	be	accomplished	by	marching	on	the	streets.	Yet	even	though	the	list’s	inventory	comprises	only	three	items	(bread,	peace,	roses),	the	cyclical	format	employed	(accomplished	by	the	repetition	of	the	conjunction	“and”)	has	the	textual	effect	of	a	loop,	making	it	seem	never-ending.	In	this	way,	the	slogan	mimics	the	infinity	of	struggle	to	attain	economic	stability,	peace	and	“beauty	and	dignity	in	our	lives”.			Using	 the	 cyclical	 arrangement	 of	 the	 sentence,	 which	 curiously	 does	 not	 contain	 any	punctuation	marks,	Andrea	opens	up	an	opportunity	for	spectators	to	join	the	symbolic	
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merry-go-round-ride	 of	 women’s	 struggle,	 wherever:	 at	 either	 “bread”,	 or	 “peace”	 or	“roses”.	 She	 also	 signals	 that	 the	 three	 issues	 are	 inextricably	 linked:	 there	 is	 no	economic	equality	without	peace,	no	peace	without	dignity,	no	dignity	without	economic	equality.	 The	 slogan,	 formatted	 in	 this	way,	 also	 symbolically	 serves	 to	 bring	 different	groups	 of	 people	 into	 a	 performative	 assembly	 (voicing	 issues	 of	 either	 economic	inequality,	violence	or	dignity	as	priority)	through	a	chain	of	equivalence.				Moreover,	the	denoted	historical	repetition	of	the	voiced	demands	draws	a	link	between	time	 and	 space,	 creating	 a	 sense	 of	 assembly	 of	 protestors	 from	 around	 the	 globe	 in	different	 timelines	 –	 an	 assembly	 that	 surpasses	 the	 streets	we	marched	along,	 on	 the	8th	of	March	2017.	Such	an	assembly	is	demonstrated	on	the	main	poster	for	IWD	2017,	in	which	the	artist	created	a	sense	of	solidarity	 that	spans	different	epochs	and	places,	merging	streets,	people	and	slogans	from	cities	around	the	globe	and	blending	them	into	one	image,	one	protest.												
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	Sensory	imbrication	–	Image,	language	and	colour:		
					Photo	8:	The	main	poster	for	IWD	2017		The	poster’s	finish	is	grey-scale	and	the	only	splash	of	colour	(red)	is	present	in	the	form	of	 the	 slogan	 “and	bread	and	peace	 and	 roses”,	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	 announcement	of	 the	event,	stating	the	date,	venue	and	time.	The	grey-scaling	serves	the	purpose	of	blending	and	making	uniform	different	moments	 in	history	 from	various	parts	of	 the	globe.	The	highlighted	 slogan	 serves	 a	 similar	 purpose:	 it	 summarises	 the	 messages	 from	 the	placards	people	in	the	picture	hold	(that	also	resonate	with	the	issues	voiced	by	people	in	Montenegro),	which	are	inscribed	in	different	languages,	and	so	unify	the	struggle	of	women	globally.			
	 275	
Yet	 the	 blending	 strategies	 employed	 are	 not	 so	 extreme	 as	 to	 completely	 erase	 the	particularities:	 closer	 observation	 offers	 a	 window	 into	 different	 eras,	 noticeable	 in	people’s	attire	(hippie	clothing	hinting	at	the	1960s,	the	tweed	costume	of	office	workers	from	perhaps	the	1950s,	simple	coats	of	factory	workers	from	the	1970s	and	1980s,	etc.),	as	 well	 as	 the	 glimpse	 of	 older	 vehicles	 and	 different	 architecture	 (British	 Victorian,	Yugoslav	 minimalism,	 American	 Art	 Deco,	 etc.).	 As	 such,	 the	 poster	 allows	 for	simultaneous	identification	and	dis-identification	with	certain	elements,	people,	events,	etc.	 from	previous	 actions,	 eras	 and	 places,	without	 breaking	 the	 chain	 of	 equivalence	and,	therefore,	the	basis	for	united	action.			Moreover,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 ordering,	 as	 the	 fragments	 of	 older	 IWD	 marches	 are	pushed	towards	the	background	to	provide	space	for	the	newer	generations	(elements	of	the	 picture’s	 foreground	 are	 taken	 from	 recent	 IWD	 marches	 in	 Montenegro).	 Such	positioning	 provokes	 the	 feeling	 of	 continuity	 between	 past	 and	 present	 generations,	older	ones	passing	the	symbolic	torch	(a	placard,	an	issue)	to	younger	ones,	regardless	of	their	 respective	 countries.	 Such	 assembling	 of	 continuity	 erases	 national	 borders	 and	rearranges	the	boundaries	of	the	battle	for	liberty	and	equality.	It	further	strengthens	the	sense	of	solidarity	of	women	globally.			One	 curious	 aspect	 is	 the	 appearance	 of	 the	male	 arm	 (detached	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	body)	that	reoccurs	in	different	places	in	the	poster.	We	can	see	that	the	arm	is	suited	in	a	shirt	and	jacket	sleeve,	which	evokes	a	corporate	man	or	a	politician.	The	arm	has	no	body	with	a	face	attached	to	it,	so	it	is	easy	to	assume	any	particular	corrupt	politician	or	predator	capitalist	guiding	it	–	it	may	symbolise	a	common	enemy,	an	antagonist	who	the	aesthetic	 chain	 of	 equivalence	 is	 posited	 against.	 The	 hand	 serves	 a	 performative	
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function	 in	 the	chain,	extending	 from	the	suit	 sleeve	 in	a	grabbing	or	scooping	gesture	and	 wherever	 it	 is	 placed,	 it	 leaves	 an	 erased	 smudge.	 The	 largest	 image	 of	 a	 hand	appears	on	the	placard,	which	reads	‘I	don’t	want	benefits,	I	want	a	job’,	half-erasing	the	second	part	of	the	message,	especially	tearing	through	the	word	‘job’.			This	 playful	 depiction	 problematises,	 in	 particular,	 the	 adoption	 of	 legislation	 that	incentivised	a	large	number	of	mothers	to	leave	their	jobs	in	exchange	for	benefits,	and	the	subsequent	act	of	the	unlawful	withdrawal	of	benefits,	which	instigated	the	protests	of	mothers.	Observed	in	this	way,	the	depiction	addresses	a	very	particular	problem	of	a	very	 specific	 group.	 However,	 the	 author	 of	 the	 poster	 also	 places	 the	 same	 grabbing	hand	 above	 the	 IWD	 slogan,	 rendering	 the	 threat	 (from	 the	 capitalist	 or	 politician)	common	to	all	–	not	only	 to	protesting	mothers.	This	common	enemy	serves	here	as	a	unifying	 force	 for	 different	 groups	 of	 women	 –	 it	 places	 the	 protesting	 mothers,	unemployed	 women,	 employed	 but	 underpaid	 women	 and	 working	mothers	 within	 a	chain	 of	 equivalence	 against	 the	 corporate	men	 and	politicians	who	marginalise	 them.	The	presence	of	 a	disembodied	arm	also	 serves	 a	 comic	 function,	 inviting	 ridicule	 and	perhaps	removing	some	of	the	sense	of	dread	women	feel	 in	relation	to	such	figures	of	masculinity.			Sensory	imbrication	–	Melody,	movement,	language:		The	assembling	of	a	chain	of	equivalence	also	took	place	through	a	concoction	of	music,	lyrics	 and	 the	 rhythm	 of	marching	 people,	waving	 banners.	 As	we	 started	marching,	 I	noticed	people	taking	photos	and	recording	videos	from	the	pavement.	One	person	was	
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scribbling	something	about	equal	pay	on	the	back	of	a	large	yellow	envelope,	using	a	post	office	window	as	support	and	joined	the	marching	column,	lifting	the	envelope	above	her	head.	Somewhere	in	the	back	a	group	of	women	was	singing	an	old	Yugoslav	rock	song:			
Look	what	I	did	to	your	daughter,	mum…	
I	twisted	and	turned	and	changed	her		
and	all	of	a	sudden	she’s	not	so	dull	any	more…			The	song	was	originally	sung	by	a	man	but	it	adopts	a	very	different	connotation	when	sung	 by	 women.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 IWD	 march	 it	 may	 denote	 that	 a	 woman	 has	decided	to	break	away	from	a	patriarchal	upbringing,	one	that	undermines	her	political	agency.	 It	also	denotes	 the	struggle	 involved	 in	breaking	away	 from	patriarchal	norms,	yet	this	is	also	a	struggle	that	brings	about	a	“change”:	“I	twisted	and	turned”.	The	final	verse	is	somewhat	mischievous	–	she	hints	at	a	change	(“not	so	dull	any	more”),	but	does	not	 clearly	 state	 what	 others	 might	 expect	 to	 experience,	 building	 a	 sense	 of	 hope	(uneasy	anticipation,	even)	in	the	air.			The	song	is	rather	cryptic,	and	as	such	allows	for	a	variety	of	interpretations	and	ways	of	relating	to	it:	we	know	that	the	daughter	(an	identity	common	to	all	marching	women)	is	changing	in	an	unspecified	way	(allowing	for	people	to	attribute	their	own	experiences	to	 such	 a	 change).	We	 know	 that	 the	 change	 is	 turbulent	 (a	 common	 experience	 that	most	can	relate	to)	and	that	she	emerges	a	different	person	(again,	something	many	can	relate	to).	The	commonalities	conveyed	in	this	song	serve	as	a	binding	force	for	the	chain	of	equivalence	and	provide	an	impetus	to	the	chain	-	they	make	it	performative.	Unified,	people	are	marching	along	to	the	same	song,	singing	 lyrics	that	can	be	 interpreted	in	a	number	 of	 potentially	 dis-unifying	ways,	 and	 yet	 due	 to	 its	 aesthetic	 assemblage	 (the	
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song	 is	 well-known,	 conveys	 a	 broad	 enough	 meaning	 for	 people	 to	 relate	 to,	 is	performed	 in	 the	 street	 by	 marching	 people	 rather	 than	 discussed	 as	 an	 intellectual	exercise),	the	song	performatively	brings	diverse	people	together.			By	the	time	the	song	was	over,	we	had	the	protesting	mothers	in	our	line	of	sight	and	a	seasoned	practitioner	played	another	 tune,	 this	 time	via	a	portable	speaker.	The	music	was	 quickly	 drowned	 out	 by	 a	 chorus	 of	 several	 hundred	 voices	 singing	 in	 unison,	placards	dancing	to	the	rhythm	of	the	song,	amplified	by	marching	drummers:		
…Within	us,	the	time/weather	is	changing	
And	everyone	is	yet	again	
Ready	to	fight	for	a	dream	
	
Within	us,	the	time/weather	is	changing	
From	the	barricades	we’ll	shout:	
No	passarán!	[They	shall	not	pass]	
	
Now	is	the	time…	
	
Sejmeni	are	coming	
Bringing	chains…			This	 song	evokes	 revolutionary	 feelings;	 it	 speaks	of	 the	 fight	 for	 freedom,	 and	 can	be	applied	to	numerous	contexts,	allowing	many	to	relate	 to	 it.	 It	depicts	 idealistic	people	(“ready	 to	 fight	 for	 a	 dream”)	 rebelling	 against	 ‘sejmeni’,	 which	 could	 be	 anyone	who	holds	 a	 weapon	 (guards,	 police,	 military,	 etc.)	 or	 threatening	 someone’s	 freedom	(sejmeni	are	portrayed	as	“bringing	chains”	to	the	people).	 ‘No	passarán’	 is	 the	 famous	line	uttered	by	Dolores	 Ibárruri	Gómez,	 a	 communist	 revolutionary	 from	Spain,	 in	 her	
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speech	directed	again	the	fascist	forces	of	Francisco	Franco	in	1936	(Ayrton,	2016).	The	line	 is	 repeated	 several	 times	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 chant,	 in	 crescendo,	 inciting	 an	 emotional	build-up	and	sense	of	solidarity.		It	 is	worth	noting	here	the	word	“vrijeme”,	which	can	be	translated	as	both	“time”	and	“weather”.	The	verse	“within	us	the	time/weather	is	changing”	is	repeated	several	times	in	 the	 song,	 denoting	 two	 things.	 First,	 the	 word	 ‘weather’	 suggests	 that	 people’s	mindsets/feelings	are	changing,	as	 they	are	no	 longer	willing	to	 tolerate	 the	curbing	of	freedom.	 The	 staccato	 rhythm	 of	 the	 song	 suggests	 that	 such	 a	 change	 of	‘weather’/feeling	could	be	tempestuous	–	a	drum-roll	announcing	a	release.	Second,	the	word	‘time’	suggests	a	change	in	era,	a	shift	on	the	horizon	that	could	potentially	bring	forth	a	new	social	order.	It	did	feel	slightly	eerie	to	sing	this	song,	as	we	were	surrounded	by	police	(wardens	and	special	forces).	The	police	presence	provided	a	visual	reference	for	the	lyrics,	allowing	supplementary	identification	with	the	scenario	depicted	in	song,	further	strengthening	the	established	chain	of	equivalence.				
Aestheticising	equivalence	summary		I	explored	aestheticising	equivalence	as	a	kind	of	democratic	practice	in	which	aesthetics	acted	 as	 a	 medium	 for	 assembling	 a	 chain	 of	 equivalence	 between	 diverse	 groups	 of	people.	Practitioners	used	aesthetics	 to	generate	a	basis	 for	 solidarity	by	 transforming	particular	 issues	 that	people	voiced	 into	a	 common	platform	 for	action,	 in	artful	ways.	This	meaning	creation	only	made	sense	through	a	particular	and	gendered	performative	assembly.	 The	 equivalence	 gained	 its	 force	 through	 a	 performative	 connection	 to	 the	
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women’s	struggle,	through	its	situating	in	contemporary	socio-political	life	by	a	group	of	practitioners	and	activists.	Grounding-airing	referred	to	the	dimension	that	encapsulated	simultaneous	acts	of	generalisation	and	particularisation	of	issues	women	face,	allowing	for	alliances	to	be	made	across	time	and	space.	Such	alliances	gained	their	force	through	a	contextualised	and	therefore	familiar	and	repetitive	performative	setting,	the	everyday	experiences	of	women	 in	Montenegro.	The	 coming	 together	of	 image,	 text	 and	music	 -	generated	a	provocative,	confrontational	but	also	unifying	meaning,	a	particular	chain	of	equivalence,	 one	 that	 connected	 contemporary	 struggle	 with	 that	 of	 past	 Yugoslav	struggle	and	the	women’s	struggle	globally.	The	overlapping	sensory	mediums	engaged	participants	 in	 a	way	 that	 created	 new	meaning	 and	 identifications	 –	 a	 vehicle	which	enabled	a	collective	agency	through	democratic	assembly.			I	 now	move	 onto	 the	 next	 sub-practice	 of	 the	 aesthetics	 of	 assembling,	 which	 I	 term	embodied	reordering,	where	I	describe	the	performative	enactments	present	as	people	vie	for	recognition	in	an	order	of	the	sensible.		
	
8.2.	Embodied	reordering		In	this	section	I	explore	the	ways	in	which	the	ordering	of	the	sensible	(Ranciére,	2012)	is	 reconfigured	 performatively	 through	 the	 interplay	 between	 WRC	 practitioners	 and	protesting	mothers,	each	side	attempting	to	enact	an	assembly	(Butler,	2015)	that	could	foster	recognition	of	a	specific	political	subject	(i.e.	to	make	a	particular	political	subject	intelligible)	 in	the	context	of	 IWD.	The	literature	on	democratic	practice	recognises	the	importance	 of	 forming	 ‘hegemonies’	 for	 practicing	 democracy	 –	 through	 voicing	
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demands,	 protesting	 against	 injustices,	 forging	 alliances,	 etc.	 However,	 it	 offers	 little	insight	into	the	dynamic	within	hegemonies,	how	a	conflict	of	interests	between	various	groups	unfolds	or	how	groups	strive	to	make	their	 identifications	commonsensical	and	dominant,	 which	 I	 present	 as	 an	 aesthetic	 process.	 The	 order	 of	 the	 sensible	 here	 is	interpreted	 as	 something	 temporary	 and	 dynamic,	 which	 shifts	 through	 a	 range	 of	embodied	 acts.	 The	 sub-practice	 and	 its	 dimensions	 are	 defined	 and	 illustrated	 in	 the	following	table:		
Sub-practice	of	the	aesthetics	of	
assembly	
	
Dimensions	of	the	
sub-practice	
Illustrative	examples	
Embodied	reordering	
	A	realignment	of	the	sensible	order	through	aesthetic	and	bodily	acts.	
Embodied	
improvisation	
	Decision-making,	which	triggers	a	reordering	of	prominence	and	recognition,	is	performed	through	embodied	and	instinctive	acts	rather	than	informed	debate.	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		“What	are	we	going	to	do?”	Nina	asked	somewhat	anxiously.	“No,	idea…Proceed?	I	replied.	“But	listen	to	them…We	can’t	see	or	hear	anything	behind!	Can	you	see	anything?	But	they	can.	Something	happened,	someone	saw	something,	otherwise	they	wouldn’t…I	don’t	want	to	turn	back,	but	listen…we	have	to	trust	them….”			Nina	and	I	improvised	and	made	a	decision	based	upon	the	instincts	and	bodily	prompts	of	others.		
Persistence	
	Remaining	physically	and	stubbornly	present	in	assembly,	which	places	pressure	and	strain	on	the	order	in	that	moment	through	preventing	the	grounding	of	a	certain	political	agency.		
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		We	continued	to	walk	through	the	protesting	crowd	and	formed	a	line	in	front	of	the	stage,	stretching	our	flag	wide.	It	was	important	to	occupy	a	space	visible	to	all	so	that	we	could	act	as	a	reminder	that	IWD	belonged	to	all	women,	not	only	mothers.		
Subversion	
	Employing	subversive	tactics	in	order	to	trigger	a	reordering	of	the	sensible.	
Ethnographic	journal	extract:		One	of	the	mothers	complained	about	the	administrators	of	a	Facebook	group	for	not	pushing	their	cause	more	vehemently,	to	which	the	crowd	started	to	chant	in	mock-lament:	“Admin,	do	you	have	a	mother?”	subverting	the	
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well-rehearsed	line	from	most	of	the	speeches	(e.g.	Prime	Minister,	do	you	have	a	mother?	President,	do	you	have	a	mother?	etc.).			A	group	of	people	began	to	undermine	the	repetitive	speeches	of	mothers	through	humour,	in	an	attempt	to	shift	the	assembly	from	exclusionary	(mothers	only)	to	inclusive	(all	women).		
Resolution	
	The	settling	upon	an	order	by	contesting	parties.	
Extract	from	a	speech	delivered	by	Nina	at	the	IWD	march:		“Mothers’	suffering	is	my	suffering,	and	their	burden	is	the	burden	of	all	of	us,	one	for	which	we	are	ready	to	plant	our	backs	in	support.	Women,	we	make	up	half	of	this	country!	Let's	not	forget	that…Let's	be	as	united	as	much	as	they	are	trying	to	divide	us!	I	wish	us	all	a	happy	Women's	Day!”		The	speech	linked	broader	women’s	issues	with	the	demands	of	mothers	in	a	chain	of	equivalence.		
Table	11:	Sub-practice	of	embodied	reordering			
Ethnographic	 episode	 (embodied	 reordering):	 International	 Women’s	 Day	 or	
Mothers’	Day?		On	IWD	morning,	we	collectively	descended	down	the	narrow	office	staircase	and	spilled	onto	the	square	(a	large	basin,	framed	by	steps),	designated	as	the	official	meeting	place,	where	we	met	with	the	rest	of	the	marchers.	I	repeatedly	span	around	on	my	own	axis	trying	to	see	and	memorise	it	all,	never	before	witnessing	so	many	women	in	one	space.	I	climbed	a	few	steps	to	try	to	locate	the	WRC	practitioners	and	from	there	was	able	to	see	people	 carrying	 placards	 and	 flags	 emerging	 from	 side	 streets,	 like	 rivulets	 joining	 a	river.	Finally,	I	 identified	Nina,	motioning	me	to	join	her.	I	squeezed	through	the	crowd	
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and	picked	up	the	corner	of	the	flag	she	held,	extended	towards	me.	“Ready?”,	she	asked,	smiling.	I	nodded,	smiling	back.	“It’s	exhilarating,	isn’t	it?	Look	at	this	power!	There	are	more	and	more	people	each	year!”	she	exclaimed,	looking	around	one	last	time	before	we	led	the	column	forwards,	towards	the	protesting	mothers,	and	to	the	rhythm	of	drums.			Embodied	improvisation:		Mothers	were	cheering	the	approaching	river	of	people,	many	with	tears	in	their	eyes.	It	was	an	emotional	encounter.	A	group	immediately	behind	me	started	to	shout:	“Support!	Support!!”	and	Nina	and	I	joined	them	in	the	heat	of	the	moment,	prolonging	the	chant,	my	eardrums	vibrating	 from	the	power	of	 released	decibels.	 I	 looked	around,	 trying	 to	absorb	all	 the	motions,	 facial	expressions	and	encounters,	 thinking	how	empowering	 it	was	 to	 witness	 such	 a	 diverse	 pool	 of	 people	 in	 one	 place,	 united.	 I	 had	 never	experienced	such	wholesale	solidarity	amongst	women	in	Montenegro	before	and	I	 felt	as	if	I	was	part	of	an	important	historical	event.	“Look	at	us”,	Nina	said,	pointing	to	the	women	 around	 us,	 “we	 could	 run	 this	 country	 together!”	 I	 smiled	 and	 hoped	 that	everyone	was	feeling	the	same.			WRC	 practitioners	 spoke	 on	 numerous	 occasions	 with	 organisers	 of	 the	 protests	 of	mothers	 about	 the	 IWD	march	 and	 an	 agreement	was	made	 that	 people	would	march	past	 the	protestors	(as	a	way	of	signalling	support	and	allowing	mothers	 to	 join	 in	 the	march),	 proceed	 to	 collect	 others	 along	 the	 designated	 route	 and	 then	 loop	 back	 to	support	the	protestors.	It	was	also	agreed	that	upon	joining	the	protestors,	several	of	the	practitioners	and	participants	in	the	march	would	be	given	an	opportunity	to	address	the	
	284	
assembled	 people	 from	 the	 stage	 in	 front	 of	 Parliament,	 where	 mothers	 had	 been	protesting	for	weeks.			As	we	began	merging	with	protestors,	mothers	approached	the	marchers,	hugging	them	and	thanking	them	for	their	support.	The	column	slowed	down	to	a	crawling	pace	but	we	continued	to	walk	straight	ahead,	passing	the	mothers	and	heading	for	the	bridge	linking	two	main	parts	of	the	city.	I	was	daydreaming	about	how	powerful	it	would	be	when	we	joined	 the	 mothers	 later	 with	 a	 significantly	 larger	 crowd	 and	 I	 smiled	 to	 myself,	imagining	the	encounter.	At	that	moment	a	few	of	the	marchers	towards	the	back	of	the	column	started	to	direct	us	to	turn	around.	“Turn	around!	You	have	to	turn	around!	The	mothers	 will	 think	 we’re	 abandoning	 them!	 TURN	 AROUND!”	 A	 chant	 of	 “support	 for	mothers”	drifted	through	from	the	mothers’	stage,	in	between	the	shouts.		The	 shouts	 persisted	 and	 everything	 became	 so	 confusing.	 Nina,	 a	 couple	 of	 other	participants	and	I,	who	were	at	the	beginning	of	the	column,	continued	to	walk	forwards	somewhat	 insecurely,	 as	 the	 urging	 to	 turn	 around	 and	 join	 the	 mothers	 increased.	Turning	 around	 felt	 wrong.	 My	 instincts	 urged	me	 to	 stick	 to	 the	 initial	 plan,	 but	 the	external	 pressure	 was	 escalating.	 Thoughts	 about	 all	 the	 work	 that	 we	 had	 put	 into	shaping	and	designing	the	IWD	campaign	and	march	so	that	we	could	make	it	inclusive	and	foster	solidarity	between	diverse	groups	of	women,	many	of	whom	were	waiting	to	join	us	 along	 the	 agreed	 route,	were	 racing	 through	my	mind.	 I	 could	not	 fathom	why	mothers,	 or	 anyone	 else,	 thought	 we	 were	 abandoning	 them,	 as	 the	 initial	 and	 well-advertised	plan	was	to	join	them	at	the	end	and	to	mark	IWD,	as	women,	together.	“We	have	to	go	back,	don’t	cross	the	bridge!	Turn	around!”	-	the	shouting	broke	my	train	of	thought.	Nina	and	I	looked	at	one	another	and	it	was	clear	that	neither	of	us	wanted	to	
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halt	the	marching,	but	we	had	to	decide.	If	we	had	continued,	it	would	have	been	wrong,	if	we	had	stayed,	it	would	have	been	wrong.			“What	 are	 we	 going	 to	 do?”,	 Nina	 asked	 somewhat	 anxiously.	 “No	 idea…Proceed?	We	advertised	 the	route”,	 I	 replied	coyly.	 “I	know	but	 listen	 to	 them…We	can’t	see	or	hear	anything	behind!	Can	you	see	anything?	 [I	 shook	my	head]	We	can’t	 see.	But	 they	can.	Something	happened,	 someone	 saw	 something…otherwise	 they	wouldn’t…I	don’t	want	to	 turn	 back,	 but	 listen…”	 Nina	 said.	 A	 further	 shout	 of	 “TURN	 AROUND!	 We	 can’t	abandon	 them!”	 came	 from	 behind,	 from	 a	 voice	 I	 thought	 I	 recognised	 as	 that	 of	 a	seasoned	practitioner.	Nina	said:	“We	don’t	want	mothers	to	feel	as	if	we	don’t	care…this	is	 not	 our	decision	 to	make…If	 people	want	 to	 stay,	we	have	 to	 trust	 them…Let’s	 turn	around.”		We	both	felt	 that	turning	around	meant	some	sort	of	shift	but	we	could	not	perceive	 it	until	later.	We	made	a	decision	operating	on	incomplete	information,	in	a	matter	of	less	than	 a	 minute,	 relying	 on	 the	 judgement	 of	 more	 seasoned	 practitioners	 and	 other	participants	of	the	march	behind	us.	I	felt	a	pull	within	my	body	–	as	if	my	passions	and	principles	wanted	me	to	continue	but	my	nerves	wanted	me	to	turn	around.	We	made	an	improvised	 and	 embodied	 decision,	 as	we	were	 relying	 purely	 on	 other	 people’s	 eyes,	ears	 and	 judgements,	 and	 our	 own	 instincts.	 This	 was	 an	 example	 of	 us	 interpreting	through	 our	 senses	 rather	 than	 through	 the	 employment	 of	 informed	 arguments.	 The	instinctively	made	decision	to	cease	with	our	initial	plan	and	to	turn	around	in	practice	marked	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 sensible	 order:	 from	 an	 inclusive	 act	 (march	 in	 support	 of	 all	women)	to	an	exclusive	one	(march	in	support	of	mothers).			
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Persistence:		As	 soon	 as	 we	 turned	 around,	 we	 regretted	 it,	 as	 we	 saw	 that	 so	many	mothers	 had	already	joined	the	marching	column,	so	there	was	in	fact	no	urgency	to	turn	around.	“We	basically	 stood	up	 those	women	waiting	 for	 us	 along	 the	way,”	Nina	 sighed.	 But	 there	was	no	going	back	–	 the	gravitational	centre	of	 the	assembly	had	already	shifted	away	from	 ‘all	women’	 to	 ‘mothers’	 and	we	had	 to	 persist,	 continue	with	 the	 new	plan,	 and	bide	 our	 time	 for	 further	 opportunities	 to	 shift	 the	 order	 back	 in	 our	 favour.	 We	continued	to	walk	through	the	protesting	crowd	and	formed	a	line	in	front	of	the	stage,	stretching	our	flag	wide.	It	was	important	to	occupy	a	space	visible	to	all,	so	we	could	act	as	 a	 reminder	 that	 IWD	belonged	 to	 all	women,	 not	 only	mothers.	We	made	 sure	 that	whoever	as	much	as	glanced	in	the	direction	of	the	stage	could	see	the	flag	and	us	as	part	of	the	protest	and	IWD	march,	hoping	that	our	presence	might	shift	the	order	back	to	‘all	women’.	Nina	found	a	volunteer	to	replace	her	holding	the	flag	and	went	to	speak	to	the	protest	 organisers	 about	 a	 speech,	 the	 content	 of	which	was	 intended	 to	 reiterate	 the	importance	of	solidarity	and	to	underline	that	 the	mothers’	problems	were	common	to	all.			Above	my	head,	on	the	stage,	one	of	the	mothers	spoke	about	the	government	“sinning	against	 mothers”.	 A	 burly	 man,	 wearing	 nationalist	 insignia	 on	 his	 jacket,	 started	shouting	 profanities	 at	 us	 and	 pulling	 at	 the	 flag.	 He	 raised	 one	 of	 his	 hands,	 as	 if	preparing	to	hit	one	of	the	people	holding	the	flag,	and	I	pulled	him	away	by	the	back	of	his	jacket,	while	still	holding	the	flag.	A	few	of	the	journalists	and	protestors	dragged	him	away.	We	were	not	deterred	and	we	persisted,	standing	and	holding	the	flag.	Moreover,	the	attempted	assault	 instigated	sympathy	 towards	us	amongst	some	of	 the	protestors	
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standing	nearby,	who	started	chanting	the	slogan	from	the	flag	as	the	man	was	dragged	away.	This	hint	of	support	was	encouraging	and	in	a	way	confirmed	that	persistence	was	a	good	tactic.			I	 glanced	 back	 over	 my	 shoulder	 and	 spotted	 Nina	 talking	 to	 some	 of	 the	 organisers	beside	the	stage,	wondering	what	was	going	on.	Time	was	passing;	my	legs	were	starting	to	cramp	from	a	lack	of	movement,	as	the	mothers	delivered	speech	after	speech	about	motherhood,	not	once	mentioning	the	word	‘women’,	not	even	as	a	slip	of	the	tongue.	In	between	 the	 speeches	 the	 audio	 speakers	 boomed	 with	 various	 songs	 celebrating	mothers.	 My	 ears	 ached	 with	 the	 noise.	 Yet	 we	 persisted,	 maintained	 our	 bodily	 and	aesthetic	presence	in	front	of	the	stage,	as	Nina	continued	trying	to	engage	the	mothers’	leaders	 in	 discussion.	 Whatever	 hopes	 for	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 order	 (from	 ‘mothers’	 to	‘women’)	I	may	have	mustered	earlier	when	the	protesters	chanted	our	slogan,	gradually	started	to	fade	away.	Yet,	at	the	very	least,	just	by	occupying	a	prominent	spot,	we	were	usurping	 the	 sedimentation	 of	 the	 order	 –	 the	 ‘mothering’	 of	 IWD:	 we	 could	 not	 be	unseen	or	ignored.				Subverting:		I	glanced	again	at	Nina	and	 Jana,	who	 looked	concerned	as	 they	 joined	 in	conversation	with	the	mothers’	leaders.	We	were	too	far	from	one	another	to	be	able	to	communicate	verbally,	so	had	to	improvise	through	body	language.	As	Jana	locked	her	eyes	with	mine,	I	used	the	opportunity	to	slightly	 jerk	my	head	upwards,	as	a	way	of	asking	something	along	 the	 lines	of:	 ‘What’s	going	on?’	and	 Jana	shook	her	head,	signalling	 that	 the	 talks	
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were	not	going	well.	I	asked	someone	to	replace	me	at	my	spot	and	went	to	join	the	WRC	group	 of	 practitioners	 and	 volunteers.	 Luka	 explained	 to	me	 that	 Nina	was	 frustrated	because	 the	 mothers’	 leaders	 had	 changed	 their	 minds	 about	 everything	 previously	agreed	upon.	As	I	listened	to	Luka,	a	small	group	of	marchers	approached	us	to	say	that	they	 could	 no	 longer	 stand	 there	 as	 they	 felt	 “cheated	 and	 tricked”,	 because	 they	understood	that	“WRC	was	fighting	for	the	‘unmothering’	of	IWD,	not	for	reaffirming	it	as	a	mothers’	day”.	Lara	and	Marija	apologised	and	explained	that	 they	were	surprised	as	well,	but	that	women’s	lives	were	at	stake	because	of	the	revoked	benefits	and	because	of	that	 WRC	 could	 not	 revoke	 support,	 but	 that	 they	 completely	 understood	 if	 others	wished	to	leave.			Nikola,	one	of	 the	volunteers,	expressed	 frustration	with	 the	mothers’	 speeches,	 loudly	proclaiming:		
I’m	fed	up	with	this	mother,	mother,	mothering!	Every	speech	sounds	the	same!	Don’t	they	
have	a	crumb	of	courtesy	 left	 in	 them	to	thank	all	of	 these	people	who	came	to	give	them	
support	but	are	not	mothers?!		One	of	the	elderly	women	standing	in	our	vicinity	responded	by	saying	that	she	was	one	of	the	protesting	mothers	and	that	it	was	important	to	stay	on	course	and	not	lose	track	of	their	agenda,	but:		
Not	 today.	 This	 bothers	me	 as	 well.	 Every	 time	 I	 hear	 one	 of	 those	 songs	 and	 praise	 for	
mothers	I	feel	a	knot	clenching	in	my	stomach	as	my	daughter	cannot	bear	children,	you	see,	
and	yet	she	stood	by	me	all	 these	weeks,	here	on	this	pavement,	 so	why	 is	 she	 less	worthy	
than	me	and	all	these	women	up	there?	That’s	not	right.		
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Encouraged	 by	 the	 interaction	 between	 Nikola	 and	 the	 protesting	 woman,	 the	 group	around	them	started	to	make	jokes,	linking	to	whatever	the	mothers	were	saying	in	their	speeches.	Spontaneously,	through	humorous	interjections,	the	group	started	shifting	the	gravity	of	the	assembly	towards	‘all	women’,	reordering	through	subversion.	One	of	the	mothers	complained	in	her	speech	about	the	administrators	of	a	Facebook	group	for	not	pushing	 their	 cause	 more	 vehemently,	 to	 which	 the	 crowd	 started	 to	 chant	 in	 mock-lament:	“Admin,	do	you	have	a	mother?”	subverting	the	well-rehearsed	line	from	most	of	the	 speeches	 (e.g.	 Prime	 Minister,	 do	 you	 have	 a	 mother?	 President,	 do	 you	 have	 a	mother?).	Another	mother	said	that	“the	mother	is	the	most	sacred	being”,	to	which	the	crowd	 responded	with	 a	 chant:	 “All	 bow	 to	 the	 supreme	 deity”,	 causing	 an	 uproar	 of	laughter.	 The	 humour	 somewhat	 elevated	 people’s	 spirits	 and	 dissuaded	 some	 from	leaving	the	protest,	which	meant	that	all	hope	was	not	lost	after	all.	I	could	not	hear	and	pick	up	on	all	the	jokes	but	what	I	could	see	and	hear	was	that	people	laughed	in	groups	and,	more	importantly,	did	not	leave.	The	order	of	the	sensible,	although	still	in	favour	of	mothers,	began	to	unsettle	through	subversive	humour.			Nina	and	 Jana	approached	us	and	explained	that	 the	mothers	were	placing	restrictions	on	their	previous	agreement	but	these	started	to	crumble	as	the	crowd	grew	increasingly	frustrated.	 After	 “hard	 negotiations”	 (Jana),	 the	 mothers	 agreed	 to	 allow	 a	 narrow	category	 of	 mothers-practitioners	 to	 speak,	 and	 only	 two	 of	 them,	 after	 a	 group	 of	mothers	 finished	with	 their	 speeches.	 It	 was	 an	 act	 of	 exclusion	 but	 allowing	 at	 least	some	of	the	women	to	speak	was	better	than	nothing,	so	Nina	and	Mina,	being	mothers,	agreed	to	speak.	Initially,	WRC	members	asked	me	to	write	a	speech	and	deliver	it,	as	an	ordinary	 woman	 who	 was	 neither	 a	 practitioner	 nor	 a	 mother,	 as	 they	 wanted	 to	“broaden	 the	 relevance	 of	 IWD	 beyond	 mothers	 but	 also	 beyond	 NGO	 membership”	
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(Lara).	Since	I	was	there	from	the	beginning	of	the	campaign,	and	strongly	believed	in	the	idea	 that	 IWD	 should	 be	 a	medium	 for	 fostering	 solidarity	 between	 diverse	women,	 I	happily	accepted.	Now,	however,	it	was	clear	that	I	did	not	belong	to	the	order	assembled	by	 mothers	 and	 I	 was	 prevented	 from	 speaking.	 Nina,	 as	 a	 mother	 and	 practitioner,	offered	to	deliver	my	speech,	while	the	rest	of	us	continued	to	swap	places	at	the	flag	in	shifts.			In	 the	 meantime,	 jokes	 on	 my	 account	 (‘half-woman’,	 ‘child-woman’,	 ‘half-activist’,	‘satan’s	 child’,	 ‘zero’)	 started	 to	 pour	 in	 from	 friends	 and	 new	 acquaintances,	 to	everyone’s	delight,	 including	my	own.	Some	even	extended	their	mock-condolences	 for	the	 fact	 I	 was	 not	 counted	 a	 ‘full’	 human	 and	 we	 pretended	 to	 be	 grief	 stricken.	 The	whole	 interaction	 looked	 like	 a	 humorous	 play	 for	 onlookers,	who	 gradually	 began	 to	come	up	with	their	own	quips	and	remarks	about	motherhood,	which	assured	me	that,	through	humour,	they	understood,	at	least	partially,	why	it	was	important	not	to	neglect	women’s	 experiences	 outside	motherhood.	The	humorous	 subversion	 added	weight	 to	the	WRC	position	and	the	order	of	the	assembly	shifted	a	bit	more	towards	‘women’.			Resolution:		The	 resolution	 phase	 was	 marked	 by	 the	 coming	 together	 of	 a	 number	 of	 aesthetic	elements	and	in	a	relational	recognition	of	some	kind	of	closure	between	the	parties.	It	was	 enacted	 through	 an	ordering	 of	 bodies	 on	 the	 stage,	 the	 colour	 and	presence	 of	 a	flag,	intensity	of	voice,	choice	of	language	and	the	responses	of	the	listeners.		
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			A	practitioner	speaking	at	IWD		Nina	and	Mina	came	up	on	the	stage,	a	red	flag	from	the	previous	IWD	march,	which	the	mothers	appropriated	as	their	symbol	throughout	their	protest,	stretched	behind	them.			Below	is	an	extract	from	the	speech	I	wrote,	but	which	Nina	delivered:		
Women,	 comradesses!	 	 We	 are	 the	 group	 that	 is	 most	 profoundly	 hit	 by	 transition	 and	
corruption,	 the	 consequences	 of	 which	 we’ve	 felt	 on	 our	 skins	 for	 decades.	 We’ve	 been	
removed	from	a	large	part	of	the	labour	market,	held	captive	in	either	our	homes,	the	grey	
economy	 or	 in	 service	 industries…performing	 jobs	 for	 which	 we	 are	 either	 unpaid,	 paid	
poorly	or	cash-in-hand,	although	the	 figures	 say	 that	we	are	more	educated,	more	ethical	
and	more	hard-working.	When	introducing	austerity	measures,	the	government	saves	at	the	
expense	of	the	already	impoverished	and	disenfranchised	groups,	these	mothers,	who	have	
been	persisting	in	the	fight	for	their	rights	on	this	pavement	for	weeks...Mothers’	suffering	is	
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my	suffering,	and	their	burden	is	the	burden	of	all	of	us,	one	for	which	we	are	ready	to	plant	
our	backs	in	support.	Women,	we	make	up	half	of	this	country!	Let's	not	forget	that.	And	so:	
Let's	 be	 as	 loud	 as	 they	want	 to	 silence	 us!	 Let's	 be	 proud	 as	much	 as	 they	 are	 trying	 to	
humiliate	us!	And	most	importantly	of	all:	Let's	be	as	united	as	much	as	they	are	trying	to	
divide	us!	I	wish	us	all	a	happy	Women's	Day!		My/Nina’s	 speech	 has	 a	 resolving	 effect	 by	 making	 a	 link	 between	 all	 women	 in	Montenegro	and	protesting	mothers,	pointing	 to	women’s	 impoverishment	 fostered	by	transition	and	corruption	for	the	purpose	of	creating	a	sense	of	inclusion,	a	wider	bond	between	women;	stressing	that	it	is	not	only	mothers	who	are	affected	by	poorly	devised	policies,	 suspicious	 privatisation	 processes	 and	 corruption.	 I/Nina	 emphasise	 the	resolving	 bond	 by	 citing	 research	 which	 states	 that	 women	 in	 Montenegro	 are	 on	average	more	educated,	deemed	more	ethical	and	do	not	shy	away	from	work,	even	if	the	work	means	spending	longer	hours	in	lower	paid	and	unpaid	jobs.	By	drawing	this	link,	my	aim	when	writing	the	speech	was	to	shift	the	axis	regarding	the	meaning	attributed	to	IWD	(a	day	when	all	women	come	together	to	raise	common	demands),	as	well	as	to	resolve	the	tension	between	women	and	mothers.	I	also	constructed	a	common	enemy,	without	specifying	so	explicitly,	in	order	to	allow	for	broader	identification	–	something	all	 women	 could	 easily	 relate	 to.	 Such	 framing	 was	 designed	 to	 unite	 and	 create	 an	assembly,	an	order,	which	was	to	include	diverse	women.			Nina’s	passionate	delivery	of	the	speech	infected	the	crowd,	something	I	feel	I	could	not	have	pulled	off	in	an	equally	powerful	way.	The	aesthetics	of	the	delivery	were	absorbing	and	 encompassing,	 bringing	 home	 the	 resolution	 of	 the	 moment.	 She	 played	 with	accentuating	certain	words,	like	“us”	and	“we”,	to	stress	the	commonality	and	inclusion,	and	made	tactical	pauses	to	allow	people	to	absorb	the	lines	she	uttered.	The	collective	
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mode	 of	 Nina’s	 oratory	 accentuated	 the	 resolution,	 lending	 it	 an	 affective	 force.	 As	 if	deliberately	staged,	the	wind	carried	Nina’s	hair	backwards	to	reveal	the	tensed	tendons	in	her	neck,	dancing	with	each	vocal	motion.	From	below	the	stage,	she	looked	like	a	tall,	looming	 liberty	 statue	–	 a	 recognised	 figure	 (one	of	 ‘us’)	 –	 in	 a	newly	 formed	order	of	bodies	 on	 the	 stage.	 In	 turn,	 people	 shouted	 confirmations	 back	 at	 her,	 in	 the	 form	of	exclaimed	‘yes-es’,	spontaneous	applause	and	excited	shouts,	like	‘Truth!’,	 ‘Spot	on!’	etc.	Finally,	when	she	made	 the	 loudest	exclamation,	wishing	all	women	a	happy	Women’s	Day,	she	received	long	applause,	cheering	and	encouragement	in	the	form	of	a	repeated	‘Bravo!’	 and	multiple	hands	 raised	 in	 the	air,	 including	a	group	of	mothers	behind	me.	Suddenly,	 it	 felt	that	the	gravitational	axis	of	the	tectonic	plate	of	solidarity	had	shifted	further	 again	 –	 this	 time	 towards	 all	 women.	 Even	 a	 few	 mothers	 who	 subsequently	addressed	the	crowd	changed	their	narratives	to	include	other	women	as	well.			Resolution	of	the	order	was	experienced	and	enacted	in	an	embodied	and	aesthetic	way,	through	 the	 coming	 together	 of	 words,	 bodies,	 symbols	 and	 body	 language.	 It	 was	 a	relational	acceptance	of	a	changed	order,	as	indicated	through	the	crowd’s	confirmation	of	recognition	and	participation;	yet	it	was	also	a	reordering	that	was	persuasively	won,	through	assertive	bodily	presence	and	symbolism.			
Embodied	reordering	summary		In	relation	to	the	sub-practice	of	embodied	reordering,	I	explored	how	WRC	practitioners	attempted	 to	make	 the	 political	 subject	 of	 ‘woman’	 intelligible	 by	 realigning	 assembly	aesthetically,	so	as	to	encompass	many	diverse	groups	of	women.	Forming	a	‘hegemony’	
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–	a	public	assembly,	in	the	analysed	episode,	between	diverse	groups	of	people,	was	an	important	 aspect	 of	 democratic	 practice	 and	 I	 explored	 the	 dynamics	 within	 such	hegemony,	paying	attention	to	the	embodied	aspect	of	it	and	how	certain	groups	strove	to	make	themselves	dominant	and	‘sensible’.	In	the	ethnographic	episode,	these	attempts	were	 made	 against	 the	 protestors,	 who	 attempted	 to	 ground	 a	 political	 subject	 of	‘mother’.	 The	 first	 reordering	 of	 the	 ‘sensible	 order’	 took	 place	 through	 an	improvisational	 form	 of	 decision-making	 rather	 than	 informed	 debate.	 The	 second	reordering	 took	 place	 through	 acts	 of	 persistence	 in	 the	 face	 of	 exclusion.	 The	 third	reordering	took	place	through	subverting,	using	humour	to	trigger	a	reordering.	Finally,	the	dimension	of	resolution	encapsulated	settling	upon	a	temporary	order	by	contesting	parties	through	a	relational	coming	together	of	bodies,	language	and	symbols.														
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IX	Discussion		
Introduction		I	 now	 discuss	my	 findings	 in	 relation	 to	my	 stated	 contributions	 (Chapter	 1)	 and	 the	literatures	 on	 NGOs	 and	 democratic	 practice,	 filtered	 through	 a	 performative	 lens.	 I	return	 to	Butler	 to	provide	an	embodied	and	performative	 interpretation	of	 the	data.	 I	relate	 the	 data	 to	 Butler’s	 theorising,	 discussing	 how	 practitioners	 enact	 democratic	practice	within	and	through	re-iterative	normative	frameworks	of	gender	expectations,	patriarchy	and	corruption.	I	discuss	how	practitioners’	bodies	enact	democratic	practice	and	how	they	relate	 to	 the	vulnerable	bodies	of	others	 in	doing	so	(Butler,	2006,	2011	and	 2015).	 Overlaying	 this	 performative	 interpretation,	 I	 discuss	 such	 enactments	 in	relation	to	theories	of	deliberative	and	agonistic	democratic	practice,	which	I	claim	are	drawn	upon	in	piecemeal	and	overlapping	ways.			The	discussion	sections	are	structured	according	to	the	three	practices	presented	in	the	data	 chapters,	 which	 also	 map	 against	 three	 of	 my	 contributions	 to	 knowledge,	 with	gender	 being	 a	 constant	 theme	 across	 practices.	 I	 structure	 each	 sub-section	 of	 the	discussion	by	providing:	first,	a	brief	summary	of	the	practice;	second,	an	overview	of	the	broader	 utility	 and	 limitations	 of	 the	 reviewed	 literature;	 third,	 by	 discussing	 the	literature	in	more	depth	against	the	findings	in	each	sub-practice.				
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9.1.	Embodying	democratic	practice		Embodying	 democratic	 practice	 focused	 on	 the	 embodied	 performativities	 of	practitioners	 in	 their	 day-to-day	 work.	 I	 termed	 it	 embodying	 democratic	 practice	 in	order	to	highlight	practitioners’	bodies	as	sites	of	such	practice,	where	the	possibilities	and	 tensions	of	democratic	engagement	are	played	out	with	and	 through	bodily	acts.	 I	also	wanted	 to	emphasise	 the	physical	 struggle	 in	performing	democratic	practice	and	how	it	bears	on	the	bodies	of	practitioners.			The	 NGO	 literature	 recognises	 the	 tension	 between	 NGOs	 and	 patriarchy	 (e.g.	 Lokar,	2007;	 Tsetsura,	 2013),	 corruption	 (e.g.	 Dollar	 et	 al,	 2001;	 Sadiku,	 2015)	 and	requirements	 stemming	 from	 international	 stakeholders	 (e.g.	 the	 UN,	 EU	 etc.)	 (e.g.	Harrold,	2016).	These	place	demands	on	 their	practices	within	a	 country	 in	 transition,	yet	 the	 literature	does	not	offer	 insight	 into	how	these	 tensions	unfold,	especially	how	they	bear	on	bodies.			Conceptually,	 this	 data	 section	was	 relevant	 to	 some	 of	 the	 agonistic	 and	 deliberative	dimensions	 of	 practice,	 albeit	 enacted	 in	 embodied,	 performative	 ways.	 Deliberative	understandings	 of	 democratic	 practice	 can	 help	 us	 better	 understand	 the	 ‘pull’	 of	 the	rational	 (Blau,	 2011:	 46)	 underway	 in	 the	ways	 in	which	 practitioners	make	 sense	 of	‘self’	 and	 their	 duties	 as	 democratic	 subjects.	 Agonistic	 democratic	 theory	 can	 help	 us	understand	 the	 passionate	 identifications	 (Mouffe,	 1999)	 practitioners	 and	 their	 allies	hold	and	we	can	see	in	the	data	how	such	identifications	enliven	and	unsettle	democratic	practice.	 Through	 Mouffe	 (1999;	 2014)	 and	 Ranciére	 (2012)	 we	 can	 also	 begin	 to	
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understand	 how	 identifications	 are	 partially	 achieved	 through	 visual	 means	 and	 can	become	more	adept	at	seeing	pluralism	unfolding	in	multimodal	ways.			I	 interpret	 these	 forms	 of	 democratic	 practice	 in	ways	 that	 go	 beyond	 the	 theories	 of	democratic	 practice	 considered,	 theories	 that	 give	 primacy	 to	 language	 over	 the	corporeal	and	material.	Through	drawing	on	Butler’s	notion	of	embodied	performativity	(1999;	 2011;	 2015),	 we	 can	 understand	 both	 the	 bodies	 of	 practitioners,	 and	 their	relational	 democratic	 engagements,	 as	 incorporating,	 re-configuring	 and	 exceeding	 the	norms	purported	through	democratic	theory.				Understanding	democratic	practice	as	embodied	and	performative	enables	us	to	notice	it	occurring	not	merely	in	more	formalised	debates,	within	designated	times	and	spaces	for	practicing	 ‘democracy’,	 but	wherever	 the	 performative	 norms	 of	 a	 society	 are	 enacted	and	 wherever	 bodies	 are	 present	 –	 in	 offices,	 squares,	 streets,	 and	 even	 homes.	Deliberation	 occurred	 in	 my	 data	 in	 both	 spoken	 and	 unspoken	 ways	 –	 for	 example,	when	practitioners	felt	injustice,	which	prompted	them	to	seek	resolution	or	consensus,	outside	 linguistic	 intersubjective	 space.	 I	 found	 that	 bodies	 themselves	 generated	democratic	practice	and	acted	as	sites	upon	which	such	practices	were	enacted,	beyond	deliberation.	For	example,	the	act	of	a	hunger	strike	cut	out	deliberation	and	proceeded	straight	 to	 an	 embodied	 democratic	 act,	 which	 enacted	 a	 new	 subjectivity	 of	practitioners-mothers	 in	 solidarity.	 Drawing	 on	 Butler	 in	 relation	 to	 this	 section	 also	helps	me	move	 beyond	 the	 account	 of	 relationality	 posited	 by	Mouffe	 (2009a;	 2013),	who	states	 that	 identities	can	only	be	understood	as	a	negotiation	against	an	 ‘other’	 in	agonistic	 struggle.	 Butler’s	 (2006	 and	 2015)	 embodied	 performativity	 enables	 me	 to	
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foreground	the	vulnerability	and	compassion	of	such	relationality,	where	bodies	act	with	and	in	response	to	one	another	to	generate	democratic	practice.			Having	discussed	the	broader	relationship	between	the	‘embodying	democratic	practice’	chapter	and	reviewed	literature,	and	the	contribution	made	by	my	approach,	I	will	now	move	on	to	consider	each	sub-practice	in	turn	in	order	to	highlight	my	contributions	in	more	depth.		
Transversing		Transversing	 referred	 to	 the	 movement	 that	 takes	 place	 between	 subjectivities	 in	democratic	 practice	 and	 I	 illustrated	 it	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 protest	 of	 mothers.	 The	democratic	element	of	practice	here	refers	to	transversing	subjectivities	with	the	aim	of	protecting	liberty	and	equality.	Such	transversive	movements	enacted	a	common	agency	necessary	 for	 building	 assembly	 between	 groups	 and	 subjects.	 Primarily,	 this	 sub-practice	 was	 concerned	 with	 working	 in	 and	 through	 difference,	 often	 in	 conflictual	ways.	 It	 was	 underlined	 as	 a	 relational,	 incremental	 and	 everyday	 form	 of	 embodied	democratic	practice	that	occurred	in	a	range	of	settings.			When	 Habermas	 (1989[1962];	 1996)	 addresses	 deliberation	 in	 the	 public	 sphere,	 he	advocates	for	face-to-face	dialogue,	where	people	can	raise	and	justify	their	claims	on	the	basis	 of	 whether	 they	 are	 true	 (objectively),	 just	 (socially)	 and	 sincere	 (subjectively)	(Habermas,	1984:	398).	Interlocutors	are	positioned	as	making	such	claims	in	language	and	 the	 inference	 is	 that	 they	 are	made	 in	 settings	 that	 allow	 the	 time	 and	 space	 for	patient	 and	 lengthy	dialogue.	What	 is	noticeable	here	 is	 that	Habermas	maintains	 that	
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these	 public	 sphere	 sites	 represent	 “concrete	 locales	 where	 an	 audience	 is	 physically	gathered”	(1996:	361).		It	 might	 be	 possible	 to	 re-interpret	 what	 occurred	 in	 the	 dimensions	 of	 exposing	 and	
inhabiting	through	the	lens	of	validity	claims.	For	Habermas,	form	takes	precedence	over	content,	so	how	debate	occurs	matters	more	than	what	is	communicated.	In	the	case	of	the	 mothers’	 protest,	 one	 could	 argue	 that	 WRC	 practitioners	 regarded	 the	 claims	 of	mothers	as	empirically	and	factually	problematic,	in	the	sense	of	rejecting	the	category	of	motherhood	as	privileged.	Nevertheless,	they	did	recognise	their	claims	as	sincere	and	as	the	product	of	the	dominant	hetero-normative	matrix	of	patriarchy.	Ultimately,	the	cause	of	the	mothers	did	register	with	WRC	practitioners	and	others,	despite	not	redeeming	all	of	the	validity	claims.	We	can	make	sense	of	this	conundrum	after	first	considering	what	can	be	gleaned	from	an	agonistic	reading.		The	 agonistic	 account	 of	 democratic	 practice	 offered	 by	 Mouffe	 (1999;	 2009a;	 2013)	offers	 a	 vocabulary	 for	 identifying	 whom	 practitioners	 stand	 in	 an	 agonistic	 and	antagonistic	 relationship	 with	 and	 a	 way	 of	 considering	 the	 implications	 for	 practice,	thereby	also	providing,	by	extension,	a	set	of	guidelines	for	the	relationship.	In	my	data,	mothers	 initially	 stood	 in	 a	 somewhat	 antagonistic	 relation	 to	 practitioners,	 which	gradually	 transversed	 to	 agonistic.	 Government	 by	 and	 large	 remained	 in	 antagonistic	relations	 during	 this	 particular	 episode.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 mothers,	 being	 in	 agonistic	relations	 with	 practitioners	 meant	 the	 two	 groups	 could	 unite	 against	 an	 external	antagonist,	 albeit	 through	 an	 uncomfortable	 process	 of	 challenging	 one	 another’s	identifications.	 In	 the	 sense	 of	 agonistic	 relations,	 we	 can	 therefore	 see	 that	 conflict	proved	generative	of	democratic	practice	and	transversing	difference.	Conflict	between	
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mothers	 and	 practitioners	 helped	 assemble	 a	 more	 durable	 alliance,	 by	 facilitating	 a	movement	 between	 subjectivities.	 Difference	 between	 mothers	 and	 practitioners	 was	never	 collapsed	 in	 the	 process	 of	 transversing	 but	 rather	 remained,	 and	 recalibrated,	contributing	to	the	maintenance	of	the	democratic	practice.		Drawing	 on	Mouffe	 and	 Laclau,	we	 can	 take	 a	 step	 back	 conceptually	 and	 posit	 broad	alliances	 formed	through	transversing	as	crucial	 for	democratic	practice.	Their	account	of	 identity	 as	 always	 relational,	 and	 dependent	 on	 an	 external	 and	 antagonistic	 other,	helps	us	 to	see	how	chains	of	equivalence	(Laclau	and	Mouffe,	1985;	Laclau,	2007)	are	formed	across	difference,	 in	order	to	attain	certain	demands.	We	can	even	point	 to	 the	alliance	formed	by	the	mothers	and	NGOs,	highlighting	some	of	the	populist	character	of	the	 particular	 transversing	 highlighted	 in	 the	 data	 (Laclau,	 2007;	 Mouffe,	 2018).	Transversing	can	bear	 some	hallmarks	of	populism,	 in	 the	 sense	meant	by	Mouffe	and	Laclau,	 when	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	 groups	 and	 individuals	 are	 drawn	 together	 to	 make	collective	demands.	Crucially,	and	differently	to	reactionary	right-wing	populism,	such	a	chain	is	articulated	against	the	very	system	itself	(in	the	case	of	the	mothers’	protest,	a	government	 operating	 outside	 the	 framework	 of	 liberty	 and	 equality),	 rather	 than	 a	minority	group,	such	as	immigrants.	Transversing	can	adopt	a	‘popular’	hue,	in	addition,	through	tapping	into	sedimented	and	favoured	identifications	in	a	society	–	in	this	case,	the	role	of	mothers.		To	 address	 my	 critique	 of	 democratic	 theory	 in	 relation	 to	 transversing,	 Habermas’	account	erases	the	body	and	embodied	aspects	of	democratic	practice	in	encounters	with	others	 (intersubjective	 spaces).	 The	 suffering	 bodies	 of	 mothers	 that	 propelled	me	 to	question	my	political	stances	would	be	rendered	irrelevant	through	his	account	and	it	is	
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difficult	not	 to	 regard	 such	a	 rendering	as	a	masculine	practice.	Mouffe’s	 insistence	on	the	primacy	of	language	in	working	across	and	with	difference	did	not	quite	capture	the	embodied	 richness	 of	 working	 within	 transversing.	 Her	 differentiation	 of	 antagonism	and	 agonism,	 combined	 with	 her	 predominant	 focus	 on	 language,	 can	 leave	 the	impression	of	a	somewhat	disembodied	and	even	relatively	consistent	understanding	of	how	 people	 in	 a	 set	 of	 relations	 navigate	 difference	 and	 bind	 together	 in	 democratic	practice.		The	 dimension	 of	 exposing	 draws	 out	 some	 of	 the	 embodied	 aspects	 of	 transversing	missing	within	 theories	 of	 democracy	 and	 can	 provide	 insight	 into	 how	 chains	 across	difference	are	assembled	within	democratic	practice.	My	findings	in	relation	to	exposing	showed	that	understanding	could	be	reached	in	an	unspoken	way,	prior	to	any	dialogue	commencing.	Practitioners	exposed	themselves	to	precarity	and	vulnerability	in	order	to	build	and	strengthen	democratic	agency.	As	I	–	and	practitioners	–	exposed	ourselves	to	the	precarity	of	others,	particularly	the	protesting	mothers,	a	claim	was	made	on	us,	and	we	 developed	 a	 “heightened	 sense	 of	 [the]	 expendability	 and	 disposability	 that	 is	differentially	 distributed	 throughout	 society”	 (Butler,	 2015:	 15).	 But	 the	message	was	delivered	in	a	pre-verbal	way.	The	vulnerability	of	others	prompted	a	reconfiguration	of	the	political	stances	previously	held	by	practitioners,	in	the	case	of	the	mothers’	protest,	in	terms	of	advocating	on	behalf	of	women	who	were	suffering	as	a	result	of	a	breach	of	the	rule	of	law	that	practitioners	opposed	(and	mothers	supported	at	the	time).			Here,	Butler’s	account	of	vulnerability	and	relationality	can	help	enrich	understanding	of	claims	 made	 upon	 us	 in	 the	 field,	 where	 bodies	 were	 “speaking	 before	 uttering	 any	words”	 (Butler,	 2015:	 156;	 see	 also	 Pullen	 and	 Rhodes,	 2014;	 Ross-Smith	 and	
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Kornberger,	2004).	These	claims	heightened	our	sense	of	embodied	relationality,	where	the	democratic	dimensions	of	exposing	and	inhabiting	take	place	“‘between’	bodies,	in	a	space	 that	 constitutes	 the	 gap	 between	 my	 own	 body	 and	 another’s…the	 action	emerg[ing]	 from	 the	 ‘between’,	 a	 spatial	 figure	 for	 a	 relation	 that	 both	 binds	 and	differentiates”	(ibid:	77).	In	that	moment	of	connection	I	felt	both	different,	in	the	sense	that	I	had	not	experienced	the	same	deprivations	as	the	mothers,	and	yet	also	the	same,	in	the	sense	that	I	too	had	been	brought	up	within	an	oppressive	culture	of	patriarchal	norms.	Understanding	was	developed	as	people	‘felt’	each	other	out,	testing	assumptions	and	 positions	 against	 the	 precarious	 and	 vulnerable	 bodily	 presence	 of	 others.	Democratic	claims,	then,	can	be	made	via	the	body,	through	simply	sharing	a	space	with	another	 body	 and	 experiencing	 its	 precarity	 –	 my	 political	 stance	 shifted	 as	 I	encountered	mothers	whose	bodies	emitted	suffering	and	pain.		In	 turn,	 mothers	 experienced	 a	 disruption	 of	 their	 sense	 of	 self,	 a	 “decentring	 of	 the	narrative	“I””	(Butler,	2006:	6).	Their	 ‘infrastructure	of	support’	(Butler,	2016:	19)	was	removed	 and	 this	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 two	 ways:	 first,	 in	 the	 material,	 as	 the	government	revoked	their	benefits	and	second,	in	embodied	and	discursive	terms,	as	the	government	 reneged	 on	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 ‘sacred’	 role	 of	 mothers	 within	 the	collective.	 Through	 experiencing	 such	 vulnerability,	 the	 mothers	 were	 more	 open	 to	transversing	to	alternative	infrastructures	of	support	–	in	the	form	of	building	an	alliance	with	 practitioners.	 This	 alternative	 infrastructure	 was	 not	 just	 technical	 but	encompassed	 the	 symbolic	 and	 the	 embodied.	 Turning	 to	 Ranciére	 (2012)	 and	 Butler	(2011,	 2015	 and	 2016),	 we	 can	 understand	 the	 movement	 and	 emergence	 of	 an	alternative	 agency,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 mothers,	 as	 enacted	 through	 the	appropriation	 of	 new	 signifiers	 from	 practitioners	 –	 infrastructural	 and	 relational	
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symbols	of	solidarity,	democracy	and	feminism	-	in	order	to	augment	their	subjectivity.	Such	augmenting	was	enacted	 through	a	mix	of	bodies,	 texts	 and	visual	 signs	and	 it	 is	difficult	 (and	 undesirable,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 research)	 to	 conceptually	uncouple	any	of	 these	 in	 isolation	 (e.g.	Alcadipani	and	 Islam,	2017;	Heizmann	and	Liu,	2018).			Finally,	 in	 relation	 to	 transversing,	 I	 posit	 that	 passions	 (Mouffe,	 2014:	 149)	 do	 not	necessarily	bear	confrontational	dimensions.	In	my	data,	passions	were	transversed	into	compassion.	 This	 can	 be	 seen	most	 clearly	 in	 relation	 to	 inhabiting	 the	 subjectivity	 of	others.	Here,	practitioners	experienced	deprivation	in	order	to	better	understand	it	and	advocate	 against	 it.	 Drawing	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 inhabiting	 through	 compassion,	 we	 can	extend	understanding	of	what	Connolly	(2004	and	2005)	means	by	‘agonistic	respect’,	a	deep	 acceptance	 and	 openness	 to	 others	 based	 on	 our	 ‘common	 condition’	 (Connolly,	2004:	154)	of	incompleteness	and	therefore	dependence	upon	one	another.	According	to	my	 findings,	cultivating	agonistic	respect	may	require	a	 form	of	 inhabiting	 through	the	body,	 otherwise	 developing	 respect	 for	 the	 other’s	 vulnerability	 and	 hardship	 surely	becomes	something	of	a	theoretical	exercise.		Talk	 of	 ‘carrying	 home’,	 being	 ‘tormented’	 by	 and	 ‘being	 with’	 protestors	 in	 the	 data	signals	 a	 deep,	 corporeal	 and	 somewhat	 antagonistic	 manifestation	 of	 inhabiting	 the	subjectivity	of	others.	‘Inhabiting’	goes	a	step	further	than	exposing,	the	word	evoking	a	lingering	 and	 persisting	 feeling	 when	 some	 of	 the	 discomfort	 and	 pain	 of	 others	 is	adopted.	 This	 discomfort	 is	 perhaps	 underplayed	 by	 both	 Butler	 and	 Connolly,	whose	emphasis	 tends	 to	 the	more	positive	and	generative	experiences	of	 relationality,	 albeit	filtered	through	the	notion	of	precarity.	Raising	notions	of	discomfort	and	pain	leads	me	
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to	consider	how	practitioners	experience	conflicting	subjectivities,	which	I	now	discuss	in	relation	to	the	sub-practice	of	foregoing.			
Foregoing		Foregoing	 was	 explored	 as	 a	 sub-practice	 that	 denotes	 the	 practitioner	 as	 a	 site	 of	democratic	 practice	 and	 I	 illustrated	 it	 through	 the	 story	 of	 Marija	 and	 her	 lost	pregnancy.	 I	 highlighted	 how	 foregoing	 involved	 the	 antagonistic	 battle	 between	different	 subjectivities	 at	 play	 upon	 the	 bodies	 of	 practitioners.	 These	 subjectivities	consisted	of	various	demands	on	and	of	self	–	the	maternal	self,	the	professional	self,	the	emotional	and	rational	 self,	 and	various	other	people,	who	are	 represented	as	needing	energy,	 care	 and	 attention.	 Despite	 the	 contest,	 the	 battle	 at	 play	 always	 seemed	 to	culminate	in	the	same	result:	the	emergent	agency	favoured	the	posited	other	whom	the	practitioner	 served.	 Such	 agency	was	 enacted	 through	 persistent	masculine	 discursive	claims	on	the	body	towards	rationality	and	discipline.			Key	 to	 conceptualising	 foregoing	 is	 Mouffe’s	 (1999)	 notion	 of	 adversarial	 conflict	 in	democratic	practice.	For	Mouffe	(1999;	2013),	and	to	a	lesser	extent	Connolly	(2004	and	2005),	conflict	 is	constitutive	and	generative	of	democratic	practice	 in	the	sense	that	 if	meaning	 is	 contingent,	 there	will	 always	be	a	 range	of	 clashing	 interpretations	at	play.	Conflict	 can	 therefore	be	 generative	 as	 it	makes	 apparent	 ineradicable	differences,	 the	clash	of	which	will	produce	“vibrant	democracy”	(Mouffe,	2013:	7).			
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Mouffe’s	account	of	agonism	always	seems	to	assume	more	than	one	person	present	in	democratic	practices	–	‘us’	against	‘them’	(Mouffe,	2013:	79).	Yet	my	data	demonstrated	how	antagonistic	relations	can	occur	upon	the	subject	of	the	practitioner	rather	than	in	any	particularly	public	 form	of	debate	 (Knights	 and	Clarke,	2014).	Different	 aspects	of	self	 and	posited	others	 in	need	vied	 for	dominance	upon	 the	 site	of	 the	 subject.	 In	 the	case	of	Marija,	we	saw	how	her	maternal	and	emotional	selves	battled	the	rational	and	professional	 selves	 allied	 with	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 demands	 of	 others.	 In	 some	 ways	Mouffe	helps	us	understand	this	clash	of	identifications,	in	that	she	states	that	a	subject	is	“precariously	and	temporarily	sutured	at	the	intersection	of…subject	positions”	(Mouffe,	1991:	80).	Further,	she	claims	that	we	are	only	knowable	in	relation	to	what	we	are	not,	and	 that	 this	 unknowing	 that	 constitutes	 our	 knowing	 is	 experienced	 as	 a	 “radical	negativity,	 the	 ever	 present	 possibility	 of	 antagonism”	 (Mouffe,	 2014:	 155).	 Yet	 such	theorising	 is	 reserved	 in	Mouffe	 for	 accounts	 of	 practices	 between	people,	 rather	 than	upon	 the	 self	 itself.	 My	 claim	 with	 foregoing	 is	 not	 that	 we	 need	 to	 retreat	 to	 an	autonomous	 view	of	 self	 but	 recognise	 the	 inter-	 and	 intra-implication	of	 the	 ‘I’	 in	 the	‘we’,	 in	the	words	of	Butler	(Butler	and	Athanasiou:	2013:	107).	Antagonisms	‘external’	to	the	self	are	reflected	in	and	through	the	self,	and	vice	versa.		It	 is	 important	 at	 this	 juncture	 to	 re-emphasise	 the	 distinction	 between	 agonism	 and	antagonism.	 Agonism,	 in	 Mouffe’s	 (2009a:	 13;	 see	 also	 Rhodes	 and	 Harvey,	 2012;	Rhodes,	 2016;	 Smolović	 Jones	 et	 al,	 2016)	 terms,	 is	 a	 clash	 between	 adversaries	who	each	 subscribe	 to	 the	basic	principles	of	 liberty	and	equality,	whereas	antagonism	 is	 a	clash	 between	 “enemies”	 (Mouffe,	 2013:	 7),	 those	 who	 do	 not	 share	 an	 allegiance	 to	democratic	 principles	 against	 those	 who	 defend	 them.	 In	 my	 data,	 foregoing	 was	primarily	antagonistic,	where	certain	aspects	of	the	self	seemed	to	relate	to	other	aspects	
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as	 “enem[ies]	 to	 be	 destroyed”	 (Mouffe,	 1999:	 755).	 Such	 antagonistic	 struggle	 bears	material	 consequences	 as	 it	 is	 lived	 out	 in	 an	 embodied	way.	 This	was	 brought	 home	vividly	 in	 the	 experience	 of	 Marija,	 who	 lost	 her	 pregnancy,	 as	 her	 professional	 and	rational	selves	antagonised	her	maternal	and	emotional	selves	(e.g.	Clarke	and	Knights,	2015).			We	 can	 draw	 on	 Butler	 (2006)	 here	 to	 understand	 the	 pull	 upon	 the	 self	 of	 the	vulnerable	and	precarious	other,	whom	practitioners	seek	to	serve	in	their	practice	(Dale	and	Latham,	2014;	Rhodes,	2012).	Marija	 is	 clearly	 shaken	and	driven	by	ameliorating	the	 suffering	 of	 others:	 “No	 one	 should	 be	 brought	 to…such	 an	 inhumane	condition…They	are	starving,	all	of	them,	so	malnourished!”	This	could	be	interpreted	as	a	 democratic	 demand	 by	 the	 other,	 made	 upon	 the	 body	 of	 the	 practitioner.	 Yet	 the	demand	does	not	really	arrive	in	an	agonistic	form	that	would	allow	for	Marija	to	work	through	 a	 process	 of	 clashing	 identifications	 but	 in	 a	 hostile	 and	 antagonistic	 way.	Placing	Mouffe’s	sense	of	antagonism	with	Butler’s	embodied	and	relational	account	of	agency	 therefore	 helps	 us	 identify	 a	 dark	 side	 to	 democratic	 practice	 highlighted	 by	neither	author.	Foregoing	can	be	 interpreted	as	a	democratic	practice,	 as	practitioners	were	overwhelmed	by	serving	the	liberty	and	equality	of	others.	Yet,	in	other	ways	this	serving	 was	 distinctly	 undemocratic,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 antagonism	 lies	 outside	 the	framework	of	democracy	and	could	therefore	be	viewed	as	a	shadow	side	of	democratic	practice.		Returning	to	Butler	(1999;	2011),	we	can	draw	on	her	account	of	reiterative	norms	as	a	way	 of	 framing	 understanding	 of	 how	 various	 norms	 within	 the	 field	 of	 democratic	practice	 unfold	 upon	 the	 body	 of	 the	 practitioner.	 The	 antagonistic	 battle	 of	 different	
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aspects	of	self	could	be	said	to	mimic	the	existing	contest	of	social	norms.	In	the	context	of	my	study,	these	norms	can	be	identified	as	patriarchy	in	antagonism	with	democracy.	Specifically,	in	the	case	of	Marija,	we	were	able	to	see	how	her	masculine	and	rational	self	was	enacted	as	 an	aid	 to	posited	vulnerable	others	 and	 so	mimicked	 the	norms	of	 the	benevolent	but	strong	male	protector	over	vulnerable	and	helpless	women.	The	norms	of	patriarchy	that	shape	gender	relations	(victim	and	saviour,	in	this	instance)	imprinted	so	strongly	 upon	 Marija	 that	 its	 agency	 overpowered	 the	 possible	 emergence	 of	alternatives.	 Finally,	 in	 relation	 to	 norms,	 one	 might	 counter	 that	 the	 pull	 of	 the	masculine	and	rational	is	a	prevalent	one	in	organisations	in	general	(Knights	and	Clarke,	2017;	 Plester,	 2015).	 We	 can	 develop	 these	 insights	 more	 specifically	 in	 relation	 to	democratic	 practice	 by	 acknowledging	 the	 strong	 presence	 of	 Habermasian	 norms	 of	disembodied	and	rational	practice.	Marija	was	not	immersed	in	Habermas’	ideas,	but	she	was	situated	within	the	normative	framework	of	NGO	culture	in	Montenegro,	to	a	certain	extent.	From	my	time	in	the	field,	the	dominant	approach	of	most	other	NGOs	(WRC	was	usually	 more	 agonistic)	 was	 pervaded	 by	 masculine	 rationality	 and	 the	 need	 for	detached,	efficient	and	composed	practitioners.	 It	 is	quite	possible	 that	 these	norms	of	NGO	 culture	 would	 have	 produced	 a	 certain	 masculine	 pull	 towards	 an	 ideal	 of	professional	NGO	worker.			
Shielding		The	sub-practice	of	shielding	denoted	the	enactment	of	a	series	of	protective	‘shields’	by	practitioners,	for	the	purpose	of	strengthening	both	vulnerable	people	and	new	alliances	formed	 in	 the	 face	 of	 antagonistic	 outside	 agents.	 Through	 shielding,	 practitioners	
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exhibited	 an	 instinctive	 sense	 of	 when	 and	 how	 to	 engage	with	 others	 as	 enemies	 or	adversaries.	 Shielding	 did	 not	 consist	 of	 a	 single,	 homogeneous	 shield,	 but	 a	 series	 of	shields,	 erected	 by	 various	 actors,	 each	 of	 which	 offered	 a	 different	 form	 of	supplementary	experience	and	expertise	–	ranging	from	the	use	of	technical	expertise	to	support	enacted	through	bodies.	Shields	gained	their	 force	through	their	co-emergence	in	 language	 and	 through	 the	 body.	 Shielding	was	 not	 simply	 a	 theoretical	 exercise,	 in	other	words,	but	one	 that	 required	 the	simultaneous	knowledge	of	activism	developed	by	 practitioners	 over	 the	 years	 and	 a	 corporeal	 commitment	 to	 the	 principles	 of	democracy.		Conceptually	we	can	make	 sense	of	 shielding	 through	Mouffe’s	 (2009a:	13)	distinction	between	enemies	and	adversaries.	My	data	 shows	 that	 these	are	not	 stable	 categories,	however,	 but	 that	 actors	 and	 groups	 can	 veer	 between	 the	 two	 as	 events	 unfold.	Distinguishing	 between	 the	 two	 and	 knowing	 how	 to	 respond,	 in	 order	 to	 offer	protection	 to	 citizens,	was	 important	 in	maintaining	 practice	within	 the	 framework	 of	democracy.	 This	 differentiating	 and	 protecting	 was	 palpable	 in	 the	 episode	 of	 the	mothers’	 protests.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 practitioners	 assisted	 protestors	 in	 aiming	 their	efforts	 at	 the	 most	 effective	 target	 –	 protecting	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	practitioners	prevented	agents	of	the	government	from	normalising	a	breach	of	the	rule	of	law	and	in	doing	so	they	defended	the	democratic	framework	of	liberty	and	equality.	By	naming	 the	government	as	 ‘enemy’,	 through	the	assertion	 that	 it	was	breaching	 the	law,	practitioners	sought	to	legitimise	a	series	of	democratic	responses,	such	as	assembly	and	protest.	Also	apparent	 in	 the	data	was	 the	 shifting	of	 this	 identification	of	 enemy-adversary,	 as	 practitioners	 switched	 shielding	 tactics	 to	 the	more	 agonistic	 practice	 of	
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seeking	to	engage	through	an	established	range	of	 institutional	 tools	–	writing	appeals,	reports	to	international	organisations	and	engaging	with	the	media,	amongst	others.		Conceptually,	 this	 shifting	 between	 shields	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 amalgamation	 of	deliberative	 and	 agonistic	 practice	 but	 also	 as	 a	 blurring	 between	 the	 two	 not	 readily	acknowledged	in	the	literature:	the	knowledge	required	for	deliberation	merged	with	the	power	 offered	 by	 an	 embodied	 presence.	 Habermas	 (1996:	 372)	 underlines	 the	importance	of	expertise	within	civil	society	to	counter-balance	and	influence	the	system	(institutions	and	government)	and	states	that	such	knowledge	is	valuable,	provided	it	is	not	used	as	a	 tool	of	domination	within	 the	 informal	public	 sphere.	 In	my	data,	WRC’s	switch	 from	 a	 focus	 on	 embodied	 presence	 to	 the	 production	 and	 dissemination	 of	knowledge	 was	 a	 decision	 arrived	 at	 intersubjectively,	 following	 discussions	 with	mothers.	 Habermas,	 however,	 is	 silent	 on	 how	 such	 a	 non-domineering	 application	 of	expert	knowledge	unfolds.		My	proposition	is	that	such	an	unfolding	happens	in	an	embodied	way.	Practitioners	did	not	apply	their	expert	knowledge	in	isolation	from	mothers,	nor	did	they	try	to	replace	their	 tactics.	 The	 introduction	 of	 supplementary	 experiential	 knowledge	 was	 a	consequence	 of,	 and	 happened	 in	 tandem	 with,	 numerous	 engagements	 and	conversations	 with	 the	 mothers,	 as	 they	 shared	 a	 public	 space	 of	 protest,	 which	 was	often	marked	by	harsh	conditions	-	cold,	wet,	scorching	hot	and	physically	intimidating.	Through	such	embodied	experiences,	practitioners	gained	knowledge	–	the	two	did	not	exist	in	isolation.		
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Discussion	 of	 knowledge	 and	 embodied	 engagement	 with	 allies	 in	 the	 practice	 of	shielding	holds	the	possibility	of	enriching	understanding	of	how	chains	of	equivalence	are	formed.	Laclau	and	Mouffe	(1985)	state	that	such	chains	are	articulated	by	a	diverse	group	of	people,	brought	together	through	a	particular	issue,	which	can	be	generalised	to	accommodate	 broader	 political	 demands.	 Mouffe	 (2009	 and	 2013),	 in	 addition,	emphasises	 the	 importance	of	pluralism	 in	 a	democratic	practice,	 implying	 strength	 in	diversity.	While	Laclau	and	Mouffe	(1985)	acknowledge	that	one	group	may	enjoy	more	prominence	in	leading	such	formations,	they	do	not	account	for	how	differential	forms	of	knowledge	may	be	infused	and	worked	with	in	practice.	My	data	shows	that	the	process	is	 a	 relational	 and	 embodied	 one,	 where	 participants	 in	 the	 chain	 learn	 about	 one	another	and	adapt.	Further,	Laclau	and	Mouffe,	and	Mouffe	 in	her	subsequent	work	on	pluralism,	 do	 not	 acknowledge	 the	 protective	 function	 of	 some	 participants	 in	 a	 chain	over	 others.	 Such	 protecting	 seemed	 an	 important	 practice	 that	 fortified	 the	 chain	through	care	and	empathy.		We	also	need	to	consider	the	corporeal	effect	of	shielding	as	an	important	dimension	of	democratic	practice.	Butler’s	 (2015:	8)	claim	 is	 that	bodies	 in	assembly	exceed,	are	 “in	excess”	of	 the	purely	 spoken	and	 that	 their	plural	presence	 stakes	a	demand	 in	and	of	itself,	 “bodies	 assembled	 ‘say’	 ‘we	 are	 not	 disposable’,	 whether	 or	 not	 they	 are	 using	words	at	that	moment”	(ibid:	25).	Similarly,	Ranciére’s	(2012)	notion	of	the	order	of	the	sensible	 is	 an	 embodied	 one,	 where	 certain	 bodies	 are	 noted	 and	 acknowledged	 by	people	 in	power	more	 than	others,	with	 the	political	 act	 envisaged	as	one	of	 asserting	bodily	presence	within	an	order	that	is	then	altered.	Drawing	on	the	notion	of	shielding,	I	can	posit	 that	 the	presence	of	practitioners	 in	 relation	 to	vulnerable	protestors	helped	render	 the	 collective	 assembly	 more	 visible.	 The	 physical	 presence	 of	 practitioners	
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offered	 a	 different	 collective	 presence	 to	 the	 assembly	 –	 one	 that	 arrived	 with	associations	of	previous	actions	and	the	knowledge	developed	through	them	–	without	practitioners	 ‘speaking’.	 The	 bodily	 presence	 of	 practitioners	 shifted	 assembly	 from	 a	localised	 collection	 of	 bodies	 protesting	 their	 particular	 form	 of	 precarity	 to	 a	 more	general	cause	of	shared	precarity	in	society.		Finally,	 absorption	 was	 an	 important	 dimension	 of	 shielding	 that	 signalled	 this	protecting	 function	 as	 something	 corporeal	 and	 relational.	 Such	 a	 corporeal	 aspect	 of	shielding	can	be	understood	through	drawing	on	Butler’s	(2006,	2011,	2013,	2015	and	2016)	 understanding	 of	 relationality	 through	 vulnerability	 and	 precarity.	 Such	connectivity	 and	 relationality	 was	 clearly	 significant	 in	 the	 assembling	 of	 democratic	coalitions	 in	my	 study.	 In	 the	 case	 of	Mina,	 she	 literally	 absorbed	 the	 deprivations	 of	those	 she	 represented	 and	 was	 in	 an	 alliance	 with,	 experiencing	 the	 pain	 of	 hunger	alongside	them.	However,	Butler	does	not	account	for	instances	where	one	subject	might	adopt	a	protective	stance	in	relation	to	the	other,	which	in	turn	instigates	the	production	of	new	subjectivities.	My	data	demonstrated	that	through	democratic	practice,	emerging	agency	between	practitioners	and	those	they	represent	was	neither	purely	corporeal	nor	linguistic	but	was	enacted	simultaneously	through	words	and	the	body.	As	the	physical	boundaries	 in	 the	 act	 of	 absorption	 became	 blurred,	 so	 too	 did	 the	 language	 –	particularly	notable	in	my	data	with	the	shifting	use	of	pronouns.						
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Summary		Embodying	 democratic	 practice	 denoted	 the	 corporeal	 side	 of	 democratic	 engagement	and	 especially	 surfaced	 practitioners	 as	 sites	 upon	 which	 such	 practice	 unfolds.	 In	discussing	this	practice,	I	particularly	drew	on	accounts	of	democracy,	both	deliberative	and	agonistic,	but	read	them	through	a	performative	perspective	to	draw	out	how	they	were	enacted	in	embodied	ways.			The	 first	 sub-practice	of	 transversing	denoted	 the	movement	between	 subjectivities	 in	generating	democratic	agency.	 It	was	concerned	with	how	practitioners	work	with	and	through	difference.	Habermas’	(1984)	notion	of	validity	claims	was	offered	as	one	way	of	understanding	 how	 practitioners	 work	 with	 difference	 but	 this	 was	 ultimately	 too	disembodied	a	view	to	capture	what	took	place	 in	the	field,	as	was	Mouffe’s	(1999	and	2013)	distinction	between	enemies	and	adversaries.	 I	placed	some	of	the	 insights	from	these	 theories	 of	 democratic	 practice	 within	 a	 performative	 frame	 and	 noted	 how	exposing	 involved	 a	 relational	 sense	 of	 appreciating	 and	 working	 amidst	 difference,	undermining	any	notion	of	an	autonomous	self	in	democratic	practice.	Going	further	still,	notions	of	 inhabiting	 seemed	 to	 go	beyond	Butler	 and	 theories	of	democratic	practice,	implying	 a	 visceral	 and	 constant,	 even	 tormenting,	 dimension	 to	 working	 with	 and	within	difference.		The	 second	 sub-practice	 of	 foregoing	 denoted	 instances	 of	 democratic	 practice	 being	played	upon	the	site	of	the	practitioner’s	body.	Mouffe’s	(2013)	agonism	and	antagonism	were	 important	 here,	 as	was	 Butler’s	 notion	 of	 a	 pull	 of	 the	 vulnerable	 other	 (Butler,	2006),	as	they	provided	a	way	of	conceptualising	a	battling	of	subjectivities	upon	the	site	
	 313	
of	 the	subject.	 I	noted,	however,	 that	Mouffe	does	not	discuss	democracy	as	something	that	 plays	 out	 upon	 bodies.	 I	 argued	 that	 these	 battles	 were	 primarily	 antagonistic,	rather	than	agonistic,	struggles	where	masculine	and	‘disciplined’	norms	seemed	to	drag	practitioners	 back	 from	alternatives.	We	 can	 therefore	understand	 foregoing	 as	 a	 sub-practice	that	walks	a	fine	line	between	democratic	and	undemocratic	practice	and	could	be	conceptualised	as	a	shadow	side	of	democratic	practice.		The	third	sub-practice	denoted	protecting	people’s	democratic	rights	through	shielding.	Mouffe’s	 (1999	 and	2013)	distinction	between	 enemies	 and	 adversaries	 helped	us	 see	how	practitioners’	experience	could	help	citizens	navigate	the	framework	of	democratic	engagement.	 Habermas’	 (1984)	 account	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 factual	 knowledge	 in	democratic	 practice	 reminds	 us	 not	 to	 downplay	 this	 side	 of	 practice.	 Filtering	 such	insights	 through	 Butler	 (2006	 and	 2011),	 however,	 enabled	 us	 to	 see	 a	 movement	between	embodied	and	more	disembodied	shielding.				
9.2.	Navigating	corruption		In	 navigating	 corruption	 I	 explored	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 practitioners	 confronted	 and	worked	around	corruption	as	they	strove	to	generate	democratic	practice	in	a	country	in	transition,	where	endemic	 corruption	pervades	nearly	every	 segment	of	people’s	 lives.	Exploring	 such	 democratic	 practice	 in	 depth	 required	 identifying	 and	 analysing	 the	corrupt	 practices	 that	 practitioners	 encountered,	 as	 these	 existed	 in	 a	 co-dependent	relationship	with	 democratic	 practices,	 shaping	 one	 another.	 In	 particular,	 I	 identified	two	dominant	 corrupt	 sub-practices	 generated	by	 institutional	 representatives,	 closely	
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related	to	the	enactment	of	patriarchal	norms	(gaslighting	and	privatising),	and	one	by	GONGOs	 (colonising),	 against	 and	 through	 which	 practitioners	 performed	 democratic	practice,	in	their	day-to-day	work.	I	termed	these	democratic	sub-practices	dispelling	(in	relation	to	gaslighting),	publicising	(in	relation	to	privatising)	and	unsettling	(in	relation	to	colonising).			The	 literature	 on	 NGOs	 and	 corruption	 was	 useful	 in	 understanding	 the	 ‘watchdog’	function	of	NGOs	 in	keeping	government	accountable	 to	 its	 citizens	and	protecting	 the	public	from	various	forms	of	power	abuse	(Antlöv	et	al,	2010;	Herrold,	2016;	Jezierska,	2015).	 Indeed,	 a	 large	 portion	 of	 WRC	 work	 involved	 staying	 vigilant	 to	 illegal	 and	unethical	 practices	 enacted	by	 institutional	 representatives	 and	 reacting	 against	 these.	This	body	of	literature	also	helped	me	understand	that	NGOs	can	sometimes	contribute	to	 the	corrupt	environment	by	either	being	 “briefcase	NGOs”	 (Dupuy	et	al,	2015:	419),	where	 the	agenda	of	 international	donors	 is	 implemented	uncritically,	or	as	 “GONGOs”	(Smith,	 2010:	 250),	 where	 they	 act	 as	 shell	 organisations	 established	 to	 pursue	 the	private	interests	of	corrupt	government	actors.	The	latter	was	particularly	important	for	my	 fieldwork	 as	 it	 helped	me	 identify	 such	 NGOs	 encountered	 in	WRC’s	 work,	 which	sought	 to	 inhibit	 the	 generation	 of	 democratic	 practice	 and	 to	 obstruct	 the	 work	 of	practitioners.	What	this	body	of	literature	lacks	is	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	corrupt	practices	that	may	be	encountered	in	countries	in	transition,	how	they	manifest	and	how	practitioners	engage	with	such	contexts	in	their	work.			The	 overall	 impression	 gained	 from	 both	 deliberation	 and	 agonism	 is	 that	 democratic	practice	 is	 generated	 in	 a	 somewhat	 benign	 environment,	 where	 each	 participant	 is	committed	 to	 the	 common	 goal	 of	 promoting,	 establishing	 and	 advancing	 democratic	
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practice	 (e.g.	 Habermas,	 1984	 and	 1987;	 Mouffe,	 2009a	 and	 2013).	 Proponents	 of	deliberation	 and	 agonism	 do	 not	 provide	 a	 framework	 for	 understanding	 the	 breadth	and	depth	of	corruption	as	an	inhibitor	of	democratic	practice,	nor	do	they	explore	how	their	posited	practices	may	be	established	in	such	corrupt	environments.			Habermas	recognises	that	the	lifeworld	is	susceptible	to	‘colonisation’	(Habermas,	1987:	196)	by	an	instrumental	rationality,	which	may	lead	to	a	deformation	of	the	lifeworld,	a	position	 that	 could	 be	 helpful	 in	 the	 context	 of	 trying	 to	 understand	 corrupt	 societies.	The	more	society	evolves	in	instrumentally	rational	ways,	the	more	a	lifeworld	distorts	and,	in	time,	instrumentally	rational	systems	may	overpower	the	lifeworld	and	decrease	the	 possibility	 for	 acting	 communicatively	 (Finlayson,	 2005;	 Outhwaite,	 2009).	 Such	instrumental	 forms	 of	 rationality	 could	 include	 corrupt	 practice	 for	 private	 gain,	 even	though	such	a	connection	is	not	made	by	Habermas.	As	a	consequence,	decision-making	in	 systems	 is	 performed	 via	 formal,	 institutionalised	 procedures,	 bypassing	 the	communicative	action	of	social	actors,	making	their	engagement	redundant.	While	such	colonisation	of	 the	 lifeworld	 could	be	perceived	as	practice	 that	 reflects	 the	 imbalance	between	the	lifeworld	and	the	system,	in	which	the	system	strives	to	achieve	efficacy	in	decision-making	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 input	 stemming	 from	 the	 lifeworld,	 such	performativity	 on	 the	 part	 of	 systems,	while	 harmful,	 cannot	 be	 judged	 as	 necessarily	corrupt.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 model	 presented	 by	 Habermas	 is	 useful	 in	 helping	 me	understand	 how	 the	 lifeworld	 of	 my	 scene	 of	 study	 has	 gradually	 distorted	 in	 recent	decades,	 infiltrated	 and	 overcome	 by	 corrupting	 rationalities,	where	 such	 rationalities	become	instrumentalised	and	incorporated	within	mainstream	logics.		
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However,	although	Habermas	provides	a	means	of	understanding	the	creep	of	corruption	into	 a	 lifeworld,	 he	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 way	 of	 understanding	 how	 actors	 can	 seek	 to	perform	democratic	practice	in	a	context	of	endemic	corruption,	where	malign	forms	of	strategic	 action	 overwhelm	 communicative	 action.	 His	 solution	 of	 insisting	 upon	communicative	 action	would	 have	 been	 at	 best	 a	 naïve	 strategy	 in	 the	 environment	 I	inhabited	as	a	researcher.		The	 agonistic	 democratic	 practice	 literature	 helped	me	 distinguish	 between	 ‘enemies’	and	 ‘adversaries’	 	 (Mouffe,	 2009a:	 13),	 where	 enemies	 will	 strive	 to	 undermine	 the	process	 of	 democratisation.	 In	 my	 data,	 it	 was	 evident	 that	 sometimes	 certain	institutional	 and	 NGO	 representatives	 engaged	 in	 practices	 that	 went	 against	 these	principles	 of	 democracy	 and	 were	 more	 focused	 on	 an	 “elitist	 notion	 of	 democracy”	(Doorenspleet,	2015:	479),	which	would	uphold	the	dominance	of	a	particular	privileged	group	(Smith,	2010).	In	light	of	my	research,	Mouffe’s	dismissal	of	undemocratic	agents	as	 ‘enemies’	 who	 fall	 outside	 this	 space	 appears	 as	 an	 overly	 convenient	 way	 of	eliminating	 endemic	 corruption	 as	 a	 consideration	 for	 democratic	 practice.	 Often,	participants	in	my	study	had	no	choice	but	to	try	to	engage	such	enemies,	as	they	occupy	official	positions,	meaning	that	they	are,	in	practice,	impossible	to	circumnavigate.	In	fact,	the	situation	was	even	more	ambiguous,	as	practitioners	had	little	choice	but	to	engage	
and	 oppose	 corrupt	people	and	organisations,	meaning	 that	 government	officials	often	occupied	a	grey	zone	between	enemy	and	adversary.	More	helpful	than	Mouffe	directly	was	Rhodes’	 (2016)	notion	of	agonism	as	a	 form	of	engagement	 that	 is	more	 fluid	and	can	 be	 used	 to	 unsettle	 the	 status	 quo,	 disrupting	 ‘sovereign’	 logics	 of	 power	 and	normalising	dissent	as	a	civil	practice.			
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Butler’s	 account	 of	 reiterative	 norms	 was	 useful	 in	 terms	 of	 understanding	 the	movement	 –	 the	 navigation	 –	 of	 practitioners	 through	 an	 environment	 of	 corruption.	Practitioners	were	embedded	within	a	normative	framework	of	corruption,	the	power	of	which	was	 inescapable,	and	they	were	always	restricted	within	 the	boundaries	of	such	pre-existing,	sedimented	social	norms	(1999;	2004;	2011).	Their	daily	work	took	place	in	situations	 where	 the	 norms	 of	 corruption	 were	 made	 routine	 through	 continuous	reiteration	 (Butler,	 2011:	 70),	 repeated	 and	 reaffirmed	 via	 both	 informal	 and	 formal	social	 institutions.	 For	 example,	 practitioners	 were	 accustomed	 to	 corrupt	 politicians	applying	patriarchal	norms	 in	meetings,	speaking	on	behalf	of	marginalised	women,	or	simply	talking	over	them.		This	interpretation	suggests	that	practitioners	cannot	escape	the	work	of	corrupt	norms	in	 a	 society,	 but	 also	 that	 a	 persistent	 reinscription	 of	 corrupt	 norms	 will	 bear	 on	practitioners,	 opening	 the	 possibility	 of	 them	becoming	 corrupt	 themselves.	 Yet,	 those	reiterative	 norms,	 which	 partially	 govern	 subjectivity,	 also	 open	 a	 space	 for	 different	identifications	and	 therefore	practices	 to	be	enacted,	 as	 those	very	norms	produce	 the	conditions	for	resistance	and	reinscription	(Butler,	2004:	333).	In	my	data,	practitioners	agentically	resisted	corrupt	norms,	reiterated	by	institutional	and	NGO	representatives,	and	 in	doing	so	enacted	 ‘counter-practices’	 that	undermined	and	unsettled	 the	corrupt	status	quo.			However,	such	counter-enactment	was	not	smooth	and	easy	(and	not	always	successful)	and	it	bore	vigorously	onto	the	bodies	of	practitioners.	While	Butler	(2011:	91)	suggests	that	defying	norms	can	be	a	violent	process,	when	she	talks	about	subjects’	desire	to	be	recognised	as	‘viable	human	beings’	(ibid:	82),	she	does	not	provide	a	first-hand,	detailed	
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account	of	how	such	a	process	unfolds.	I	now	contribute	to	a	better	understanding	of	this	unfolding	through	discussing	each	sub-practice	of	navigating	corruption.			
Gaslighting-dispelling		Gaslighting	 was	 explored	 as	 an	 undemocratic	 and	 corrupt	 sub-practice	 where	institutional	 representatives	 employed	 a	 range	 of	 tactics	 in	 order	 to	 discredit	practitioners	 and	 make	 them	 question	 their	 sanity.	 I	 used	 first-hand	 experience	 of	gaslighting	in	order	to	denote	how	corrosive	of	democratic	practice	such	corruption	can	be,	especially	when	encountered	by	someone	who	did	not	have	in-depth	experience	with	it	at	 the	time.	Dispelling,	on	the	other	hand,	was	explored	as	a	democratic	sub-practice	aimed	at	dissipating	corrupt	gaslighting	norms.	Here,	I	used	an	episode	featuring	a	more	experienced	practitioner,	Nina,	who	worked	against	the	gaslighting	of	police	officers.		In	 the	 examples	 I	 used	 in	 the	 navigating	 corruption	 findings	 chapter,	 institutional	representatives	 employed	 tactics	 in	 order	 to	 systematically	 distort	 communication	(Habermas,	 1970)	 and	 confuse	 those	 interlocutors	 (practitioners)	 they	 perceived	 as	threatening	 the	 status	 quo.	 Gaslighting	 was	 particularly	 evident	 during	my	 encounter	with	 institutional	 representatives	 at	 a	 roundtable	 discussion	 regarding	 the	 law	 on	gender	 equality.	 Institutional	 representatives’	 tactics	 involved:	 ruling	 –	 changing	 the	communication	 rules	 during	 deliberations	 arbitrarily,	 and	 weaponising	 victimhood,	where	they	assumed	the	status	of	victims	when	challenged,	in	order	to	shift	the	narrative	away	 from	 the	 main	 topic.	 These	 tactics,	 in	 Habermasian	 terms,	 undermined	 the	underlying	 structure	 of	 communication	 –	 its	 rules	 and	 the	 identity	 of	 participants.	
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Questioners	 become	 perpetrators,	 perpetrators	 became	 victims	 and	 the	 rules	 were	applied	arbitrarily,	a	secret	code	for	a	privileged	elite.	Unlike	Habermas’	interpretation,	however,	in	my	study	these	tactics	were	experienced	in	embodied	ways,	as	institutional	representatives	used	their	body	language	alongside	their	speech	acts	to	enact	the	role	of	victim	 (e.g.	 they	 made	 grimaces,	 which	 denoted	 sadness	 and	 indignation),	 and	 these	enactments	produced	affective	responses,	such	as	confusion,	embarrassment,	anger,	etc.	in	others.			Disparaging	 was	 a	 dimension	 of	 gaslighting	 that	 presented	 as	 an	 antithesis	 to	 both	agonistic	 respect	 (Connolly,	 2005)	 and	 assumptions	 that	 deliberators	 enter	 dialogue	with	 good	 intentions,	 orientated	 towards	 reaching	 understanding	 (Dux,	 1991;	 Erman,	2012).	 In	 my	 data,	 disparaging	 was	 employed	 to	 exclude,	 to	 close	 space	 and	 restrict	access	 to	 deliberation.	 Practitioners	were	 rendered	 inept	 in	 front	 of	 others,	whenever	they	raised	queries	regarding	corrupt	practice.			Collective	 affirmation	 was	 an	 example	 of	 generating	 a	 temporary	 hegemonic	constellation	 of	 ‘us’	 –	 those	 in	 the	 know	 about	 the	 interests	 and	 rules	 at	 play	 in	gaslighting,	versus	 ‘them’	–	people	questioning	this	practice	 through	 insisting	upon	the	principles	 of	 liberty	 and	 equality	 (Mouffe,	 2013).	 Both	 collective	 affirmation	 and	disparaging	 constituted	 democratic	 actors	 as	 external	 antagonists	 –	 ‘outsiders’.	 In	my	study,	 the	smooth	enactments	of	such	hegemonies	gave	 the	 impression	 that	 the	 tactics	underpinning	 their	 formation	 were	 well	 rehearsed	 amongst	 institutional	representatives.	 These	 conceptual	 resources	 demonstrate	 that	 some	 aspects	 of	 the	theory	of	agonism	can	be	useful	as	a	means	of	practitioners	understanding	how	they	are	
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being	positioned	within	deliberative	processes,	 although	 they	do	not	 provide	 a	way	of	conceptualising	how	these	are	experienced	and	navigated	by	practitioners.		The	 dispelling	 sub-practice	 enriches	 understanding	 of	 how	 agonism	might	 be	 used	 to	hold	 corrupt	 institutions	and	 individuals	 to	account	 (Rhodes,	2016)	 through	 the	 fog	of	gaslighting.	Yet,	the	context	in	which	practitioners	work	is	not	a	benign	environment	but	one	through	which	they	need	to	navigate,	balancing	risks	of	reprisal	with	the	desire	for	promoting	democratic	norms.	In	doing	so	they	draw	on	a	range	of	tactics.	These	tactics	cross	over	between	modes	of	democratic	practice	and	embodied	presences.		Butler	(1999)	states	that	phenomena	can	be	normalised	through	the	reiteration	of	norms	within	 speech	 acts.	 The	 more	 speech	 acts	 are	 repeated,	 the	 more	 sedimented	 the	intelligibility	 of	 whatever	 they	 are	 aiming	 to	 affirm.	 I	 identified	 such	 a	 reiteration	 of	speech	 acts	 in	 dispelling,	 as	 practitioners	 attempted	 to	 refocus	 the	 discussion	 on	 the	needs	 of	 the	 people	 they	 represented,	 and	 away	 from	 the	 various	 digressions	institutional	representatives	engaged	in.	Reiterative	speech	acts	were	supplemented	by	presenting	evidence	–	a	dimension	that	reflects	an	aspect	of	Habermas’	communicative	action	 relating	 to	 redeeming	 the	 second	 validity	 claim.	 Namely,	 this	 aspect	 of	deliberation	 specifically	 refers	 to	 drawing	 on	 factual	 knowledge	 in	 dialogue	 and	supporting	claims	with	evidence	if	we	want	them	to	be	accepted	as	credible	(Habermas,	1984).	Yet	the	presenting	of	evidence	in	my	data	was	not	used	as	a	means	of	upholding	the	rules	of	deliberation	but	 in	order	 to	 instigate	a	response	 from	interlocutors	(either	verbal	or	emotional)	and	to	refocus	their	attention	to	the	issue	they	gathered	to	discuss.	The	repetition	of	the	issue	scheduled	for	discussion,	and	presenting	evidence	in	relation	to	 it,	 was	 performed	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 dry,	 vexing	monologue	 by	 practitioners,	 cutting	
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through	the	theatrical	commotion	enacted	by	institutional	representatives	who	posed	as	victims.	It	was	an	embodied	enactment	of	a	validity	claim,	in	other	words.		Another	 dimension	 of	 dispelling,	 which	 I	 termed	 instigating	 compassion,	 was	 closely	related	 to	 the	previous	dimensions,	as	 it	was	also	aimed	at	provoking	a	response	 from	interlocutors.	Yet	in	this	instance	the	provocation	was	aimed	at	interlocutors’	emotions.	Rather	than	allies,	practitioners	engaged	‘enemies’	(Mouffe,	2013)	emotionally	with	the	case	of	family	violence,	trying	to	reach	understanding	through	evoking	compassion.	This	embodied,	emotional	engagement	of	interlocutors,	especially	those	they	stood	in	conflict	with,	is	something	that	is	insufficiently	considered	by	Mouffe	and	overlooked	entirely	by	Habermas,	yet	proved	to	be	a	useful	 tactic	 for	engaging	 institutional	representatives	 in	democratic	 deliberation.	 Democratic	 theory	 can	 here	 be	 supplemented	 by	 Butler’s	insights	 into	relationality	 through	an	experience	of	shared	vulnerability	(Butler,	2006),	as	practitioners	invited	institutional	representatives	to	recall	their	own	vulnerability	 in	relation	to	an	abused	minor	–	“Imagine	 if	your	child	was	being	 treated	 in	 this	way”,	as	Nina	said	to	a	police	officer	whose	neglected	practice	exposed	a	child	needlessly	to	more	violence.		Finally,	 the	 dimension	 of	 tactical	 withdrawal	 encapsulates	 some	 of	 the	 aspects	 of	strategic	 action	 (Habermas,	 1987),	 where	 speakers	 are	 concerned	 with	 achieving	 “a	desired	result”	(Niemi,	2005:	518),	but	this	was	employed	selectively	and	pragmatically	when	 the	embodied	aspects	of	practice	appeared	as	 though	 they	had	 run	 their	 course.	This	 tactic	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 ‘manifest’	 (ibid)	 kind	 of	 strategic	 action,	 where	intentions	 and	 desired	 goals	 are	 obvious	 and	 overt	 (Habermas,	 1984:	 333).	 Nina,	 the	practitioner,	 accepted	 part	 of	 the	 blame	 for	 the	 actions	 she	 was	 accused	 of	 by	 police	
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officers,	 even	 though	 both	 parties	 (officers	 and	 practitioners)	 likely	 knew	 that	 these	actions	were	strategic	deflections.	For	practitioners	this	was	a	way	to	extract	themselves	from	a	gaslighting	distraction,	enacted	by	members	of	the	police	force,	and	to	refocus	the	discussion	onto	the	case	of	violence.	Manifest	strategic	action	was	used	here	as	a	means	of	attaining	democratic	ends,	as	a	precondition	to	deliberation.				
Privatising-publicising		In	 this	 sub-section	 I	 explored	 the	 enactment	 of	 patriarchal	 norms	 by	 institutional	representatives	 as	 ‘privatising’.	 Such	 corrupt	 practice	 represented	 the	 creep	 of	purportedly	 ‘private’	and	 ‘domestic’	norms	 into	the	public	sphere	and	actions	of	public	officials,	where	it	served	to	protect	the	perpetrators	of	family	and	gender-based	violence	and	 hide	 their	 crimes.	 To	 illustrate	 this	 practice,	 I	 used	 the	 episode	 depicting	 the	concerted	malpractice	of	the	Centre	for	Social	Protection	(CSP)	and	the	police,	which	left	a	woman	exposed	to	more	violence.	In	contrast,	 I	explored	the	democratic	sub-practice	of	NGO	practitioners	 seeking	 to	 reform	 ‘privatising’	 tendencies	 as	 ‘publicising’	 (public-ising).	 Publicising	was	 explored	 as	 a	 performative	 practice	 that	 seeks	 to	 close	 the	 gap	between	professed	public	standards	of	liberty	and	equality	and	the	‘privatised’	practice	of	public	officials.	Here,	I	used	the	episode	featuring	Andrea’s	experience	with	the	police,	the	abuser	and	the	victim	of	family	violence	in	order	to	highlight	the	embodied	ways	in	which	practitioners	enacted	the	law	aimed	at	protecting	liberty	and	equality.					
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Privatising:		The	NGO	literature	recognises	patriarchy	as	a	corrupt	series	of	practices	that	inhibit	the	generation	 of	 democratic	 practice	 (Lazda,	 2018;	 Lokar,	 2007;	 Tsetsura	 2013).	 Yet	 this	literature	stops	short	of	providing	detail	concerning	how	practitioners	engage	with	and	combat	 patriarchy,	 particularly	 when	 democratic	 practice	 and	 notions	 of	 democratic	standards	cross	over	 into	 issues	of	welfare.	One	of	my	contributions	 is	 to	demonstrate	how	 the	 private	 and	 public	 realms	 overlap	 in	 democratic	 practice:	 that	 the	 personal	issues	within	a	family	home	are	also	democratic	matters,	where	practitioners	seek	on	a	micro	level	to	defend	people’s	rights	to	liberty	and	equality.	Such	defending,	in	my	data,	entailed	the	protection	of	a	peaceful	life,	free	from	violence	and	the	threat	of	violence.		Habermas’	 (1996)	 understanding	 of	 lifeworld	 is	 that	 which	 comprises	 our	 social	 life	outside	formal	institutions	and	was	useful	for	understanding	how	certain	norms	persist	through	social	organisation	and	practice.	He	argues	that	a	lifeworld	provides	a	reservoir	of	 meaning	 and	 a	 space	 for	 cultural	 exchange,	 which,	 through	 the	 means	 of	communicative	action,	creates	social	integration	(Alexander,	1991).	However,	Habermas	does	 not	 provide	 insight	 into	what	 to	 do	when	 such	 a	 reservoir	 of	meaning	 is	 heavily	informed	 by	 sedimented	 patriarchal	 norms,	 which	 are	 perpetually	 affirmed	 through	practice.	 If	 the	 third	 validity	 claim	 in	 deliberation	 refers	 to	 the	 cultural	 and	 empirical	soundness	of	the	claim	(Habermas,	1984:	38-39)	does	this	mean	that	a	patriarchal	claim	(drawn	 from	a	patriarchal	 cultural	 context)	would	be	redeemed	as	valid	 in	democratic	deliberation?	Of	course,	Habermas	(1996)	states	that	the	content	of	a	lifeworld	is	always	open	 to	 challenge	 and	 critique.	 Yet	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 imagine	 that	 interlocutors	 whose	worldview	 is	 deeply	 patriarchal	 would	 be	 particularly	 receptive	 to	 such	 a	 challenge	
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through	purely	 communicative	means,	 especially	when	many	 of	 the	 patriarchal	 norms	are	 normalised	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 are	 taken	 for	 granted	 as	 factual	 truth	 and	sometimes	are	not	even	verbalised.			In	 terms	 of	 agonistic	 democratic	 practice,	 Laclau	 and	 Mouffe’s	 (1985)	 concept	 of	 the	chain	of	equivalence	was	useful	 for	understanding	 the	role	of	patriarchal	norms	 in	 the	formation	 of	 a	 chain	 between	 institutional	 representatives	 and	 male	 abusers.	 Such	 a	chain	was	posited	against	women	and	practitioners,	thus	further	developing	knowledge	as	 to	 the	 application	 of	 chains	 of	 equivalence	 away	 from	 the	 strictly	 formal	 political	sphere	(Islam	et	al,	2017;	McLaughlin	and	Bridgman,	2017).	I	posit	that	such	chains	are	not	 overt	 and	 formally	 established	 but	 performed	 through	 the	 common	 enactment	 of	patriarchal	 norms	 in	 both	 private	 and	 public	 spheres,	 forming	 tacit	 bonds	 between	institutional	representatives	and	abusers.	Similarly,	NGO	practitioners	were	not	always	confronted	 directly	 by	 the	 actors	 within	 such	 a	 chain.	 Rather,	 the	 enactment	 of	patriarchal	 norms,	 especially	 when	 it	 came	 to	 institutional	 representatives,	 was	packaged	 through	 selective,	 skewed	 and	 arbitrary	 reference	 to	 law,	 protocols	 and	procedures.	 As	 with	 gaslighting	 there	 was	 some	 ambiguity,	 therefore,	 in	 whether	institutional	 representatives	 were	 always,	 or	 predominantly,	 enemies,	 adversaries	 or	allies.			Butler	 helps	 us	 understand	 the	 anti-democratic	 practice	 of	 privatising	 in	 terms	 of	 the	enactment	of	norms	that	define	and	control	what	it	means	to	be	a	woman	or	a	married	woman	 and	 to	 possess	 a	 female	 body.	 In	 a	 patriarchal	 setting,	 a	 woman’s	 body	 is	“expendable”	 and	her	 life	 is	 valued	 less	 than	 a	man’s,	 counter	 to	 democratic	 norms	 of	liberty	 and	 equality	 (Butler	 and	 Athanasiou,	 2013:	 43).	 Dominant	 and	 persevering	
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normative	frameworks,	such	as	patriarchy,	bear	on	the	organisation	of	an	entire	society,	“dispossessing	whole	populations”	(Butler	2015:	151),	rendering	them	“ungrievable…in	public	 view”	 (ibid:	 152).	 Such	 dominant	 normative	 frameworks	 are	 accomplished	through	 continuous	 reiteration,	 affirming	 the	 ‘truth’	 of	 certain	 phenomena,	 through	speech/body	acts	 (Bowring	and	Brewis,	2009),	 such	as	violence	against	women.	 In	my	data,	 when	 the	 woman	 –	 a	 victim	 of	 violence	 –	 reported	 the	 abuse	 to	 CSP,	 the	 social	workers	 undermined	 publicly	 declared	 norms	 of	 liberty	 and	 equality	 and	 instead	reverted	 to	 corrupt	 and	 undemocratic	 ‘private’	 norms.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 patriarchal	norms	of	violent	relations	were	not	only	enacted	in	the	private	sphere	(home)	but	were	reiterated	further	through	everyday	bureaucratic	actions.				Publicising:		Habermas	 (1987)	 argues	 that	 what	 is	 communicatively	 agreed	 upon	 in	 a	 lifeworld	amongst	social	actors	should	feed	into	the	administrative	system	in	the	form	of	various	regulating	mechanisms	 (laws,	 rules,	 protocols,	 etc.).	 He	 further	 argues	 that	 bringing	 a	private	matter	(e.g.	 family	violence)	to	the	arena	of	public	deliberation	does	not	“imply	an	 infringement	 on	 individual	 rights”	 nor	 violation	 of	 intimacy,	 as	 deliberating	 upon	private	matters	“is	not	necessarily	the	same	as	meddling	in	another’s	affairs”	(Habermas,	1996:	313).	Namely,	 every	 issue	which	 in	 the	eyes	of	 social	 actors	deserves	 regulation	(e.g.	legal	prohibition	of	domestic	violence)	should	be	publicly	deliberated	upon	because	the	“general	public	sphere	is	unconstrained”	(Habermas,	1996:	314)	in	terms	of	what	can	be	 brought	 up	 for	 deliberation,	 no	matter	 how	 ‘controversial’	 the	 issue	might	 be.	 But	what	 happens	when	 patriarchal	 interests	 dominate	 the	 lifeworld?	 Habermas	 does	 not	
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offer	us	a	framework	for	understanding	how	practitioners	can	seek	to	bring	the	‘private’	into	 the	 public,	 especially	when	 patriarchal	 norms	 of	 behaviour	 permeate	most	 of	 the	public	 sphere	 as	 well,	 despite	 the	 existence	 of	 laws	 that	 contradict	 such	 patriarchal	norms.			One	could	interpret	the	work	of	practitioners	as	enriching	Habermas’	theorising	through	offering	 a	 form	 of	 embodied	 and	 in-the-moment	 deliberation	with	 agents	 of	 the	 state	who	should	know	better.	In	my	data,	Andrea	did	not	only	spell	out	the	legal	procedures	in	 dialogue	with	 representatives	 of	 the	police	 in	 some	predetermined	 space	 for	 public	deliberation	but	also	physically	occupied	the	crime	scene.	She	positioned	her	body	in	a	strategic	way,	 enacting	 the	 law	 through	 and	with	 her	 body	 –	 embodying	 the	 law	 that	stands	 against	 patriarchal	 norms	 and	 exemplifying	 how	 it	 should	 be	 interpreted	 and	enacted	in	practice.			Mouffe’s	 (2013)	 account	 of	 agonism	 might	 help	 us	 frame	 the	 engagements	 of	practitioners	 with	 institutional	 representatives	 as	 confrontational,	 in	 the	 service	 of	reiterating	democratic	norms	and	challenging	sedimented	identifications	but	cannot	take	us	much	further.	When	Andrea	positioned	herself	between	the	victim	on	one	side	and	the	police	 officers	 and	 abuser	 on	 the	 other,	 while	 spelling	 out	 legal	 procedures,	 she	 was	challenging	 the	 patriarchal	 identifications	 of	 police	 officers	 with	 an	 alternative	 set	 of	identifications	 –	 of	 police	officers	upholding	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 regardless	of	 their	private	preferences	(e.g.	their	inclination	to	protect	the	male	abuser).			The	accounts	of	both	deliberation	and	agonism	are	ultimately	too	disembodied	to	be	of	much	analytical	help	in	understanding	publicising	practices	that	took	place	in	my	study.	
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Butler’s	 (2015)	 work	 on	 assembly	 is	 more	 suitable	 for	 helping	 us	 understand	 the	renegotiation	between	private	 and	public	 as	 a	 form	of	 assertion,	where	 bodies	 “assert	and	enact	themselves	by	speech	or	silence,	by	action	or	steady	inaction,	by	gesture”	(ibid:	156).	Butler	claims	that	bodies	gathered	in	public	assert	something	even	when	they	are	silent,	that	they	say:	“We	have	not	slipped	quietly	into	the	shadows	of	public	life:	we	have	not	become	the	glaring	absence	that	structures	your	public	life.”	(Butler	and	Athanosiou,	2013:196).	However,	rather	than	taking	place	in	a	large	public	assembly,	the	practitioner	in	my	 study	 asserted	public	 standards	 of	 liberty	 and	 equality	 through	her	 body	 in	 the	private	sphere	of	somebody	else’s	home.	She	placed	her	body	in	between	the	victim	and	the	abuser,	accompanied	by	police	officers,	on	the	threshold	of	a	private	home,	asserting	that	this	woman	was	not	disposable	and	should	be	recognised	as	a	full	human	being.			We	can	understand	the	dimensions	of	repetition	and	embodying	the	discourse	of	law	as	speech	 and	 bodily	 acts	 enacted	 in	 concert	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 normalising	 publicly	declared	standards	of	democratic	practice.	Not	only	did	Andrea	hold	her	place,	marking	the	 legal	 boundary	 between	 public	 and	 private	 spheres,	 but	 she	 also	 spelled	 out	repetitively	 legal	norms	and	procedures	 that	should	have	been	 followed,	as	 if	 trying	 to	drill	the	words	of	the	law	through	the	patriarchal	mindset	of	police	officers.				
Colonising-unsettling		I	 termed	 the	 corrupt	 sub-practice	 ‘colonising’	 in	 order	 to	 denote	 the	 act	 of	 GONGO	members	 infiltrating	the	spaces	designated	for	generating	democratic	practice	 in	order	to	obstruct	 the	work	of	NGO	practitioners.	 In	doing	so	 they	employed	corrosive	 tactics	
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(e.g.	foreclosing	dialogue	and	self-exclusion)	and	so	actively	eroded	the	time,	energy	and	credibility	 of	 practitioners	 dedicated	 to	 generating	 democratic	 practice.	 In	 contrast,	 I	termed	the	democratic	sub-practice	of	practitioners	‘unsettling’	in	order	to	highlight	the	labour-intensive	 effort	 involved	 in	 such	 endeavours,	 where	 practitioners	 had	 to	 be	constantly	 vigilant	 of	 GONGOs’	manipulations	 and	 be	 prepared	 to	 respond	 adequately	when	 faced	 with	 these.	 Such	 engagement	 was	 time-consuming	 and	 tiresome,	 as	practitioners	had	 to	actively	prevent	colonising	 from	settling	and	becoming	a	norm.	 In	my	 analysis	 I	 drew	 on	 an	 episode	 featuring	 practitioners’	 engagement	 with	 a	 GONGO	representative,	during	reporting	to	a	UN	body,	which	I	participated	in	directly.			The	NGO	literature	has	begun	to	flag	the	phenomenon	of	the	GONGO	(Dupuy	et	al,	2015;	Smith,	 2010),	 highlighting	 how	 these	 organisations	 either	 unquestioningly	 promote	donors’	agendas	or	act	as	agents	for	corrupt	and	even	criminal	interests.	But	knowledge	of	the	practices	of	GONGOs	and	their	interactions	with	non-corrupt	NGO	practitioners	is	under-explored.	 My	 data	 strengthens	 understanding	 of	 the	 position	 of	 GONGOs	 more	conceptually	in	relation	to	democratic	practice.		I	 described	 the	practices	of	GONGOs	as	 colonising	because	 they	 insert	 themselves	 into	the	 spaces	 where	 others	 strive	 to	 generate	 democratic	 practice	 and	 corrode	 the	generation	 of	 knowledge	 and	meaningful	 dialogue.	We	 can	 understand	 this	 colonising	partially	 through	 turning	 to	 Habermas’	 (1987:	 196)	 notion	 of	 a	 colonisation	 of	 a	lifeworld	 through	 instrumental	 rationality,	 where	 GONGO	 members	 deploy	 ‘strategic’	action	 for	 their	own,	or	 the	government’s,	private	 interests.	 In	addition,	we	 can	enrich	our	understanding	of	GONGO	tactics	by	 interpreting	 the	dimensions	of	 foreclosure	and	self-exclusion	as	instances	of	systematically	distorted	communication	(Habermas,	1970),	
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where	 representatives	 of	 GONGOs	 deliberately	 obstruct	 dialogue,	 systematically	 and	persistently,	over	a	period	of	time	in	order	to	avoid	challenge.			We	 can	 also	 turn	 to	 Mouffe	 (2009a)	 and	 Butler	 (2015)	 to	 understand	 the	 colonising	practices	of	GONGOs.	These	organisations	tend	to	avoid	confrontation	at	almost	all	costs,	seeking	 to	 remove	 themselves	 from	 the	 prospect	 of	 agonistic	 engagement,	 and	 this	withdrawal	has	the	effect	of	taming	democratic	practice	(Mouffe,	2014;	Roskamm,	2015).	We	can	turn	to	Butler’s	 (2015)	notion	of	assembly	 to	enrich	understanding	of	how	the	self-excluding	 and	 silent	 bodies	 of	 GONGO	practitioners	 speak	 through	 their	 ‘gestures’	(Butler,	 2015:	 156):	 evading	 contact,	 not	 turning	 up	 to	 meetings,	 or,	 when	 present,	foreclosing	 dialogue	 through	 adopting	 vague	 and	 even	 cryptic	 language.	 GONGO	practitioners	 also	 insert	 their	 bodies	 in	 spaces	 necessary	 for	 furthering	 their	 aims,	colonising	 literal	 space,	 as	well	 as	 the	 time	 and	 energy,	 of	 rival	NGO	practitioners	 and	representatives	of	international	organisations.	The	presence	of	GONGO	workers	can	feel	like	 an	 empty	 yet	 life-absorbing	 corporeal	 presence,	 a	 zombification	 of	 lifeworld	encounters:	offering	evasive	and	banal	statements	 in	response	to	reasoned,	researched	and/or	passionately	held	commitments.		My	 research	 presents	 an	 initial	 framework	 for	 understanding	 how	 NGO	 practitioners	might	yet	seek	to	pursue	forms	of	democratic	practice	amidst	the	colonising	incursions	of	GONGOs.	Sleuthing	can	be	related	to	pursuing	Habermas’	 (1984:	38)	second	validity	claim,	 insisting	 that	 claims	 made	 by	 GONGOs	 (including	 whether	 they	 really	 exist	 as	organisations	at	all)	are	supported	by	facts.	In	practice,	this	is	an	embodied	experience,	however	–	time	consuming	and	tiring.	In	addition,	the	truth	is	not	pursued	solely	through	
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dialogue,	 as	 Habermas	 (1984)	 claims,	 but	 is	 an	 investigative	 piece	 of	 work	 that	 takes	place	through	a	range	of	activities.			The	dimension	of	‘confrontation’	helps	us	extend	Rhodes’	(2016)	notion	of	agonism	used	to	hold	participants	 in	democratic	practice	accountable	by	showing	 that	such	practices	can	 be	 extended	 to	 the	 agents	 of	 corrupt	 governments	 (GONGOs).	We	 can	 enrich	 the	notion	 of	 agonism	 by	 drawing	 attention	 to	 its	 sustained	 character	 over	 time.	 In	 the	example	 in	 the	 data,	when	we	 finally	managed	 to	 secure	 the	 presence	 of	 Kristina,	we	embarked	on	continuous	questioning,	confrontation	and	challenge,	as	a	counter-practice	to	her	attempts	to	foreclose	dialogue.		Finally,	 the	 dimension	 of	 ‘marginalisation’	 helps	 us	 understand	 that	 sometimes,	undemocratic	 means	 might	 need	 to	 be	 employed	 in	 the	 face	 of	 dealing	 with	 corrupt	participants.	 Conceptually,	 we	 can	 make	 sense	 of	 this	 dimension	 as	 a	 form	 of	 ‘latent’	strategic	 action	 (Niemi,	 2005),	 where,	 in	 the	 episode	 in	 the	 data,	 we	 kept	 Kristina	occupied	with	her	plans,	while	presenting	the	façade	that	we	were	prepared	to	consider	them.	 Marginalisation	 is	 also	 an	 embodied	 experience,	 where	 bodily	 tactics,	 such	 as	speaking	 in	 a	 particular	 order	 and	 for	 extended	periods	 of	 time,	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 re-configuring	an	order	of	 the	sensible	 (Ranciére,	2012)	by	excluding	certain	bodies	 from	counting	as	valid	participants	in	a	democratic	process	(Butler,	2015).						
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Summary		Navigating	corruption	was	discussed	as	a	practice	that	acknowledges	the	inescapability	of	corruption	within	the	scene	of	study,	something	under-developed	in	both	the	NGO	and	democratic	practice	 literatures.	 I	 contributed	by	 conceptualising	navigating	as	 a	 subtle	and	 embodied	 process,	 generating	 knowledge	 of	 democratic	 practice	 by	 interpreting	deliberation	 and	 agonism	 as	 embodied	 practices	 enacted	 through	 a	 context	 of	corruption,	which	pervaded	the	working	lives	of	practitioners.	I	also	drew	on	ideas	from	the	 NGO	 literature	 concerning	 the	 ‘watch-dog’	 (Smith,	 2010)	 function	 of	 NGOs	 in	protecting	 people’s	 democratic	 rights	 but	 interpreted	 such	 a	 function	 as	 an	 embodied	and	 proactive	 one,	 of	 practitioners	 physically	 employing	 their	 bodies	 to	 defend	democratic	norms.			The	 first	 sub-practice	 of	 ‘gaslighting-dispelling’	 drew	 attention	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	institutional	 representatives	 erode	 the	 credibility	 of	 practitioners	 through	 a	 fog	 of	corrupt	practices	and	how	practitioners	seek	to	dispel	such	practices	through	recourse	to	 democratic	 practices.	 I	 drew	 on	 theories	 of	 democratic	 practice	 to	 enrich	understanding	of	how	corrupt	practices	divided	groups	and	distorted	the	basis	of	their	communication.	 To	 conceptualise	 the	 dispelling	 response	 of	 practitioners,	 I	 turned	 to	deliberative	 democratic	 practice,	with	 its	 emphasis	 on	 the	 use	 of	 factual	 evidence	 and	knowledge,	 and	 a	 more	 embodied,	 Butlerian	 practice	 of	 re-iterating	 norms	 and	instigating	compassion.		The	second	sub-practice	of	‘privatising-publicising’	discussed	the	ways	in	which	‘private’	patriarchal	 norms	 are	 dragged	 into	 matters	 within	 the	 public	 sphere,	 infecting	
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democratic	norms.	It	also	discussed	how	practitioners	counter	such	privatising	through	seeking,	 in	embodied	ways,	 to	move	 the	practices	back	within	standards	of	 liberty	and	equality.	 I	 drew	 on	 theories	 of	 deliberative	 and	 agonistic	 democratic	 practice	 to	understand	the	seep	of	private	patriarchal	standards	into	the	public	realm,	and	Butler’s	(2006	and	2011)	notion	of	what	counts	as	a	 liveable	 life,	 to	discuss	 the	effects	of	 such	practices	 on	 the	 bodies	 of	women.	 In	 response,	 I	 positioned	publicising	 as	 a	matter	 of	enacting	democratic	standards	through	bodily/speech	acts	(Butler,	2011).		The	 third	sub-practice	of	 ‘colonising-unsettling’	sought	 to	expand	knowledge	about	 the	operation	of	GONGOs	(Dupuy	et	al,	2015;	Smith,	2010)	and	how	practitioners	navigate	their	influence	in	everyday	democratic	practice.	I	drew	on	Habermas	(1984)	and	Mouffe	(2009a)	 to	 conceptualise	 how	 GONGOs	 colonise	 democratic	 space	 and	 seek	 to	 tame	democratic	 conflict	 through	 underhand	 means.	 In	 contrast,	 I	 drew	 on	 notions	 of	democratic	 practice	 to	 conceptualise	 how	 practitioners	 combat	 the	 corruption	 of	GONGOs	through	insisting	upon	informed	and	evidence-based	engagement,	as	well	as	the	centrality	of	challenge	in	public	life.	In	addition,	I	discussed	unsettling	as	a	practice	that	can	be	informed	by	non-democratic	means	to	achieve	democratic	ends.			
9.3.	The	aesthetics	of	assembling		I	termed	this	practice	‘the	aesthetics	of	assembling’	in	order	to	denote	the	artful	aspects	of	 the	 act	 of	 public	 assembly	 and	 the	 practices	 of	 NGO	 practitioners	 in	 facilitating,	shaping	 and	 influencing	 assembly.	 To	 illustrate	 this	 practice	 I	 explored	 an	 episode	featuring	the	IWD	march	that	coincided	with	the	protest	of	mothers.	The	acts	of	people	
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gathering	in	streets	to	voice	their	political	demands,	carrying	placards	and	various	other	artefacts,	chanting	and	delivering	speeches,	linking	with	one	another,	are	aesthetic	acts,	which	 hold	 a	 performative	 power	 to	 enact	 certain	 practices	 and	 subjectivities.	 In	 the	discussion	that	follows	I	predominantly	draw	on	the	work	of	Ranciére	(2009,	2012	and	2016),	Laclau	(2007)	and	Butler	(2015)	to	explore	the	conceptual	significance	of	the	two	sub-practices	of	the	aesthetics	of	assembling:	‘aestheticising	equivalence’	and	‘embodied	reordering’.	Before	that,	I	outline	the	theoretical	contribution	of	the	practice	as	a	whole.		The	NGO	 literature	does	not	 seem	 to	 consider	 the	 role	of	NGOs	 in	public	assembly,	 let	alone	explore	 the	aesthetic	practices	 involved,	which	 seems	 like	an	oversight,	one	 that	could	 be	 remedied	 from	 a	 reading	 of	 NGO	 work	 in	 relation	 to	 democratic	 practices.	Habermas	 views	 aesthetic	 rationality	 as	 a	 distinct	 dimension	 of	 communicative	rationality,	 closely	 tied	 to	 redeeming	 the	 fourth	 validity	 claim,	 which	 relates	 to	 the	evaluation	 of	 the	 sincerity	 of	 expression	 (1984:	 20).	 Although	 Habermas	 elsewhere	states	 that	 artworks	 have	 emancipatory	 potential,	 as	 they	 “promote	 the	maturation	 of	the	 person’s	 subjectivity	 and	 provide	 the	motivational	 structures	 necessary	 for	moral	autonomy	 and	 scientific	 thinking”	 (Boucher,	 2011:	 62),	 in	 terms	 of	 deliberative	democratic	 practice,	 he	 is	 more	 concerned	 with	 style	 of	 communication	 (Habermas,	1984:	 95)	 and	 whether	 or	 not	 interlocutors’	 intentions	 are	 “genuine”	 (Chang	 and	Jacobson,	2010:	664).	His	preoccupation	with	one	particular	form	–	speech	-	rather	than	the	content	of	deliberative	democratic	practice,	which	might	 include	aesthetic	 forms	of	communicating,	is	of	little	help	here.			Mouffe	 (2013)	states	 that	art	can	make	visible	 “what	 the	dominant	consensus	 tends	 to	obscure	and	obliterate…giving	a	voice	to	all	those	who	are	silenced	within	the…existing	
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hegemony”	 (ibid:	 93),	 especially	 when	 enacted	 collectively.	 She	 argues	 that	 for	 an	“artistico-activist”	 (2013:	 97)	 practice	 to	 be	 critical	 and	 to	 instigate	 change,	 it	 is	 not	sufficient	for	it	to	only	problematise	the	phenomena	it	aims	to	address.	Artistic	practice	within	 democratic	 practice	 must,	 in	 her	 view,	 supply	 the	 means	 of	 articulating	 new	identifications	 that	 are	 not	 yet	 available.	 Such	 an	 account	 of	 the	 aesthetic	 within	democratic	 practice	 was	 insightful	 for	 understanding	 that	 artistic	 practices,	 such	 as	carrying	 creative	 placards	 and	 flags,	 singing	 and	marching,	 can	 operate	 on	 two	 levels.	First	 is	 the	 “deconstructive”	 (ibid:	 93),	 assisting	 people	 to	 “dis-identify”	 (ibid)	 with	dominant	regimes	of	patriarchal	power;	and	second,	on	the	 level	of	re-identification,	 is	providing	 aesthetic	 resources	 to	 support	 participants	 in	 generating	 new	 forms	 of	subjectivity,	 as	was	 the	 case	with	 the	use	 of	 a	mix	 of	 popular	 rock	 songs	 and	 socialist	slogans	 in	 the	 IWD	 episode	 recounted.	 However,	 even	 though	 Mouffe	 underlines	 the	importance	 of	 artistic	 practices	 for	 democratic	 transformation	 and	 recognises	 the	entanglement	of	art	and	politics,	she	does	not	offer	a	developed	conceptual	 framework	for	understanding	how	such	entanglements	unfold.		Although	she	does	not	explicitly	 treat	bodies	 in	assembly	as	 ‘aesthetic’,	Butler	helps	us	understand	 how	 the	 physical	 presence	 of	 bodies,	 and	 relations	 between	 bodies,	 can	constitute	 democratic	 practice.	 She	 does	 touch	 upon	 parodic	 performances	 in	 Gender	
Trouble	(1999),	which	possess	a	subversive	power	to	alter	but	can	also	further	entrench	sedimented	norms.	Specifically,	she	talks	about	gender	as	a	“corporeal	style”	(ibid:	190),	of	 stylistic	 acts	 in	 “ritual	 social	 dramas”	 (p.191)	 that	 are	 continuously	 repeated.	 She	draws	 on	 the	 example	 of	 cross-dressing	 as	 an	 “imitation	 of	 gender”	 (1999:	 xxxi)	 to	demonstrate	 both	 the	 subversive	 but	 also	 the	 “punitive”	 (ibid:	 190)	 character	 of	deviating	from	a	normative	script.	A	person	may	change	their	appearance	(e.g.	through	
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cross-dressing)	in	an	attempt	to	de-naturalise	certain	gender	norms.	However,	such	acts	may	also	serve	to	further	‘consolidate’	“hegemonic	norms”	(Butler,	2011:	85)	by	merely	citing	 existing	 norms.	 We	 can	 draw	 on	 this	 theorising	 to	 better	 understand	 how	 the	women	in	my	episodes	tried	to	problematise	certain	sedimented	norms	through	stylistic	and	performed	means,	stepping	outside	the	ritual	ways	in	which	women	were	supposed	to	behave,	and	to	better	understand	some	of	the	risks	they	took	in	doing	so.		Butler	can	also	help	us	better	understand	the	aesthetics	of	assembly	at	play	in	my	data,	in	the	corporeal	power	of	bodies	to	jointly	stake	a	claim	for	recognition.	According	to	Butler	(2015),	any	public	gathering,	“vigils	or	funerals,	often	signify	in	excess”	(Butler,	2015:	8)	of	 language,	 meaning	 that	 they	 connote	 something	 that	 is	 not	 necessarily	 “written	 or	vocalised”	(ibid).	This	signifying	is	a	valuable	conceptual	resource	for	understanding	that	democratic	 practice	 can	 be	 enacted	 in	 excess	 of	 words	 but	 also	 that	 the	 presence	 of	diverse	bodies	in	a	particular	place	can	challenge	norms	in	a	way	that	goes	beyond	any	one,	 or	 even	 a	 few,	 bodies.	 Diverse	 bodies,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 educated	 and	 experienced	practitioners	mingling	with	mothers	predominantly	from	rural	areas,	by	itself	delivers	a	message	through	the	collective	effect	of	the	assembly.		Although	we	can	read	aesthetics	into	Butler’s	account	of	norms	and	assembly,	she	does	not	 provide	 an	 explicitly	 aesthetic	 lens.	 Her	 work	 accounts	 only	 for	 bodies	 and	 their	relationality	 in	 vulnerability	 (Butler,	 2006),	 and	 so	when	 read	 in	 isolation	 against	my	data,	may	miss	some	of	the	richness	of	aesthetic	modes	of	assembly,	in-person	or	online,	which	 can	 be	 evoked	 beyond	 bodies,	 through	 a	 range	 of	 forms,	 such	 as	music,	 colour,	visual	 art	 and	 the	 rhythms	 and	 textures	 of	 bodies	 and	 texts.	Ranciére	 (2012)	helps	 us	somewhat	 here	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 he	 provides	 a	 framework	 for	 understanding	 the	
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aesthetics	of	politics	and	how	aesthetics	can	become	politicised	 in	democratic	practice.	His	 notions	 of	 the	 sentence-image	 (2009)	 and	of	 orders	 of	 the	 sensible	 (2012)	will	 be	drawn	 upon	 in	 more	 depth	 in	 discussing	 the	 excess	 that	 Butler	 refers	 to,	 in	 the	 sub-practices	below.			
Aestheticising	equivalence		In	 aestheticising	 equivalence	 I	 explored	 the	ways	 in	which	 diverse	 people	 assemble	 a	basis	 for	solidarity	and	common	action	using	aesthetics	as	a	medium	for	achieving	this	(Ranciére,	2009).	 In	 the	episode	 featuring	 the	campaign	related	 to	 IWD,	 I	explored	 the	artful	connection	of	particular	experiences	of	women,	conveyed	through	the	medium	of	online	 video,	 with	 general	 causes	 that	 tie	 them	 together	 in	 a	 chain.	 The	 chain	 of	equivalence	(Laclau,	2007;	Laclau	and	Mouffe,	1985)	here	was	constituted	 through	 the	dimension	 I	 termed	 ‘grounding-airing’.	This	 is	because	 the	connection	had	the	effect	of	enacting	 both	 a	 sense	 of	 familiarity	 with	 democratic	 subjects,	 the	 ‘ordinary’	 women	participating	 in	 the	 event,	 the	 kinds	 of	 women	most	 people	 would	 know,	 and	 also	 of	collectivising	 their	 experiences	 into	 principles	 of	 equality	 through	 the	 ‘air’	 of	 online	technology.			I	referred	to	the	second	dimension	of	aestheticising	equivalence	as	‘sensory	imbrication’,	which	built	on	Ranciére’s	(2009)	account	of	the	sentence-image	in	democratic	practice.	Through	 this	 dimension,	 practitioners	 used	 aesthetic	 means	 to	 assemble	 a	 basis	 for	common	action	and	solidarity,	an	equivalential	chain	between	different	groups	of	people;	they	transformed	particular	issues	people	voice	into	a	common	platform	for	action.	This	
	 337	
dimension	was	 explored	 through	 the	 episode	 featuring	 the	 IWD	march.	 The	 assembly	gained	 its	 performative	 impetus	 through	 blending	 visuals,	 audio,	 rhythms	 and	 texts,	which	 come	 together	 in	a	way	 that	 enacted	meaning	 for	participants	 (see	also	Michels	and	Steyaert,	2017;	Munro	and	Jordan,	2013).		The	 contribution	 of	 grounding-airing	 gains	 its	 value	 through	 the	 application	 of	 a	multimodal	analysis	in	relation	to	Laclau	and	Mouffe’s	(1985)	and	Laclau’s	(2007)	notion	of	a	chain	of	equivalence.	Lacalu	and	Mouffe’s	focus	is	conceptual	but	some	efforts	have	been	 made	 to	 translate	 the	 framework	 into	 organisational	 and	 political	 contexts	 (see	Griggs	and	Howarth,	2004	and	2008;	Islam	et	al,	2017;	McLaughlin	and	Bridgman,	2017;	Smolović	Jones	et	al,	2016).	However,	the	extant	literature	has	not	explored	how	chains	of	equivalence	can	be	articulated	through	aesthetic	mediums	or	in	online	spaces.	This	is	a	conceptual	 and	 empirical	 gap	 worth	 addressing,	 as	 the	 concept	 holds	 great	 value	 in	better	understanding	the	inter-subjective	enactment	of	interests	and	passions.			Butler	 (2015:	 8)	 acknowledges	 that	 online	 activism	 counts	 as	 a	 particular	 form	 of	assembly	 but	 does	 not	 expand	 on	 how	we	might	make	 conceptual	 sense	 of	 relational	positioning	 in	a	digital	 context.	Likewise,	Habermas	 (1996:	361)	 sees	virtual	 spaces	as	public	 spaces	 but	 advocates	 for	 deliberation	 in	 person,	 between	 people	 occupying	 a	common	physical	 space.	Mouffe	does	not	 focus	on	 the	digital	 as	 a	 specific	medium	 for	democratic	practice	at	all.	Both	Mouffe	and	Habermas	seem	to	 tacitly,	and	often	not	so	tacitly,	favour	face-to-face	democratic	engagements.	This	is	something	of	an	oversight,	as	the	capability	of	online	spaces	to	generate	a	certain	‘social	capital’	(Carroll	and	Simpson,	2012)	seems	plausible.		
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In	my	analysis,	the	online	domain	was	inclusive	in	a	way	that	more	traditional	forms	of	democratic	practice	simply	are	not	(see	Srnicek	and	Williams,	2016).	Many	of	the	people	featured	in	the	online	videos	simply	could	not	have	taken	time	away	from	their	work	and	family	commitments	 to	 join	 in	with	the	 IWD	march,	or	were	geographically	 too	distant	from	 events	 in	 the	 campaign.	 The	 digital	 space	 helped	 them	 constitute	 a	 democratic	subjectivity	through	making	visible	a	diverse	range	of	problems	and	experiences	(Butler,	2004:	44),	such	as	unemployment,	poverty,	harsh	working	conditions	and	so	on,	created	by	dubious	acts	of	privatisation	and	the	destruction	of	the	welfare	system	(Lokar,	2007).			Rendering	 the	 sedimented	 practices	 of	 oppression	 visible,	 online	 videos	 enabled	 the	generation	of	 a	 chain	of	 equivalence	 (Laclau,	2007;	Laclau	and	Mouffe,	1985)	between	the	participants	by	virtue	of	revealing	that	the	conveyed	issues,	problems	and	concerns	were	not	particular	(only	my	problem),	but	that	they	cut	across	a	diverse	population	(our	problem).	Moreover,	 the	online	videos	 served	 to	 “unsettle	 the	 ‘I’”	 (Butler,	2011:	68)	of	the	 individual	 online	 participants	 and	 revealed	 that	 such	 ‘I’s	 represented	 a	“sedimentation	 of	 the	 ‘we’”	 (ibid),	 of	 a	 collective	 that	 emerged	 through	 the	 normative	etching	of	corrupt	practices.	For	 instance,	 the	notion	of	being	a	 ‘working	class	woman’,	although	 manifesting	 in	 qualitatively	 different	 ways,	 connected	 women	 through	experiences	of	a	common	struggle	against	poverty	and	injustice.		Missing	 from	 Laclau	 and	Mouffe’s	 conceptualisation,	 however,	 is	 an	 aesthetic	 sense	 of	how	experiences	within	a	chain	are	articulated	in	such	a	way	as	to	draw	others	in,	and	they	 thereby	 overlook	 a	 rich	 and	 sensory	 understanding	 of	 constitutive	 articulation	within	and	across	a	chain.	In	my	data,	bodies	and	their	vulnerabilities	were	significant	in	expressing	democratic	demands	–	 they	were	 significant	because	others	 (including	me)	
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heard	and	felt	 the	call	 in	an	embodied	way.	Yet	these	calls	took	place	 in	a	digital	space	through	 a	 “plural	 form	of	 performativity”	 (Butler,	 2015:	 8),	 rather	 than	 in	 face-to-face	encounters.	 Videos,	 collectively,	 provided	 viewers	 with	 an	 opportunity	 to	 recognise	themselves	in	their	vulnerability	but	in	such	a	way	that	“vulnerability	enters	into	agency”	(Butler,	2016:	25)	and	enacts	joint	action.			Visual	material	provided	a	means	for	expressing	something	that	“may	be	more	difficult	to	express	through	language”	(Machin	and	Mayr,	2012:	31)	alone.	In	this	sense,	streamed	videos	did	not	only	serve	to	convey	the	verbal	messages	uttered	by	participants	but	also	conveyed	 a	 sense	 of	 familiarity	 with	 the	 women	 (people	 filmed	 themselves	 in	 their	homes,	in	pyjamas,	surrounded	by	family	photos,	children,	etc.),	which	in	turn	fostered	a	sense	of	relatability	(this	could	be	me).			We	 can	 dig	 deeper	 into	 how	 the	 aesthetic	 made	 connections	 between	 people	 and	problems	in	my	data.	Ranciére	(2009),	in	relation	to	political	and	democratic	art,	talks	of	the	 aesthetic	 potential	 of	 a	 ‘sentence-image’,	 where	 a	 combination	 of	 language	 and	images	may	‘undo’	(ibid:	46)	dominant	representative	connections,	opening	the	way	for	disruption	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 fresh	 associations,	 new	 areas	 of	 the	 ‘sayable’	 (see	 also	Michels	and	Steyaert,	2017;	Munro	and	Jordan,	2013).	In	my	data,	the	colour	red	in	the	context	 of	 the	 IWD	 march	 served	 a	 visually	 unifying	 purpose	 of	 creating	 a	 sentence-image	 assembled	 between	 people,	 their	 clothes,	 accessories,	 inscribed	 placards	 and	banners.			Moreover,	the	colour	red	combined	with	other	auditory	and	visual	artefacts	to	mobilise	meaning	sedimented	through	a	range	of	practices	from	the	workers’	movement,	a	shared	
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socialist	 past,	 school	 recitals,	 IWD	 celebrations,	 female	 bodily	 functions,	 etc.	 It	 was	 a	sensory	imbrication,	which	allowed	for	the	agentic	enactment	of	new	subjectivities.	The	coming	together	of	 image,	 text	and	music	generated	a	provocative,	confrontational,	but	also	 unifying	meaning,	 a	 particular	 chain	 of	 equivalence	 that	 connected	 contemporary	struggle	 with	 that	 of	 past	 Yugoslav	 democratic	 traditions	 and	 the	 women’s	 struggle	globally.				
Embodied	reordering		In	 this	 sub-practice	 I	 explored	 the	ways	 in	which	 practitioners	 struggled	 to	make	 the	political	subject	of	 ‘woman’	intelligible	in	assembly	with	and	against	protestors,	who	in	turn	 attempted	 to	 ground	 the	 political	 subject	 of	 ‘mother’.	 I	 now	 discuss	 this	 power	interplay	between	practitioners	 and	protesting	mothers	 as	 an	 ordering	 of	 the	 sensible	(Ranciére,	 2012),	 which	 shifted	 through	 a	 range	 of	 embodied	 acts.	 To	 illustrate	 such	embodying	 reordering	 I	 used	 the	 episode	 featuring	 the	 IWD	 march,	 capturing	 the	moment	when	marchers	and	protestors	converged	into	a	public	assembly.			Ranciére’s	(2012)	theory	of	the	order	of	the	sensible	provides	an	understanding	of	how	certain	bodies	enjoy	visibility	and	prominence,	whereas	others	are	cast	aside,	as	simply	‘insensible’,	 outside	 the	 dominant	 order	 of	 knowing.	 For	 Ranciére,	 orders	may	 change	through	aesthetic	means	–	acts	of	reordering	are	seen	and	felt	through	embodied	acts,	as	the	 excluded	 assert	 their	 stake	 for	 recognition	 as	 equal	 members.	 There	 are	 always	“performing	bod[ies]	that	work	to	fill	in	the	gap	between	the	words…and	the	materiality”	(Ranciére,	 2016:	 136).	 In	my	 ethnographic	 episode	 I	 explored	 how	WRC	 practitioners	
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and	 mothers	 struggled	 with	 one	 another	 to	 assert	 a	 particular	 subjectivity	 within	 an	assembly.	 Two	 orders	 met	 and	 overlapped	 in	 the	 form	 of	 street	 assembly:	 the	 IWD	march,	rooted	in	notions	of	feminist	equality,	and	the	mothers’	protest,	 initially	at	 least	defined	around	protecting	a	certain	privileged	subjectivity.			What	my	data	demonstrated	was	that	the	order	of	the	sensible	is	not	merely	a	useful	way	of	understanding	the	tension	between	an	antagonistic	ruling	bloc	and	resisting	subjects	but	also	the	dynamics	within	resistance	itself.	Although	Ranciére	does	not	talk	about	an	order	of	 the	sensible	 in	such	a	way,	 for	my	study	 it	 can	help	us	see	 the	heterogeneous	character	of	assembly.	It	also	foregrounds	the	notion	that	assemblies	are	corporeal,	the	configuration	of	which	can	shift	in	a	relatively	short	space	of	time.	Ranciére	underplays	the	 heterogeneity	 of	 orders	 of	 the	 sensible	 and	 embodied	 responses	 to	 them.	 He	 also	does	not	provide	either	a	vocabulary	or	empirical	 examples	 for	helping	us	understand	how	orders	are	challenged	through	bodies.		Drawing	 on	 Mouffe	 (1999;	 2009a),	 we	 could	 interpret	 a	 shifting	 of	 an	 order	 within	assembly	as	a	matter	of	competing	 identifications	between	adversaries	within	counter-hegemony.	Nevertheless,	Mouffe’s	 reading	 is	 primarily	 based	 in	 language	 and	 perhaps	misses	the	embodied,	improvised	and	in-the-moment	enactment	of	shifts.	Furthermore,	she	 likens	 democratic	 encounters	 between	 allies	 as	 ‘conversions’	 (Mouffe,	 1999:	 755),	brought	about	as	people’s	identifications	shift.	My	data	showed	that	the	experience	was	more	 piecemeal	 and	 partial	 than	 this.	 Connolly’s	 (2004)	 notion	 of	 ‘pluralising’	 rather	than	pluralism	 is	useful	 in	 seeing	 the	 incompleteness	of	groups	engaged	 in	democratic	practice	and	how	one’s	dependencies	on	others	 for	 identification	means	 that	a	group’s	sense	of	itself	will	shift	–	though	perhaps	not	convert	-	through	encounters.	Yet	he	does	
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not	provide	a	rich	and	in-depth	account	to	help	us	further	knowledge	of	the	detailed	and	contextual	embodied	unfolding	of	the	experience.		Butler	 (2004)	does	provide	a	means	 through	which	we	can	better	understand	 the	 rich	and	 embodied	ways	 in	which	 assembly	 pluralises	 and	 shifts	 and	we	 can	 combine	 her	reading	with	aesthetics	to	enrich	our	understanding.	She	says	that	identity	is	a	“practice	of	 improvisation	within	 a	 scene	of	 constraint”	 (Butler,	 2004:	1),	which	means	 that	 the	subject	will	always	be	confined	by	the	existing	normative	frameworks	within	which	that	subject	 is	 embedded.	 Nevertheless,	 as	 meanings	 ‘exceed’	 their	 intended	 purposes,	 it	follows	 that	 a	 speaker	 has	 limited	 power	 over	 words	 and	 their	 effects	 (Butler,	 2011:	171).	 The	 subject	 has	 the	 power	 to	 reconfigure	 its	 subjectivity	 through	 continuously	reiterating	 norms,	 which	 may	 yet	 “go	 awry…and	 produce	 new	 and	 even	 subversive	effects”	(Butler,	2009:	iii).			The	 dimension	 of	 ‘embodied	 improvisation’	 could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 relational	responsiveness,	“composed	neither	exclusively	of	myself	nor	you,	but	is	to	be	conceived	as	the	site	by	which	those	terms	are	differentiated	and	related”	(Butler,	2006:	22).	In	my	data,	 the	 consensus	 (Habermas,	 1996)	 between	 practitioners	 and	 marchers	 on	 the	decision	 to	 turn	around	and	 join	 the	protestors	was	not	enacted	 through	an	 informed,	respectful	dialogue	where	validity	claims	were	redeemed	but	in	a	fleeting,	spontaneous	moment,	 where	 decision-making	 was	 informed	 by	 embodied	 responses	 to	 unfolding	aesthetic	cues	and	a	sense	of	relational	responsibility	to	others.	Butler	(2004)	states	that	one	 improvises	 within	 a	 normative	 framework,	 in	 relation	 to	 available	 normative	resources,	 but	my	 data	 enriches	 this	 understanding	 by	 showing	 how	 such	 improvised	decisions	can	be	enacted	within	assembly,	 in	 the	moment,	within	a	cacophony	of	noise	
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and	confusion.	These	are	not	calculated	decisions	based	on	a	consideration	of	norms,	in	other	words.			Butler	 (1999;	 2004;	 2011;	 2015)	 argues	 that	 norms	 are	 constantly	 repeated	 and	 that	they	etch	us	in	a	particular	way.	In	my	study	I	was	able	to	observe	the	clash	between	two	different	 normative	 frameworks,	 where	 different	 subjects	 (‘all	 women’	 vs.	 ‘mothers’),	vied	 for	prominence	by	attempting	 to	ground	a	particular	subjectivity	 in	 the	assembly.	For	 instance,	when	 the	order	of	 the	 sensible	 shifted	 towards	 ‘mothers’	 in	my	example,	the	practitioners	stretched	a	flag	carrying	a	unifying	slogan	in	front	of	the	stage	so	that	everyone	who	observed	the	mothers	delivering	speeches	were	able	to	see	it.	By	doing	so,	practitioners	 persisted	 in	 preventing	 the	 grounding	 of	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 ‘mother’	 as	dominant.			Butler	 (1999;	 2011)	 argues	 that	 subjects	 may	 subvert	 the	 dominant	 normative	framework	and	enact	a	different	kind	of	subjectivity	in	relation	to	it,	as	these	norms	can	act	as	“sites	of	phantasmic	promise”	(2011:	90),	providing	an	escape	route	to	a	“liveable	life”	 (2015:	 62).	 However,	 she	 warns	 that	 such	 subversion	 may	 not	 necessarily	 be	successful,	 and	 that	 attempts	 at	 “denaturalisation”	 (2011:	 85)	 of	 sedimented	subjectivities	 may	 be	 a	 violent	 process35.	 In	 my	 data,	 subversion	 happened	 through	humour.	The	 role	of	humour	 in	 relation	 to	Butler’s	 concept	of	performativity	has	been	noted	 in	 organisation	 studies	 by	 Plester	 (2015)	 as	 one	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 toxic	masculinity	 is	 maintained	 and	 reinforced.	 However,	 in	 my	 data,	 humour	 served	 to	unsettle	the	hegemonic	constellation	of	‘mothers’	and	instigated	reflection	on	the	part	of																																																									35	In	the	film	Paris	is	Burning,	which	Butler	uses	to	illustrate	her	point,	the	main	protagonist,	a	transgender	character	called	Venus	suffers	violent	death	as	a	consequence	of	defying	the	norms	of	sexual	difference.		
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some	of	the	protestors.	People	responded	to	a	humorous	quip	by	one	of	the	participants	in	 the	 march/protest	 and	 it	 spread	 in	 a	 chain	 reaction	 further	 into	 the	 crowd.	Furthermore,	 humour	 was	 injected	 from	 the	 crowd,	 on	 egalitarian	 terms,	 rather	 than	from	 the	 stage	 in	 some	 orchestrating	 fashion.	 The	 humour	 disrupted	 the	 order	 of	 the	sensible	 by	 merging	 subjectivities	 through	 the	 medium	 of	 laughter,	 bringing	 the	protesting	mothers	and	marchers	closer	together.			It	is	important	to	note	here	that	such	subversion	led	to	a	temporary	resolution	within	the	assembly,	 rather	 than	 a	 new	 and	 longer-lasting	 formation	 of	 subjectivity.	 The	 struggle	between	practitioners,	other	marchers	and	the	protesting	mothers	continued,	albeit	with	an	 altered	 power	 dynamic	 underlying	 the	 order	 of	 the	 sensible,	 where	 some	 of	 the	practitioners	managed	to	be	accepted	on	an	equal	footing.				
Summary		The	aesthetics	of	assembling	was	discussed	as	a	practice	 that	denotes	how	democratic	subjects	form	a	sense	of	collective	democratic	agency	through	aesthetic	means.	I	sought	to	empirically	enrich	Mouffe’s	(2013)	positioning	of	art	within	democratic	practice	and	Ranciere’s	 (2012)	 notions	 of	 the	 order	 of	 the	 sensible,	 the	 aesthetics	 of	 politics	 and	politics	of	aesthetics,	as	well	as	his	(2009)	account	of	the	sentence-image.	I	placed	these	two	perspectives	 in	 conversation	with	Butler	 (2015)	 and	Laclau	 (2007)	 to	 theorise	 an	embodied	 aesthetics	 enacted	 between	 allies	 in	 a	 chain	 of	 equivalence.	 The	 practice	particularly	 focused,	 in	 all	 its	 sub-practices	 and	 dimensions,	 on	 how	 difference	 is	aesthetically	and	performatively	articulated	in	assembly.	
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	In	 the	 sub-practice	 of	 grounding-airing	 I	 sought	 to	 contribute	 to	 knowledge	 of	 how	chains	 of	 equivalence	 (Laclau,	 2007;	 Laclau	 and	 Mouffe,	 1985)	 are	 formed	 through	aesthetic	means.	I	did	so	through	drawing	out	some	of	the	aesthetic	aspects	of	forming	a	chain	 in	 a	 digital	 space,	 through	 film.	 A	 multimodal	 analysis	 of	 the	 chain	 revealed	 a	common	 but	 also	 intimate	 and	 distinctive	 repertoire	 of	 visual	 signals	 that	 formed	 the	basis	 for	 collective	 sensemaking.	 Ranciere’s	 (2009)	 account	 of	 the	 sentence-image	helped	us	see	how	new	meaning	can	be	brought	to	life	in	the	physical	assembly	of	people	in	 a	march,	 with	 a	multimodal	 reading	 drawing	 out	 the	ways	 in	which	 colour,	 sound,	image	and	rhythm	form	a	collective	democratic	chain	of	meaning.		In	the	sub-practice	of	embodied	reordering	I	provided	a	more	empirically	rich	account	of	aesthetic	 orders	 within	 assembly	 by	 combining	 in	 conceptual	 dialogue	 insights	 from	Ranciere	(2012)	and	Butler	(1999,	2004,	2006,	2009	and	2011).	Ranciére’s	(2012)	order	of	the	sensible	was	posited	as	a	useful	overall	framework	for	understanding	how	orders	of	 power	 within	 assembly	 are	 embodied	 and	 aesthetic	 ones.	 However,	 I	 drew	 on	 the	work	of	Butler	to	theorise	the	relational,	shifting	and	embodied	richness	of	a	reordering	of	the	sensible.	In	particular,	I	emphasised	how	embodied	acts	help	shift	the	aesthetics	of	order	 through	 subversive	 humour	 and	 the	 re-iteration	 of	 norms.	 Packaged	 together,	these	contributions	offer	a	rich,	embodied	and	aesthetic	account	of	how	diverse	groups	of	 people	 come	 together	 and	 struggle	 in	 the	 process	 of	 enacting	 collective	 democratic	agency.				
	346	
X	Conclusion		
Introduction		In	this	chapter	I	first	remind	the	reader	of	my	research	question,	as	well	as	the	objectives	I	 set	 out	 to	 achieve	 in	 this	 study.	 Second,	 I	 provide	 a	 summary	 of	 the	 contributions	 I	sought	 to	 make.	 Third,	 I	 offer	 some	 reflections	 on	 what	 I	 have	 learned	 through	 the	methodology	 adopted	 and	 pursued.	 Finally,	 I	 explore	 some	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 my	research	and	reflect	on	directions	for	future	study.				
Revisiting	my	research	question	and	objectives		At	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 study	 I	 posed	 the	 research	 question:	How	 do	 people	working	
within	 an	NGO	 in	 a	 country	 in	 transition	 performatively	 enact	 democratic	 practice?	 The	question	suggests	that	I	was	interested	in	learning	more	about	the	lived	experiences	of	practitioners	 as	 they	 strove	 to	 generate	 democratic	 practice	 in	 a	 country	 in	 which	democracy	 was	 in	 its	 nascent	 stages	 of	 development.	 In	 my	 study	 I	 approached	 NGO	practitioners	 as	 subjects	 situated	 within	 a	 larger	 context	 of	 assumptions	 and	 norms	regarding	the	meaning	of	democracy	and	what	it	meant	to	be	a	democratic	practitioner:	e.g.	 those	 generated	 by	 government,	 the	 political	 context	 of	 the	 research	 site	 and	 the	identifications	of	those	people	NGOs	work	with.	However,	I	simultaneously	approached	them	 as	 agents	 of	 democratic	 practice,	 who	 actively	 informed	 such	 a	 context.	 In	 this	respect,	 my	 first	 objective	 was	 to	 understand	 this	 broader	 context	 that	 WRC	
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practitioners	were	 situated	within	 and	 how	 it	 informed	 their	 practice.	 Furthermore,	 I	explored	practices	generated	in	relation	to	such	a	context,	paying	attention	to	the	overt	and	more	discreet	ways	in	which	these	practices	unfolded.	This	objective	was	significant	for	 understanding	 in	 more	 depth	 the	 embodied	 ways	 in	 which	 NGO	 practitioners	enacted,	reproduced	and	shaped	democratic	practices	in	a	context	where	democracy	was	inevitably	entangled	with	other	socio-political	norms,	such	as	patriarchy	and	other	forms	of	corruption.				
Revisiting	my	contributions	to	knowledge	in	relation	to	the	research	question	and	
objectives		The	overarching	contribution	to	knowledge	in	my	study	lies	in	providing	rich	insight	into	the	 experiences	 of	 NGO	 practitioners	 who	 enact	 democratic	 practice.	 I	 provided	 an	embodied	 account	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 generate	 democratic	 practice	 in	 a	 country	 in	transition	ridden	with	endemic	corruption,	including	patriarchy.	In	doing	so,	I	employed	insights	 from	 Butler’s	 (1999,	 2006,	 2011	 and	 2015)	 theory	 of	 performativity,	 which	 I	combined	 with	 theories	 of	 deliberative	 and	 agonistic	 democratic	 practice	 (e.g.,	Habermas,	1984,	1987	and	1996;	Laclau	and	Mouffe,	1985;	Mouffe,	1999,	2009a,	2009b,	2013,	2014	and	2018),	as	well	as	my	own	ethnographic	account.	I	drew	on	the	literature	on	NGOs	and	democratic	practice	to	sketch	the	background	to	my	study	and	to	highlight	areas	that	could	benefit	from	ethnographic	insights.			In	 the	 process,	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 NGO	 literature	 tends	 to	 overlook	 practice	 related	 to	democracy	in	favour	of	outcomes.	In	addition,	it	does	not	provide	a	gendered	account	of	
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how	women	NGO	practitioners	might	 enact	 democracy	 in	 the	 face	 of	 various	 forms	 of	corruption.	 My	 contribution	 is	 important	 because	 at	 present	 the	 NGO	 literature	 risks	becoming	 divorced	 from	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	 people	 who	 work	 within	 these	organisations	 and	 could	 present	 a	 view	 of	 NGO	 work	 as	 a	 neutral	 and	 unitary	implementation	of	uncontested	tools	and	knowledge.	It	is	important	that	we	appreciate	more	 fully	 the	 range	of	 tasks,	 pressures	 and	possibilities	 that	 are	 enacted	 through	 the	agency	of	practitioners	in	this	field.	In	terms	of	democratic	practice,	these	are	important	contributions	 because	 they	 bring	 theories	 of	 democracy	 into	 the	 arena	 of	 empirically	explored	 practice.	 In	 doing	 so,	my	 research	 has	 shown	 that	 these	 theories	make	 little	sense	 in	 and	 of	 themselves	 but	 rather	merge	 and	 become	 something	more	 novel	 and	multi-dimensional	through	performative	engagement.				The	 NGO	 literature	 and	 theories	 of	 democratic	 practice	 can	 leave	 the	 impression	 of	practicing	 democracy	 as	 a	 disembodied	 activity.	 Yet	my	 study	 foregrounded	 corporeal	engagement,	 through	which	 the	bodies	of	practitioners	emerged	as	 sites	of	democratic	practice.	 In	 theorising	 the	 bodies	 of	 practitioners,	 I	 filtered	 accounts	 of	 democratic	practice	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 performativity	 in	 order	 to	 surface	 the	 embodied	ways	 in	which	practice	was	enacted.			Drawing	 on	 aspects	 of	 deliberative	 and	 agonistic	 democratic	 practice,	 but	 also	 going	beyond	these	theories,	 I	contributed	by	 illustrating	empirically	how	practitioners	work	in	 embodied	 ways	 to	 build	 alliances	 through	 difference,	 which	 I	 presented	 under	 the	headings	 of	 ‘transversing’	 and	 ‘shielding’.	 Drawing	 on	 Butler’s	 (2006)	 notions	 of	relationality	 and	 precarity	 I	 showed	 how	 practitioners	 generate	 democratic	 practice	through	 exposing	 themselves	 to	 others	 and	 even	 inhabiting	 their	 embodied	
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subjectivities.	 Further,	 in	 relation	 to	 shielding	 more	 specifically,	 I	 demonstrated	 the	cross-over	 between	 embodied	 and	 more	 disembodied	 engagement,	 as	 practitioners	transition	between	 the	 two	 in	order	 to	protect	 liberty	and	equality.	 I	 enriched	 insights	into	 antagonistic	 and	 agonistic	 practice	 (Mouffe,	 2013)	 through	 interpreting	 these	 as	performative	aspects	of	practice	that	can	take	place	upon	the	bodies	of	practitioners,	as	well	 as	 between	 democratic	 subjects	 in	 dialogue	 or	 debate.	 I	 also	 questioned	whether	such	practices	might	easily	spill	 into	undemocratic	 forms	of	 ‘foregoing’,	where	subjects	are	tormented	by	antagonisms.		My	analysis	drew	attention	to	the	ubiquitous	character	of	corruption,	which	shapes	the	context	in	which	practitioners	strive	to	generate	democratic	practice.	The	NGO	literature	recognises	 corruption	 as	 a	 problem	 for	 democratic	 practice	 but	 does	 not	 provide	 a	detailed	account	of	types	of	corrupt	practices	or	how	practitioners	engage	and	work	in	such	a	context.	Scholars	of	democratic	practice	by	and	large	assume	a	somewhat	benign	environment,	 where	 all	 participants	 are	 equally	 dedicated	 to	 the	 broad	 principles	 of	liberty	and	equality	–	or,	if	not,	are	simply	excluded	from	the	process	(Mouffe,	1999:	755;	Habermas,	 1996:	 166).	 Yet	 overlooking	 corruption	 as	 a	 lived	 reality	 for	 practitioners	means	 eliding	 how	 corruption	 seeps	 into	 and	 co-constitutes	 the	 democratic	 practice	produced	 in	 settings	 akin	 to	 Montenegro.	 I	 contributed	 to	 knowledge	 of	 democratic	practice	 by	 interpreting	 deliberation	 and	 agonism	 as	 embodied	 practices	 enacted	through	 a	 context	 of	 corruption,	 which	 pervaded	 the	 working	 lives	 of	 practitioners.	 I	drew	on	the	work	of	Butler	(2011	and	2015)	to	analyse	how	practitioners	continuously	responded	 to	 and	 ‘navigated’	 a	 corrupt	 environment.	 They	 ‘dispelled’,	 in	 subtle	 and	reiterative	ways,	those	attempts	to	confuse	and	obfuscate	via	gaslighting	practices;	they	exemplified,	 through	their	bodies,	public	standards	of	 liberty	and	equality	and	resisted	
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attempts	to	re-configure	these	as	 ‘private’	matters;	 finally,	 they	grappled	 in	democratic	and	undemocratic	ways	with	corrupt	and	fake	NGOs,	GONGOs.		Considerations	of	 aesthetics	are	 less	developed	 in	 the	area	of	democratic	practice	and,	indeed,	 in	the	broader	NGO	literature.	My	notion	of	 ‘the	aesthetics	of	assembling’	drew	attention	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 participants	 in	 democratic	 practice	 formed	 a	 sense	 of	collective	 democratic	 agency	 through	 aesthetic	 means.	 This	 contribution	 is	 valuable	because	 it	 helps	 us	 understand	 the	 sensory	 and	 affective	 ways	 in	 which	 democratic	practice	can	be	generated	beyond	the	linguistic,	especially	in	relation	to	the	formation	of	collective	democratic	agency.	 In	exploring	 this	practice	 I	 filtered	accounts	of	aesthetics	developed	by	Mouffe	(2007	and	2013)	and	Ranciére	(2009	and	2012),	as	well	as	some	insights	 from	 the	 organisation	 studies	 literature	 on	 aesthetics,	 as	 it	 pertains	 to	 bodies	and	 spaces	 (Michels	 and	 Steyaert,	 2017;	 Munro	 and	 Jordan,	 2013;	 Plester,	 2015),	through	the	 lens	of	Butler’s	plural	performativity	(2015)	and	Laclau	(2007)	and	Laclau	and	Mouffe’s	 (1985)	notion	of	 the	chain	of	equivalence.	 I	 contributed	 to	knowledge	on	the	formation	of	hegemonies	by	showing	how	the	aesthetics	of	democratic	practice	can	act	as	a	binding	force	between	diverse	groups,	helping	them	to	identify	with	the	intimate	but	 also	 the	 common	 –	 in	 online	 and	 face-to-face	 environments.	 I	 also	 contributed	 to	better	understanding	the	dynamics	within	hegemonies	by	demonstrating	how	aesthetic	orders	 of	 the	 sensible	 in	 groups	 seeking	 to	 practise	 democracy	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	dynamic,	shifting	with	various	aesthetic	interventions.		Underlying	 all	 of	 the	 findings	was	 the	 inescapable	 and	 constant	 dynamic	 of	 gendered	democratic	 practice.	 My	 research	 was	 undertaken	 in	 a	 predominantly	 female-staffed	organisation	 dealing	 in	 practices	 that,	 albeit	 aiming	 to	 benefit	 the	 whole	 of	 society,	
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related	 to	 women	 predominantly.	 In	 Montenegro,	 where	 democracy	 remains	 on	 a	declarative	 rather	 than	 a	 substantive	 footing,	 principles	 of	 liberty	 and	 equality	 do	 not	extend	 equally	 to	 all	 genders.	 This	 is	 something	 that	 is	 largely	 rendered	 invisible	 in	existing	studies	pertaining	to	NGOs	and	democratic	practice.	Democratic	practice,	in	the	NGO	 literature,	 is	 addressed	as	 something	 that	 is	 gender	neutral	 and	attained	 through	the	 application	 of	 various	 ‘impartial’	 programmes	 aimed	 to	 fit	 all	 circumstances	 and	identities	 (e.g.	 Carbone,	 2009;	 Kneuer;	 2016;	 Munck,	 2015).	 My	 data	 illustrated	 how	designing	 programmes	 aimed	 at	 democratisation,	 and	 generating	 democratic	 practice	itself	within	 these	 programmes,	 cannot	 be	 performed	without	 taking	 into	 account	 the	contextual	 norms	 practitioners	 operate	 within.	 This	 is	 because	 each	 context	 carries	within	 itself	 different	 sets	 of	 normative	 frameworks	 that	 people	 operate	 within,	frameworks	 that	 bear	 on	 practitioners	 and	 the	 practices	 they	 generate	 through	 them.	Gender	 norms	 and	 counter-enactments	 were	 dominant	 in	 all	 three	 of	 my	 highlighted	practices	 and	 my	 theorising	 can	 offer	 qualitative	 and	 empirical	 depth	 to	 better	understand	the	gendered	experiences	of	practitioners	in	the	field.			Whilst	not	the	focus	of	the	study,	a	number	of	implications	of	relevance	to	practice	were	surfaced,	and	I	summarise	these	below.		The	 highlighted	 tension	 between	 democratic	 ends	 (helping	 others	 achieve	 liberty	 and	equality)	 and	 undemocratic	 means	 for	 achieving	 these	 (antagonistic	 clashes	 upon	 the	subject)	 presents	 a	 problem,	 but	 also	 perhaps	 an	 opportunity,	 for	 practitioners.	 The	tendency	 of	 practitioners	 was	 to	 push	 themselves	 to	 extremes	 in	 terms	 of	 working	commitments.	I	experienced	these	demands	myself,	albeit	for	a	limited	amount	of	time,	whereas	 for	 WRC	 practitioners	 they	 represented	 a	 way	 of	 life.	 The	 sub-practice	 of	
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foregoing	perhaps	drew	out	the	extreme	working	patterns	of	practitioners	most	clearly.	The	dominant	functioning	of	foregoing	was	antagonistic,	and	it	operated	as	a	dark	side	of	democratic	practice,	holding	the	possibility	of	serious	negative	effects	for	the	wellbeing	of	practitioners,	in	terms	of	stress,	burnout	and	other	mental	and	physical	risks.	While	a	core	tenet	of	performativity	is	that	norms	bearing	upon	the	subject	cannot	be	escaped	or	relinquished,	 practitioners	 could	 seek	 to	 transit	 undemocratic	 antagonisms	 into	democratic	agonisms.	One	might	envisage	that	a	practice	of	critical	self-reflection	could	foster	recognition	of	these	antagonisms	and	offer	possibilities	for	their	reinterpretation	and	reincorporation	as	generative	agonistic	practices.	 It	 could	be	possible	 to	apply	 the	principles	of	agonism	to	care	 for	the	self,	recognising	that	 liberty	and	equality	apply	to	aspects	of	the	self	as	much	as	to	others.	I	might	also	add	a	material	point,	which	is	that	were	 the	 funding	of	 this	particular	organisation	 sufficient	 –	perhaps	as	 a	 result	 of	 less	funding	 going	 the	 way	 of	 corrupt	 GONGOs	 –	 extreme	 work	 patterns	 might	 be	ameliorated.			Another	 practical	 implication	 of	 this	 research	 lies	 in	 placing	 corruption,	 including	patriarchy,	 under	 the	 spotlight	 as	 a	major	 inhibitor	 to	 generating	 democratic	 practice.	Familiarity	with	the	literature	pertaining	to	democratic	practice	and	NGOs,	as	well	as	my	experience	 in	 the	 field,	 taught	 me	 that	 corruption	 is	 routinely	 overlooked	 by	 both	scholars	 and	 international	 stakeholders	directly	 invested	 in	promoting	 and	 supporting	democratisation	 efforts	 in	 countries	 in	 transition.	 For	 instance,	 statements	 such	 as	“Montenegro	is	a	leader	in	the	[European]	integration	process	and	a	positive	example	for	the	region”,	uttered	by	the	President	of	the	European	Council,	Donald	Tusk,	earlier	this	year	 (see,	Lenoir,	2018)	seem	flawed	 in	 light	of	 this	 research.	The	 findings	stated	here	can	serve	as	useful	qualitative	evidence	for	practitioners,	beyond	the	numbers,	drawing	
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out	a	counter	and	shadow	tale.	Hopefully,	this	study	can	also	provide	practitioners	with	an	 alternative	 articulation	 of	 corrupt	 practices	 and	 counter	 practices	 in	 their	 lobbying	efforts	to	the	bodies	of	the	EU	and	other	supranational	stakeholders.			Seeing	 corruption	 as	pervasive	 and	 inescapable,	 through	drawing	out	 the	detailed	 and	rich	 experiences	 of	 practitioners,	 international	 stakeholders	 participating	 in	 the	democratisation	 process	 of	 Montenegro	 (e.g.	 supranational	 and	 international	organisations)	might	recognise	the	difficulty	of	generating	democratic	practice	in	such	a	context	 and	 adopt	 a	more	 responsible	 and	 responsive	 role	 in	 combating	 corruption	 in	cooperation	with	NGO	 practitioners.	 One	way	 to	 do	 that	would	 be	 to	 encourage	more	collaboration	amongst	genuine	NGOs	and	 to	 incentivise	such	collaboration	 through	 the	targeting	of	funds	at	such	endeavours	(assisting	them	to	build	capacity	to	receive	funds	directly,	 rather	 than	 via	 a	 corrupt	 government	 or	 large	 international	 organisations).	International	 and	 supranational	 organisations	 might	 also	 assume	 a	 more	 explicitly	critical	 stance	 towards	 GONGOs	 and	 their	 colonisation	 of	 time,	 space	 and	 energy,	 and	government	wrongdoings,	such	as	breaches	of	the	rule	of	 law	and	arbitrary	application	of	laws	in	practice,	which	bear	material	consequences	for	people’s	lives.		Furthermore,	 my	 study	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 call	 to	 government	 and	 supranational	organisations	 implicated	 in	 the	democratisation	process	 of	 countries	 in	 transition	 (e.g.	various	 bodies	 of	 the	 EU)	 to	 stop	 treating	 gender	 equality	 as	 a	 discrete	 unit	 within	democratic	 practice,	 pertaining	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 equality,	 and	 to	 start	 approaching	patriarchy	 as	 a	 performative	 practice	 of	 gender	 that	 harmfully	 pervades	 all	 aspects	 of	human	 life	 (hooks,	 2004),	 as	 illustrated	 in	 this	 research.	 Allowing	 for	 the	 principle	 of	equality	 to	 be	 broken	 down	 into	 discrete	 parts	 masks	 the	 multifaceted	 working	 of	
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patriarchy	and	prevents	it	from	being	treated	as	a	form	of	corruption	that	seeps	into	all	aspects	of	human	life,	including	institutional	practice.			Finally,	women’s	organisations	are	usually	dealt	with	as	a	sub-strand	of	broader	chains	of	 equivalence	 within	 considerations	 of	 populist	 left	 movements	 (Laclau,	 2007	 and	Laclau	and	Mouffe,	1985,	Mouffe,	2018).	My	time	in	the	field	showed	me	that	a	women’s	organisation	could	genuinely	be	a	driving	force	of	democratisation	for	all	–	standing	for	and	 with	 people	 of	 all	 genders,	 LGBTQI	 people,	 those	 with	 disabilities,	 and	 ethnic	minorities,	for	example.	Feminist-driven	alliances	have	the	power	to	surface	and	open	up	a	myriad	of	 issues	people	 face	 in	 countries	 in	 transition,	yet	 these	 issues	are	 rendered	invisible	and	obscure	within	the	present	status	quo.	In	particular,	my	data	demonstrated	that	 women-led	 movements	 can	 provide	 a	 generative	 frame	 for	 connecting	 people’s	experiences	into	a	broader	social	and	political	platform	for	common	progressive	action:	they	formed	into	a	potent	counter-hegemony	to	neoliberal	logics	of	‘democratising’.			
Limitations	and	directions	for	future	research		The	relationship	between	ethics	and	democratic	practice	surfaced	as	an	important	area	for	future	research,	a	focus	that	could	have	been	developed	more	with	an	increased	word	count	 and	more	 time.	 This	was	 especially	 clear	when	 I	 started	 exploring	 vulnerability	and	 relationality	 in	my	data,	 through	Butler	 (2006),	where	 she	 draws	 on	 Levinas	 (e.g.	1985	and	1999)	to	accentuate	the	need	to	acknowledge	“the	precariousness	of	the	Other”	(Butler,	 2006:	 134)	 when	 we	 enter	 “the	 sphere	 of	 ethics”	 (ibid).	 Care	 for	 others’	vulnerability	was	prominent	in	my	study,	yet	the	ethical	side	of	such	care	was	not	overtly	
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explored.	 Future	 research	 might	 explore	 how	 explicitly	 ethical	 engagement	 drives	democratic	practice,	pushing	subjects	into	engagements	and	considerations	with	others	that	might	not	otherwise	have	 surfaced.	Likewise,	 future	 research	might	 focus	on	how	democratic	 engagements	 surface	 ethical	 dilemmas,	 such	 as	 the	 conundrum	 I	 posed	 in	relation	to	the	adoption	of	undemocratic	means	of	attaining	democratic	outcomes.		Another	limitation	worth	raising	in	relation	to	my	study	is	the	heavy	focus	on	the	body	in	‘embodiment’.	While	I	was	aware	of	post-humanist	research,	having	engaged	in	the	past	with	 Barad	 (2003	 and	 2007),	 as	 well	 as	 the	 emerging	 research	 on	 socio-materiality	within	organisation	studies	(e.g.	Orlikowski,	2007;	Putnam,	2015;	Symon	and	Pritchard,	2015),	and	while	I	recognise	that	bodies	are	entangled	within	the	socio-material	fabric	of	everyday	 life	 (see	Butler,	2011;	Cabantous	et	al,	2016),	 I	made	a	 conscious	decision	 to	give	prominence	to	bodies	in	my	research.	Such	a	decision	was	made	as	a	consequence	of	being	 in	 the	 field	 and	 feeling	 so	much	 of	 democratic	 practice	 through	my	own	body.	 I	experienced	 first-hand	 how	 much	 democratic	 practice	 bears	 on	 the	 bodies	 of	practitioners	 and	 Butler’s	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	 body	 provided	 me	 with	 ways	 to	surface	this	performativity	and	explore	it	in	more	depth.	While	I	do	account	for	aspects	of	 the	 socio-material	 world,	 especially	 in	 my	 data	 section	 on	 the	 aesthetics	 of	 the	assembling,	focusing	more	closely	on	how	the	entanglement	of	the	socio-material	etches	certain	democratic	practices	 into	existence	 is	 a	 fruitful	 avenue	 for	 future	 research.	For	example,	 future	 research	 could	 draw	 on	 aspects	 of	 my	 data	 that	 were	 more	 overtly	concerned	with	the	material,	such	as	the	design	of	office	space	to	encourage	democratic	practice,	 or	 even	 the	 materiality	 of	 money,	 and	 how	 salaries	 and	 bribery	 affect	democratic	practice.		
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Another	 limitation	 relates	 to	 an	 impression	 that	 might	 emanate	 from	 this	 research:	namely,	that	corruption	is	something	that	taints	only	those	countries	in	nascent	stages	of	democratic	development.	 It	would	be	rather	naïve	to	 imagine	that	countries	with	more	consolidated	 democratic	 frameworks	 are	 free	 or	 safe	 from	 corruption	 in	 democratic	practice.	 While	 the	 examples	 of	 corrupt	 practices	 explored	 in	 Montenegro	 might	 not	necessarily	 translate	 into	 different	 contexts,	 the	 prerequisite	 that	 emerges	 from	 this	research	 is	 that	democratic	practice	 cannot	be	 studied	 (or	practiced)	 in	 isolation	 from	the	normative	contexts	that	work	to	undermine	principles	of	liberty	and	equality.	If	we	are	to	accept	the	definition	of	corruption	as	“the	abuse	of	public	office	for	private	gain”	(Epperlon	and	Lee,	2015:	176),	we	must	also	accept	it	as	a	more	pervasive	phenomenon	not	 restricted	 to	 developing	 countries	 (see	 Graeber,	 2014,	who	makes	 a	 similar	 point	throughout	 his	 book).	 In	 a	 UK	 context,	 perhaps	 NGOs,	 charities,	 pressure	 groups	 and	even	 political	 parties	 work	 with	 and	 against	 a	 backdrop	 where	 the	 public	 realm	 is	distorted	for	private	gain	all	the	time.	How	else	might	one	explain	the	influence	of	a	press	in	 the	 UK,	 owned	 by	 billionaires,	 which	 routinely	 seeks	 to	 demonise	 and	marginalise	progressive	causes?	Adopting	a	frame	of	corruption	might	be	a	fruitful	and	provocative	means	of	exploring	democratic	practice	within	‘developed’	countries.			
Methodological	reflections		Opting	for	an	ethnographic	approach	was,	in	hindsight,	an	appropriate	one,	as	it	allowed	me	to	 integrate	myself	 into	the	world	of	practitioners	and	experience	first-hand	how	it	felt	to	enact	democratic	practice	and	what	such	work	entailed.	Upon	reflection,	identity	ambiguity	was	something	I	experienced	throughout	the	research.	What	I	mean	by	this	is	
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that	 I	 struggled	 to	 distinguish	 between	my	 identity	 as	 researcher	 and	 as	 practitioner,	which	became	even	more	complicated	by	the	subsequent	friendships	that	developed	in	the	field.	I	spent	a	lot	of	time	trying	to	distinguish	between	my	identities	and	ultimately	failed	in	this	endeavour,	as	neither	my	participants	nor	I	could	ever	be	completely	sure	when	I	was	speaking/performing	as	researcher,	practitioner	or	friend.	It	finally	dawned	on	me,	well	into	the	fieldwork,	that	I	was	trying	to	defy	the	very	paradigmatic	framework	employed	in	this	research,	assuming	that	I	had	autonomous	agency	and	power	to	draw	clear	 lines	 between	 my	 various	 selves.	 Perhaps	 part	 of	 my	 learning,	 which	 I	 could	develop	into	further	research,	is	the	notion	of	a	developing	and	democratic	practitioner-researcher,	as	someone	operating	on	an	equal	footing	with	research	participants,	seeking	both	 knowledge	 generation	 and	 social	 change.	 Trying	 to	 defy	 paradigms	 of	 research	identity,	I	developed	a	self-cautioning	mantra:	‘whoever	you	are,	do	not	do	harm’.	Such	a	mantra	forced	me	to	be	as	reflexive	as	I	possibly	could	be,	while	also	acknowledging	that	a	researcher	cannot	“extricate	herself	and…assume	the	position	of	an	outsider”	(Fotaki	et	al,	2014:	1252)	and	that	 there	will	always	be	aspects	of	myself	 that	are	 inaccessible	 to	me,	 that	 might,	 in	 the	 view	 of	 others,	 cause	 harm.	 Therefore,	 I	 engaged	 in	 dialogic	reflexivity,	 exposing	myself	 in	 all	my	 flaws	 and	 vulnerabilities	 (Butler,	 2006;	 2016)	 to	participants/practitioners/friends’	 scrutiny	 and	 critical	 feedback.	 Such	 relations	between	 us	 were	 underlined	 by	 a	 sense	 of	 reciprocity	 and	 fairness,	 a	 democratic	engagement	between	equals	in	the	field.			A	multimodal	approach	to	ethnographic	research	allowed	me	to	account	for	sensory	data	in	general.	It	broadened	my	horizons	and	made	the	task	of	seeing	performativity	beyond	language	 more	 tangible	 –	 a	 multimodal	 approach	 allowed	 me	 to	 see	 the	 ‘unsayable’,	‘invisible’	and	‘unthinkable’	(Ranciére	2009;	2012;	2016).	Although	I	initially	wanted	my	
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participants	 to	 take	 their	 own	 photographs	 in	 the	 course	 of	 their	 work,	 this	 did	 not	materialise,	 as	 practitioners	 were	 simply	 too	 busy	 to	 indulge	 my	 request,	 despite	 in	principle	being	enthusiastic.	However,	from	a	vantage	point,	this	would	have	been	a	good	way	 to	 instigate	 conversations	 concerning	what	 practitioners	 perceived	 as	 valuable	 in	their	practice,	as	well	for	them	to	try	to	encapsulate	those	aspects	of	their	work	that	they	were	perhaps	unable	to	verbalise	to	the	extent	they	would	want	to.	In	retrospect	I	ought	to	have	been	more	insistent	on	this	approach,	but	at	the	time	was	influenced	by	my	own	tiredness	and	a	sense	of	not	wanting	to	impose	too	much	on	practitioners’	time.		Being	 in	 the	 field	 as	 an	 ethnographer,	 although	 fulfilling	 and	 exciting,	 can	 be	 all	consuming,	 dominating	 every	 segment	 of	 one’s	 life	 for	 an	 extended	 period	 of	 time.	Therefore,	extracting	oneself	from	the	research	setting	once	the	fieldwork	is	completed	can	potentially	be	a	difficult	process.	Caretta	and	Cheptum	(2017)	advise	kindness	upon	exit,	with	 the	 acknowledgment	 that	we	 are	 implicated	 in	 each	 other’s	 lives	 and	 that	 a	research	 setting	 is	 not	 a	 “geographical	 location	 but	 rather	 a	 set	 of	 relations	 nurtured,	contested	and	developed	during	the	course	of	long	ﬁeldwork”	(ibid:	415).			At	the	onset	of	the	fieldwork	and	in	dialogue	with	research	participants,	agreement	was	reached	 between	 us	 that	 I	would	 spend	 11	months	 in	WRC	 as	 a	 participant-observer,	after	which	I	would	return	to	the	UK	and	resume	my	research-related	obligations	at	the	university.	However,	 as	 time	passed	and	 I	became	more	attached	 to	both	practitioners	and	 the	 democratic	 practices	 we	 enacted	 together,	 it	 became	 increasingly	 difficult	 to	imagine	the	moment	of	departure.	So	instead	of	spending	energy	devising	an	ethical	way	to	extract	myself	from	the	research	setting,	I	redirected	my	efforts	to	thinking	about	how	not	to	do	so.	 I	realised	that	 I	may	have	entered	the	 field	as	a	researcher	but	that	 I	was	
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coming	 out	 of	 it	 as	 friend	 and	 practitioner-researcher	 who	 was	 invested	 in	 these	relationships,	as	well	as	the	practice	that	we	produced	jointly,	which	rendered	the	‘rule’	of	extraction	somewhat	redundant.	The	relationship	between	research	participants	and	myself	was	 founded	upon	 the	democratic	basis	of	 fairness,	 reciprocity	and	equality,	 so	excluding	myself	seemed	an	act	of	treachery	to	the	principles	of	liberty	and	equality	we	aimed	 to	 apply	 in	 practice.	 Ultimately,	 I	 still	 have	 not	 extracted	 myself	 from	 WRC,	although	 I	 have	 indeed	 returned	 to	 the	 UK.	 Practitioners	 and	 I	 still	 maintain	 regular	contact,	most	evenings,	in	fact,	and	they	still	keep	me	involved	in	conversations	relating	to	their	practice,	and	I	engage	from	a	distance	(e.g.	through	building	an	online	library	and	facilitating	knowledge	exchange	between	people	I	met	in	my	previous	research	projects	and	WRC	practitioners).			Prior	to	commencing	my	fieldwork,	 I	understood	conceptually	that	democratic	practice	entailed	continuous	and	dedicated	engagement	but	having	finished	my	fieldwork	I	now	understand	in	an	embodied	sense	that	democratic	practice	is	truly	a	way	of	life.											
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